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INTRODUCTION TO AN INTRODUCTION
This Article contests some of our most reassuring self-perceptions
and  offers  a new way  of thinking  about our  legal  theories,  our  laws,
our institutions, and, above all,  ourselves.
In  lieu  of  a  conventional,  preview-heavy  opening,  we  will  begin
with  a suggestion  that you,  the  reader,  consider your  situation.  We
urge  you  to  examine  the  internal  and  external  influences  that may
affect  your experience  of this  Article.  Uncommon  advice,  perhaps,
in  a  law  review  article,  but  consider  the  counsel  of  Italian  novelist
Italo Calvino:
Relax.  Concentrate.  Dispel  every  other  thought.  Let  the  world
around you fade ....
Find  the  most comfortable  position:  seated,  stretched  out,  curled
up, or lying flat.  Flat on your back,  on your side, on your stomach.  In
an  easy  chair,  on  the  sofa,  in  the  rocker,  the  deck  chair,  on  the
hassock.  In  the  hammock, if you  have  a  hammock.  On  top of your
bed,  of course,  or in  the bed.  You  can  even stand  on your hands,  head
down,  in the yoga position.  With the book  upside down,  naturally.
...  Stretch your  legs, go  ahead  and  put your feet  on  a cushion,  on
two  cushions, on the arms of the  sofa, on  the wings of the chair, on  the
coffee  table,  on  the desk, on the  piano, on  the globe.  Take your  shoes
off first.  If you want to, put your feet up; if not, put them  back.
We  urge you also  to consider any internal  influences  that may affect
your reading-elements  that cannot  be  so readily  inventoried,  such
as your attitudes,  motives,  and moods.  These  are less  easily  adjusted
than the lighting, but can  be even  more important to the reading.
Try to be aware of what you bring to this Article;  be aware  of how
you  read, why you  are  reading, and  even  that you  are  reading.  Do
you have expectations  about what this Article  will  say or how you  will
feel  about  it?  Ask  yourself:  What  am  I  looking  for in  this Article,
and why?  Am  I  reading this because  it has been  assigned  and I want
a good  grade  on  my final?  Because  I  am a law professor  and  that is
what law professors  do?  Because I  need support for a proposition  in
my  own  article?  Because  a  friend recommended  it?  Because  I  am
snowed  in  and it is  this  or  nothing?  And  as  you  react  to  what you
read,  take  a  moment  to  examine  those  reactions  and  their  possible
sources.
ITALO  CALVINO,  IF  ON  A  WINTER'S  NIGHT  A TRAVELER  3-4  (William  Weaver
trans.,  Harcourt Brace Jovanovich  1981)  (1979).
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In short, try  as best you  can to read this Article  mindfully.4  This
promises  to  be  a  difficult,  but  revealing,  process,  for  the  situation
"determine[s]  our mental  life  and  our  actions" far  more  than  most
of us  realize  or care  to believe.
I.  SETTING THE  STAGE:  TWO PUZZLES
Throughout  most  of this introductory  Article,  we  will  focus  our
arguments  primarily  on  economics  and  law  and  economics.  We
believe,  however,  that  the  implications  of  our  inquiry  extend  far
beyond  those  domains.  The  tendencies  we  hope  to  elucidate  find
their  origins  in  the  human  animal,  not  in  any  particular  legal
theoretic perspective.  It happens  that these  tendencies  are especially
prominent in  law and economics,  currently  the  dominant theoretical
paradigm for  creating and  analyzing  legal  policy.  But  the  relevance
of our  thesis  is  not  confined  to  one  approach,  or  even  to  legal-
political  questions.  All  humans  are  more  or  less  implicated,
whether  they  are  liberals  or  conservatives,  legal  economists  or
critical  theorists,  students  or  scholars,  producers  or  consumers,
6 elected  officials or citizens.
A.  The First Puzzle
Economists usually  assume  that each  economic  actor maximizes  something:
consumers  maximize  utility...  firms  maximize  profits,  politicians maximize
votes,  bureaucracies  maximize revenues...  and so forth.
-Robert  Cooter &  Thomas Ulen
7
I do not myself believe that many people do things because they  think they are the
right thing to  do ..  ..  I  do not think that knowledge  of what is morally right is
motivational in any serious sense for anyone except  a  handful of saints.
-Richard  Posne
4 See ELLENJ.  LANGER,  MINDFULNESS  62  (1989)  (describing the "key qualities  of
a  mindful  state  of being:  (1)  creation  of new  categories;  (2)  openness  to  new
information; and (3)  awareness of more than one perspective").
Banaji,  supra note  1, at 8.
6  Readers should  not expect, and  will  not find, an  exhaustive defense  of many of
this Article's  claims  and conclusions.  Our goal  is  to establish  the basic  premises  of
our  argument  and  the  conclusions  to  which  they  lead.  We  hope  to  provide  a
framework  for a  much  larger  project, where  we  and  others  defend  those  premises
and  conclusions.  That is  the subject  of numerous works  now in  progress,  which  we
cite to loosely by working tire.
7 ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN,  LAW AND  ECONOMICS  10-11  (3d ed. 2000).
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[Tlhe  tendency  to  make  unwarranted  leaps  from  acts  to  corresponding
dispositions is perhaps the most fundamental and most common failing of social
inference.
-Lee  Ross &  Richard Nisbett?
Have  you ever noticed  how quick legal  economists  are  to assume
that  individuals  and  institutions  are  motivated  by  selfish  interests,
usually wealth  and profit?'0  Have  you ever been  puzzled  by  the  fact
that they  have not applied  the  same  type  of analysis  to explain  their
own work and remarkable  success  in the marketplace  of ideas?  Why,
in  other  words,  has  there  not  been  "An  Economic  Analysis  of  the
Economic Analysis of Law?""
When  legal  economists  write  about their movement,'2  they  write
of  its  historical  affiliations,  distinguished  members,  theoretical
breakthroughs,  scientific  methods,  rapidly  growing  numbers,
sustained dominance  within  legal academia, and significant influence
over  policy. ' 3   Implicit  in  these  conventional  narratives  of  the
ascension of law and economics  is  an abstract  and idyllic  model of a
tournament  of ideas  played  on  a  level  field,  out of which  law  and
economics  emerges,  on  the  merits,  as  a  champion  legal  theory.'
4
Such  canonical  accounts  say  nothing  about  the  actors'  motives,
except  insofar  as  they  imply  that  the  participants  have  a
8 Richard  A. Posner, Social Norms, Social Meaning and Economic Analysis of Law:  A
Comment, 27J. LEGAL  STUD.  553, 560 (1998).
9  LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETI,  THE PERSON AND  THE SITUATION 53  (1991).
to  See, e.g.,  supra text accompanying note  7 (noting the basic  assumptions of legal
economists).
I1 Cf Richard  Posner,  The Sociology of the Sociology of Law:  A  View  from Economics, 2
EUROJ.L.  & ECON.  265  (1995)  (claiming to use sociological  methodologies to anal)ze
and  criticize  sociological  legal  theories,  but failing  to  apply  the  same methods  to an
analysis of Law and Economics).
By "legal  economists,"  we mean scholars  in economics  departments and,  more
commonly,  in  law  schools  who  apply  neoclassical  economics  to  law  and  law-related
issues.
13  See  generally  COOTER  &  ULEN,  supra  note  7,  at  3  (identifying  law  and
economics  as  useful  to  lawmakers  when  evaluating  policy);  RICHARD  A.  POSNER,
ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS  OF  LAw 21-22  (4th ed.  1992)  (providing a history  of the  law and
economics  movement)  [hereinafter  POSNER,  ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS  OF LAW];  RICHARD
POSNER,  FRONTIERS  OF  LEGAL  THEORY  1-2  (2001)  [hereinafter  POSNER,
FRONTIERS]  (examining  the contributions  of other  disciplines  to  the  understanding
and improvement of law, including economics);  Richard  Posner, Some  Uses and Abuses
of Economics  in Law, 46  U.  CHI.  L.  REv.  281  (1979)  [hereinafter  Posner,  Uses  and
Abuses]  (explaining the applications and incorrect uses of law and economics).
14.  See infra text accompanying  notes  66-81  (describing widely  held presumptions
regarding the "marketplace of ideas").
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magnanimous  desire  to  advance  scientific  knowledge  and,  perhaps,
social welfare  through normal, well-functioning,  neutral processes.15
For  example,  in  his  famous  exchange  with  Professor  Whitford,
who was  not  a  legal  economist,  on  the  enforceability  of consumer
product warranties,  George  Priest, one of the  founding fathers of law
and economics,  wrote:  "Our objectives  ...  are  similar:  to  identify
policies  that,  other  things  equal,  will  reduce  the  seriousness  and
frequency  of  injuries  suffered  by  consumers."'6  Priest  went  on  to
explain  that  Whitford,  like  other  scholars  who  wrote  on  this  topic,
relied on arguments lacking in  social scientific rigor and born of feel-
good  intuition and emotion.  Of the former, Priest wrote:  "Professor
Whitford's  criticism  ...  rests upon a misunderstanding  of the  nature
of scientific  reasoning." 7  Of the latter, Priest declared:
If I  have  distorted  the  approach  of the  exploitation  theorists,  it  is
"distortion"  that  comes  from  the  sharpened  focus  of  any  careful,
scientific study.  Upon  closer view, a flat  world becomes  round,  and the
Martian  canals  are  shown  to  be  illusions.  The  brilliant  and  moving
calls  of Professor  Kessler  in  1943  and  of Professor Leff  in  1970  to  the
attack on  incompletely  bargained contracts  provoked sympathy in man),
of us  in the  contracts  field.  Their ideas  have  dominated  our thinking
about  contractual  relations,  especially  between  manufacturer  and
consumer,  and  have  transformed  the  law  of  products  liability.
Unfortunately,  the  suppositions  upon  which  their  ideas  are  based  are
unsupported  by the evidence.  The time has come for a new view of the
world. 8
Regardless  of  what  one  thinks  about  the  strength  of  Priest's
arguments or the reliability of his conclusions,  the  point is  that Priest
clearly sees himself as a  (winning)  participant in a neutral  process of
15  See,  e.g.,  W.  KIP  ViSCUSI,  SMOKING:  MAKING  THE  RISKY  DECISION  14  (1992)
("By  adopting  a  policy  approach  that  utilizes  the  choice  process  to  promote  market
competition  for  safer  cigarettes,  we  could  better  foster  individual  health  and
welfare.");  George  L. Priest, Can Absolute Manufacturer  Liability Be Defended?, 9  YALE J.
ON  REG. 237, 263  (1992)  ("The great virtue of the economic approach  to the  study of
the  law is  that it attempts to  isolate  data  that bear on  conflicting  theories to  allow a
discerning  reader  to judge  between  them.  I encourage  [my  critics]  to  turn  their
prodigious  energies  to the  discovery' of such data.");  cf  Posner,  supra note  11,  at 275
("I  am sure that economic  analysts of law would be . . . generous  to any sociologists  of
law who wanted  to borrow some of the  theoretical  or empirical  tools of economics  to
illuminate sociological  topics.").
16 George L. Priest, Comment, The Best Evidence of the Effect of Products  Liability Law
on the Accident Rate:  Reply, 91  YALE L.J. 1386,  1386  (1982).
17  Id.;  see  also  id.  at  1388  ("Whitford  misconceives  the  nature  of  scientific
inquiry.").
is Id. at 1400 (footnotes omitted).
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generating  knowledge  about a  topic  that  will  save  lives  and  reduce
injuries.  This  type  of  claim  to  the  principles  of science-neutral
testing  of hypotheses  against  meaningful,  hard  empirical  data-has
been  extremely  common  among  legal  economists,  particularly  in
response  to critics or potential  critics.
To  return  to  the  puzzle:  why  don't  legal  economists  analyze
themselves  through  the  same  models  they  apply  to  everyone  else?
Why  don't  they  explain  their  success  in  economic  terms-the
predictable  consequence  of  selfishly  motivated,  self-aggrandizing
scholars seeking  to maximize  their wealth,  influence, or reputations?
We  have  an answer  and,  perhaps  surprisingly,  it is  an  answer  that is
less  about  highlighting  a  contradiction  than  it  is  about  locating  an
underlying consistency.
Simply stated,  legal  economists  are  human '  and, being  human,
they  are  subject  to  biasing  cognitive  tendencies.  Among  the  most
fundamental  biases  is  what  social  psychologists  have  appropriately
named  the fundamental attribution error  Our  proclivity  is  to  under-
estimate  the  role  of situational  influences,  and  to  overestimate  the
influence  of individual dispositions  in explaining people's  behavior.2'
"[W]e tend  to  look  for  the  person  in  the  situation  more  than  we
19 We do not mean  to suggest that the humanity of legal  economists should come
as news.  We  mean  only to  point  out the obvious,  and then  to  take  its  implications
seriously.  While  some critics  have demonized  or dehumanized  legal  economists,  we
believe  that  this  is  wrong  in  fact  and  as  a  critical  tactic.  See,  e.g.,  David  Glenn,
Calculated  Risks:  Harvard  Professor Says Smokers Know Exactly  What They're Doing, CHRON.
OF  HIGHER  EDUC.,  May  31,  2002,  at  A14  (reporting  economist  W.  Kip  Viscusi's
account  of  someone  reacting  to  him  as  if  he  were  "Darth  Vader"),  available at
http://chronicle.com/free/v48/i38/38aol401.htm.
20 See  infra  Parts  II,  VI.C  (describing  in  greater  detail  much  of  the  social
psychological  evidence  regarding  this attributional  bias);  see  also SUSAN  T. FISKE  &
SHELLEY  E.  TAYLOR,  SOCIAL  COGNITION  67-86  (1991)  (discussing  the  fundamental
attribution  error, defined as a "bias in  social perception"  whereby a person's behavior
is  attributed  to  "her own  dispositional  qualities,  rather  than  to  situational  factors");
ZIVA KUNDA,  SOCIAL  COGNITION:  MAKING  SENSE  OF  PEOPLE  430  (1999)  (noting that
participants in psychological  studies routinely make the fundamental  attribution  error
by "underestimat[ing]  the extent to which  behavior is shaped  by the constraints of the
situation  and overestimat[ing]  the extent to which it is  shaped by people's underlying
dispositions");  Ross  &  NISBETT,  supra note  9,  at 4  ("People's inflated  belief  in  the
importance  of  personality  traits  and  dispositions,  together  with  their  failure  to
recognize the importance  of situational factors  in affecting behavior, has been  termed
the  'fundamental  attribution  error."');  supra quotation  accompanying  note  9.  See
generally Daniel T.  Gilbert & Patrick  S.  Malone,  The Correspondence Bias, 117  PSYCHOL.
BULL.  21  (1995)  (providing  an  intellectual  history  of the  fundamental  attribution
error-or correspondence  bias-and a description  of some of its causes and limits).
1 KUNDA,  supro note 20, at 429.
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search  for  the  situation  that makes  the  person.
22  That  is  true  even
though  "human  behavior  is  much  more  under  the  influence  of
situational  variables  than  we  usually  recognize  or  are  willing  to
admit. 
23
That tendency, like numerous other interpretive biases, is  partially
the result of the mind's  propensity  to conserve  scarce  resources.2 4  It
is  often  easy  to  see  a  person's  role  in  bringing  about  a  particular
event,  but  it  takes  a  good  deal  of thought  to  understand  how  the
situation  may have  wielded  influence.25  A more  general  description
of this  phenomenon  is  that  the mind  tends  to downplay  the  role  of
complexifying  context  and  overplay  the  role  of  salient  behavior.
"Background  factors,  social  context,  roles,  or  situational  pressures
that may  have  given  rise  to the  behavior  are  . . . relatively  pallid and
dull  and  unlikely  to  be  noticed  in  comparison  to  the  dynamic
behavior of the actor.
26
A second  powerful  influence  over  human  cognition  stems  from
the fact that people  tend to  arrive  at  conclusions  they are  motivated
to  reach:  "[M]otivation  may  affect  reasoning  through  reliance  on  a
biased  set  of  cognitive  processes:  strategies  for  accessing,
constructing,  and  evaluating  beliefs  ....  [M]otivation  can  be
construed as affecting the process of reasoning:  forming impressions,
determining  one's  beliefs  and  attitudes,  evaluating  evidence,  and
making decisions.",
27
2  PHILIP  G.  ZIMBARDO  &  MICHAEL  LEIPPE,  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  AlTIITUDE
CHANGE AND  SOCIAL  INFLUENCE 93  (1991).
23  Id.  Daniel Gilbert and Patrick Malone also note that:
Three decades of research  in social  psychology  have shown  that many  of the
mistakes  people  make  are  of a  kind:  When  people  observe  behavior,  they
often conclude  that the person who performed  the behavior was  predisposed
to  do  so-that  the  person's  behavior  corresponds  to  the  person's  unique
dispositions-and  they  draw  such  conclusions  even  when  a  logical  analysis
suggests they should not.
Gilbert & Malone, supra note 20, at 21.
24  Other cognitive  biases  with related  origins  include  well-known  heuristics such
as availability and hindsight bias.
25  See  FiSKE  &  TAYLOR,  supra note  20,  at  67  (identifying  the  "fundamental
attribution  error" as  a tendency  "to attribute  another  person's  behavior  to  her  own
dispositional  qualities,  rather  than  to  situational  factors").  For  other  possible  or
partial explanations of the fundamental attribution error, see  infra Parts II, VI.C.
26  FISKE  & TAYLOR,  supra note 20, at 67.
27  Ziva  Kunda,  The  Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108  PSYCHOL.  BULL.  480,  480
(1990).
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One  key  motivation-central  to  "one  of  the  most  influential
social  psychological  theories"28-is  the desire  to  see  ourselves  in self-
affirming  ways.29  People  tend  to  view  themselves  as  well-intentioned
and  good,  and  will  often  engage  in  fairly  dramatic  cognitive
adjustments  to maintain  that self-image.  Moreover,  individuals  en-
gage  in  the  same  kind  of  motivated  reasoning  regarding  the
institutions, groups, and situations with which they identify.  In those
contexts,  however,  the  tendency  is  often  referred  to  as  the
"ethnocentric"  or  "group-serving"  bias  or,  more  popularly,  as
jingoism,  racism,  sexism,  heterosexism,  and  so  on.  The first  lesson
of  motivated  reasoning,  whatever  its  manifestation,  is  that  we
humans  tend  to  hold beliefs  and  reach judgments  and  conclusions
that  we  desire,  and  we  vastly  underappreciate  that  tendency
-particularly  in ourselves.
When  those  sorts  of human  tendencies  are  taken  seriously,  the
initial  puzzle  begins  to  lose  its  mystery.  The  puzzle  is  simply  an
expression  of the  larger  human  inclination  to  see disposition  where
situation  is  largely  controlling  and  to  do  so  in  a  way  that  is  self-
affirming.  Legal  economists  view others  as  dispositionally-typically
selfishly-motivated  because  they  can  plausibly  infer  such
information  from  people's  conduct.  And  the  dispositions-which
legal  economists  typically  call  "preferences"-behind  that  conduct
are  thereby  "revealed."  Or  it  at  least  appears  that  way  to  legal
economists, given  the influence of the fundamental  attribution error.
Legal  economists, likewise,  see themselves  (and others in their move-
ment) as  dispositionally driven,  but their own purposes  are presumed
less  crass,  in part because  their personal sense  of themselves  does not
"reveal"  such  motives,  and  in  part  because  they  are  motivated  to
attribute  their successes  and  their competitors'  concomitant  failures
to dispositional,  not situational, forces.2
28  KUNDA,  supra note 20, at 3.
29 Id. at 220-23.
30 Id.; see alsoJon Hanson &  David Yosifon,  The  Situational Character:  A Critical
Realist  Perspective  on  the  Human  Animal  (unpublished  manuscript,  on  file  with
authors)  (reviewing  key studies and summarizing evidence  on role of motivation).
31  See Hanson  & Yosifon,  supra note  30  (describing group-affirming  motive);
see also FIsKE & TAYLOR,  supra note 20, at 80-81  (noting that the terms "ethnocentric"
or  "group-serving  bias"  refer  to  "the  tendency  of  in-group  members  to  attribute
internal causes  to positive  in-group behavior  and negative  out-group  behavior and  to
attribute  negative  in-group  behavior  and  positive  out-group  behavior  to  external
causes").
32 See infra text accompanying notes  106-10  (discussing the  actor-observer bias).
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It  is  not  contradiction,  then,  but  consistency  that  begins  to
suggest  the  more  illuminating  dimension  of  this  puzzle.  Legal
economists  presume  a  dispositional  account  of  behavior,  both  in
their  understanding  of economic  actors  and  institutions  as  selfish,
and  in  their  view of  themselves  as  relatively  selfless.3  Social  psych-
ology,  however,  has  demonstrated  that  seemingly  dispositional
actions  are  very  often  more  accurately  identified  as  situational
reactions.  Since economists consistently rely on dispositionist attribu-
tions,  they  may  be  consistently  wrong,  both  as  to  others  and  as  to
themselves.
The point-and this is a big one-is that even though individuals
and  institutions may behave  as if their  goal were  to maximize  wealth,
such behavior  may actually  reflect the social  stage  of interactions
(the  situation)  more  than  it  does  the  dispositions  of the  actors.
Moreover,  legal economists  have  failed  to take  situation  into account
in  their understanding of their own  success,  both individually  and as
a school of thought.  This  tendency, we  believe,  has blinded  us all-
legal economists,  their admirers, and their critics.
The  first  puzzle  thus  yields  a glimpse  of a  central  claim  of  this
Article:  Legal  economists  are  correct  to  presume  the  profound
influence  of the  profit motive  over  the  behavior  of individuals  and
institutions  in  our society,  but are  mistaken  to  locate  that influence
dispositionally  rather  than  situationally.  The  latter  possibility-that
situation  accounts  not  only  for  the  behavior  that  legal  economists
analyze,  but also  for the  success  of their  movement-brings  us  to  a
second puzzle.
B.  The Second Puzzle
Have  you  ever  noticed  that  many  of  the  most  prominent  legal
scholars  actively  reject  the  tenets  of  law  and  economics  in  their
teaching  and writing?  And  have  you  ever  wondered  about  the  fact
that  the  criticisms  that  such  scholars  have  advanced  are  rarely,  if
ever,  acknowledged-much  less  rebutted-by  legal  economists?
And,  in  light  of  all  that,  have  you  ever  wondered  why  law  and
economics  is  nevertheless  commonly  (and  we  think  correctly)
33 In  responding  to  these  observations,  we  suspect  that  many  legal  economists
would  stress  that  they  too  are  moved  by  selfish  dispositions  to  advance  their  own
interests,  financial and otherwise.  Our point  is that they seem  not to  begin with that
presumption  and build from  there, but instead experience  themselves and their ideas
as  marching  beneath  the  pennant  of  scientific  truth  and,  in  all  cases,  take  a
dispositionist view of their own  (and others')  behavior.
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described  as  the  dominant  legal  theoretic  approach?  It  may  be
helpful to describe  this puzzle in greater  depth.
In  a  1996  survey  of the most  cited  law review  articles  published
from  1982  to  1991,
34  scholars  taking  the  critical  approach-critical
legal  studies,  critical  race  theory,  and  feminism-vastly  outpaced
those  taking  a  law  and  economics  approach,  forty-three  to  twelve,
respectively.35  From  its  origins, law and  economics  has  been  subject
to  powerful  and  sustained  criticisms  from  a  diverse  group  of
distinguished  legal  academics3--including,  among  many  others,
Bruce  Ackerman,37  Jules  Coleman, 3 s  Ronald  Dworkin,  3   Grant
Gilmore, °  Mark  Kelman,  '  Duncan  Kennedy,4 2  Frank  Michelman,3
34 Fred  R.  Shapiro,  The  Most-Cited Law  Review  Articles Revisited, 71  CHI.-KENT  L.
REV.  751  (1996).
35 Id. at 751-59.
36  Cf LAWRENCE  M.  FRIEDMAN,  A HISTORY OF AMERICAN  LAW 693  (2d ed.  1985)
("The  'law  and  economics'  school  was  widely  attacked  as  right-wing  and  excessively
narrow; but it had gained, by the  1980s, a significant  place in  legal  teaching, thought,
and research.").
37 See,  e.g.,  BRUCE  ACKERMAN,  RECONSTRUCTING  AMERICAN  LAW  45  n.16  (1984)
("[S]upporters  and  opponents  rightly  suspect  that  there  is  more  to  'law  and
economics'  than disinterested science  ...  ."); Bruce  A.  Ackerman, Law, Economics, and
the Problem of Legal Culture, 1986 DUKE  L.J.  929, 929-34, 946  (1986)  (arguing that legal
academics  need  to adapt  their rhetoric  to  subsume  law  and economics  and  thereby
"put law and economics in its place").
is  See,  e.g., JULES  L.  COLEMAN,  MARKETS,  MORALS  AND THE  LAW  67-150  (1988)
(criticizing  several  branches  of  "the  new  law-and-economics"  school);  Jules  L.
Coleman,  The  Economic  Analysis  of  Law,  in  ETHICS,  ECONOMICS,  AND  THE  LAW:
NOMOS  XXIV  83,  100-01  U.  Roland  Pennock  & John  W.  Chapman  eds.,  1982)
(critiquing the notion of efficiency central  to  the law and economics approach); Jules
L.  Coleman, Efficiency,  Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8  HOFSTRA L.  REV.  509, 526-40
(1980)  (evaluating  and  rejecting  Posner's  concept of "wealth  maximization");  Jules
Coleman,  The Normative Basis of Economic Analysis:  A  Critical  Review  of Richard Posner's
The  Economics  of Justice,  34  STAN.  L.  REV.  1105,  1106  (1982)  (book  review)
(arguing that "neither  of Posner's arguments,  nor  any plausible available  arguments,
justify pursuing certain versions of efficiency").
39  See,  e.g.,  Ronald  M.  Dworkin,  Is  Wealth  a  Value?,  9 J.  LEGAL  STUD.  191,  191
(1980)  ("In this essay I consider and reject a political  theory about law often called the
economic  analysis  of law.");  Ronald  Dworkin,  Why  Efficiency? A  Response to  Professors
Calabresi  and Posner,  8 HOFSTRA  L. REv. 563, 563  (1980)  (criticizing "economists of law
who contemplate trade-offs" between justice and efficiency).
40  See, e.g.,  GRANT GILMORE,  THE AGES  OF AMERICAN  LAW  100  (1977)  ("So far  as
we  have been  able to  learn,  there are  no recurrent patterns  in  the course  of human
events;  it  is  not  possible  to  make  scientific  statements  about  history,  sociology,
economics-or law.").
41 Kelman writes:
[M]uch  of  the concrete  institutional  study done  in  the  Law  and  Economics
movement,  particularly  by  those whose  work has been  readily  integrable  into
mainstream  law  classroom  teaching,  is  biased,  not because  of an  inevitable
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444  46 Dierdre  McCloskey, 4  Martha  Nussbaum,"  Rick  Pildes,  Margaret
Radin
4
1 Jeanne Schroeder,
8  Joe Singer,
49  and Mark Tushnet.5 0
Indeed,  at the  same time  that legal  economists  were  proclaiming
the  strengths  and  dominance  of  their  approach,  prominent  critics
were  claiming  to  reveal  some  of  its  fundamental  flaws  and
social  theoretical  tilt but  rather  either  because  the  people  doing  the  work
explicitly  and  substantively  favor  certain  traditional  right-wing  positions  that
they have argued for rather disingenuously  or because, in their frenzied  desire
to  demonstrate  the  possibility  of  an  economistically  governed  utopia,  they
distort or deny  the  insuperable  difficulties  legal  institutions  would  have  in
overcoming  the problem  of "otherness," the problem  that selfish  people will
inevitably harm others, no matter how we  try to channel their selfishness.
MARK KELMAN,  A GUIDE TO CRITICAL  LEGAL STUDIES  151  (1987);  see also Mark Kelman,
Consumption Theory,  Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52  S.  CAL.  L.
REV.  669,  673  (1979)  (arguing  that  the  Coase  Theorem  "is  simply  wrong  as  a
purportedly  empirical  hypothetical  about  whether  liability  rules  would  affect
substantive activity as well as distribution").
42  See,  e.g., Duncan  Kennedy,  Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A  Critique,
33  STAN.  L.  REV.  387,  387-88  (1981)  (arguing  that  "liberal  law  and  economics"  is
incoherent when applied to the whole system of private law rules).
43 See,  e.g.,  Frank  I.  Michelman,  Ethics,  Economics,  and  the  Law  of  Property,  in
ETHICS,  ECONOMICS,  AND  THE  LAW:  NOMOS  XXIV  3,  3-4  (J. Roland  Pennock  &
John W. Chapman eds.,  1982)  (asserting that the presumptive efficiency thesis is false);
Duncan  Kennedy  & Frank Michelman,  Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8  HOFSTRA
L.  REV.  711,  714  (1980)  (arguing  that "the  efficiency  of private  property  and  free
contract cannot be deduced  from the  sole  factual supposition  of rational maximizing
behavior").
44  See,  e.g.,  Donald N.  McCloskey,  The Rhetoric of Law and Economics, 86 MICH.  L.
REV.  752,  753-54  (1988)  (presenting  law  as  a  primarily  rhetorical  realm  where
arguments dominate  that are at odds  with  the  mathematical  and logical  approach  of
economics).  Donald McCloskey subsequently changed names to Deirdre McCloskey.
45  See, e.g.,  Martha  C.  Nussbaum, Hlawed Foundations: The Philosophical  Critique of (a
Particular  Type  oj Economics, 64  U.  CHI.  L.  REV.  1197,  1198  (1997)  (arguing  that
philosophical arguments  cast doubts on the foundations of law and economics theory).
See,  e.g.,  Richard  H.  Pildes,  The  Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public Policy:
A  Comment on the  Symposium, 89  MICH.  L.  REV.  936,  936-40  (1991)  (explaining  that
public policy requires more than a simple cost-benefit analysis).
47 See,  e.g.,  MARGARET  JANE  RADIN,  CONTESTED  COMMODITIES  1-15  (1996)
(critiquing  the universal commodification of important aspects of human life).
4  See, e.g.,  Jeanne L.  Schroeder,  The End of the Market:  A  Psychoanalysis  of Law and
Economics, 112  HARV.  L.  REV.  483, 491  (1998)  ("I  do not believe  law can  be reduced  to
even  the most sophisticated economics  ....  It is  my judgment  [that]  ....  the ideal  of
the  perfect  market  is... inadequate  to  the  task  of making  concrete  legal  policy
recommendations.").
49  See, e.g.,Joseph William  Singer, Something Important in Humanity, 37  HARV.  C.R.-
C.L. L.  REV.  103,  105-08  (2002)  (criticizing welfare economics  for discounting fairness
as a factor in normative analysis).
50 See, e.g.,  Mark Tushnet,  "Everything Old is Neo Again":  Early Reflections on the
"New Chicago School, " 1998  WIs.  L.  REV.  579, 581-82  (asserting that traditional  law
and economics has "become stale").
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weaknesses. 1   Legal  economists  rarely  acknowledged,  much  less
rebutted,  those  criticisms.
5 2   Many  thoughtful  observers  therefore
anticipated  the  eventual,  if  not  imminent,  demise  of  law  and
economics.  For  example, Arthur Leff wrote in  1974:  "[O]ne  would
be forced to conclude that this kind of 'scientific'  study  is . . . , as an
attempt  to  present  a  total  picture,  ultimately  doomed."
53  By  1980,
Mort  Horwitz  wrote  that  the  law  and  economics  movement  had
"'peaked  out'  as the latest fad  in legal  scholarship."04  He went  so far
as to predict that "[fluture  legal historians  will need to exercise  their
imaginations  to  figure  out why  so  many  people  could  have  taken
most of this stuff so seriously.""
Outsiders'  predictions  were  not  altogether  different  from  those
of insiders.  Early on, even  some  legal  economists admitted  to  being
surprised by  their success.  As Judge Posner, in a loose version of our
second puzzle,  testified,  "economics  has  an uphill  fight in law,  being
disliked  both as  politically conservative  and methodologically  radical.
This makes its success  ...  all the more striking.,
56
And yet despite  that evidence,  those criticisms,  those predictions,
and  that  surprise,  there  is  no  dispute  that  law and  economics  has
long been,  and continues  to be,  the  dominant  theoretical  paradigm
for understanding  and assessing  law and  policy.  Not only  is  law and
economics  not  a  faddish  habit  of  the  past,  but in  the  twenty  years
51 See C.  Edwin  Baker, Starting  Points  in  Economic Analysis of Law, 8 HOFSTRA  L.
REV.  939,  948-53  (1980)  (asserting that  "Posner's wealth-maximization  standard
has  seemed  normatively  ungrounded"  and  that  "Posner's  inability  to  identify
normatively appropriate starting points leaves him unable to demonstrate that his
wealth-maximization  ..  criterion  is  either  appealing  or  workable");  James  R.
Hackney, Jr.,  Law  and Neoclassical Economics Theory:  A  Critical History of the Distri-
bution/Efficiency Debate, 32 J. SocIo-ECON.  361,  370-79  (recounting various critiques
of  law  and  economics  scholars'  focus  on  wealth-maximization  as  the  basis  for
evaluating  societal  utility);  Duncan  Kennedy,  Law-and-Economics from the Perspective of
Critical  Legal Studies, in 2 THE  NEW  PALGRAVE  DICTIONARY OF  ECONOMICS  AND  THE
LAW  465,  471  (Peter Newman  ed.,  1998)  (criticizing  law and  economics  theorists  for
'manipulating  the  apparently  value  neutral,  technocratic  discourse  of  efficiency  to
support their preferred outcomes").'
"  See  generally  Ronald  Chen  &  Jon  Hanson,  Distribution  Versus  Efficiency:
Missing the Taste of the Pie  (May  19,  2003)  (unpublished manuscript,  on file  with
authors)  (describing  history  of "distribution  versus efficiency"  debate and some  ways
in which  legal economists  have  avoided or  postponed addressing  profound  criticisms
of their approach).
.,  Arthur Allen Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J. 989, 1007-08  (1978).
54  Morton J. Horwitz,  Law and Economics:  Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA  L.  REV.
905, 905 (1980).
55  Id.
Posner, supra  note  11, at 274.
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since  Horwitz's  prognostication,  it  has  become  even  more
entrenched  among  lawmakers,  judges,  policy  shapers,  and  aca-
demics."  And,  as  we  highlight, lay versions  of the  theory  have  been
gaining  ground  in  our  culture  as  a  whole.  As  one  critic  laments,
"[t]he  law and  economics  movement  is  quite  strongly  entrenched  in
the  law  schools,  and  is  more  powerful  there  than  any  of the  other
social  sciences."'
"  Marc  Galanter  and  Mark  Edwards,  proponents  of
the  "competing"  law  and  society  approach  to legal  theory,  concede
that  "the  flourishing  of law  and  economics  [is]  undeniable," 55  that
"[e]conomic  analysis  of  law..,  has  transformed  American  legal
thought,"6  and  that  efficiency  analysis  has  enjoyed  "unparalleled
success in the legal  academy and in  the judiciary.""  Professor Bruce
Ackerman  has  described  law and economics  as  "the  most important
development in legal scholarship of the  twentieth century.
6 2
Numerous  critics  have  displayed  less  equanimity  in
acknowledging  the  dominance  of  law  and  economics,  accusing  its
adherents  of ruthless  "imperialism. ' 3  Judge  Posner  dismisses  such
57 Richard Posner's  seminal book, Economic Analysis of Law, supra note  13,  is  now
in its  sixth edition.  The fifth  edition, published  in  1998,  recently  won  Harvard  Law
School's prestigious  Ames  Prize.  Press  Release,  Harvard  Law  School, Judge  Richard
Posner  Presented  2003  Ames  Prize  (Mar.  7,  2003),  at http://www.law.harvard.edu/
news/2003/03/07ames.php.  In  fact, law  and  economics  has  its  own  Nutshell  and
two encyclopedias  devoted  to  it.  JEFFREY  L.  HARRISON,  LAW  AND  ECONOMICS  IN  A
NUTSHELL  (2d  ed.  2000);  ENCYCLOPEDIA  OF  LAW  AND  ECONOMICS  (Boudewijn
Bouckaert  &  Gerrit  De  Geewst  eds.,  2000);  THE  NEW  PALGRAVE  DICTIONARY  OF
ECONOMICS  AND THE LAW  (Peter Newman  ed.,  1998).
58 J.S.  Sterling,  The State of American Sociology of Law, in DEVELOPING  SOCIOLOGY
OF LAW:  A WORLD-WIDE DOCUMENTARY  ENQUIRY 805, 809  (V.  Ferrari ed.,  1990).
59 Marc  Galanter  &  Mark  Alan  Edwards,  Introduction:  The Path of the Law Ands,
1997 WIs.  L. REV.  375, 378.
65  Id.
61  Id. at 381.
62 COOTER & ULEN, supra note  7,  at 2.
63  See W. Bradley Wendel, Mixed Signals: Rational-Choice Theories of Social Norms and
the Pragmatics  of  Explanation, 77 IND.  L.J.  1, 29-30  (2002)  (stating that "scholars in  other
disciplines often object to  the imperialist tendencies  of economic  analysis, because  of
this  tendency  to  translate  the  explanatory  terms  employed  by humanistic  and  social
science  disciplines into a few concepts  that are deemed admissible  in economics, such
as  'preferences'  and  'expected  utility"').  This characterization  is  not new.  See,  e.g.,
ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM:  THE ECONOMIC METHOD APPLIED OUTSIDE  THE FIELD  OF
ECONOMICS,  at vii  (Gerard  Radnitzky  & Peter  Bernholz  eds.,  1987)  (attempting  to
show that  economics  can  explain  the  behavior  of living  systems,  despite  critics  who
accuse  economists  of "disciplinary  imperialism");  DAVID  M.  KREBS,  A  COURSE  IN
MICROECONOMIC  THEORY  9  (1990)  ("Economists  are  well-known  among  social
scientists  as imperialists  in  the sense  that economists  attempt to  reduce  everything  to
economic  notions and paradigms.").
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accusations  as  so much  "[p]rofessional  envy."  And  who wouldn't be
jealous?  After all:
Economic  analysis  of  law  has  grown  rapidly,  has  become  the  largest,
most  pervasive  interdisciplinary  field  of legal  studies  in  the  history  of
American  law,  has palpably  influenced  the practice  of law and judicial
decisions,  has  launched  lucrative  consulting  spin-offs,  has  spawned
courses  and  textbooks  in  economic  analysis  of  law,  has  influenced
legislation  (economic  analysts  of law  played  an  important  role  in  the
deregulation  movement),  has made  it  de rigueur for law  schools  of the
first and second  ranks to have  one  or more  economists on their faculty,
has  seeded  a  number  of its  practitioners  in  university  administration
and  the  federal judiciary,  and has  now  crossed  the Atlantic  and  begun
making rapid gains in  Europe.64
In short, regardless  of how different  scholars  feel  about it, there
is  no  contesting  the  fact  that  law  and  economics  is  currently  the
undisputed champion of the putative  legal-theoretic competition.
So here, again,  is the second  puzzle:  How is it  that a  theory that
is  the  subject  of  so  much  skepticism  and  criticism  among  legal
academics,  and  that  seems  to  have  been  rejected  (or  at  least,  not
embraced)  by  huge  segments  of that  community,  has  become  the
dominant  theoretical  paradigm  for understanding  and  assessing  law
and policy?
That puzzle  begins  to come  together when one  understands  that
scholars,  as  humans,  are  motivated  to  believe  that  the  institutions
with which  they have  a strong affiliation  are just-a  motivation  that
may be  particularly  intense  in this case,  given  that the legal  academy
is  an  institution  to  which  academy  members  have  committed  their
professional  lives  and  upon  which  their  legitimacy  is  largely  based.
Absent  undeniable  evidence  to  the  contrary,  scholars  so  motivated
assume  that the success or failure  of a theory reflects the  outcome of
a  reasonably  well-functioning  marketplace  or  tournament  of  ideas.
Success  there,  like  evolutionary  or  market  success,  is  thought  to
reflect a meritocratic selection process.6
CA  Posner,  supra note  11,  at  275  (citations  omitted);  see also POSNER,  FRONTIERS,
supra note  13,  at 35  ("It  is  not merely  an  ivory-towered  enterprise,  especially  in  the
United States, where the law and economics  movement has  influenced  legal reform  in
such  fields  as  antitrust  law,  the  regulation  of  public  utilities  and  common  carriers,
environmental  regulation,  the calculation  of damages  in personal  injury suits  .... ").
See Hanson  & Yosifon,  supra note  30  (discussing motivations relating  to an
individual's group and system  affiliations).
t To  be clear,  we  do  not believe  that  perceptive  critical scholars  (such  as  Mort
Horwitz)  consciously  think  to  themselves  that  the  playing  field  of legal  theory  is  a
purely  meritocratic  one.  Our point is  that even  system-sensitive  critical  legal scholars
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Such  a faith  is implied  in  many legal  theoretic histories.  Robert
Cooter  and  Thomas  Ulen,  in  their  authoritative  text,  Law  and
Economics,; 7  attribute  the  success  of  law  and  economics  to  its
practitioners identifying "a vacant  niche  in  the  'intellectual  ecology"'
of legal theory and then  "rapidly fill[ing]  it."6"  Thomas Ulen  recently
expanded on that survival-of-the-fittest  metaphor, boasting:
Law and economics  has been one  of the  most successful  innovations
in  the  legal  academy  in  the  last  century.  This  intellectual  revolution
began  modestly  in  the  1960s  and  1970s  with  a  few  important  and
innovative  articles and a comprehensive,  masterful  text that showed  the
possibilities  of  the  field.  Then,  in  the  1980s  the  field  exploded  into
respectability  and  prominence-becoming  a  regular  course  in  the
curricula  of  the  best  law  schools,  a  vibrant  legal  research  style  that
figured  in  a  torrent  of  important  books  and  articles,  a  force  that
transformed  many  faculty  from  exclusive  practitioners  of  traditional
doctrinal  research  to  a  more  social-science-oriented  research,  and  a
substantial  justification  for  important  public  policy  changes.  By  the
early  1990s,  economic  analysis  suffused  a modern  legal  education,  even
one devoid  of an explicit course  in law and economics.
Writing  generally  about  economics,  George  Stigler  explains:
"Economics  is  the  only  reasonably  well-developed  social  sci-
ence  ...  in  that  it  has  an  extensive,  operable,  tested  theoretical
system.  Posner beats  the same  drum  when  he  proclaims  that  the
work  of  "anthropologists,  sociologists,  psychologists,  political
scientists,  and  other  social  scientists  ...  is  insufficiently  rich  in
theoretical  or empirical  content to create  serious competition  for the
economists.' '
,  Elsewhere, he makes  the point more concretely:
There  is  a  dearth  of arresting  hypotheses  to  set  off against  the  Coase
Theorem,  the  Hand  Formula,  the  efficiency  theory  of  the  common
law  ....  the  economics  of  property  rights  versus  liability  rules,  the
implicitly  reveal  an  unexamined  trust  in  current  institutional  arrangements  (or
perhaps situational  pressures  discouraging  the articulation of distrust),  as evinced  by
the fact that such biases are  rarely even hinted at in writing about what moves current
intellectual  trends in legal academia.
67  COOTER  & ULEN,  supra note 7.
68  Id. at 3.
69  Thomas  S.  Ulen,  Firmly Grounded:  Economics in the Future of the Law, 1997  WIS.
L.  REV.  433, 434  (footnotes omitted).
70  GEORGEJ.  STIGLER,  MEMOIRS OF AN  UNREGULATED  ECONOMIST 8 (1988).
71  POSNER,  ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw,  supra  note  13, at 26;  see also Posner, supra
note  11,  at 273  ("The sheer  modesty...  of American sociology of law has hurt the field
in  its  competition  with  critical  legal  studies,  feminist jurisprudence,  political  theory,
economic  analysis  of law, and  even law  and  literature  for  a  place  at  the legal-studies
high  table.").
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activity-level  theory  of  strict  liability, ... and  the  myriad  of  other
concepts,  many  counterintuitive,  that have  made  economic  analysis  of
law intellectually exciting.
2
When  explaining  their success,  legal  economists  rely not just on
proud descriptions of methods,  discoveries, and  insights,  but also  on
the  legacy  of intellectual  giants,  from Jeremy  Bentham  and  Adam
Smith  to Gary  Becker and  George Stigler  The  internal  histories of
the emergence  of law and economics  thus focus on  the  "great ideas"
and  "great  men, 74  of  the  movement,  as  if  Coase  and  Copernicus
played  analogous  roles  in  advancing  science.
75   Even  if that  is  an
overstatement, it is patently clear that legal  economists see  themselves
as  the  rightful  winners  of a fair and  effective  process-a  success  that
is  measured  largely  in  terms  of  real-world  influence  and  without
reference  to the serious criticisms of their approach.
Professor  Horwitz,  though  no  doubt  disappointed  with  the
outcome,  also  seemed  to  view the  rise  and fall  of ideas  and theories
as  part  of  a  fair  competition,  or  at  least  that  seems  an  obvious
Posner,  supra note  11,  at  273.  Elsewhere, Judge  Posner  argues  that  law  and
economics  has  benefited from  "[r]apid  increases  in recent decades  in  the scope  and
rigor of microeconomics  (due  partly  to the  increased  incorporation  of game  theory
into economics)."  POSNER,  FRONTIERS,  supra note  13,  at 4.
Posner has  been  repeating  the same  basic historiographical  thumbnail  sketch
of the movement in his writings for decades.  See, e.g.,  POSNER,  FRONTIERS,  supra note
13,  at  31  ("What I  try  to do... in  this chapter  is  to anchor  a  brief description  of
the field by  reference  to  two of its most illustrious progenitors, Jeremy Bentham
and (briefly)  Gary Becker....").  For other Posnerian renditions of this sketch, see,
for  example,  Posner,  Uses  and Abuses,  supra note  13,  at  281-84  (1979),  where  he
discusses the role ofJeremy Bentham, Gary Becker, and others  in the development of
law and economics.  The same story  unfolds  in  his  chapter on the history  of law and
economics in  his ECONOMIC ANALYSIS  OF LAW, supra note  13, at 21-28.
74 Cf  JULIE  A.  NELSON,  FEMINISM,  OBJECTIVITY  AND  ECONOMICS,  at  xi  (1996)
("The  mainstream  academic  and  professional  discipline  of  economics..,  is  built
around  distinctly  masculine-based  notions ....  );  Marianne  A.  Ferber,  The Study  of
Economics:  A  Feminist Critique, 85  AM.  ECON.  REV.  357  (1995)  (describing  the  male-
centric bias contained  in economics scholarship);Julie  A. Nelson,  The Study of Choice or
the Study  of Provisioning? Gender and the Definition of Economics, in  BEYOND  ECONOMIC
MAN:  FEMINIST THEORY AND  ECONOMICS 23,  33 (Marianne A. Ferber & Julie A. Nelson
eds.,  1993)  ("Feminist  theory suggests  that the Cartesian  divisions between rationality
and  embodiment, and  between  man  and  nautre,  reflect  a  masculinist  and  separate
view of the world .... ");  Diana Strassman,  Not a Free Market:  The Rhetoric of Disciplinare
Authority in  Economics, in  BEYOND  ECONOMIC MAN:  FEMINIST THEORY  AND ECONOMICS,
supra, at 54, 56-65  (using "stories" to  illustrate the  present narrowness  of explanatory
accounts  in economics, which  is due to the exclusion of the woman's perspective  when
formulating theories).
75  See  supra text accompanying notes  16-18  (quoting George  Priest  for  his  claim
that law and economics, more so than  other fields of legal scholarship, is grounded  in
scientific reasoning).
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inference  to draw from his prediction  about the imminent demise  of
law  and  economics."  And  Horwitz  is  by  no  means  the  only  non-
economist  exhibiting such  faith.  Indeed, it seems to be widespread  in
legal  academics,  as  revealed  by the  fact that unfairness  or bias  in the
marketplace  of ideas  is rarely  discussed  among its participants-even
among  those  scholars  whose  work  is  built  on  identifying  and
.•  •  77
describing  such  unfairness  and  bias  in  other  institutions.  Thus,
while  scholars  have  not  always  explicitly  claimed  that  theoretical
dominance  implies  theoretical  superiority,  such  an  inference  is
manifested  in  the  legal  economists'  boasting  and  the  critics'
collective  (and  now  largely  frustrated)  expectation  that  law  and
economics  would pass  quickly.
A closer look at the details of legal  theoretic discourse  reveals yet
another  nuance  to  the  pattern.  Legal  economists  attribute  their
success  in  the  tournament  to internal  or  dispositional factors.  They
seem  to  view  their  methods  and  insights,  perhaps  even  their
intellectual  capacity,  as simply superior  to those  of their competitors.
That  dispositional  perspective  is  amplified  when  economists
criticize  their competitors.  Not  only are outsiders  deficient  method-
ologically,  they are,  as our  'just world"
78  requires,  also  dispositionally
deserving of  their  fate.  Posner,  for  example,  claims  that  some
76  See supra text accompanying  notes  54-55  (recounting  Horwitz's  prediction  that
law and economics would be only a short-lived "fad" in legal academia).
77  For example,  at  two  Harvard  Law  School  panel  discussions  on  the  future  of
progressive  legal  theory, panelists had little  to say about the underlying sources  of, or
possible solutions to, the fact that progressive legal scholarship  has had comparatively
little  influence  over  legal  theory  or  policy  while  law  and  economics  has  grown
dominant.  See Ari Z.  Weisbard,  Professors Debate Law, Economics, HARV.  CRIMSON,
Mar.  20,  2002,  http://www.thecrimson.com/article.aspx?ref=180698  (recounting  a
progressive  panelist's  statement  that  "our  institutions  are  being  reformed
everyday"  by  law  and  economics);  Press  Release,  Harvard  Law  School,  HLS
Faculty Panel to Explore  Future of Progressive  Legal Scholarship  (Feb.  22,  2002),
at  http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2002/02/22  scholarship.php  (describing
the  participants and sponsors  of two  panels discussing  progressive  legal  scholar-
ship).  Panelists  included distinguished  progressive  scholars with an  acute  awareness
of  legal  theoretic  trends  and  historical  sensitivity  such  as  Christine  Desan,  Kent
Greenfield, Janet  Halley,  David  Kennedy,  Duncan  Kennedy,  Mort  Horwitz,  Frank
Michelman,  and Joe  Singer.  In  our view,  the  lack  of a  theoretical  explanation  for
these  trends reflects an implicit (and, we think, unexamined)  faith on the part of even
the  most  institutionally  and  politically  sensitive  scholars  in  the  academic  process  as
basically fair and self-correcting.  One goal  of this  project is  to provide  an alternative
approach  to assessing legal theoretic  trends.
78  See Hanson  & Yosifon,  supra note  30  (providing a more detailed  discussion
of the  'Just world  hypothesis" and  "system-affirming  motives");  infra notes 215,  635,
and 686 and accompanying  text (briefly discussing related motives).
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competitors  may  have  fared  better  if only  they  were  not so  spiteful
about  their  losses  and,  so  unwilling  "to  pick  up  the  analytic
techniques  and models  of economic  analysis  and  use  them  in  their
own  work.'
79  According  to  Posner,  "no one  likes  to  retool with  the
methods  of  a  rival  discipline;  it  is  a  confession  of defeat."s  The
source of the  competitors'  failure  is,  in Posner's  account, not in  the
situation  of  the  competition,  but  in  the  dispositions  of  the
participants.  And  it is not just any disposition,  but the disposition of
selfishness-the  very  disposition  that  motivates  the  agents  of  legal
economists'  models.  And  it is  also,  in  Posner's  view,  the disposition
of spite  and  smallness-the  very  sort  of  qualities  that  psychologists
have shown that we are motivated  to see in "out groups" and to deny
in our own  groups, and  that consequently  enable  us  to feel  that the
misfortunes of "others" are warranted. 81
Consequently,  there  are  two  ways  in  which  the  largely  uncon-
tested  "tournament  of  ideas"  notion  reflects  the  fundamental
attribution  error.  First,  as  we  just  described,  competitors  are
presumed  to  win or lose because of dispositional  factors.  Second,  the
operation  and dynamics  of the tournament  itself is  presumed  to  be
independent  of broader  situational  influences.  The  metaphor  of a
tournament  or marketplace  highlights  the  presumption  that  comp-
etition  on  the  merits  is  the  driving  force  and  that  the  victor  is
determined  through  successful  competitive  engagements,  full  stop.
Any forces  exogenous  to the tournament  are rarely identified,  much
less systematically  analyzed.
Again,  it  is  not contradiction,  but consistency,  that  suggests  the
more  revealing aspects  of this second  puzzle.  Both  legal economists
and  their  critics  presume  a  dispositionist  account  of  scholarly
behavior.  But  again,  social  psychology  instructs  us  that  seemingly
dispositional  actions  are  often  more  accurately  understood  as
situational  reactions.  The  consistent dispositional attributions,  there-
fore,  may  be  consistently  wrong.  A more  complete  solution  to  this
puzzle, however, must await the balance of this Article.
We named  this Part "setting the stage,"  not simply because  it sets
the  stage  for  the  balance  of  the  Article,  but  also  because  it  is
79 Posner, supra  note  11, at 274.
80 Id.
81  See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30 (discussing that tendency in greater detail
and  more  general  social  psychological  findings  regarding  inter-  and  intra-group
motivations);  infra notes  689-90  and  accompanying  text  (summarizing  the  human
tendency to see bias in others that we do not see in ourselves).
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intended  to  begin  to  illuminate  the  power  of  staging  over  acting.
The  stage  is  not simply  the  place  where  independent,  dispositional
actions occur, as  is so commonly,  so  humanly, assumed.  The stage  is
itself an unseen  participant-one  that shapes, transforms,  sometimes
determines, and almost always  influences,  the behaviors  of the visible
characters.  If that is correct,  legal scholars and policymakers  need to
ascertain  how  the  stage  is  set, who  has  the  power  to  set it, and  what
the  purpose  of the  staging  is.  We  all  need  to  be  attentive  to  the
situation.
II.  BRIEF INTRODUCTION  TO THE SITUATIONAL  CHARACTER
A.  Seeing the Actors
Tastes are the unchallengeable axioms of a  man's behavior:  he  may  properly
(usefully)  be  criticized for inefficiency  in  satisfying his  desires,  but the  desires
themselves are data.
-Gary  Becker and George Stiglerf-
I find it difficult now to identify the motives for many things I  have done ....
I do not have a good answer to the question of my  own behavior ....
My  memoiy has a strange way of selecting its contents.
-George  Stigle'
In our view,  legal  theory and the  law ought to be informed by  as
realistic  a  vision  of  humanity  as  our  learning  can  muster.  This
Section  begins  to  formulate  such  a  vision  through  some  of  the
central  lessons  of social  psychology.  The  bulk  of  this  effort  must
await separate  articles. 4
82  George J. Stigler  &  Gary  S.  Becker, De  Gustibus Non  Est Disputandum, 67  Am.
ECON.  REv.  76,  76 (1977).
83  STIGLER, supra note 70,  at 132,  133,  146.
84 See,  e.g.,  David  Arkush  &  Jon  Hanson,  Law  and  Emotion  (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors)  (describing the role and influence  of emotion, affect,
and feelings, and assessing their  relevance  for law and legal theory);  Chen  & Hanson,
supra note  52  (focusing on  role and effects  of schemas, scripts, stereotypes,  and other
knowledge  structures  and  their relevance  for law and  legal  theory);  Ronald  Chen &
Jon  Hanson, The Illusion  of Law  1:  The  Legitimating Schemas  of Modern  Policy  and
Corporate  Law  (May  31,  2003)  (unpublished  manuscript,  on  file  with  authors)
(describing  the  biased  schemas  of modern  policymaking and  corporate  law and  the
interests they serve)  [hereinafter Chen & Hanson,  Illusion of Law l];Jon Hanson,  Ana
Reyes &  Daniel Schlanger, Law and Attribution  (unpublished  manuscript, on  file with
authors)  (examining  how  people  make  attributions  of causation,  responsibility,  and
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Suppose  you  are walking  down  the  street,  on  your  way  to class,
when  a  man  in  a white  coat  comes  up behind  you, jabs  a gun  into
your  spine  and  barks  "get into  that  building."  Inside  the  building,
you  find  yourself in  a  small  room where  the  gunman  explains  that
you will be shot unless you flip a switch  (labeled  "DANGER:  SEVERE
SHOCK-XXX-450  volts")  on  some  sort of electrical  box  which  is
attached  by  ires  to an  electric-chair  contraption  in  which  another
man is strapped.  The gunman  informs you that "although  the  shock
can be  extremely  painful  to the  person  in  the  chair, it can  cause  no
permanent  tissue  damage."  Meanwhile,  that  person  is  squirming,
sweating,  and  imploring  you not  to  flip  the  lever.  He seems  almost
as  scared as  you are and is saying something  about heart trouble and
pleading  to  be  released.  The  gunman  cocks  his  pistol,  aims  the
barrel  at your temple,  and tells  you:  "You  have  no other  choice, you
must go on."
Despite this scene's surreal  qualities, you believe  everything about
it, including  that the  gun pointed  at  your  head  is  real  and  that  its
holder is ready to use  it.  What would you  do?
We suspect that many of you would  flip  the  lever,  as we  probably
would.  And we  suspect  that even  those  of you who would  not would
still  sympathize  with  and  hold  relatively  blameless  anyone  who  did.
The situational pressure  is simply  too great to withstand.  The  power
of the  gun  is  unmistakable,  and the  "choices"  to  enter  the  building
and  to flip  the  lever  are  hardly choices  at  all,  for  the  disposition  of
the  person  who  makes  them  seems  so  clearly  constrained  by  the
situation  as to  render the results nearly determined.
Now,  suppose  you  are  strolling  across  your  favorite  university
campus  when  you  are  approached  by  a  clipboard-toting,  lab-
coated  graduate  student  who  is  recruiting  participants  for  an
ongoing psychological  experiment  testing  learning  techniques.  You
agree  to  take  part, and  follow  the  graduate  student  into  a  building
where you meet the professor  running the  study and  another person,
who,  like yourself, has agreed to participate.  You draw  lots and  find
that  in  the  experiment  you  will  be  the  "teacher,"  and  your  fellow
blame,  and describing  the relevance  of attribution  theory  for law  and  legal  theory);
Hanson  &  Yosifon,  supra  note  30  (providing  a  fulsome  overview  of  the  social
psychological  and  social  cognition  literatures,  and,  based  on  that,  offering  an
alternative  conception  of the  human  animal  to  the  one  imagined  in  law  and  legal
theory, and considering  some of the implications  of that new conception for law and
legal theory).
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volunteer  will  be  the  "learner."  The  professor  explains  that he  will
read  a list of pairs  of associated  words  to  the learner, after  which  he
will  read  one  word  from  the  pairs  as  a  prompt  for  the  learner  to
supply the correct  associated word.  If the learner fails to provide  the
correct word,  you,  as  the  teacher,  are  to flip a  switch  that will  shock
him.  With  each  incorrect  answer,  the  strength  of the  shock  will
increase  by  15  volts.  You follow  the professor  into an  adjacent room
where  you  watch  as  the  learner  is  strapped  into  a  chair  and
electrodes are  attached  to  his body.  Then you  move back to the first
room where  the professor begins the experiment.  Very soon  into the
procedure,  the  subject  gets  an  association  wrong.  Do  you  flip  the
switch?
Perhaps  you  do.  Now  the  wrong  answers  continue  to  come.
With  each  mistake  you  increase  the  voltage,  and you  begin  to  hear
the  learner  moaning  in  pain.  Poised  at  150  volts,  the  learner
exclaims  that his  heart is bothering  him.  When you  reach  210  volts,
he  demands  to  be  released,  saying  he  refuses  to  answer  any  more
questions.  At 300  volts,  he  is  screaming  in  agony.  After  330  volts,
the  learner's  room becomes  silent.  The  professor  continues  to  ask
questions  and  announces  that continued  silence  will  be interpreted
as  a wrong  answer, bringing  another shock.  You  look at  the  control
panel  and  see  that  the  next  level  reads  "DANGER:  SEVERE
SHOCK-XXX-450  volts."  You  hesitate,  and  the  professor  de-
mands,  "You have no  other choice, you must go on."  Do you  flip the
switch?  Would you  have made it to this point in the  study?
If you are like  most people, you  have almost certainly answered  a
resounding  "no!" to those questions.  And if you  think others would
respond  to  the scenario similarly, you would expect them to refuse  to
go along with the experiments as well.  And you would not be alone.
College  students  asked  to evaluate  such  a  proposed  experiment
estimated  that, on average,  most people would go to  135 volts before
refusing to go on, and they said  that only one in a hundred would go
all  the  way to end of the scale-450  volts.  Professional  psychiatrists
surveyed  about  the  same  proposed  experiment  predicted  that  only
one  in a thousand-"the  sadists"-would go all the way.86
85 See ZIMBARDO & LEIPPE,  supra note  22,  at 67-68  (1991)  ("Most said that no one
would go all the way to 450 volts.").
86 Id. at 65-74  (summarizing  Stanley Milgram's  obedience  experiments);  see  also
STANLEY MILGRAM,  OBEDIENCE  TO  AUTHORITY  27-31  (1974)  [hereinafter  MILGRAM,
OBEDIENCE  TO AUTHORITY]  ("Each  one of the  110 respondents sees himself disobeying
the experimenter  at some  point."); Stanley  Milgram,  Some Conditions of Obedience and
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We humans do not understand  ourselves well.
The  scenario  described  above-the  one  with  the  graduate
student and  not the  one  with  the  gun-was  the  basis  of a  series  of
actual  experiments  that  Stanley  Milgram,  a  pioneer  in  the  field  of
social  psychology conducted  at Yale  University  beginning  in the early
1960s. 7  In  the  actual experiment, however,  the flipped  switches  did
not actually shock the learner.""  The responses that the teacher heard
were  scripted-a  fact  unknown  to  the  teacher.s9   Milgram's
expectations  matched those  of the  college  students  and psychiatrists
who  he  surveyed  beforehand.9 0  But  out  of the  first  forty  teacher
subjects  he tested,  twenty-six  of them  (sixty-five  percent)  went all  the
way  to  450 volts.9'  And  that was  only  the  beginning of a long series
of studies revealing the disturbing "banality of evil. ' 2
By  now  the  reason  for the  experimental  results  should  be clear:
situation,  like an  invisible hand,  moves  US.  Milgram  performed  this
Disobedience to Authority,  18  HUM.  REL.  57,  72-73  (1965)  [hereinafter  Milgram,
Some  Conditions of  Obedience]  ("The  psychiatrists  predicted  that  most  subjects
would not go beyond the tenth shock level  [150 volts]  ....  ").
87 See Milgram,  Some Conditions of Obedience, supra note  86, at 60  ("Pilot studies
•  . .were completed  in the winter of 1960.").
88 See  Stanley  Milgram,  Behavioral Study  of  Obedience, 67  J.  ABNORMAL  &  SOC.
PSYCHOL.  371,  373-74 (1963)  (explaining the basic design of  Milgram's experiments).
89 See id. at 372  (explaining that in  most versions of the experiment  the "learner's"
responses  were  tape  recorded  and  played  over  a  sound  system  in  the  "teacher's"
room).
qO  See ZIMBARDO  &  LEIPPE,  supra note  22,  at  68  ("Milgram  himself foresaw  little
total obedience.").
91  See MILGRAM,  OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY,  supra note 86,  at  60  tbl.3 (identif-
ying  these  numbers  as  resulting  from  a  base-line  condition  in  which  the  "learner"
responded with more than just cries of anguish,  including voicing concerns of a heart
problem).
92 See generally HANNAH  ARENDT,  EICHMANN  IN JERUSALEM:  A  REPORT  ON THE
BANALITY  OF  EVIL  (1994);  DANIEL  JONAH  GOLDHAGEN,  HITLER'S  WILLING
EXECUTIONERS:  ORDINARY GERMANS  AND THE HOLOCAUST (1996);  ERVIN  STAUB,  THE
ROOTS  OF EVIL:  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL AND  CULTURAL  ORIGINS  OF GENOCIDE  (1992);
Philip  G.  Zimbardo,  The  Psychology  of  Evil,  5  EYE  ON  PSI  CHI  16  (2000),
http://www.psichi.org/pubs/articles/article_72.asp.
As Milgram learned in his experiment:
With  numbing  regularity  good  people  were  seen  to  knuckle  under  the
demands of authority and perform actions  that were  callous and severe.  Men
who  are  in  everyday  life  responsible  and  decent  were  seduced  by  the
trappings  of  authority,  by  the  control  of  their  perceptions,  and  by  the
uncritical  acceptance  of the  experimenter's  definition  of the  situation,  into
performing harsh acts ....
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experiment  hundreds  of times  using  many  different  variations." 4  By
manipulating  the situation,  Milgram was  able  to increase  or decrease
conformity  on the part of the teachers.  For example,  when it was not
the  teacher  administering  the  shock  himself,  but  rather  a  peer
operating  at  the  teacher's  instruction,  more  than ninety  percent of
subjects  administered  the  maximum  shock'  When  an  ordinary
person  rather  than  a  scientist  was  demanding  that  the  shocking
continue,  however,  far fewer  teachers  went to  450 volts. 6  The  sixty-
five  percent  full  compliance  observed  repeatedly  at Yale  shrunk  to
forty-eight  percent  when  the  study  was  moved  off  campus  and
purportedly run by "Research Associates  of Bridgeport.",9
7
The  vast discrepancy  between  ex ante  predictions  about the  likely
behavior  of subjects  in  these  experiments  and  their  actual  behavior
reveals  a  central  lesson  of social  psychology-namely,  the  profound
ways  in  which  situation  influences  our  behavior.9   The  naive
predictions  themselves  reveal  the  gross  extent  to  which  we
underestimate  the  power  of the  situation  and wrongly  presume  that
behavior is  motivated by disposition."'
...  A  substantial  proportion  of  people  do  what  they  are  told  to  do,
irrespective of the content of the act and without limitations of conscience,  so
long as they perceive  that the command comes from a legitimate  authority.
Milgram,  Some Conditions of Obedience, supra  note  86, at 74-75. 94  .. Milgram  conducted  at  least  twenty-one  different  variations  on  the  initial
experiment.  See  MILGRAM,  OBEDIENCE  TO  AUTHORITY,  supra note  86,  at  207  n.6
("[Nervousness]  data  [of  the  subjects]  are  available  for  twenty-one  experimental
conditions  .... ").
95 See  id. at  119,  121-22  (concluding  that  "any factor  that  will  create  distance
between  the  subject  and  the  victim[]  will  lead  to  a  reduction  of  strain  on  the
participant and thus lessen disobedience").
96  See  id. at  93-97  (finding  that  despite  authority  "hovering  in  the  background,"
experiments  in which  an  ordinary  man  gave  the orders  resulted in  a "sharp drop in
comPliance" to twenty percent administering  the maximum shock).
Id. at 68-69.
98  The discrepancy  also  reveals  the extent  to  which  even  psychologists  frequently
fail  to  anticipate  how situation  will  move their subjects.  SeeJerry  Fodor,  Why  We Are
So  Good at Catching Cheaters,  75  COGNITION  29,  32  (2000)  ("When  subjects  appear to
behave  peculiarly  in  an  experimental  task, that  is  not infrequently  because  they  are
sensitive to a  material[]  variable that the experimenter has failed to notice.").
9q  Milgram's  research  reflects  what many, including  Milgram,  noticed  about Nazi
Germany:  the  ease  with  which  situational  influence  can  lead humans  to  engage  in
atrocious,  morally  reprehensible,  individual  acts.  Recent  primary  research  indicates
that "ordinary men"-those who previously led regular, civilized lives-overwhelmingly
accepted  the  Nazi  regime's  call to  genocide despite  an explicitly available  "choice" to
evade  the  action.  See  CHRISTOPHER  BROWNING,  ORDINARY  MEN  1-3,  55-57
(HarperPerennial  1998)  (1992)  (reporting how a Nazi  battalion commander in World
War  II  Poland  allowed  "any  of the  older  men  who  did  not  feel  up  to  the  task"  of
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As  Milgram's  experiments  help  demonstrate,  unobserved
(though  observable)  situation  can  be  as potent  as observed  situation.
And  when it  is unobserved  situation  that  moves us,  we  experience  it
as dispositional  consent.
Insofar  as  economics,  and  law  and  economics,  have  been
challenged  by critics,  most debate  has taken  place over  the  extent
to  which  people  are rational  Economists  tend  to  assume  that  the
"rational actor model" is  reasonably accurate,  or that its inaccuracies
do  not,  for  one  reason  or  another,  threaten  their  conclusions
substantially. ° 00   The  critics  tend  to  either  roll  their  eyes  at  the
obvious  absurdity  of  the  rational  actor  model  or,  more  carefully,
provide  evidence  to  support  a  conclusion  that  the  rational  actor
model  is  flawed  and  should  be  adjusted  to  take  into  account  the
irrational  features  of the  typical  human  actor.  In  our  view,  both
perspectives  miss  the  far  more  significant  assumption  behind  the
rational  actor  model:  that people  are  dispositional  actors.  As  the
Milgram  experiments  so  powerfully  demonstrate,  it  is  our
situations-far  more  than  we  realize,  and  often  far  more  than  our
dispositions-that move  us.  We  are,  in  essence, not rational  actors,
but "situational characters."
B.  Missing the Stage
We  are  too  ready  to read personality and  character traits into  the behavioral
drama and too resistant to  see stage settings as the basis for the action.
-Philip  G.  Zimbardo &  Michael Leippe'
°'
participating in a massacre  to "step ott" and be given an  alternative assignment); id. at
64-65  (describing how during one execution  in  the  Polish woods  "anyone who  could
not take it any longer could report" and be excused);  id. at  74  (reporting  that despite
the  opportunity  to drop  out, less  then  twenty percent of the Nazi  policemen  evaded
the killing of 1500 people-an entire town).  But see id. at 65-70,  75  (relating the stories
of German policemen  who  chose not to kill,  several of whom  felt  no  need to  impress
their comrades  because  of financial  security  and a lack of career  military  ambitions).
The author of Ordinary Men, Christopher  Browning, dispositionalized  the massacre by
focusing  on  those  who  avoided  the  situational  influence-or  responded  to  a  less
prominent situation-despite the glaring fact that so few managed to do so.
100  See  Hanson  & Yosifon,  supra note  30  (reviewing  responses  of economists  and
legal  economists  to social  psychological  evidence  that conflicts  with the rational  actor
model).
101  ZIMBARDO  &  LEIPPE, supra note 22, at 93.
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All the world's a stage...  And all the men and women  nrely players ....
- Willim  Shakesea12
The  "situational  character,"  introduced  in  this  Article  and
fleshed  out  in  a  companion  article"' ,  and  in  other  works,' 4  is
meant not to reconstruct, but rather to retire the  basic  rational  actor
model  of law and  economics  (including  its chief competitors  such
as  the  behavioral  actor, the  boundedly  rational  actor,  the  satisficing
actor, and the autonomous agent of classical liberalism).  Our goal  is
not, in  other  words,  to  offer  an  alternative  dispositionist"'  account,
but  rather  to  develop  an  approach  to  legal  theory  that
conceptualizes  people's  behavior  more  accurately  in  the  locus  of
situation.
We  thus  introduce  the situational  character:  an  individual  who
does  not  act  with  total  freedom  (even  if she  does  sometimes  act
extemporaneously)  and  who  does  not often  choose  her  stage.  She
instead  finds  herself,  and  we  as  legal  scholars  find  her,  already  in
action  on  a  given  stage,  among other  characters,  with  dialogue  and
plot proceeding  apace  around  her, and  subject  to  the  powerful  (if
less visible)  influence of scripts,  props, backdrops, and  directors.  To
be sure, such  a character  will often behave  as  if she is  a dispositional
actor, but alter  the stage,  the script, and  so on,  and  you will  see  the
pervasive role of situation as  the actor's behavior conforms  to it.
Consider the following  thought experiment:
Your plane,  a  Boeing  747, is  reaching cruising altitude  in  your flight
from  Logan  to  O'Hare,  and  the  pilot  turns  off  the  "Fasten  Seatbelt"
sign.  You  recline  in  your  aisle  seat for  a  catnap  when  the elderly  and
somewhat  feeble  gentleman  next to you  stands  and politely  asks  to  get
by.  You  move  quickly into the  aisle  to  aid his  passage  and  then  return
to your seat  as  he makes  his  way slowly  to the  back of the plane  to the
lavatory-about  one-eighth  of the  length  of the  plane.  You  don't  re-
buckle  your  seatbelt because  you  expect  him  to return  shortly and  you
want to be  prepared to again  move  into the  aisle so  that he can  reclaim
his seat.
102 WILLIAM  SHAKESPEARE,  As You  LIKE  IT act 2, sc. 7.
1034 See Hanson & Yosifon,  supra note 30.
104  See sources cited supra note 84.
105 By  "dispositionist"  or  "situationist,"  we  mean  to  indicate  the  attributional
perception,  and  by  "dispositional"  and  "situational"  we  mean  to  indicate  the
attributional  truth  of  the  matter.  Thus,  describing  people  as  situational
dispositionists  is  one  way  of  saying  that  they  are  subject  to  the  fundamental
attribution error.
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Ten  minutes  pass,  and  you  begin  to  worry  because  the  elderly
gentleman  seemed  a  little  unstable.  Still,  you  are  reluctant  to  meddle
and  possibly  embarrass  him  or  yourself.  When  another  five  minutes
have  passed, you  decide to alert a  flight attendant  of your concerns.  As
you  reach  for the call button,  the man  returns, apparently  no worse  for
wear.  You jump out to  let him  in,  and  you  both  slide into  your seats.
You breathe  a slight sigh of relief that he  is  fine after  all, and  that  you
did  not have  to press the button.
Now,  without  re-reading  any  portion  of  the  preceding  para-
graphs,  estimate  the  distance  that  the  old  man  traveled  between
leaving and  returning to his seat.
If you are  like  most people  we  asked  about  this scenario,  you
estimated  close  to  thirty  feet.  A  more  accurate  estimate,  however,
would  be  roughly  1000  times  greater  than  that-approximately  150
miles.  In other words,  most people  see  the  man  moving within  the
plane, but miss his situation,  the plane  itself.'  But even  the few who
see the  plane tend  to miss the movement of the Earth-a failure  that
made  Copernicus,  one  who  did  notice,  the  butt  of ridicule,  and
Galileo,  another who saw what others were  missing,  a prisoner.  And
even  those  great  astronomers  did  not  perceive,  just  as  most  of  us
today  do not, the  immense  currents  of the  solar  system,  the  galaxy,
and  the  universe.  Indeed,  when  one  takes  those  additional  situa-
tional  forces  into  account,  the  old  man  moved,  in  his  visit  to  the
bathroom, something closer  to 350,000 miles.
07
106  Of the  thirty-three  people  we  asked,  twenty-four of  them  provided  answers  of
between  zero  and  one  hundred  feet.  Nine  gave  answers  that  revealed  that  they
considered  the  movement  of the  plane:  more  than  fifty  miles.  But of  those  nine,
seven  indicated  that  they considered  that  movement  because  they  were  looking  for
the "trick," and that it took  them some  time  to figure out the second  answer.  It bears
mentioning  that even  the  respondents  in  the  first  group appeared  to be  looking for
the  trick,  asking  questions  about  what  they  had  missed,  but were  still  unable  to
perceive  the plane's movement  when asked  how far the man  had "traveled"  in fifteen
minutes.  Within  the  seemingly  fixed  environment  of  the  cabin,  one  individual's
movement was far more salient  than the  (forgotten)  progress of the plane itself.
107  The  Earth's average  orbital velocity is  18.5 miles  per second.  See Scott Wilber,
How Many  Miles Does the Earth Travel in Space Each Day?,  PHYSLINIK.COM:  PHYSICS  &
ASTRONOMY  ONLINE,  at http://www.physlink.com/Education/AskExperts/ae548.cfm
(last  visited  Oct. 25,  2003)  (stating that the "entire solar system,  including  the Earth,
moves through  the cosmic background...  for a total  of 32 million  miles per day").  In
one minute,  the elderly man  travels  1110 miles due  to the  Earth's orbital  velocity;  in
fifteen minutes, he travels  16,650 miles.  Factoring  in background  movement-22,222
miles per minute-results  in 350,000 miles in fifteen minutes.
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C.  The Bounds of Dispositionism
We  have  already summarized  some  of the  "evidence  that people
are  inclined  to offer  dispositionist  explanations  for  behavior  instead
of  situationist  ones,  and  that  they  make  inferences  about  the
characteristics  of actors when  they would do  well  to  make inferences
instead  about the  characteristics  of situations  ...."'s  We  have  also
suggested  that this  fundamental  attribution  error has not spared  the
professional  and  credentialed  minds  of  economists  and  legal
economists-hence,  our  repeated emphasis  on  the fact that they  too
are human.
But,  if we  humans  are  subject  to  a  tendency  to  see  disposition
where  situation  is  largely  controlling,  a  critical  question  emerges  as
to the strength and expansiveness of that tendency.  Of course,  this is
a  question  for  which  no  precise  answer  can  be given.  But  it  is
nevertheless  a crucial  issue for  legal  theory, and  one  that cannot  be
papered  over  by  implausibly  presuming  near-total  dispositionism.
Some  clarifying light can  be shed  on  the  matter by separating  it into
two  sub-questions.  First,  at what  point  and  to  what  degree  do  lay
people  and  economists  begin  to  see  situation  and  to  take  it  into
account?  In other words,  what are  the  limits  to our dispositionism-
how fundamental  is  it?  Second,  to  what  extent  do  disposition  and
situation  actually  move  us?  Put  differently,  how  fundamental  an
error  is  our  dispositionism?  The  first  question  is  about  how  we
perceive  what we  see, and the  second question  is  about how accurate
our perceptions are.
1.  How Fundamental  Is Our Dispositionism?
Regarding  the  first  question,  our  gun-to-the-head  exam0ple l'
makes  clear  that  our  dispositionism  does  occasionally  give  way  to
situationism.  The example  is particularly  apt because  it appears that
we  rarely  see  situation  unless the  situation  is  thrust  upon  us  in  the
form of another hard-to-miss actor such  as a person wielding a gun.""
108  Ross & NISBEr,  supra note 9, at 125.
109  See supra Part II.A (suggesting that a threat of serious bodily harm would likely
cause one to inflict pain on another despite a disposition against such an action).
110  There  are  exceptions  to  those  basic  patterns.  Most  notably,  when  making
attributions  about  ourselves  we  often  are  more  likely  to  attribute  the  cause  of bad
outcomes or behavior to exterior situational influences.  For example, if we  do  poorly
on an important test, we may be quick to complain about the distractions  in the testing
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a.  Economic incentives
Even  a  very  obvious,  controllable,  and  tangible  situational
influence-money-is  commonly overlooked in  favor of dispositionist
explanations  of behavior.  The  effects  of financial  incentives  on  lay
people  tend  to  be  understood  in  terms  of  stable  dispositional
proclivities.  This lesson  is rendered  explicit by  experiments  in  social
psychology.
In one such study, a first group of subjects  (the  "observers")  were
asked  to monitor and later draw  conclusions about  the  conduct  of a
second  group  of  subjects  (the  "volunteers")  as  part  of a  study  on
decision  making."'  After  describing  a  fictitious  study  to  the
subjects,  the  experimenter  announced  that before  they  began
the  experiment, she  "happen [ed]  to have sort of a real decision
for  [them]  to  make."" 2  The  corporate  board  and  potential  finan-
cial supporters  of the  college's "Human  Development Institute" were
gathered  in  town  for  the  weekend,  and  the  Institute  was  seeking
students  who  would  help  with  entertainment  and  campus  tours  for
the spouses of these  businesspeople.  The real  experiment, of course,
was underway.  Some subjects were  offered  $0.50 per hour and  some
were offered  $1.50  (or some amount closer to  $3  and $9,  respectively,
in  2003 values).  Just twenty-four percent of the low-payment  subjects
volunteered,  while  sixty-eight  percent  of  the  high-payment  subjects
did so."1  Volunteering was therefore  correlated  with  the amount of
money offered,  hardly  a shocking result.
environment  or  a biased  professor who  grades  unfairly.  Conversely,  when  things  go
well  for  us  we  have  a  tendency  to  attribute  the  cause  to  our own  dispositions-our
intelligence, diligence, etc.-rather than situational  influences.  Those patterns in  the
actor-observer bias, as  the  phenomenon  has been  dubbed  by  social  psychologists,  echo
part  of our  basic  claim  here,  which  is  that  our  behavioral  attributions  are  often
motivated.  See Emily  Pronin  et al.,  Understanding  Misunderstanding- Social Psychological
Perspectives, in HEURISTICS AND  BIASES:  THE PSYCHOLOGY  OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT  636,
653-65  (Thomas  Gilovich  et  al.  eds.,  2002)  (reviewing  social  psychological  findings
concerning  the actor-observer  bias);  see also FISKE  & TAYLOR,  supra note  20, at  72-75
(discussing actor-observer  bias).  Social psychologists have identified other limits to our
dispositionism.  See  infra  text  accompanying  notes  411-41  (discussing  cultural
influences  over dispositionist and situationist attributions).  Of course, even  when  we
attribute causation  to situation, we  often only recognize  a tiny portion of the  situation.
See  also  infra text  accompanying  notes  140-45  (describing  other  limitations  to  our
ability to appreciate the  role of situation).
I Richard  E. Nisbett et al.,  Behavior as Seen  by  the Actor and as Seen  by  the Observer,
27J.  PERSONALITY & SOC.  PSYCHOL.  154,  155  (1973).
112  Id. at 155-56.
11 I  Id. at  157.
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More  revealing findings, however,  came out of the  second part of
the experiment.  "Observers,"  who  had been  privy  to  all  elements  of
the first part of the  study, were  asked  about their perceptions  of the
volunteers'  reasons  for  agreeing  or  declining  to  assist  the  Institute
over  the  weekend.  The  observers  apparently  attributed  the
differences  in volunteering to the stable dispositions of the  individual
subjects,  rather  than  to the  amount of money  that each  was  offered
in  the  situation.  Asked  "[h]ow  likely  do  you  think  it  is  that  [the
subject]  would  also  volunteer  to  canvass  for  the  United  Fund?,"
observers  responded  that those  who  had volunteered  in  the  present
experiment  would  be  substantially  more  likely  to  volunteer  for  the
United  Fund than  would  those  who  had  not presently  volunteered,
regardless  of how  much  they  had  been  offered.
14  "Observers  were
apparently  misled  by  the  actor's  behavior,  assuming  it  reflected  a
dispositional  tendency  to  volunteer  rather  than  a  response  to  a
suitably compensated  'job opportunity.''1
5
This study  suggests  the  depth  of our dispositionism.  It  can  run
deeper  than  any  intuitive  belief  in  the  selfish  or profiteering  nature
of  human  behavior;  we  think  people  are  the  way  they  are,
irrespective  of the  influences  under  which  they  act  at any  moment.
We  are  prone  to  dispositionism  even  where  situational  factors  are
visible,  countable,  and  widely  acknowledged  to  be  a  source  of
incentives  and  influence.  Of  all  the  non-human,  non-threatening
situational  factors,  it  is  difficult  to  think  of one  more  obvious  and
unmistakable  than  cash.  And  yet,  even  when  money  is  the  clear
motive, we still tend to see disposition.
This  is one  place where  economists part ways with  the  rest of us,
though  as argued in the next subsection,  not nearly  so far as  it might
initially appear.  The self-interested,  rational actor  of many economic
models  acts pursuant  to  one  primary  situational  factor-money-in
the forms  of prices and incomes.  An  economist would  not miss  the
implied  upward-sloping  supply  curve  in  the  experiment  just
described.  The volunteer ratios would be explained  immediately  and
solely by the situational distance between  $0.50 and $1.50.
b.  The limits of economists' situationism
One  should not be fooled  by  this fleeting  attributional  accuracy,
for it is just a consequence  of the otherwise  dispositional assumptions
114 Nisbett et al.,  supra note  111,  at 156-57.
115  Ross & NISBETr,  supra note 9, at 127.
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behind  the  rational  actor  model.  It  is  actually  the  important
similarity  between  the  economist  and  the  non-economist  as
dispositionists  that is most striking.
As we  have  already suggested, the  reason that economists  see the
situational  role  of money  is because  of their preliminary  assumption
that  people  are dispositionally  motivated  to pursue  little  else.  Close
inspection  reveals  that  economists  actually  provide  an  unjustifiably
anemic  version  of  their  favored  situational  factor,  as  their  models
allow  for  only  a  fraction  of  the  situational  force  of  price.  For
example,  a  fundamental  assumption  of  legal  economists,  one  that
quietly  makes  possible  much  of  their  analysis,  is  that  a  person's
willingness  to pay equals  her willingness  to accept for  the same  item.
That is, a person would be willing to pay as  much for a widget as  that
person  would be willing to accept in payment  from another party for
selling  that same widget.  That assumption  is, for example,  central  to
the  Coase  Theorem's  instruction  that  well-functioning  markets  will
yield allocatively efficient outcomes.
Yet,  even  if one  ignores  the  growing  evidence  from  economic
behavioralists  that  willingness  to  pay  tends  to  be  significantly  lower
than willingness  to accept,'
16  such  a  starting place  entirely  disregards
the role of external  situation.  More specifically,  a "basic  principle  of
economics"" 7 that assets tend to "gravitate toward their most valuable
uses  if  voluntary  exchange-a  market-is  permitted"' 8  ignores  the
fact  that a  person's  "willingness  to pay,"  will  to  a great degree  reflect
that person's  "ability to  pay."  In  other words,  the  basic  principle  of
economics  treats  situation  (ability  to  pay)  as  disposition  (willingness
to  pay).  Richard  Posner  describes  this  translation  of  situational
constraints  into  dispositional  tendencies  in  the  introduction  to  his
seminal  law and economics text:
Suppose  that pituitary extract  is  in  very  scarce supply  relative  to the
demand and is therefore  very expensive.  A  poor family  has  a  child who
will  be  a  dwarf if he  does  not get  some  of  the  extract,  but the  family
cannot  afford  the  price  and  could  not  even  if  they  could  borrow
against the  child's future  earnings  as a person of normal  height ....  A
rich  family has  a child  who will  grow  to  normal height, but the  extract
will  add  a  few  inches  more,  and  his  parents  decide  to  buy  it for  him.
116  See,  e.g.,  Daniel  Kahneman  et  al.,  Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect
and the Coase Theorem, 98J.  POL.  ECON.  1325,  1325  (1990)  (declaring  that "[c]on-
trary to theoretical expectations, measures  of willingness  to accept greatly  exceed
measures  of willingness to pay").
117  POSNER,  ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW,  supra note  13, at 10.
H  s I  d  .
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In  the  sense  of value  used  in  this  book  [Economic Analysis of Law],  the
pituitary  extract  is  more  valuable  to  the  rich  than  to  the  poor  family,
because  value  is  measured  by  willingness  to pay;  but the  extract  would
confer greater  happiness  in  the  hands of the  poor  family  than  in  the
hands of the rich  one.
As  this  example  shows,  the  term  efficiency,  when  used  as  in  this
book  to  denote  that  allocation  of  resources  in  which  value  is
maximized,  has  limitations  as  an  ethical  criterion  of  social
decisionmaking  ....  Although  no  effort  will  be  made  in  this  book  to
defend  efficiency  as  the  only worthwhile  criterion  of social  choice, ...
it  is  an  important criterion.  In  many areas  of interest to  the economic
analyst  of  law ....  it  is  ...  the  main  thing  that  students  of  public
policy worry about.
" '
In  short,  economists  are  situationally  sensitive  in  only  the
narrowest  sense-taking  into  account  the  way  in  which  price  might
influence  people's  actions  based  on  their  willingness  to  pay,  but
refusing  to look  at the  situational backdrop  to that disposition
2 0   As
the Posner  quotation exemplifies,  economists do not typically go very
far  to justify  that  situational  blindness. 21  But  it  is  a  blindness  that
arguably implicates even the most central features of their theory.
Indeed,  it  may  be  that same  type of situational  influence  (ability
to  pay  as  limited  by  "budget  constraints"  or  prices)  and  not  the
presumed  dispositional  forces  (rational  ranking  of preferences)  that
puts  the  "down"  in  the  downward-sloping  demand  curve,  the  crown
jewel of economic  theory.  As  Nobel  Laureate  Gary  Becker  taught
forty years  ago:
Negatively  inclined  market demand  curves  result not so  much  from
rational  behavior  per se  as from  a general  principle  which  includes  a
wide  class  of irrational  behavior  as well.  Therefore,  households  can  be
119  Id. at 13.
120 There  are  arguably other  minor ways  in  which  economists  take  into  account
situational considerations.  For instance,  they  sometimes take into account the role  of
collective,  as  compared  to  individual,  decisions  or  decisions  regarding  uncertain
outcomes.  But even  then, their analyses  are otherwise based on dispositionist assump-
tions.  A  group  of  people  is  usually  assumed  to  act  like  a  set  of  dispositionally
motivated individuals who are making  a choice, and little or no adjustment is made to
consider the situational influence  of even various group dynamics.
121  When  pushed,  they  instruct  those  who  see  it  otherwise  that  such
"distributional"  concerns  are not properly  the province  of either economists  or legal
rules.  See  Chen  &  Hanson,  supra note  52  (recounting  Posner's  argument  that  the
economic  analysis  of  law  does  not  take  in  account  income  distributional
considerations).
122  See,  e.g.,  COOTER  &  ULEN,  supra note  7,  at  23  (treating  as  axiomatic  the
downward-sloping  demand curve-i.e.,  the notion  that "when the  price of x goes  up,
the amount of x that the consumer will purchase goes down, and  vice versa").
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said  to  behave  not only  "as  if'  they were  rational  but also  "as  if'  they
were  irrational:  the  major  piece  of empirical  evidence justifying  the
first statement can  equally well justify the second  ....
[T]he  change  in  opportunities  resulting  from  a  change  in  relative
prices  also  tends  to  produce  a  systematic  response,  regardless  of  the
decision  rule.  In  particular,  the  fundamental  theorem  of  traditional
theory-that  demand  curves  are  negatively  inclined-largely  results
from  the change  in  opportunities  alone  and  is  largely  independent  of
123 the decision rule.
Not  only  utility  maximization  but  also  many  other  decision  rules,
incorporating  a  wide  variety  of  irrational  behavior,  lead  to  negatively
inclined  demand  curves  because  of the  effect of a change  in  prices  on
opportunities. 
1 2 4
Hence  the  market  would  act  as  if "it" were  rational  not only  when
households  were  rational,  but  also  when  they were  inert, impulsive,  or
otherwise  irrational.1
2
5
Indeed,  the  most  important  substantive  result  of this  paper  is  that
irrational  units would  often  be  "forced"  by  a  [situational]  change  in
opportunities  to  respond  rationally.  For  example,  impulsive
households  would  tend  to  have  negatively  inclined  demand  curves
because  a rise  in  the price  of one  commodity would  shift opportunities
toward  others,  leaving  less  chance  to  purchase  this  one  even
impulsively.  Other  irrational  households  would  likewise  tend  to  have
negatively  inclined  demand  curves,  irrational  firms  negatively  inclined
demand  curves  for  inputs,  and  irrational  workers  positively  inclined
supply curves to occupations.
6
Strikingly,  despite  Becker's  demonstration  that downward-sloping
demand  curves  do  not  imply  rational  behavior,  many  subsequent
economists  (particularly legal economists)  have ignored  or trivialized
it
.
1
2 7  The  idea  that situation  is  central  and disposition  is  peripheral
123 Gary  S.  Becker,  Irrational  Behavior and Economic Theoy,  70 J.  POL.  ECON.  1,  4
(1962).
124  Id. at5.
125  Id. at 7.
126 Id. at  12.
127  Richard Posner is one of the few  legal economists to  address it.  See Hanson  &
Yosifon,  supra note  30  (reviewing  Richard  Posner's  discussion  and  dismissal  of the
issue).  Posner  recently  ridiculed Ronald  Coase  for suggesting that the  insight might
be  taken seriously.  See RICHARD  A.  POSNER,  OVERCOMING  LAW 442  (1995)  ("Could
Coase believe  that some cognitive  or psychological  defect prevents  us  from moving  up
the ladder  of preferred  alternatives  in  the manner  that  I described?  That  misfiring
brain  cells  make  us  disregard  opportunity  cost  or  fail  to  disregard  sunk  costs?
Unlikely.").  Very recently, however, behavioral economists  have identified several ways
in which arbitrary anchors can provide  the illusion of stable preferences and how there
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has no purchase,  given  what economists  seem  to  "know" about their
world  (as  confirmed by their human vision  and, tautologically,  by the
shape  and  slope  of the  demand  curves  they  have  "seen").' 2 8   It  is  as
though  legal  economists,  like  the  rest of us,  are  so  swept  up  by  the
play  that they forget that they are  watching one  and come  to believe
that  the  characters  in  it  are  internally,  dispositionally  motivated.
Becker's  point  has  been  regarded  as  a  move  in  a  logic  game;  it  is
treated  as  a  bizarre,  if strictly speaking  correct,  theoretical  insight.  1
9
His  point  is  stripped  of  its  power  as  the  human  figures  are
caricatured  as "irrational" actors and the more revealing depth of the
insight  is  not  pursued:  situation  is  often  more  potent  than  we
acknowledge,  exerting  a  greater  influence  over  our  actions  than
disposition.
Besides  the  narrow  treatment  of  price  and  budget,  the  other
major exception  to economists'  dispositionism  is,  as for the rest of us,
the  case  in  which  someone  acts  in  response  to  a  significant  threat
(usually of force)  posed by another person-prototypically  a bullet to
the brain.  Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, in their highly regarded
law  and  economics  text, provide  a  fairly conventional  description  of
when situation should  be considered  in the law of contracts:
[S]ometimes  one of the  parties to  a  bargain  faces  a  dire constraint.
A  dire  constraint  leaves  the  decision-maker  with  little  or  no  choice.
Contract  law treats dire constraints differently  ....
Law prohibits  people  from  making threats such  as,  "Work for  me  if
you want your sister to come home  safely  from school  .... ""')
Then, at  the  conclusion  of their analysis,  they  ask  the reader  to
explain  the  efficiency  argument  against  enforcing  the  following
arrangement:  "Suppose that person  A,  while aiming  a gun at person
B,  invites  B  to  write  a  check.'
13'  As  such  hypotheticals  illustrate,
can  be  "stable  demand  curves  without  stable  preferences".  See generally Dan  Ariely,
George  Loewenstein  &  Drazen  Prelec,  Coherent Arbitrariness:  Stable Demand  Curves
Without Stable Preferences, 118 Q.J. ECON.  73  (2003).
128  See,  e.g.,  POSNER,  supra note  127,  at  441-42  (acknowledging  the  first  point,
then trivializing it through brief tautological assertions).
129 See id. at 442 ("Becker's argument  is that since consumers have limited  budgets,
even  irrational  consumers  will on  average  purchase  less  of a good  when  [the]  price
rises, because the consumers'  resources will become depleted  sooner.").
130 COOTER & ULEN, supra note  7, at 261.
131  Id. at 263.
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situation  is  easy  to  see,  if  not  impossible  to  miss,  when  it  is
brandishing  a revolver. 13
Along  with  those  scenarios,  Cooter  and  Ulen  offer  some  less
dramatic  examples,  such  as  a  crew  threatening  to  walkout  midway
through  a  chartered  fishing  voyage  in  an  effort  to  extract  higher
wages  from  their  captain. 3   But  even  examples  that  do not involve
violent threats  still  involve  "threats.'' 4   And  those  threats  are  made
clear by  one or more dispositionally  motivated  human  actors  seeking
to  force  one  party  to  act contrary  to  his  or her interests  absent  the
threat.  In other words,  only an extremely narrow range of situational
factors count-those  of dispositionally bad actors.  Cooter and Ulen's
lesson  is  that constraints  less  "dire" than  the  sort indicated  in their
examples  are  ignored  in  contract  law,  and  properly  so  from  an
economic  perspective.' 3 5
But  these exceptions  do  not reveal  a  true  sensitivity  to situation;
they expose only the tiny and predictable  exception  to dispositionism
that  proves  the  rule.  Indeed,  these  departures  flow  from  the  very
same  current  that  creates  the  more  general  phenomenon-the
fundamental  attribution  error-to  which  they  are  exceptions.  That
current, recall,  originates from our cognitive tendency to  "see" salient
actors and features and  to  miss the rest. 3 6  The general  result is  that
we  tend to attribute a person's actions  to her free choices because we
do  not  see  the  influence  of situation.  However,  when  the  situation
takes  the  form  of a  threatening  actor,  we  see  that  "situation"  and
alter  our  conclusion  regarding  how  free,  in  fact,  the  first  actor's
132 Revealingly,  even  in  conditions of unmistakable  situational  duress,  economists
sometimes  see  a  person's  submission  as  properly  understood  as  voluntarily  and
dispositionally motivated, albeit inefficient.  For instance,Judge  Posner writes:
A  points  a  gun  at  B  saying,  'Your money  or  your  life.'  B  is  very eager  to
accept the first branch  of this offer by  tendering his money.  But a court will
not enforce the resulting contract.  The reason  is not that B was not acting of
his  own  free  will.  On  the  contrary,  he  was  no  doubt  extremely  eager  to
accept  A's offer.  The  reason  is  that  the  enforcement  of such  offers  would
lower  the  net  social  product,  by  channeling  resources  into  the  making  of
threats and  into efforts  to protect against them.
POSNER,  ECONOMIC  A.NALYSIS  OF  LAW,  supra note 13, at 116.
133  COOTER  & ULEN,  supra  note 7, at 263.
134 Id.  at  262  ("Bargaining,  which  involves  demands  and  offers,  is  opposite
from coercion, which  involves threats.").
135  See infra text accompanying  notes  550-614  (discussing other legal  theorists and
the  law's treatment of similar issues).
136  See  supra text  accompanying  notes  21-26  (explaining  that  the  fundamental
attribution  error  is a function  of numerous  factors,  including the dominant  role  that
human action  generally takes in our causal construal  processes).
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choices  were.  Put differently,  a person  is seen  to give  up her seat for
an 800-pound  gorilla,  not by free  choice,  but because  of the half-ton
of hairy,  menacing  situation.  If she gives  up her seat for  an  elderly
person  or a  parent  holding  a  child,  in  contrast,  suddenly  it  is  her
kind disposition  that dominates  the field, eclipsing situation.
In  sum,  there  is  little  or no  place  in  economists'  models  for
situational  influences  other  than  prices  or  narrowly  defined  threats.
It  is  not just the  inability  of poor  parents  to  afford  pituitary  extract
for their children  that  the  economic  approach  ignores; it  is  also  the
myriad  of  situational  influences  that  Milgram's  studies  and
countless  other  social  psychological  studies  have  exposed,  and
137 that  economists  have yet to  see,  much  less  explain.  It  is  also  the
countless  situational  influences  that invisibly  regulate  us  all-as they
would  the  impoverished  dwarf  in  Posner's  example  whose  future
earnings  presumptively  would  be  less  than  those  of  an  affluent
person  of normal  height.'  Thus,  economists  exclude  most  of the
vast range  of situational  influences  in their analyses,  and  provide  no
explanation  for  privileging  guns  and  money  over  the  situational
factors that they, like the rest of us, mostly ignore.
c.  Some situation  behind our dispositionism
Social  psychologists  have  discovered  that  our  day-to-day
dispositionism  goes  still  further.  When  we  observe  a  person's
behavior,  we  tend  to  first  characterize  that  person  in  terms  of her
disposition.  Only  then  do we  begin  to  correct  our  characterization
and take  into account some of the situational variables that may have
shaped her behavior.
3
9  For instance, when we  observe someone who
is  acting  nervously,  we  automatically  infer  that  the  person  is  a
nervous  person.  If we  then  discover  that  the  person  was  talking
about her intimate  life,  we might  adjust our  initial  inference  to  take
137 See, e.g.,  supra notes  86-99;  infra notes  148-54,  180-81,  192, 242,  489-91,  616-34
(describing  some  of  the  situational  manipulations  in  Milgram's  studies  and  closely
related  studies,  and  how  they  influenced  behavior  and  expectations).  See  generally
Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30 (providing an overview of situational influences).
138  See  supra text  accompanying  notes  119-20  (presenting  the  pituitary  extract
exarn  le).
Daniel  T.  Gilbert,  Thinking Lightly  About  Others:  Automatic Components of the
Social Inference Process, in UNINTENDED  TIiOUGHT  189,  193  (James S. Uleman  &John
A.  Bargh eds.,  1989).
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that situational feature into account.  We might, in other words,  drop
or doubt our inference that she is dispositionally  a nervous  person.140
While  initially  inferring  character  and  temperament  from
people's  behavior  is  an  automatic  process,  correcting  those  initial
inferences  to  account  for  the  situation  requires  effort.  We  must
expend  cognitive  resources  to  correct  our  initial  dispositional
impressions.  And  if  our  cognitive  resources  are  being  utilized
because  we  are, say,  preoccupied,  tired, or  intoxicated,  then we  will
be  less  able  to  correct  our  dispositional  inferences  about  people's
behavior  to  account  for  the  situation.  Consequently,  we  will
inaccurately  attribute  a  person's  behavior  to  her  disposition  rather
than  the  underlying  situation.
142   Put  differently,  our  situations
influence  the  extent  to  which  we  take  into  account  other  people's
situations-a tendency discussed at greater length  below.
43
More  troubling still,  "even  when we  appreciate  the impact  of the
situation, want to correct our inferences for it, and have the  cognitive
resources  necessary  for doing so,  we  may  still  fail  to  make  sufficient
corrections."  The  dispositional  attribution  that  we  initially  and
automatically  make  acts  as  an  anchor  on  the  adjustments  that  we
allow  for  situational  factors.  "Our  ultimate  conclusions  about  a
person  may remain  contaminated  by  our initial  inferences  about this
person's  character  even  if we  consider  these  inferences  unwarranted •  . ,,145
and attempt to rid ourselves of this contamination.
140  KUNDA,  supra note  20, at 431.
141  Gilbert, supra note  139, at  193-94.
142  Id. at  194  (finding empirical support for the hypothesis  that a perceiver who  is
distracted  is more likely to engage in dispositional thinking than a perceiver who is not
"cognitively busy");  KUNDA,  supra note  20,  at 431  ("When we  are  preoccupied,  tired,
intoxicated,  or in  a hurry, and so unable to devote  careful  thought to making sense  of
others,  we  may  fail  to  correct our impressions  for  situational  constraints  even  if we
understand  these  constraints.");  see also Timothy  D. Wilson  &  Nancy  Brekke,  Mental
Contamination  and Mental Correction:  Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations,
116  PSYCHOL.  BULL.  117,  127-28  (1994)  (citing this as an example of the fundamental
attribution  bias  and explaining that we  often  attribute  a  person's  behavior  to certain
traits or attitudes-i.e., disposition-implied by such conduct).
143 See infra text accompanying  notes  415-56 (discussing  the role of culture);  infra
Part VI.C-E  (discussing some of the situational  influences behind our culture).
144 KUNDA,  supra note 20,  at 431-32;  see  also George  A. Quattrone,  Overattribution
and  Unit  Formation:  When  Behavior Engulfs  the  Person, 42 J.  PERSONALrY  &  Soc.
PSYCHOL.  593,  600-01,  604-06  (1982)  (reviewing  two experiments  demonstrating  that
there  may  be  circumstances  in  which  observers  overattribute  behavior  to  situational
causes while adjusting instufficiently  for information about an actor's dispositions).
145 KUNDA,  supra note  20, at 432; see also Wilson  & Brekke,  su/ra note  142,  at 127-
28  (characterizing  "the tendency  to  attribute  people's  behavior  to  their  underlying
dispositions" as a "failure" of the "unacceptable  process").
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2.  How Fundamental  an Error Is Our Dispositionism?
As  the  previous  subsection  suggested,  considerable  evidence
reveals  that our dispositionism  runs very  deep. 46  But even  if most of
us, including  legal  economists,  are  hard-core  dispositionists,  there  is
a  second,  related  question  regarding  the  extent  to  which
dispositionism  is  wrong:  That is, just how influential  is situation  vis-A-
vis  disposition?  How  much  like  a  play  are  the  settings  in  which
humans actually find themselves  and observe others?
It  is  difficult  to  read  about  Milgram's  experiments  and  the
reactions  to  them  without  strongly  suspecting  that  the  human
presumption  is  exactly  inverted; that  what we  do  not see  dominates
the  little  that  we  do  see.  That  suspicion  would,  in  our  view,  be
generally  correct.  But  since  those  early  studies, social  psychologists
have managed  to get a better measure  of that inversion,  a sample  of
which we will highlight here.
When we introduced  Milgram's  famous  experiments, we  asserted
that most  readers  would,  like  us,  predict  that they  themselves  would
not have  carried  out  the  instructions  to  shock a  fellow experimental
subject at high voltages.  Most readers surely would  have predicted  ex
ante  that  the  vast  majority  of others  would  not  have  gone  through
with  it  either, just  as  the  lay  people  and  psychologists  surveyed  by
Milgram  before  his  experiment  predicted. 4
7  This  divergence
between  the  common  sense  prediction  and  the  actual  behavior,  we
indicated, was  due to the  erroneous  presumption  that people  behave
dispositionally  rather  than  situationally.  In  fact,  the  situational
features  were  central,  leading  many  to  shock  their  fellow  subjects
despite  having  an  otherwise  normal  or  benign  character. 4
3  Once
one is familiar with Milgram's  experiments,  it would  seem difficult  to
deny his central  claim-that situation  played  a major role in  causing
the subjects to perform as  they did.
And yet, social  psychologists  have found  that even when  exposed
to  the Milgram  study, people  continue  to  conclude  that  the  subjects
were  motivated  dispositionally  and  thus  miss  the  power  of  the
146 See  KUNDA,  supra  note  20,  at  432-41  (providing  a  fascinating  review  of
additional  types of evidence  of the fundamental  attribution  error).
:47 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
48 See ZIMBARDO  & LEIPPE,  supra note  22, at 70  (dismissing the argument that
Milgram's  subjects  were  somehow  "bad  apples"  by  pointing  out  that  the
experimental  "results were the  same:  meek obedience  to  unjust authority" across
a wide demographic  subject population).
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situation  even  when  it  is  made  explicit.  For  example,  social  psych-
ologist  Martin  Safer  showed  students  Milgram's  film,  Obedience,"W,
which  portrays  the  dynamics  of  the  situational  forces  operating  in
Milgram's  experiments.  One week later,  Safer  provided  his students
with  a  description  of the  control  experiment  where  the  subject  or
"teacher"  was free  to choose the  shock level  on  his  own,  without  any
direction  by  the  experimenter  to  increase  the  voltage  after  each
wrong  answer.' 0  Safer  then  asked  the  students  to  make  certain
predictions,  including  the  average  shock  level  set by  the  teachers  in
the  control  experiment  and  the percentage of teachers  choosing  the
maximum  shock level.'0'
Even  after  seeing  the  film  of the  obedience  experiment and  the
situational pressures  of the experiment, Safer's  students  still believed
that  disposition  was  driving  the  teachers  and  would  do  so  even  in
other  situations,  including  that in  which  they  were  given  no  orders
from the  experimenter.  When  comparing  the  students'  forecasts  to
the  actual  results  of  the  control  experiment,  Safer's  students
significantly  overestimated  both  the  average  shock  level  set  by  the
teachers  and  the  number  of  teachers  who  chose  the  maximum
amount of shock  absent the  most significant  situational  forces  of  the
original  obedience  experiment.
2   In  other  words,  Safer's  students
persisted  in  believing  that  the  teachers  in  Milgram's  original
experiment  were  motivated  by  stable  disposition  rather  than  the •  153
situation of the expenment.
This,  of  course,  completely  contradicts  the  findings  of  the  ex
ante  surveys in  which  people  drastically  underestimated the amount  of
149  OBEDIENCE  (Stanley Milgram  1969).
150  Martin  A.  Safer, Attributing Evil to the Subject, Not the Situation:  Student Reaction
to Milgram's Film on  Obedience, 6  PERSONALITY &  SOC.  PSYCHOL.  BULL.  205,  205-06
(1980).
151  Id. at 206.
152 Id. at 207.
153 Id. at 208.  In  Milgram's  movie  about the experiments,  only one of the many
subjects  is  shown  flipping  the  final  switch,  even  though  a  majority  of  those
participating did so.  OBEDIENCE,  supra note  149.  According to  folk wisdom among
social  psychologists,  that is because  the subjects  who  went that far  did not want  to be
shown  on  film  doing  so,  presumably  because  they  felt  that  their  actions  reflected
badly  on  their  dispositions.  In  other  words,  it  appears  that  even  the  subjects
interpreted what happened in largely dispositionist terms.  As revealed in one subject's
reflections one year after the experiment, subjects and their family members construed
the experiment as  revealing dispositionism:  "As my wife said,  '[ylou  can  call yourself
Eichmann.'  I hope  I  can  deal  more  effectively  with  any  future  conflicts  of values  I
encounter."  MILGRAM,  OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY, supra  note 86, at 54.
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shocking  that  would  occur  with  situational  pressures  present.  The
contradiction  again  reveals  the  underlying  consistency  of  the
stubborn command  of our dispositionism.  Even  when  the power  of
the  situation  was  made  explicit,  "subjects continued  to  interpret
behavior in  terms  of presumed  dispositions,  rather  than  recognizing
the  crucial  role  that  Milgram's  particular  situation  had  played  in
producing his disturbing demonstration . Our dispositionism  runs
deep, despite the fact that situation often runs deeper.
In  another  classic  demonstration  of this  phenomenon,  subjects
were  asked to read a short essay on "Castro's Cuba"  and to judge  the
true  attitude  of  the  writer  toward  Castro.  The  subjects  were
informed  that  the  essay  was  a  prepared  answer  to  an  examination
question, in which  some  exam  takers  were  asked  to criticize  Castro's
Cuba and  other exam  takers were  asked  to  defend it.  Subjects  thus
understood  that the writer  of any exam  had  little choice  with  respect
to the position he or she took regarding  Castro's Cuba.  Surprisingly,
many of the subjects  nevertheless  associated  the writer's true attitude
(disposition)  toward  Castro  with  the  content  of  the  essay.  If  the
writer  wrote  a  pro-Castro  essay  as  (situationally)  directed,  many
subjects  concluded  that the writer was  privately  (dispositionally)  pro-
Castro,  and  vice  versa.
55  Thus,  even  when  situational  influences
should  be  obvious  and  even  when  people  are  watching  what  is
tantamount  to a  play,  humans  still  tend  to  overestimate  the  role  of
disposition.
Consider  another  exemplary  experiment.  In  this  one,  college
students  participated  in  a simulated  quiz  game  and  were  randomly
assigned  to  either  of  two  roles:  contestant  or  questioner.
Questioners  were  asked  to  compose  general-knowledge  queries  to be
posed  to  the  contestants,  and  the  contestants  were  instructed  to
answer  as  many  of the  questions  as  they  could.1
57  The  situational
IA Ross & NISBETr,  supra note 9, at 132.
155 See  Edward  E.  Jones  &  Victor  A.  Harris,  The  Attribution of Attitudes,  3  J.
EXPERIMENTAL  SOC.  PSYCHOL.  1,  4-8  (1967).  Jones  and  Harris  observed  similar
results  in  a  second  experiment  that  had  the  subjects  draw  dispositional  inferences
based on  hearing an opening statement in  a debate.  Id. at 8-14.
J56  Lee  D.  Ross  et al.,  Social Roles, Social Control, and Biases in Social-Perception
Processes, 35 J.  PERSONALITY  &  SOC.  PSYCHOL.  485,  485-94  (1977).  In  a  separate
experiment,  observers  of the  simulated  quiz  game  exhibited  the  same  dispositional
bias as the contestants.  Thus, even  though the observers were  aware of the situational
advantage  of the  questioners,  the  observers  nonetheless  ranked  the  questioners  as
more generally knowledgeable  than the contestants.  Id. at 490-91.
157 Id. at 489-94.
2003]170  UNIVERSITY  OF  PEANSYLVANIA  LAW REVIEW
advantage  of  the  questioners  is  clear,  given  that  they  could  draw
from their areas of personal  expertise, while  contestants were  forced
to answer  questions  on unfamiliar  topics.  Therefore,  it should not
have  been  surprising  that  contestants  could  only  give  a  small
percentage  of correct  answers.  Yet,  when  it  came  to  estimating
the  intelligence  of  the  two  groups,  the  situational  advantage
was  forgotten:  both  questioners  and  contestants  grossly  under-
appreciated  the  situational  benefit  of  being  a  questioner.  As  a
result,  both  groups  ranked  the  questioners  as  more  generally
knowledgeable  than  contestants.  In  other  words,  the  game  was
perceived  as  a fair measure  of general  knowledge,  and  the failure  of
contestants  was  attributed  to  disposition.  Put  differently,
158 This  study (and  the many  like)  it would be, if they were well  known,  a favorite
among law students and anyone  else  on  the business  end of the Socratic  method.  Cf
LANi  GUINIER  ET AL.,  BECOMING  GENTLEMEN:  LAW  SCHOOL  AND  INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE  28  (1997)  (noting that many women are alienated by the use of the Socratic
method,  especially  in  the  first  year  of  law  school);  Lani  Guinier  et  al.,  Becoming
Gentlemen:  Women's Experiences at One Ivy  League Law School, 143  U.  PA. L.  REv.  1, 6-59
(1994)  (describing in detail the results of the study discussed in Guinier's book).
In  another important study, a group  of subjects was  asked to  divide  a set of their
peers into two categories:  those the subjects  thought would  be likely  to contribute  to
a  tood  drive,  and  those  they  believed  would  be  unlikely  to  contribute.  ROSS  &
NISBETT,  supra note  9,  at 132.  Half of each  group-the  "most likely" and  the "least
likely"-was  then  sent  a  personalized  letter  asking  for  a  specific  food  donation,
including  a  map  of where  to  deliver  the  item.  Id.  The  other  half of each  group
received a generic form letter requesting only a general food donation, and with no
map.  Id.
The study confirmed both the prevalence of dispositionism  and the dominance of
situation  in determining  actual conduct.  The  subjects who  selected  the "most likely"
and "least likely" groups predicted  that dispositional  ascriptions, not the  type of letter
received,  would  determine who would  actually  donate food.  Id. at  133.  Specifically,
subjects  predicted  that  disposition  (the  type  of person)  would  be  nearly  five  times
more  influential  than  situation  (the  type  of letter).  But when  the letters  were sent
aud  the food was collected, it turned  out that the influence  of situation  was  over four
times  greater  than  the  influence  of disposition-those  who  received  personal  letters
mth  a map  were  much  more likely  to donate  food.  Id.  Of course,  even  that figure
oxerstates  the  role  of  disposition,  because  even  those  seemingly  "dispositional"
influences  may be explained  in  part by situational  influences  beyond  the channeling
effect  of the letter.  In any event, the subjects  tended to  see what  mattered least and
miss what mattered most.
DISPOSITION
Most Likely  Least Likely
SITUATION  Channeling  Letter  83%  predicted/  17% predicted/
42%  actual  25%  actual
Non-Channeling  80%  predicted/  16% predicted/
Letter  8%  actual  0% actual
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participants  saw  the  players  and  missed  the  playing  field,  thus
presuming  that it was  level.
Finally,  consider  the  following  experimental  inquiry  into  the
social-psychological  lessons  of  the  classic  Christian  parable  of  the
Good  Samaritan.  In  the  biblical  version  of  the  story,  Jesus,  in
response  to  questioning  by  a  lawyer  about  the  meaning  of
neighborliness,  tells  of a  man  mortally  wounded  and  left  on  a  road
by  thieves.1  The  man was  passed  first by  a priest, who  saw  the  hurt
man  but  did  not  stop  to  help  him.  Next,  a  Levite  (a  priest's
assistant)  passed  the  man,  saw  him,  but  continued  on  without
stopping.  Finally came  a man  from Samaria-a  Samaritan.  He  saw
the  wounded  man  and  "was  moved  to  pity.  He  went  up  and
bandaged  his wounds..,  brought  him  to  an  inn,  and  looked  after
him  there."'6  Having  told  this  story, Jesus  turns  to  the  lawyer  and
asks,  "Which  of these  three  do you think  was  neighbor  to the  man
who fell into  the hands  of the robbers?"" '  The  answer, of course,  is
that  the  Samaritan  was  the  neighborly  one,  hence  earning  the ,,  ,162
dispositional  moniker the "Good Samaritan.
Social  psychology,  however,  instructs that situation  may  provide
a better  explanation  for  the  conduct of the characters  in  this  tale,  as
it does in so much of our social  life.  This  is not merely conjecture;  it
has  been  subject  to  experiment.16 ' c   Princeton  Theological  Seminary
Subjects  predicted  that  eighty-three  percent  of the  "most  likely"  group  would
donate if they  received  the detailed channeling  information,  and that eighty percent
of the  "most  likely" group  would  donate  if they  received  the  general  letter.  Id.
Subjects  further  predicted  that only seventeen  percent of those deemed  "least likely"
would donate  if they  received  the  letter with  the  channeling  information,  and  that
sixteen  percent of the group  would donate  if they  received  the general  request.  Id.
In  other words,  the  subjects  expected  that  the different  letters would  have  virtually
no effect,  but that the different "types"  of recipients would  have  an  immense  effect.
The  predictions  failed:  only  four  percent  of  subjects  donated  food  in  the  non-
channeling  condition  (none  of the  "least  likelies"  and  eight  percent  of the  "most
likelies"),  while  thirty-three  percent donated food  in  the facilitory  condition  (twenty-
five percent of the "least likelies" and forty-two percent of the "most likelies.").  Id.  As
the  authors  of the  study  noted,  "[t]he  situational  variables  proved  more  important
than the relevant  actors'  dispositions-more  important, at least, than  any dispositions
salient to their peers."  Id.
159 Luke 10:29-37.
166  Id. 10:33-34.
11  Id. 10:36.
'6' Perhaps  revealingly,  the phrase  is  not found  in  the  biblical  tale  at all;  rather,
it has come down to  us through  dispositional interpretations  of the parable.
163  See John  M.  Darley  &  C.  Daniel  Batson,  From Jerusalem to Jericho:  A  Study  of
Situational and Dispositional Variables in  Helping Behavior, 27 J.  PERSONALITY  SOC.
PSYCHOL.  100,  100-08  (1973).
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students  were  asked  to  prepare  a  brief  extemporaneous  talk  that
would  be  recorded  in  a  nearby  building.
6 4  The  experiment  thus
neatly  managed  to  have  its  subjects  parallel  the  priestly
vocations  of  the  characters  in  the  biblical  tale.  Some  of  the
students  were  told  to  discuss  possible  jobs  for  seminary  students,
while  the  others  were  told  to  discuss  the  parable  of  the  Good
Samaritan.
165  After informing  them  about their  respective  talks, the
experimenter  told some  of his  subjects,  "Oh, you're late.  They were
expecting you a few minutes ago.  We'd better get moving." 6 6  These
students were  given  the  high-hurry  situational  condition.  Another
group  of  subjects  was  given  an  intermediate-hurry  situational
condition.  This  group  was  told,  "The  assistant  is  ready  for  you,  so
please  go  right  over.'
167   Finally,  for  a  low-hurry  situational
condition,  the experimenter  told the  remaining  subjects,  "It'll  be a
few minutes before  they're ready for you, but you might as well  head
",168 on over.
Along  the  route  between  the  two  buildings  was  a  man,  the
experimenter's  undisclosed  confederate,  "slumped  in  a  doorway,
head  down,  eyes  closed,  not  moving[,  coughing,  and  groaning] ." 1 69
Only  ten  percent of  the  seminarians  who  had  been  told  they were
running late  (the  high-hurry  situational  condition)  stopped  to  help
the  ailing  man,  and  only  forty-five  percent  of  the  seminarians  who
were  pressed  for time  (the intermediate-hurry  situational  condition)
offered  help.
17 0  In  contrast, among those  who  were  not pressed  for
time  (the  low-hurry situational condition),  sixty-three percent  offered
to  help.  Again,  a  minor  situational  manipulation  produced  a
major behavioral  difference.  Perhaps most indicative  of the power of
situational  influence  is  that  several  of  the  seminarians  who  were
pressed for  time and who were  to speak on the  parable  of the Good
Samaritan  "literally  stepped over the victim"  on  the way  to give  their
talks. 1 72
16C4  Id. at 103.
165  Id.
163 Id. at 103-04.
167 Id. at 104.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 105.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 107.
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What  about  dispositions?  Before  the  experiment  began,  the
seminarians  filled out a survey, answering a variety of questions about
themselves.1 3   For  example,  the  seminarians  were  asked  whether
their  interest  in  religion  stemmed  primarily  from  a  desire  to  assure
their  own  personal  salvation  or  whether  it  was  primarily  related  to
their  desire  to help  others. 74  Such  dispositional  self-ascriptions  had
"virtually  no  role  in  determining  whether  the  subject  stopped  to
help.""'  After  analyzing  psychological  evaluations  of  their  forty
subjects,  the  experimenters  found  that  the  only  significant  variable
that  correlated  with  "helping  behavior"  was  time,  a  situational
factor. 7'  The fact that some of the seminarians  were to speak on the
parable  of  the  Good  Samaritan,  thereby  raising  the  salience  of
dispositional  helping  norms,  did  not  significantly  affect  helping
behavior in the students.
7
Taken  together,  these  experiments  help  bring  into  relief  the
profound  power  of situation  over  human  action.  They  also  reveal
that such  influences are  usually left unexamined in  our daily lives,  in
our stories, and in our theories about what moves people.  There was
little  evidence  of  a  "good  seminarian"  or  a  "bad  seminarian,"  but
there  was  much  evidence  of  "situational  seminarians."  The  differ-
ence  between  the priest who  passes on  and  the Samaritan  who stops
may be  more a function of a bad or good  situation  than  of a  bad or
good disposition.7
We  humans  tend  to  perceive disposition  as dominating  situation
even  though  evidence  from  social  science  strongly  suggests  the
reverse;  this  is,  again,  the  fundamental  attribution  error.  The
objective  here  is  not to  prove  or  to  claim  that  disposition  plays  no
role  in our  behavior, or  even  that it does  not sometimes  play  a very
important  role.  Rather,  the  objective  is  to  make  clear what  social
science  reveals  about just how surprisingly slight  that role  is most  of
the  time-at  least  as  compared  to  what  most  of  us  believe  and,
173 Id. at 102.
174  Id.
175 Ross & NISBETr,  supra  note 9, at 131.
176  Darley & Batson, supra note  163, at 104-06.
177  Id.  at  107;  see  also  Hanson  &  Yosifon,  supra note  30  (discussing  a  related
portion  of this experiment).
178  See also MILGRAM,  OBEDIENCE  TO AUTHORITY,  supra note  86, at  205  ("[T]he
social  psychology  of this century  reveals  a major  lesson:  often,  it  is not so much  the
kind  of  person  a  man  is  as  the  kind  of situation  in  which  he  finds  himself  that
determines  how he will  act.").
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perhaps,  want  to  believe.
17 9   Readers  may,  as  we  do,  take  some
reassurance  from  the  fact  that  ten  percent  of  the  hurried
seminarians  did stop to  assist  the ailing man, despite  their perceived
time  crunch.  But  again,  it  is  easy  to  miss  even  the  profound
situational  influence  wielded  in  that  experiment  by  the  groaning,
slumped  elderly  man.  Settings  with  less  compelling  situational
pressures for help are  likely to  yield  even  less  "goodness."  Indeed,  a
disheartening  finding  is  that,  in  the  many  versions  of  Milgram's
studies,  not  a  single  subject  ever  went  to  check  on  or  assist  the
learner whom  they believed  was being shocked, despite  the learner's
protests  and  ultimate  silence  during  the  "experiment"  and  despite
the  teacher's  own concern  about hurting the learner.'  Why not?  A
good  guess  would  be  that  offering  such  aid  was  somehow  not
situationally scripted.'"
D.  Some Sources of Dispositionism
Why do we see what isn't and fail  to see what is?  We have already
discussed  several  reasons.  First,  part of the  answer  stems  from  the
fact  that  human  actions  dominate  the  field  in  our  causal
attributions-we  see  what  is  most  obvious  and  salient,  and  tend  to
miss  the  rest.Is2  Perhaps  that would not be  such  a  problem were  we
not so inclined  to believe  in the accuracy  of our vision-that we  see
all  there  is  to see,  and  that  what  we  miss  does  not  exist.  Second,
even when  there are  situational  features  that we  might recognize  as
influential,  we  make  dispositional  attributions  automatically,  while
our  situational  adjustments  require  cognitive  effort-meaning  that
dispositionism  is the  default inference,  mutable only when our minds
179 See  infra text  accompanying  notes  193-95,  393-401,  454-56,  638-81  (suggesting
some  of  the  ways  in  which  dispositionism  may  be  linked  to  the  motive  to  affirm
ourselves,  our groups, and  our systems);  supra note  110  (describing  our tendency  to
attribute  cause to situation when  doing so is self-affirming).
180 ZIMBARDO & LEIPPE,  supra note 22, at 73-74.
is) Without a  model of action, our feelings  of upset and our desire  to  help often
lead  to no action.  Milgram discussed  the frustration of a specific "teacher" as such:
This subject  did  not want to  shock  the victim,  and he found it  an extremely
disagreeable  task, but he was  unable to invent a  response that would free  him
from  [the  experimenter's]  authority.  Many subjects  cannot find  the specific
verbal  formula  that would enable them to  reject  the role assigned to them  by
the experimenter.  Perhaps our culture does not provide adequate  models for
disobedience.
Milgram,  Some Conditions  of Obedience, supra note 86,  at 67.
182  See supra text accompanying  notes  21-22.
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are  not  otherwise  occupied. ""  Third,  even  then  our  automatic  dis-
positional attributions  will contaminate  the adjustments for situations
that  we  do  have  the  cognitive  energy  to  make.11
4  As  significant  as
those reasons are, there  is more  to consider.
To  comprehend  the  robustness  of dispositionism,  it is  necessary
to  understand  that  the  causal  ambiguities  that  fog  our experiences
allow,  and  often  encourage,  it.  As  Lee  Ross  and  Richard  Nisbett
have  argued  at  length,  our  dispositionism  often  appears  to  be
confirmed  in  the evidence we  encounter in our daily  lives.11
5  That is
true  in  part  because  we  tend  to  see  what  we  expect  to  see,  and,
particularly  in  Western  culture,  disposition  is  the  general
expectation."  We  will  return  to both  of these  points  below.8 7  For
now it is enough to say  that our construals of what we experience  (or
of  our  memories  of  what  we  have  experienced)  are  far  more
malleable  in  service of our expectations than we  recognize.
But even  if we were  seeing what  "is,"  our  dispositionist theory  of
human  conduct  will  tend  to  be  confirmed  by  the  evidence  we
encounter,  though  our  interpretation  of  that  evidence  is  often
fundamentally  wrong.  We  constantly  see  people  behaving  in  ways
consistent with  our assumptions  about their personality traits, and we
often  conform  our  own  interactions  with  them  based  on  those
dispositional  accounts.  Our predictions are  confirmed,  however,  not
because dispositions  are in fact stable, but because  situations so  often
are:
In  the  course  of  ordinary  experience,  we  rarely  have  a  chance  to
observe  the  same  people  in  radically  different  roles  or situations  in  a
way  that  would  test  fairly  the  cross-situational  consistency  of  their
geniality,  generosity,  or  ability  to  delay  gratification.  Nor  do  we
systematically  vary  our  own  behavior,  or  our status  and  circumstances,
or the  nature  of our  relationships  with  others,  to  determine  how  their
responses  might change  as  a result.188
And  even  if  "the  many  situations  in  which  we  observe  our
acquaintances  are  quite  diverse,  they  all  share  an  important
See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
84  See supra  notes  144-45 and accompanying text.
185 Ross & NISBETr,  supra note 9, at 145-58.
86  See  infra text  accompanying  notes 418-52;  see also KUNDA,  supra note  20,  at
442  (asserting  that  Western  culture's  emphasis  on  personality  traits  leads  to  the
expectation that human behavior will  be consistent across different situations).
187  See infra Part VI.C.
188  ROSS & NISBETr,  supra note 9,  at 147-48.
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element-our  presence.  What we  see and  what  we  expect  to  see
operate  as  self-fulfilling,  situational  forces  on  those  we  are
observing' 90 -our  dispositionism is part of the  situation.  As  Ross  and
Nisbett explain,  none  of this  implies  that dispositionism  is correct;  it
implies  only  that  people  will  experience  dispositionism  as  a
reasonably  reliable  heuristic  for  predicting  behavior.  Because  the
people  we  observe  will  tend  to  behave  as  if they  are  motivated  by
disposition  and  not  situation,  the  data  we  collect  will  appear  to
confirm  our  flawed  dispositionist  conception  of the  humans  we  are
observing:
It  is  precisely  the  confounding  of  person  and  situation  that  allows
people  to  be  well  served  by  their  naive  dispositionism.  When  we
predict  that  the  behavior  of  professors  will  be  professorial,  that  the
behavior  of dictators  will  be  dictatorial,  that  the  behavior of servants
will  be servile  . . . it  makes  little  difference  whether we  do  so  because
we  are  aware  of  the  impact  of  the  respective  roles,  because  we  have
made stereotyped judgments  about the  types  of individuals  who occupy
such  roles,  or  because  we  have  taken  role-prescribed  behavior  at  face
value  and  ascribed  corresponding  personality  traits  to  the  actor.  In
each  case,  the  performances  we  observe  more  often  than  not  will
confirm  our  predictions..,  provided  that  no  other  powerful
situational  factors suddenly intrude.
9
In  all  those  ways,  our  dispositionism  is  shielded  from  having  to
regularly  confront unambiguously anomalous  evidence.
189  KUNDA,  supra  note 20, at 442.
1  See id. at  442-43  (summarizing  the  "considerable  amount  of evidence  [that]
suggests  that our expectations  of others can be self-fulfilling").
191  Ross  &  NISBETr,  supra note  9,  at  150.  Briefly  below,  and  in  some  detail  in
Hanson  &  Yosifon,  supra  note  30,  we  discuss  other  motives  that  amplify  our
dispositionism.  See  infra notes  193-94,  393-401,  454-56, 638-81  and  accompanying  text
(highlighting  some  of  the  connections  between  motivation  and  dispositionism).
Research  in  system  legitimation  theory,  for example,  suggests  that when we  perceive
our social  systems  to be under threat-as in periods  of social  instability-we  exhibit a
heightened  tendency  to dispositionalize  out-groups and individuals within out-groups,
blaming their stable character  traits for the threat, and missing situational factors  that
may be  the real  cause  of the  threat.  See,  e.g., John T. Jost, Outgroup Favoritism and the
Theory  of System Justification, in  COGNITIVE  SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY  86,  101  (Gordon  B.
Moskowitz  ed.,  2001)  (noting  that  "the  presence  of an  ideological  threat  directed
against the national  system increases  stereotypic differentiation" between inside groups
and outside groups).
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E.  The Fundamental  Interior  Attribution Error
(or, Getting Ourselves Wrong)
We  all wear glasses that cany a date in  time and the name of some geographic
area, and with even  the keenest of vision these glasses allow us to see only  limited
distances and partial  motion of our world.
-George  Stigler"'
The  upside-down  causal  ascriptions  behind  the  fundamental
attribution  error  are  also  explained  by  a  more  subtle,  though  as
we've  emphasized  is  often  the  case, no  less important  understanding
of the  human  animal.  Appreciating  its significance  requires  distin-
guishing  between  two  types  of fundamental  attribution  error.  The
first is the sort that we have been discussing since opening the Article
and  that social  psychologists  have  in  mind  when  they use  the  term.
We  will  call  this  the  exterior fundamental attribution  error.  When
humans look at any setting  and make  causal  attributions,  certain  key
features  of that  setting-the  observable  actions  of individuals-exert
disproportionate  influence  over  their  evaluations.  They  see  what  is
easy  to see and  tend  to  miss  what  is not.  Thus,  observers  give  little
or no weight to the fact that Milgram's  shock box had many switches
instead of just one-a distinction  that most social psychologists  now
recognize  was  likely  influential.  All  the  observers  see  is  the  teacher
shocking  (or, if they are  imagining  themselves  in  the  teacher's  role,
not shocking)  the learner.
The theoretic primacy  of dispositionism  also reflects  what we call
the  interior fundamental  attribution  error.  That  error,  which  is
analogous  to  its  exterior  counterpart,  is  the  tendency  to  "see"  and
attribute  a  powerful  causal  role  to  certain  salient  features  of  our
interior  that  exercise  comparatively  little  causal  influence  over  our
behavior while, at the same  time, failing to see those interior features
that are highly influential.  Those salient features  of our interior that
we  see, in turn, make  possible  (if not likely)  a theory  of ourselves  in
which  dispositions  play  a  role-usually  the  dominant  role-in  our
behavior.  We  are  primed  by  our  felt  interior  experience  to  see
dispositions  and  to  overlook  a  potentially  more  significant
influence-the  situation.  In  that  way,  the  interior  fundamental
attribution error contributes  significantly  to the exterior fundamental
attribution error.
192 STIGLER,  supra note  70, at 219.
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In  a  companion  article,  we  describe  what  many  people-
particularly  those  of us  in  the  West-"see"  when  we  look  into  our
interiors:  above  all,  we  "observe"  ourselves  thinking, perceive  that we
have  preferences,  experience  our  "wills,"  and  see  our  actions,
which  we  attribute  to  that  salient  combination  of  thought,
preferences,  and will.'
1"  Again,  that  myopic  vision  of our  interiors,
just like our vision of our exteriors,  is fundamentally  distorted  by our
oversight  of  many  far  more  important  influences  that  elude  our
conscious awareness.
The  bulk  of  our  companion  article  is  devoted  to  bridging
-though  only loosely-that  gulf and  examining  the  implications  of
the  fundamental  interior  attribution  error.  More  specifically,  that
article  describes  at  length  how  causal  attributions,  motives,
emotions,  visceral  factors,  implicit  attitudes,  knowledge  structures,
affiliations  and  group  memberships,  and  behavior  itself  invisibly
influence  our  more  visible  cognitions,  attitudes,  and  actions.  It
explains  how  the  desire  to  see  ourselves,  the  groups  and  institutions
with  which  we  identify,  and  our world  in  self-affirming  ways,  has  an
immense  effect  on  how  we  construe  our  environs  and  ourselves,
including  our  own  interiors.
194  In  doing  so,  the  companion  article
helps to clarify how the  interior and exterior fundamental attribution
errors  combine  to  render  "axiomatic,  though  generally  implicit,  in
many modern Western  cultures,"  the beliefs  that:
*  Actions are freely chosen.
*  Choices imply a preference.
*  Preferences are stable over time.
"  Preferences  implicate  the identity of the self.
"  Outcomes are mostly controllable.
*  People  are  responsible  for  (and hence  the  self is  implicated
in)  the choices  they make  and the  resulting outcomes.
"  Smart  (good)  people  make  good  choices  whose  outcomes
they are happy with.' 9 5
See Hanson  & Yosifon,  supra note  30.
194  Id.
195 Alan  P.  Fiske  et  al.,  The  Cultural Matrix  of  Social  Psychology,  in  2  THE
HANDBOOK OF  SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY  915,  939  (Daniel T. Gilbert  et al.  eds.,  4th  ed.
1998).
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Those  axioms are implicit for most of us, and, as  this Article  and
our next illuminate,  they define  the  starting  points for most scholars
and  policymakers.  Indeed,  neoclassical  economists  have  built  their
theory  around a formal  version of those basic  axioms.  According  to
conventional  economic  assumptions,  a  person's  preferences  can  be
inferred  from  that  person's  choices-the  latter  reveal  the  former. ' 6
As illustrated  in this Article and its companion,  the  starting  points  of
dominant legal  theories are  unrealistic and are  based  on fundamen-
tally inaccurate visions of humanity.
III.  A BRIEF INTRODUCTION  TO CRITICAL  REALISM
[The search was on, from  World  War H onwards, for a  new  method to  replace
the  deductive approach of the  late nineteenth century  with  some  criterion for
judicial lawmaking other than open-ended,  contextualized policy  analysis, one
that would be plausibly non-political.
-Duncan  Kennedy'
197
The life of the law has not been logic:  it has been experience.
-Oliver  Wendell Holmes'
"
In  light  of  evidence  about  how  real  humans  actually  behave,
most  conventional  legal  theories,  which  are  based  primarily  on
dispositionist  premises,  seem  suspect.  By  way  of  an  alternative,
therefore,  this Section  introduces  critical realism-the legal  theoretic
approach  hinted  at  above,  named  and  cursorily  defined  here,  and
employed in this Article  and in others to follow.""
Because  terms like  "critical" and "realism"  have  been widely used
to describe  a variety of legal-theoretic  approaches,  and  because  they
have been  infused  with a variety of meanings, we  begin by offering  a
loose,  simple  explanation  of what we  hope  to capture  by  the  phrase
"critical realism.,
2 00
196 See  COOTER  &  ULEN,  supra note  7,  at  348  (explaining  economists'  use  of
directly observable  choices to impute the decision maker's  unobservable  preferences);
Hanson  & Yosifon,  supra note  30  (summarizing  revealed  preference  theory  and  the
dispositionist assumptions of economics and law and economics).
197  Kennedy, supra note 51,  at 468.
198 OLIVER WENDELL  HOLMES, JR.,  THE COMMON LAW  I  (Little, Brown  & Co.  1946)
(1881).
199  For a sample of these works, see manuscripts cited supra note 84.
200  We  are  not  the  first  to  employ  the  term  "critical  realism."  In  fact,  legal
scholars  have  previotsly  formulated  several  variants  of the  phrase,  though  none  of
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them  have adopted quite the meaning  that we  intend.  Morton  Horwitz, for example,
used  the  term  to  denote  an  approach within  the  tradition  of American  legal  realism
that  emphasized  the  practical  political  applications  of legal  theory.  See MORTON  J.
HORWITZ,  THE  TRANSFORMATION  OF  AMERICAN  LAW,  1870-1960:  THE  CRISIS  OF
LEGAL  ORTHODOXY  209-10  (1992).  Horwitz  distinguishes  "critical"  realists  from
"constructive"  realists,  who  he  describes  as  having been  more dedicated  than critical
realists  to  "subordinat[ing]  political  and moral passion  to  social  science expertise"  in
the  study  of law.  Id.  Horwitz  characterizes  this  brand  of  critical  realism  as  a
predecessor  to  the critical legal studies movement.  Id. at 270-71.
More  recently,  a  few  contemporary  scholars  have  adopted  the  term  "critical
realism"  to  describe  their  own  approach  to  legal  scholarship.  Ruben J.  Garcia  has
employed the  phrase to name  his work, which, in  the tradition  described  by Horwitz,
is aimed  simultaneously at a critical  and a  political agenda.  See Ruben J. Garcia,  New
Voices  at  Work:  Race  and  Gender Identity  Caucuses in  the  U.S.  Labor Movement,  54
HASTINGS  L.J.  79,  117  (2002)  (presenting  his  project  as  one  that  embraces  a
"'critical'  view of the endemic  nature of racism  and sexism  in  society but seeks  to  be
'realistic'  about potential legal  reform programs in light of contemporary realities  and
the limits of legal change").
Howard  Engelskirchen  employs  another modern variant  of "critical  realism" that
is  concerned  more  particularly  with  analyzing  the  "generative  structures  or
mechanisms  at work in  nature and society that cause  the manifest phenomena of our
natural  and social  world."  Howard  Engelskirchen,  Consideration as the  Commitment to
Relinquish Autonomy,  27  SETON  HALL  L.  REV.  490,  500  (1997).  While  part  of our
endeavor  shares  in  that basic  effort, our  approach  differs  dramatically from  that of
Engelskirchen  in  two  ways.  First,  he  emphasizes  that  he  "want[s]  to  distinguish
sharply...  between the genesis of human actions, lying in the reasons, intentions  and
plans  of people, on the one hand, and the structures  governing the reproduction  and
transformation  of social  activities,  on  the other."  Id. at 508  (quoting  ROY  BHASKAR,
THE  POSSIBILITY OF NATURALISM  35  (2d  ed. 1989)).  Second,  he  "rel[ies]  on  the fact
that the market economy  in which  we live is  characterized  by the private  autonomy of
its agents."  Id. at 510.  As will become clear, if it is  not already, we  do not adopt either
of these premises.
Finally,  Anthony  Fejfar  has  undertaken  still  another  version  of critical  realism
based  on  the  work  of  Bernard  J.  F.  Lonergan,  a  knowledge  theorist  within  the
philosophy  of science  tradition.  See Anthony J.  Fejfar,  Insight into Lawyering:  Bernard
Lonergan's Critical Realism  Applied  to Jurisprudence, 27  B.C.  L.  REV.  681,  682  (1986)
(presenting  Lonergan's  theory  that  knowledge  is  rooted  in  "affirmations  which  are
made  on  the  level  of judgment,"  a  presumption  that  serves  as  the  foundation  of
Fejfar's  approach).  According  to Fejfar,  "critical  realism  envisages  a  system  which  is
flexible enough to  deal with the human world as it actually  exists  in the concrete  and
particular."  Id.  at  717.  Fejfar  has  also  employed  concepts  from  developmental
psychology  in  his  critical  realist approach,  particularly  with  respect  to  a study on  the
concept  of  corporate  voluntarism.  See  Anthony  J.  Fejfar,  Corporate  Voluntarism:
Panacea or  Plague? A  Question  of  Horizon,  17  DEL.  J.  CORP.  L.  859,  863  (1992)
(analyzing  corporate  voluntarism  from  the  perspective  of liberal  rationalist,  critical
rationalist, and  critical realist "horizons" to determine  the extent to which one's point
of view impacts one's analysis of the subject).
As  described  in  the  text,  we  derive  our  notion  of  critical  realism  from  our
understanding  of  the  American  legal  realist  tradition  and  the  critical  legal  studies
movement.  Our use  of the term  is  meant  to signal  our intention  to  incorporate  the
best  of what we  find  in  each  of  these  traditions,  but  in  a  manner  that  we  hope
advances  legal  theory  in  ways  that  differ  from  both  of  them.  We  have  not  been
[Vol.  152:129THE SITUATION
A.  "Realism"
By  "realism"  we  mean,  first,  to  suggest  that  our  approach  is  a
descendent  of American  legal  realism and  to  claim  allegiance  to  the
basic assumptions  and attitudes  that its other descendents,  including
law and  economics20'  and  law  and  society,  claim.  The  theoretical
foundation  of  the  legal  realist  tradition  includes  "a  'scientific
outlook'  that posits  a  knowable  world  out there  beyond  the  text, a
world  whose  workings  are  not  transparent  and  which  invite
exploration  to  discern  their  deeper  and  truer  contours.,
02   This
tradition  of realism  has been  driven  by  the  desire  to  "explain  legal
realities" through  a commitment  to the  belief that "legal  scholarship
(and  law)  will  be  enriched  by  the  application  of  science.
20
3  The
"science"  of  this  tradition  is  a  social  science,  for  the  realist  is
committed  to  the  consequentialist  belief  that  "the  meaning  of law
resides  in  its  effects  on  human  well-being  (variously  conceived)
directly informed by, nor have we attempted to directly engage,  the notions of critical
realism  employed  by the scholars whose  use of the  term we have  noted here,  though
we  have  little  doubt  that  some  of  our  work  and  some  of  theirs  are  mutually
supportive  in significant  ways.
We  also  want  to  distinguish  our  "realism"  from  that employed  in  international
relations theory, where the word "realism" has come to be associated with a somewhat-
stylized  school  of thought  focusing  almost  exclusively  on  states.  Theorists  of this
school assume  states  to be rational, unitary, and functionally  identical  in  their desire
to  maximize  "power"  and  their  unwillingness  to  subject  themselves  to  international
institutions  except  where  it  serves  self interested,  power-maximizing  goals.  See,  e.g.,
Anne-Marie  Slaughter, Liberal International Relations Theory  and International  Economic
Law,  10  AM.  U.  J.  INT'L  L.  &  POL'Y  717,  721-24  (1995)  (defining  and  discussing
"realism"  in  the  context  of international  relations  theory).  This  dispositionalizing
brand  of realism  intentionally  downplays  the  role  of non-state  actors,  ideology,  and
countless other  factors, holding that  a simplified,  state-centric  view  is the  most useful
heuristic  for  understanding  the  operation  of  international  relations.  Thus,  in
international  relations  theory,  realism  at  times  becomes  somewhat  detached  from
reality; perhaps ironically, other theories purporting to be more  realistic  often define
themselves  in  opposition  to  "realism."  See  id. at  724-31  (describing  "institutional-
ism"  and  "liberalism"  as  alternatives  to  "realism"  in  international  relations
theory).  By  contrast,  the  kind  of  realism  articulated  in  this  project  differs
substantially  in  that  its  basic  principles  are  an  openness  to  rethinking  traditional
starting principles and a willingness  to question  familiar heuristics in light of empirical
observations.
201 But see POSNER, supra note  127, at 3  (criticizing  legal  realism  and downplaying
its relationship  to law and economics).
202  Galanter  &  Edwards,  supra note  59,  at  377.  For an  overview of the  develop-
ment and historical  significance  of American  legal  realism,  see  HORWITZ,  supra note
200, at 169-92  (1992).
203  Galanter & Edwards, supra  note 59, at 377.
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rather  than  in  its  formal  characteristics.
20 4  Perhaps  most  import-
antly, legal  realists  believe  that  their task  is  not only  important,  but
promising;  the  history  of  realism  has  been  advanced  under  "a
conviction  that  knowledge  derived  from  [its]  undertaking  can
promote  greater  felicity  by  modifying  social  arrangements."2 5  We
will  return  to  this  discussion  of realism,  but we  first want  to  briefly
explain the "critical" side of critical  realism.
B.  "Critical"
By  "critical,"  we  mean  to  suggest  that  our  theory  is  also  a
descendent  of  critical  legal  studies  and  other  post-modem
approaches  to  law,  such  as  feminist  legal  theory  and  critical  race
theory.0 6  To be  critical, we  believe, means  to have  (as  we  do)  serious
reservations  about  how "knowable"  our world is,  about  the existence
of  truly  neutral,  apolitical  social  sciences  and  legal  doctrines,  and
about  the  independence  of judges,  scholars,  and  other  reputedly
neutral  actors  and  institutions  from  the  influence  of  existing
allocations  of power.
We do not see  any necessary  contradiction  between  the "realism"
leg and the "critical"  leg of our approach,  and it is  in part our belief
that  a  successful  legal  theory must  stand  on both  legs  that motivates
this project.  Social  scientists are never free  from the deep biases  that
shadow  human  thinking,  and  they  should  therefore  be  continually
self-critical  and  suspicious  of  the  "knowledge"  they  produce.
Nevertheless,  social  science  done  well  can  help  us  understand  those
biases and limitations,  and, in turn, their influence  over our theories
and institutions.  Such  insights  can  assist us  in  better  understanding
our social arrangements and in improving overall  well-being.
Holmes believed  that the  life  of the  law  is  experience,  and  so  it
may  be, but to  make  sense  of and  to  guide  that life,  legal scholars,
among  others,  should  be  skeptical  of  how  that  experience  is
construed.  Legal  analysis,  in  other  words,  should  begin  with  a
critical  examination  of  our  experience  and  our  perceptions  of that
experience.  So  critical  realism  is  dedicated  to  gaining  knowledge
204  [d.
205 Id.
206 For an  overview  of the meaning  and significance  of the  critical  legal  studies
movement,  see  ROBERTO  MANGABEIRA  UNGER,  THE  CRITICAL  LEGAL  STUDIES
MOVEMENT 542 (1986).  Although  Galanter and Edwards  might disagree,  see Galanter
& Edwards, supra note 59, at 377-78,  we consider critical legal studies and other critical
schools  to be as much the heirs of legal realism  as law and economics,  if not more.
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about  our  world  through  scientific  inquiry  and  theoretical  analysis,
while  simultaneously  seeking  to unearth  and  understand  the  myriad
biases  that render suspicious  the "knowledge"  that  our inquiries  and
2017 theories produce.
C.  What Is So Critical  About Realism?
We have been moving  in  a direction in which  we have an increasingly limited
control over our own lives, and that movement  has been nourished by  a series of
arguments which, quite simply, are untrue.
-Milton  Friedman
20 8
With  that,  we  can  describe  a second,  even  more  important  facet
of  what  we  mean  by  "critical  realism."  For  reasons  that  were
suggested  above  and  will  become  more  evident  below,  we  believe
that,  to  best  promote  human  understanding  and  well-being,  legal
theories  must  be  anchored  in  a  reality-based  understanding  of
human  thinking  and behavior.  Realism,  we  think,  is critical.  To  be
realists,  on  this  telling,  means  to  begin  with  real  humans  and  to
build models  from there, rather than  to begin with  models and  then
view  and  interpret  humans  through  them.  The  distinction  may  be
better  understood  by  contrasting our approach  with  what we  do not
mean  by  realism,  and  by  describing  and  distinguishing  among  the
quasi-realistic  commitments  that  some  legal  scholars  have  recently
made.
In  a  related  article,  we  detail  the justifications  that  economists
offer  for  dispositionism  in  economics  and  the  extent  to  which
economic  and legal-economic  theorists  have,  in the  name  of realism,
begun  to relax  some of the  traditional  assumptions behind  the  basic
rational  actor  model.2°9  As  we  conclude  in  that  article,  there  is  no
compelling  justification  for  the  various  shades  of  unrealism  of
economics  and law and  economics, which  are more  or less  premised
207  In  important  ways,  we  understand  our  admittedly  loose  and  ambiguous
epistemology  to  resemble  that  of positionatity, which  "acknowledges  the  existence  of
empirical  truths,  values  and  knowledge,  and  also  their  contingency,"  Katharine  T.
Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103  HARv.  L. REv.  829,  880  (1990),  and "sets an  ideal
of self-critical  commitment  whereby  I  act, but  consider  the  truths  upon  which  I  act
subject to further refinement, amendment, and correction."  Id. at 883.
208  Milton  Friedman,  Economic Myths  and Public Opinion, NEWSWEEK,  Jan.  1976,
reprinted in BRIGHT PROMISES,  DISMAL  PERFORMANCE:  AaN ECONOMIST'S PROTEST 60,  75
(William R. Allen ed., 1983)  [hereinafter BRIGHT PROMISES].
209  Hanson  & Yosifon, supra note 30.
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on  the  same  fundamental  attribution  error  that  distorts  all  human
reasoning.2 '0  In  this Article,  we  want to  focus  briefly on just one  of
the  more  common  justifications  offered  for  eschewing  a  realistic
account of the  human  animal.  It seems  that a  key  reason  why legal
economists have been  so unwilling  to  get real about human  nature
has  to  do  with  a  somewhat  amorphous,  but  nonetheless  powerful
fear, that realism  is dangerous.
1.  Facing Our Fears of Reality
For example,  in an article devoted  to considering  the implications
of cognitive  psychology for existing products  liability laws,  Professors
Henderson  and  Rachlinski  generally  assume  that  consumers  are
dispositional,  if  cognitively  biased,  actors.  However,  they  con-
clude their article  by  briefly acknowledging  the possibility  that stable
preferences may not in fact underlie consumer "choices":
The  notion  that  manufacturers  distort  consumer  risk-perception
assumes  that  there  is  some  natural  and  appropriate  risk-benefit
assessment  from  which  manufacturers  lead  consumers  astray.  If  we
take  seriously  the  psychological  proposition  that  all  preferences  are
constructed,  then  there  is  no  magical  correct  level  of  risk  that
consumers  should endure. 
11
Their point  seems  to  be  that  if  policymakers  were  to  take
seriously  that  possibility,  then  policy  theory  as  we  know  it
would  be  rendered  largely  meaningless.  We  may  agree  with
that  claim.  But  Henderson  and  Rachlinksi's  closing  observation
highlights  a  troubling  and  common  unwillingness-even  among
cognitive  psychologists  like  Rachlinski-to  confront  the  reality  that
the  available  evidence  reveals.  If  the  implications  of  cognitive
psychology  are  as  drastic  as  Henderson  and  Rachlinski  suggest  they
might be, then why highlight those implications  only in  a concluding
comment,  rather  than  beginning  with  them?  And  why  would
Henderson  and  Rachlinski  largely  ignore  those  implications  in
reaching definitive  policy prescriptions  throughout their article  (and
work) ?21 2
210  Id.
21  James  A.  Henderson,  Jr.  &  Jeffrey  J.  Rachlinski,  Product-Related Risk  and
Cognitive Biases:  The Shortcomings of Enterprise Liability, 6  ROGER  WILLIAMS  U.  L.  REV.
213, 258  (2000).
212  It  is  not as  if Henderson  and  Rachlinski's  policy  analysis  has  no  real-world
influence.  Henderson,  as a  leading  academic  scholar  and  teacher,  a  busy  litigation
consultant  and expert, and one  of the Chief Reporters  for the Third  Restatement of
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Likewise,  numerous  psychology-sensitive  scholars  emphasize  the
influence  of context or situation  when  downplaying  the  relevance  of
social  psychological  insights  for  policy,  but  then  ignore  the
behavioral  implications  of context  in  applying  the  theoretical  model
of law and economics  to  policy  analysis.23  One important reason  for
this  tendency,  we  suspect,  is  that  these  scholars  are  human, and  we
214 humans want our world to make sense.  We  do not easily relinquish
a model  of behavior  or  a vision  of ourselves  that provides  us  with  a
feeling of predictability,  manageability, and  control, or that allows  us
to  maintain  positive  self-conceptions.  We  are  afraid  of letting go  of
comforting, if false,  images of our world and of ourselves:.  And  that
fear, like most, can  be manipulated  and exploited.
Like  Henderson  and  Rachlinski,  Samuel  Issacharoff  concludes
his  review  of  behavioralist  literature  by  emphasizing  the  need  for
"humility" among  those who  apply  its insights.  He  does not dispute
many  of  behavioralism's  findings;  instead,  he  worries  about  their
application.  As he sees it, individualism  and autonomy are themselves
threatened  by  what  behavioralism  demonstrates,  a  threat  that
counsels  caution:
[Behavioralism's  insights]  cannot  possibly  translate  into  a justification
for  greater  constraints  on  individual  decision  making.  Bounded
rationality  should  not  become  the  pretext  for  the  imposition  of  an
overarching  regulatory  structure  on  individuals  ....  [I]t  would  indeed
be  ironic  if  greater  insight  into  the  complexity  of  human  decision
making became  the justification  for taking the freedom  to decide,  even
imperfectly, from  those very  individuals.
Issacharoff  implies  that  if  a  more  accurate  understanding  of
human behavior  interferes  with  our preferred  conception  of who  we
Torts,  has  had as  much  real-world  influence  on tort  law  as virtually  any  other living
person.
213 See, e.g.,  Jennifer Arlen,  Comment:  The Future of Behavioral  Economic Analysis of
Law, 51  VAND.  L.  REV.  1765,  1765-68  (1998)  (arguing that while  behavioral psycholo-
gists'  findings  undermine  rational  choice  theory,  their  resulting  understanding  of
human  behavior  is  too  uncertain  to  formulate  a  credible  alternative  to  the
conventional law and economics framework).
214  See Hanson  & Yosifon,  supra note 30.
215  See id. (reviewing  evidence  of such  motives from  social  psychology  and related
fields).  For other examples  of this propositions,  see MELVINJ.  LERNER,  THE BELIEF IN
A  JUST WORLD:  A  FUNDAMENTAL  DELUSION  (1980); John T. Jost et al.,  Non-Conscious
Forms of System Justiflcation: Implicit and Behavioral  Preferences for Higher Status Groups, 38
J. EXPERIMENTAL  SOC. PSYCHOL. 586  (2002).
216  Samuel  Issacharoff, Can There Be a Behavioral  Law and Economics?, 51  VAND.  L.
REV.  1729,  1745  (1998).
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are, then  the  former must yield.  Beware of those who  challenge  the
basic economic  model, no matter how unrealistic it may be, he seems
to argue, for their apparent realism  may be mere pretextual  cover for
,,2 17 the  imposition  of an  "overarching regulatory structure..  Beware  of
those who  interfere  with your  "individual  decision  making,"  for what
is at stake  is your "freedom to decide." 21 8
Posner brings Issacharoff's  closeted bogeyman  out into the  open.
In  responding  to Jolls,  Thaler,  and  Sunstein's  important  work  on
behavioral  economics,  he writes, again in a concluding  paragraph:
I  wish  to  consider  .briefly  [behavioral  economics']  possible
normative  implications.  On  the  one  hand,  the  picture  of the  human
being  that  [Jolls,  Sunstein,  and  Thaler]  draw  is  one  of  unstable
preferences and  (what turns  out to be  related),  infinite manipulability.
If  you  give  a  worker  childbirth  coverage,  she'll  like  it  (endowment
effect);  but if you  don't give  it  to her,  she'll  dislike  it  (more  precisely,
won't pay for it in  lower wages)  ....  If you  describe  the threat of breast
cancer  to a woman  in  one  way,  she'll  want  a mammogram,  but if you
describe  it  another  although  logically  equivalent  way,  she  won't.
It seems  then  that  the  politically  insulated  corps  of experts that  [Jolls,
Sunstein,  and  Thaler]  favor  would  be  charged  with  determining  the
populace's  authentic  preferences,  which  sounds  totalitarian.  On  the
other  hand ....  [t]he  expert,  too,  is  behavioral  man.  Behavioral  man
behaves  in  unpredictable  ways.  Dare  we  vest  responsibility  for  curing
irrationality in the  irrational?
In  our view,  Posner  misrepresents  Jolls,  Sunstein,  and  Thaler's
far  more  nuanced  and  restrained  normative  prescriptions.
(Rest  assured,  they  never  proposed  a  Bureau  of Authentic  Prefer-
ences.)  But, for our  purposes,  it is enough  to point out the method
by which Posner seeks to persuade  his readers.  More vividly than the
others, he seems  to be stoking-and  perhaps revealing his own-fear
by  embracing  the  very  phenomena  that he  is  attempting  to  have  us
disregard.  He  accepts  the  influence of the  framing and  endowment
effects,  while  at the  same  time  suggesting  that  their  very  invocation
raises the specter of totalitarianism  or a "confederacy  of dunces."
217  Id.
218  ld.
219  Christine Jolls  et al.,  A  Behavioral  Approach  to Law and Economics, 50  STAN.  L.
REV.  1471  (1998).
220  POSNER,  FRONTIERS,  supra note  13,  at 286-87.
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2.  Thinking the Unthinkable
Legal  economists  often  take  pride in the fact that they are willing
to  reach  the  conclusions  that  their  theories  yield,  no  matter  how
unpopular  or unconventional  they may be.  To them, that willingness
helps  prove  that  they  are  neutral  scientists.
2   "Should  the  sale  of
babies  be  made  legal?"  Richard  Posner  asks.  "The idea  strikes  most
people  as  bizarre  and  offensive ....  However,  economists  like  to
think about  the  unthinkable,  so  let  us  examine  in  a  scientific  spirit
the  objections  to  permitting  the  sale  of  babies  for  adoption.  ,222
Posner acts  as if he is broad-minded,  compelled  by principles of good
science  to  apply  his  paradigm  in  all  settings  no  matter  how much
non-economists  disagree with his result.
But this habit of ending  articles  with  a caution  to  readers  about
the  perils  of taking  seriously  a  realistic  account  of human  behavior
(as  noted  in  the  previous  subsection)  reveals  a  different  picture.
These  are not the words of social scientists pursuing truth wherever  it
leads  them.  Rather, these  are  more  the  words  of a fundamentalist
preacher warning  members  of his flock to  avoid  having  their  minds
polluted  or  confused  by  anyone  who  would  argue  that  dinosaurs
once  roamed  the  earth  or  that our  species  "evolved."  These,  more
broadly,  are  the  words  of  someone  guarding,  for  himself  and  his
audience, the comfort and  reassurance  of a worldview  that faithfully
yields  familiar, easy, and agreeable  answers.
There  is  far  more  at stake  than  whether  or  not preferences  are
manipulable or what products  liability law should be.  These scholars
seem worried  about the  threat  posed to an  entire  school  of thought
and  to  their  ability  to  generate  credible  conclusions  using  the
methods  of  that  school.  They  also  seem  worried  about  the  threat
posed  to  an  entire  socioeconomic  system  that  is  built  on  the  same
basic  dispositionist  assumptions  that  they  refuse  to  challenge.
Their  implicit  warning  to  readers  is  to  close  their  minds,  because
otherwise  something  between  chaos  and  communism  will  surely  be
loosed  upon  us.  Because  we  are  human,  taking  seriously  evidence
that  thoroughly  challenges  our worldviews,  our frames  of reference,
221  RICHARD  A.  POSNER,  ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS  OF LAW  141  (3d  ed.  1986);  cf
POSNER,  ECONOMIC ANALYSIS  OF LAW,  supra note  13, at 25  ("Economic  analysis of law
has aroused considerable antagonism,  especially but not only among academic  lawyers
who dislike the thought that the  logic of the law might be economics.").
222  POSNER,  ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW  (3d ed.),  supra note 221,  at 141.
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our  theories,  and  our  systems,  is  truly  "think[ing]  ...  the
unthinkable.223
Our biggest problem with this sort of scare tactic  is not that there
is  no  truth  to  it.  If,  as  the  evidence  suggests,  preferences  are
unstable,  constructed,  and  manipulable,  this  should  give  rise  to
concern  about  the  legitimacy  of  our  systems,  about  our  being
manipulated,  and  even  about our  being subjected  to  some  form  of
totalitarianism.  The  bogeyman  that  law  and  economics  scholars
seek  to keep  at bay may be  real.  But relying on models that ignore
that possibility  does not make  the evidence  or its  repercussions  go
away, any more  than lying motionless  under a blanket would provide
a  defense  against  an  authentic  monster.  Hiding  our  heads  as  a
defense  tactic succeeds only when  the danger is just in our heads.
If  we  are  anything  close  to  infinitely  manipulable,  as  Posner
conjectures,24  or  if all  preferences  are  "constructed,"  as  Henderson
and  Rachlinski  hypothesize,2 5  then  the  "free  choice"  that  scholars
presume  to  be  reflected  in  our  behavior  (and  claim  to  want  to
protect)  may  be  an  illusion.  We  may  already  be  in  the  grips  of a
bogeyman-a  situation  closer  to  the  totalitarian  nightmare  than
inadequately  realistic models  enable us  to see.
This  returns  us  to  one  of our  main  themes:  if  situation  is  far
more  influential  than  we  realize,  then  the  dispositions  that  we
assume  are  primary  to  the  human  experience  may  be  largely  an
illusion.  Social  scientists  should  be  committed  to  examining  the
implications  of what  we  know  to  be  true,  no  matter  how  much  we
want  to  deny it, and  rejecting  what we  know  to  be  false  no  matter
how  much  we  want  to  embrace  it.  That  is  what  is  critical  about
realism.
223  Id.
224  See supra quotation accompanying note 220.
225  See supra quotation accompanying note 211.
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3.  Faith or Social Science?
[Flindings ought  not  to  be judged  by  the  level  of comfort  they  provide about
acceptable  views  of  human  nature  or  the  personal  comfort  the  findings
afford....  It  is not surprising when  a lack  of synchrony between  our view  of
ourselves as unbiased ("I am a morally good person") and evidence of ourselves
as biased ("I  am not a morally good person  ") controls assessments of the finding
of such discrepancies on the part of laypeople; it is a bit embarrassing  when the
same is possibly true of scientists themselves.
-Mahzarin  R Banaj 
226
We  are  now  ready  to return  to our earlier  discussion  of law and
economics  and  Posner's  claims  regarding  the  dominance  of  that
approach. 22v   In  describing  his  commitment  to  objectivity  and
empiricism, a commitment  that is  shared  (at least implicitly)  by most
legal  economists,  Posner has written earnestly  of the need  to employ
the  scientific  method.  In one  of his  early articles,  for example,  he
wrote:
As  biology  is to  living  organisms,  astronomy  to the  stars,  or economics
to  the price  system,  so  should  legal  studies  be  to  the  legal  system:  an
endeavor to make  precise, objective, and systematic  observations  of how
the  legal  system  operates  in  fact  and  to  discover  and  explain  the
228
recurrent patterns in  the observations-the  "laws" of the  system.
Nearly  two  decades  later, he wrote  similarly  about the  aspirations  of
the approach he helped found:
To  me  the  most  interesting  aspect  of  the  law  and  economics
movement  has  been  its  aspiration  to  place  the  study  of  law  on  a
scientific  basis,  with coherent theory,  precise  hypotheses deduced  from
the  theory,  and  empirical  tests  of  the  hypotheses.  Law  is  a  social
institution  of  enormous  antiquity  and  importance,  and  I  can  see  no
reason why  it should not be amenable  to scientific  study.  Economics  is
the most advanced  of the  social sciences,  and the  legal system  contains
many  parallels  to  and  overlaps  with  the  systems  that  economists  have
studied  successfully.229
226 Mahzarin  R.  Banaji,  Implicit Attitudes  Can Be  Measured, in  THE  NATURE  OF
REMEMBERING  137 (Henry L. Roediger III et al. eds., 2001).
227 See supra notes 56, 64,  71-72 and accompanying  text.
228  Richard A. Posner, Volume One of The Journal of Legal Studies-An Afterword, I
J. LEGAL STUD.  437,  437  (1972).
229  Richard  A.  Posner, Foreword to  ESSAYS  IN LAw  AND  ECONOMIcs  5,  5  (Michael
Faure  & Roger Van den Bergh eds.,  1989).
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And  recently,  he  has  written about  the  concomitant need  to  dismiss
the work of those who do not operate  accordingly:
The  rotation  of  the  moons  of Jupiter  was  anomalous  in  medieval
cosmology  because  each  planet  (other than  the  earth,  which  was  not
considered  a planet,  but  instead  the  center  around  which  the  planets
revolved)  was  thought  to be  fastened to  a  crystalline  sphere,  which  the
moons  would  have collided  with  in their  rotation.  The  anomaly  could
be  dispelled  by  assuming  that  the  sphere  was  permeable,  or  by
assuming  (as  Cardinal  Bellarmine  did  in  his  famous  dispute  with
Galileo)  that the  telescopic observations  that had disclosed  the rotation
of Jupiter's  moons  were  a  deceit  by  the  devil.  Whichever  route  was
taken,  the  amended  theory would  not generate  any  predictions  about
planetary  satellites;  all  it  would  predict  was  that  whatever  would  be,
would  be.23°
Posner's  message  is  clear:  the  scientific  approach  should  be
embraced,  and  those  theories grounded  in  little  more  than  faith  or
non-falsifiable  assertions  should  be  rejected,  particularly  when  they
compete  with a viable  social scientific  theory.
And  it is  purportedly  based  on  that  Galileo-like  self-image  that
Posner  has  asserted that "the economic  theory  of law seems  the  best
positive  theory  of law extant."231  It  is  simply  "rich[er]  in  theoretical
and  empirical  content" than  any of its  competitors.32  And  Posner's
views  are  held  at least  implicitly  by  most  legal  economists.  So,  for
example,  Cooter  and  Ulen  "can  say  that  economics  provides  a
behavioral  theory to predict how people  respond to changes  in laws,"
and  that  this behavioral  "theory  surpasses  intuition, just  as  science
surpasses common  sense.
2 3
We wholeheartedly  agree with  the general  case for relying on the
scientific  method.  But, for  the  reasons  we  have  provided,  we  reject
the  claim  by  legal  economists  that  the  dominance  of  law  and
economics  has much  to do with its theoretical  and  empirical  content
or  their  loyalty  to  the  scientific  method-at  least  in  the  way  they
suggest.  Legal  economists  have  missed,  among  other  things,  that
230  POSNER,  FRONTIERS,  supra note 13, at 264.
231 Richard  A.  Posner,  The Economic Approach  to Law, 53  TEX.  L.  REV.  757,  774
(1975).
232  Id.
233  COOTER  & ULEN,  supra note  7,  at 3;  see also Mark  Klock,  Are  Wastefulness and
Flamboyance Really Virtues?:  Use and Abuse of Economic Analysis, 71  U.  CIN.  L.  REv.  181,
252-53  (2002)  ("I  predict  that  the  future  of  law  will  be  characterized  by  less
commentary  arguing  that  economic  analysis  is inappropriate  and  more reliance  on
alternative  economics models .... ").
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they  have  unconsciously  adopted,  not  the  scientific  approach  of
Galileo, but the faith-based approach  of Cardinal  Bellarrnine.
23 4
It  is  the  economists  who  resist  seeing  or  taking  seriously  what
others  are  revealing,  through  the  scientific  method,  about  what 235
moves us.  And they are  doing so based  on a theory  that has  been
falsified  (or  is  non-falsifiable)  and,  which,  therefore,  is  based,  at
bottom,  on  an  evidence-blind  intuition  or  faith.  Although  Posner
and  other  legal  economists  do  not  stoop  to warning  readers  about
the  "devil" being behind  the heretical  visions of social  psychologists,
they  do,  as  we  have  noted,  commonly  raise  the  specter  of  a  close
cousin:  "the totalitarian  bogeyman. 236
D.  Some Presuppositions  of Critical  Realism
What  we  do  and  do  not mean  by  "critical  realism"  will become
clearer  below.  But  before  introducing  one  of  its  important
implications,  it  may  be  helpful  to  summarize  several  strong
presumptions  or  axioms  that  we  intend  critical  realism  to  build
upon-principles  that we  have  suggested  in  our  discussion  to  this
point:
*  First, we-scholars and non-scholars alike-do not understand
ourselves well, and certainly not as well as we think we do.
234  See Maurice A. Finocchiaro, Introduction to THE  GALILEO  AFFAIR  1, 30  (Maurice
A. Finocchiaro  ed. and trans.,  1989)  [hereinafter  THE  GALILEO  AFFAIR]  (noting that
Bellarmine rejected Copernican  theory because it conflicted with the scriptures)
Our claim is not that law and  economics  is  totally devoid of social  science;  far
from  it.  But  where  social  science  does  play  a  role,  economic  legal  theory  rarely
generates  clear answers  to  problems.  For example,  there  is  still  considerable  debate
about what the  most efficient  liability  rule  is  in  tort law,  despite  the  fact that  this  is
one of the  oldest, most  discussed  issues in  law and economics.  See,  e.g.,  Richard  S.
Markovits,  The  Allocative Efficiency  of Shifting From a  "Negligence" System  to a  "Strict
Liability" Regime  in  Our Highly-Pareto-Imperfect Economy:  A  Partial  and Preliminary
Third-Best-Allocative Efficiency  Analysis,  73  CHI-KENT  L.  REV.  11,  133  (1998)
(analyzing  "efficiency  of  a  shift  from  negligence  to  strict  liability  and  various
other  standard-of-liability  allocative-efficiency  issues").  See  generally John  C.
Moorhouse et  al., Law and Economics of Tort Law:  A  Survey  of Scholarly Opinion, 62
ALB.  L.  REV.  667  (1998).  There  is,  in  other  words,  considerable  scholarly  debate
about  most areas  of  law,  even  where  efficiency  is  accepted  as  the  law's  underlying
normative  goal.  This  is where the social  scientific features of law and economics  take
place-a  competition  among  legal  economists  offering  different  efficiency-oriented
stories and, where possible, different empirical evidence  to support  their views.  Thus,
with respect to  the application  of the  basic  theory to  various  social and  policy issues,
social  scientific  methods  are  welcome.  With  respect  to  the  basic  theory  and  its
underlying axioms, in  contrast, social scientific methods are  disallowed.
236  See supra text accompanying notes  221-23.
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*  Second,  the  process  of developing  theories  or  models  is  a
human one  and  is  therefore subject to all  sorts of biases  and
unperceived  influences.  It is  largely for that reason  that the
impressions and models-informal and formal-that  we legal
scholars have  created to help us understand  ourselves  tend to
be flawed and self-serving.
*  Third, we  cannot  hope  to make  sense  of our  institutions  or
ourselves  until  we  better  understand  how  humans  go  about
trying to make  sense of themselves  and their institutions.  To
develop  a  theory  that  is  free  of, or at least  less  distorted  by,
such  biases,  it  is  necessary  to  more  closely  examine  both
the process that yields  those biases and the  biases themselves.
*  And,  fourth,  a  promising  way  to  understand  human
cognition  and  behavior  is  to  begin  with  those  schools  of
thought  and  those  institutions  that  are  devoted  to
understanding  human  cognition  and  behavior.  In  this
Article,  we  look  primarily  to  one  such  source,  social
psychology,23 7  but  we  will  also  look  briefly  at  what  market
practices  can teach us about ourselves.
It  is  by  bringing  these  principles  together  with  the  lessons
taught  by  social  psychology  and  markets  that  critical  realism
provides unique and, for many, unsettling insights  about who we are,
why  we  behave  as  we  do,  and  what  we  should  do  about  it,  if
anything.
237  By "social  psychology,"  we  include  not  only  the  traditional  field  of research
that goes  by that name, but also  numerous  related  fields, including  social  cognition,
cognitive  neuroscience,  and  cognitive  psychology.  For  accessible  overviews  of  the
history of relationships  between  the various  fields,  see  FISKE  &  TAYLOR,  supra note
20, at 1-18;  KUNDA,  supra note 20, at  1-7.
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IV.  BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO POWER  ECONOMICS
Most  Marxists ...  [believe] politics  is  but  a  reflection  of the  underlying
economic  order.  The  bourgeoisie, and  especially  the  large  corporations, will
acquire and use the power of the state to protect and enhance their interests....
But many non-Marxist scholars also doubt that the government will  regulate
an industry over the objections or against the  interests of business.  This view,
held chiefly..  by  certain economists, does not arise out of any conviction that
the  historically formed  interests  of  the  dominant  social  class  always find
expression in the prevailing  political structure, but rather out of the assumption
that individual behavior can best be understood by  assuming that it is rationally
self-interested.  Indeed,  most  economists find  the Marxist argument murky and
unconvincing precisely  because  it  lacks  any  psychological theory  that  would
explain how class position determines individual  behavior.
-James  Q. Wilson..
It's true that if you had concentrated  power in the hands of an angel he might
be able to do a lot of good, as he viewed it, but one man's good is another man's
bad.  The  great virtue of a  market  capitalist society  is  that,  by  preventing a
concentration of power, it prevents people from  doing the kind of harm  which
concentrated power can do.
-Milton  Fredman2
9
It is certainly the case that many Nazi concentration  camp guards led blameless
lives,  both  before  and after their horrible service.  To  explain  such  complicity,
therefore,  we  must  assume  the  existence  of a  specific  social and situational
context that could induce ordinary  people to  commit extraordinarily  evil deeds.
-Ross  &  Nisbet?
4 °
A.  Power
Think  back to  our example  of the  gunman  who  commands  you
to flip  a switch  that will  deliver a violent electric  shock  to a  pleading
victim.
2 4
'  That is  an example of power, as we  mean  it in this Article.
Power  is  the  use  of  situational  devices  (like  guns)  to  influence
238 James  Q. Wilson,  The Politics of Regulation, in TIE POLITICS  OF  REGULATION
357,  357-58  (James Q. Wilson ed.,  1980).
239  Milton  Friedman,  Is  Capitalism Humane?, in BRIGHT  PROMISES,  supra note
208, at 83, 89.
240  Ross & NISBETT,  supra  note 9, at 53.
241  See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
2003]194  UNI  VERSITY OF  PENNS  YL VANIA  LA W REVIEW
people's  choices  and  to  weaken  the  effect  of  their  dispositions  in
order  to  achieve  some  goal.  This  sort  of power  is  often  viewed  as
illegitimate;  offers  of  "your  money  or  your  life"  are  unacceptable
negotiation  tactics.  Governmental  regimes  that  rely  on such  power
to exact obedience  are typically labeled authoritarian.  Particularly in
America,  we  respect  only actions  that are  consensual  and  the actions
and  institutions  that  reflect  the  autonomous  choices  of  those
involved-hence,  our  culture's  celebration  of  democracy  and
capitalism.  As  we hope readers  have begun  to see,  however, situation
can  have enormous  consequences for our behavior, even when there
is  no  gun  to  our  head.  Stanley  Milgram's  groundbreaking  experi-
ments  demonstrate  the  incredible  power  of  situation  over  our
actions.  People  delivered  what  they  believed  were  dangerous  and
painful  shocks  to  fellow  humans  simply because  of the  situational
pressures  of  a  seemingly  benign  psychology  experiment.  That  is
frightening.  But  perhaps  more  frightening  is  that  even  after
learning  about  Milgram's  experiment,  most  of  us  still  have  little
242 appreciation for the power of situation.
242  If members of the law school community believe they are immune to the power
of situation, they should consult Steven Hartwell's study of students at the University of
San Diego.  Steven  Hartwell,  Moral Development, Ethical Conduct, and Clinical  Education,
35  N.Y.L.  SCH.  L.  REv.  131  (1990).  Hartwell  set up an experiment  in  the  guise  of a
clinical class  exercise.  Id. at 142.  Each student was  to individually  advise litigants in a
small claims  court, although Hartwell  was available  in the next  room for consultation.
Id.  Unknown  to the students,  each  "litigant" presented  her student-advisor  with  an
identical  problem:  how  best  to  make  her  case  in  a  rent dispute.  Id.  As  Hartwell
recounts,  "I told each student to  advise the client to  lie under oath  that she had paid
the rent.  When  students asked for clarification,  I uniformly responded..,  my advice  is
that, if your client wants to win her case, then you must tell her to perjure herself."  Id.
The  idea  was  for  students  to  feel  the  "pull  between  loyalty  to  authority...  and
prescribed  ethical conduct."  Id.  Like the evaluators  in Milgram's  initial  experiment,
Hartwell  predicted  that the students would uniformly "reject my advice and  refuse  to
tell their client[s]  to  lie."  Id.  And, like Milgram's  evaluators, he was surprised to find
out  how  wrong  he  was.  "Although  many  of the  twenty-four  participating  students
grumbled  either to  me  or to the  client about my proffered  advice,  twenty-three  told
their client to perjure herself."  Id. at 142-43.
A more  famous example of the power of situation  over students  (although not law
students) was  demonstrated  in a classic experiment conducted at Stanford  University,
in  which  students  took  on  the  roles  of  "prisoner"  or "guard"  in  a  realistic  prison
environment.  Craig Haney et al., Interpersonal  Dynamics in a Simulated Prison, I  INT'LJ.
CRIMINOLOGY  & PENOLOGY  69  (1973).  Although  the  students  had  been  specifically
chosen  for  their  apparent  emotional  maturity,  within  only  a  couple  of days  the
"guards" began  to demonstrate  extreme  cruelty toward  the "prisoners."  Id. at 80-81.
On the other side,  several of the "prisoners" experienced severe  emotional  depression,
while others were  prompted to rebel.  Ultimately, the experiment  had to be cancelled
less than  a  week  after  it began.  Id.  Rather  than  showing dispositional  consistency
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1.  Power Blindness
[The] systematic structuring of institutions to reflect  the viewpoint and position
of those in  power is most often invisible.
-Martha  Chamalla
2 43
There  is  reason  to  suspect  that  in  our  daily  lives,  we  routinely
overlook  the  power  of our  situations.  As  social  psychology  teaches,
situational  factors  are  cognitively hidden  (often  in plain sight),  easily
camouflaged  and  naturalized  as  mere  background.  Put differently,
in  most  situations  there  is  no  gun,  only  an  invisible  hand  and  the
seemingly  consensual,  choice-driven  behavior  of  individuals.
Perhaps  that is what  political  scientists Herbert  Kaufman  and Victor
Jones were driving at when  they wrote:
There  is an  elusiveness  about  power  that  endows  it  with  an  almost
ghostly  quality.  It  seems  to  be  all  around  us,  yet  this  is  "sensed" with
some  sixth  means  of  perception  rather  than  with  the  five  ordinary
senses.  We  "know"  what  it is,  yet we  encounter  endless  difficulties  in
trying to define  it.  We  can "tell" whether  one person or group is  more
powerful  than  another, yet we  cannot measure  power.  It  is  as abstract •244
as  time yet as real  as a firing squad.
This is an insight of critical realism.  As the  quotation indicates, it
is  hard  to  think  of anything  more  "real"  than  power.  And,  yet,
despite  its undeniable  existence,  the  mechanisms of power are  often
hidden,  ghostlike,  in  the  setting.  Hidden  there,  they  tend  to  be
disregarded, literally overlooked.
Legal  economists  have  reacted  to  the  elusiveness  of this  realism
characteristically  and  understandably-they  have  ignored  it.
245   For
the  most  part, economic  thinking  has  no  place  for  the  concept  of
power.  A  perusal  of  the  indices  of the  major  law  and  economics
texts,  for  example,  yields  no  references  to  the  word--except  when
across environments,  the students'  behavior  corresponded  with  situational  cues and
roles.
243  MARTHA CHAMALLAS,  INTRODUCTION TO  FEMINIST  LEGAL THEORY 16 (1999).
244  Herbert Kaufman  & Victor Jones,  The Mystery  of Power, 14  PUB.  ADMIN.  REV.
205,  205  (1954);  see also ROBERT  DAHL,  WHO  GOVERNS?  90  (1961)  ("One  who sets
out  to  observe,  analyze,  and describe  the  distribution  of  influence  in  a  pluralistic
democracy will...  encounter formidable problems.").
245 Economics  does occasionally  take power into account in exceptions that prove
the  rule.  See,  e.g.,  supra text  accompanying  notes  130-34  (recounting  Cooter  and
Ulen's  examples  of  economic  threats);  infra  text  accompanying  notes  267-80
(describing Stigler's "shallow capture" theory).
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coupled  with  the  word  "market."24 6   Moreover,  many  economic
presuppositions,  such  as  the  presumed  autonomy  of choice-making
agents, implicitly remove  the  role of power from the analysis.  If one
type  of "autonomy" is  given,  then  there  is  no  place  for  the  sort of
power illustrated in Milgram's  experiment to emerge.2
4
'  The subjects
of the experiment  chose  to engage  in  the experiment.  They could
have  stopped;  they  could  have  walked  out,  but  they  didn't.
Obviously,  they were  made better off by shocking the other agents to
the fullest  extent possible.  Economic models  are as blind  as  we  are
to situational  forces.
This  problem  of  "unrealism"  in  law  and  economics  has  been
largely  unrecognized  by  even  its  critics. 24 8  That  may  be  partially
because  the failure, like  the problem,  is  hard to see.  And in  the rare
instance  where  legal  economists  have  acknowledged  that  their
models disregard  power,  they use  it as  a  basis for claiming  that their
power-blind  approach  is  superior  to  competing  theories.  Thus,
Richard  Posner  admonishes  sociologists  for  incorporating  power  in
their work given that the concept is  "difficult to operationalize."
249
2.  Looking for Power
We  have  three  problems  with  Posner's  rationale  for  ignoring
power.  First, what good is  a theory that ignores a force so potentially
influential  that  it  is  actually  called  "power,"  purely  for  the  sake  of
maintaining  an  operable model?  "Power  economics,"  an  element of
246  When economists speak of "market power," they generally use the term to refer
to  a  firm's  control  of a significant  share  of a  particular  market.  Often  the  term  is
associated with monopoly practices, as when a firm  enjoys such "market power" that it
can  reduce  output  and  raise  prices  without  experiencing  a  total  loss  of sales  to
competitors.  See,  e.g.,  W.  KP VISCUSI  ET  AL.,  ECONOMICS OF REGULATION  AND
ANTITRUST  164  (3d ed. 2000)  ("Generally speaking, the market power of a firm  is  the
ability to raise price without suffering a significant decline in demand.  This  is typically
measured by the price elasticity of the firm's demand curve.").
247  See  supra text  accompanying  notes  85-91  (recounting  Milgram's  obedience
experiments).
248  The  law and traditional  legal  education  also  have  no place for the concept of
power.  Critical  theories  represent  an  important  exception  inasmuch  as  they  have
influenced law  and legal education.  For instance, feminist legal  scholarship  has been
particularly  attentive  to  the  operation  of power  dynamics  in  law  and  related  social
institutions.  See, e.g.,  Bartlett, supra note  207,  at 849-62  (summarizing and discussing
feminist  legal  scholarship  about  relationships  between  power,  gender,  and  social
institutions).
249  Posner, supra note  11,  at 272.
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critical  realism,  is  committed  to  starting with  power  and  developing
our understanding or model of human behavior from there.
Second,  any  obstacle  in  operationalizing  the  concept  of  power
may  reflect  the  unrealistic  starting presumptions  of legal  economists
more  than  the  inherent  difficulty  of  incorporating  power  into  a
viable  social  scientific  theory.  Were  economists  more  committed  to
understanding  human behavior, they would  be better able  to  model
it.  The  ghostly  quality  of power,  we  hope  to  show,  is  less  in  the
object  and  more  in  the  lens.  Change  the  lens  and  power  is  more
likely to come into focus and will sometimes be as  obvious  as  a gun  to
the head.  This leads to our third point.
The  clear  message  of  Milgram's  experiments  is  that  situation
influences  us.  But Milgram's  decades-old  findings serve  as just one
example  of a much  larger situation.  "Social  psychology  has  by  now
amassed  a  vast  store  of  such  empirical  parables. ''
1
50   The  deeper
implication  of those  experiments  is  that  situation can  be  managed,
shaped, arranged,  and constructed to influence  us in ways that we do not
anticipate  or  appreciate.  Situation  is  thus  a  source  and  vehicle  of
power.  Milgram,  after  all,  designed and  created  the  situation  in his
laboratory.  Unfortunately  the  pursuit  of  academic  or  scientific
knowledge  is  not the  only  motive  that might shape  the  scenery  that
surrounds and moves us.
B.  Economics
And here  is where  the economics of "power economics" comes  into
play.  What we know about the situational  character makes  clear that
people's  behavior  is  influenced  by  situational  factors.  Thus,  the
ability  to  influence  the  situation  is  also  the  ability  to  influence
people's behavior.  Such  power  can  be profitable.  Because  power  is
valuable  to those who wield it, and  insofar as power  can be exercised
through  (invisible or, at least, unobserved)  situational variables,  those
variables  are  themselves  manipulable.  And  because  those  variables
are  manipulable,  profit-driven  agents  will  compete  to  control  or
influence  them and, in turn,  the people and institutions  that tend  to
be  blindly  moved  by  them.  More  succinctly,  once  situation  is
understood  as  the  locus  of influence,  it  follows  that  situation  will
trade like  mousetraps and widgets.
250 Ross &  NISBETT,  supra note  9, at 4.
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Market  actors  will  exert power-whether  or  not  they are  aware
of it-because  of the  situational  pressures  of the  market.  If profit
can  be  made  by influencing  the  situation,  we  predict  that it will  be.
Market  competitors  will,  to  survive  in  the  long  run,  "discover"
precisely  which  situational  manipulations  most  efficiently  influence
us  and  how.  Market  actors  who  fail  to  manipulate  situational
variables  effectively  will  sooner or later  be  supplanted  by  those  who
do.
If there  is uncertainty  regarding  the precise workings of power-
the  particular  mechanisms  by  which  situational  influence  is
wielded-that  is  a  problem  of description,  not  of economics.  The
market  will  discover  those  workings  and  exploit  them.  Because
market  actors  will,  indeed  must,  attend  to  the  operation  of power,
legal  economists  have  no  excuse,  even  on  operational  grounds,  for
ignoring  it.  Market forces  guarantee  the  exercise  of power  through
situational manipulation-that is the essence of power economics.
25
1
C.  Some Implications of Power  Economics
More than when I first wrote these pages, I  am now impressed with the role  of
power in  economic life-and with  the  great if  largely  innocent service  of the
conventional economic instruction in  concealing it ....  [The  modern business
firm's] influence and power extend  to politicians,  Presidents and the Pentagon.
This power would  be much  more remarked and resisted were it not for the social
conditioning of  economics  and its  instruction.  The  latter contends  that  all
producers-all  business firms and corporations,  from the smallest to  the largest,
from  the  corner drugstore to  Exxon  and  General Motors-are substantially
subordinate  to  the impersonal authority of the  market.  So matters are presented
in  all  reputable economic  discussion ....  Power  is  much  enjoyed,  and  its
economic and political exercise  can  also  be  pleasingly remunerative.  Nothing
serves it better than a theology that disguises its exercise.
-John  Kenneth  Galbraith
252
251  For an  earlier  statement  of power  economics,  though  not by  name, and  for
considerable  evidence  from  consumer-product  markets  confirming  our  claims,
see Jon  D. Hanson  & Douglas A.  Kysar,  Taking Behavioralism  Seriously:  The Problem
of Market  Manipulation, 74  N.Y.U.  L.  REV.  630  (1999)  [hereinafter  Hanson  &
Kysar,  Taking Behavioralism Seriously I]; Jon  D.  Hanson  & Douglas A.  Kysar,  Taking
Behavioralism Seriously:  Some  Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112  HARV.  L.  REV.  1420
(1999)  [hereinafter  Hanson  &  Kysar,  Taking  Behavioralism Seriously  I1];  Chen  &
Hanson, Illusion of Law 1, supra note 84;  see also infra text accompanying  notes  393-414
(illustrating  how  commercial  interests  have,  through  situational  manipulations,
promoted dispositionism).
252JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH,  THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY,  at xiv (4th ed. 1984).
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What  we  know  from  economics  is  that  markets  will  eventually
discover  and  exploit  profit-enhancing  opportunities  for  power.
Economics  also  helps  us  predict  that  the  market  actors  who  will
exploit  those  opportunities  most  successfully  will  be  those  with  the
greatest  wealth  and  willingness  to  pay.  Large  corporations  meet
those  criteria  because  they  amass  extreme  amounts  of  wealth
2 53
and possess  the overriding, narrow interest in profit maximization.
254
253  Comparing  the 2001  Gross  National Income  of all  nations with the  2001  total
revenues  of  the  Global  Fortune  500  companies  helps  bring  this  into  relief.  For
example, Wal-Mart's  2001  revenues  ($219.8 billion)  were  greater than  those of eight-
five  countries  combined.  Home  Depot  had  greater  revenue  ($53.6  billion)  than
Hungary  ($49.2 billion).  The Gap  had greater  revenue  ($13.8 billion)  than  Bulgaria
($13.2 billion).  Toys  "R" Us  ($11.0 billion)  had greater  revenue  than  Kenya  ($10.7
billion).  The  revenue  of  the  #500  company,  a Japanese  construction  firm  called
Takenaka,  surpassed  ninety-four  countries.  In  fact, the  sum  of the revenues  of the
Global  500  firms  ($14 trillion)  accounts  for forty-five  percent of the  total  world  GDP
($31.3 trillion).  Compare WORLD  BANK,  2003  WORLD  DEVELOPMENT  INDICATORS
(describing the  2001  gross national  income  of each  nation),  with The  Global 500:
The World's Largest Corporations,  FORTUNE, July 22,  2002,  at F-i  to  F-10 (listing the
gross revenues  of the five hundred largest corporations).
254 Cf Hanson &  Kysar,  Taking Behavioralism  Seriously I1,  supra note  251,  at  1467-
1553  (providing  a case  study of how  the  tobacco  industry, based on  shared  interest.
managed to  manipulate consumer  perceptions, preferences,  and behavior in  order to
increase profits).  With exceptions that we  will explore in future research, corporations
tend to behave  as if their sole-or, at least, primary-goal  is  to maximize profits.  See,
e.g.,  Chen  &  Hanson,  Illusion  of Law  1, supra note  84.  That is true  not  because
corporations have  dispositions,  but because  of a  confluence  of stable  and significant
situational  factors.  Most  importantly,  firms  participate  in  a  number  of  market
competitions-for  products, for capital,  for managers, for labor, and  for acquisitions
of firms  themselves.  All  of  these  markets  work  to  winnow  out  those  firms  and
managers  that  do  not effectively  profit  maximize.  Firms  have  charters  and  bylaws,
situational  restraints that typically set profit-maximization  as the firm's stated goal, and
they operate  within  a legal  environment  that places, according  to most corporate  law
scholars,  fiduciary duties on managers to maximize profit.
Moreover,  the situational  characters  who  work within  firms  face  strong  cultural
norms to maximize  profits and are  given extensive  training  in  business  schools or by
the  firms  themselves.  The  American  business  culture  promotes  the  idea  that
"business is  business" and considerations other  than  profit are irrelevant to  decisions.
For a history of the  basic scripts of business  and corporate, see  id. Together, these
and  other situational  forces  push  firms  (and  the situational  characters  who  occupy
them)  to behave  "as  if"  maximizing  profit.  Of course,  those situational  forces  are
limited,  and  corporations  and  their  managers  do  not  always  behave  in  profit-
maximizing  ways.  Still,  most  scholars  agree  that,  at  least  in  the  long  run,  the
situational  imperatives  of  profit  and  the  dispositions  and  situations  of corporate
managers  combine to  push corporations firmly  towards profit-maximizing conduct.  It
bears noting that our interpretation  of firms as situationally motivated, at least in  the
long  run,  to  behave  as  if  they  are  profit-maximizing  is  conventional  among
corporate  law scholars.  See  id.;  HENRY  HANSMANN,  THE  OWNERSHIP  OF ENTER-
PRISE  23  (1996)  (explaining  why  it is  reasonable  to  assume  that firms  will,  over
time,  tend  toward  profit-maximizing,  or  cost-minimizing,  practices);  cf  Milton
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Power  economics  predicts  that  we  are  living  within  an  ongoing
Milgram  experiment,  in which  we,  the subjects,  perceive  our acts  to
be  free  and  dispositionally  motivated,  but  in  which  the
experimenters-large  business  entities-wield  far  greater  influence
over our  movements through  situational manipulations  than  we tend
to recognize.  As  in Milgram's  experiment,  we predict and report, in
our  common  sense  views  and  formal  theories,  that  we  are  largely
immune  to  such  situational  manipulations.  Power  economics
predicts  that  the  totalitarian  bogeyman  is  invisible  but real, and that
we commonly behave  as if there  is a gun to our head.
Of course,  very often  market actors  compete  against  each  other
for situational supremacy.  In a previous work, one of us  (with Doug
Kysar)  has  examined  the  battle for prime  placement  of products  in
S  255
supermarket  aisles..  Placement  at eye  level  sells,  and someone  has
got to be on the bottom.  In those  cases, competition for situation is
often  a zero-sum game.
But  there  are  other  situational  factors  that  help  all  firms:  for
example,  the  Muzak  that wafts  over  the entire  supermarket  and  has
256 been  found  to increase  overall  purchasing.  In the  same  manner,
competing  firms  within  industries  often  act  in  ways  that  further
their shared  interests
257  or  even join  forces  when  their  collective
self-interest  is  at  stake.
25s   All  firms  share  a  broad  goal  of  profit
maximization.  This leads to secondary shared interests in  promoting
markets,  preventing  profit-restricting  regulation,  and,  most  impor-
tantly  for  our  argument  here,  supporting  a  concept  of  human
Friedman,  The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS  IN  POSITIVE  ECONOMIcs  3,
21-22  (1953)  (examining  the hypothesis  that  individual  firms behave  as  if they were
seeking rationally to maximize profits).
See Hanson &  Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously II, supra  note  251,  at  1448.
256 See  id.  at  1445  (describing  how  marketers  manipulate  consumers'  "mood
states").
257  See generallyJon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: A
Response to Market Manipulation, 6  ROGER  WILLIAMS  U.  L.  REV.  259,  337-370  (2000)
[hereinafter  Hanson  &  Kysar,  Taking Behavioralism Seriously III]  (describing  reasons
why firms tend not to engage in activities  that increase  consumer risk perceptions).
258 For  one  very  recent  example,  competing  automakers  joined  together  this
year  in  a  lawsuit  challenging  California's  strict  fuel  emission  standards.  See  Bob
Egelko,  California, Bush  Spar over  Clean Air Rules:  Appeals  Court  Ponders Block  on
Emissions Standards, S.F.  CHRON.,  Feb.  14,  2003,  at A8.  For other  examples of firm
cooperation in self-interest, see  Hanson & Kysar,  Faking  Behavioralism Seriously II, supra
note  251,  at  1467-1502  (describing  tobacco  industry's  response  to  industry-wide
threats);  Hanson  & Kysar,  Taking Behavioralism Seriously  llI, supra note  257,  at  361-66
(describing  how  even  competitive  industries  often  manage  to  cooperate  to advance
their shared interests).
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behavior that serves profit-maximizing interests.  Because  commercial
interests-particularly  corporate  entities-are  incredibly  wealthy
and  powerful  forces  in  society,  when  they  work  in  complementary
ways,  they  can  have  far-reaching  effects  on  how  we  view  society,
justice, and  ourselves.
Power  economics  predicts  that  situation  is  sold  to  the  highest
bidders through largely  unseen market processes.  Corporate entities
manipulate  situation  to  influence  our  conduct  and  dispositional
self-conceptions,  thereby building their wealth  and  increasing  their
power.
26
0  The  analogies undergirding  our conclusions in  this section
may appear  to be  loaded.  By likening situational  forces  to  a gun,  it
may  appear  that  we  have  likened  market  forces  to  a  gunman.
Indeed,  we  have.  We  are  thinking  the  unthinkable.  Posner-'s
bogeyman  reigns,  but he  rules  from  where  Posner  and  others  have
least  looked  for  him-that  is,  outside  of us,  or  at  least  out  of our
sight, in the situation.
This  talk  of  power  may  look  like  the  product  of  some  pretty
radical  thinking.  However, one can instead  see our thesis as nothing
more  than  the  careful  application  of  the  logic  unhesitatingly
embraced  by many  of academia's  most  conservative  scholars.  Here,
again,  is where  the  economics of "power  economics"  plays  a role.  We
are  making  the  same  assumptions  as  neoclassical  economists  about
how  markets  work,  but  we  add  a  more  realistic  account  of  the
humans  involved  in  that process.  And,  as  will  become  clear  in  the
next  Section,  we  also  accept  the  conventional  economic
presumptions  with  respect  to  the  way  regulatory  processes  operate
-indeed,  in some  ways,  we  take  that understanding  more  seriously
than economists  have.
259 As  will  become  clear  below  and  in  our  future  work,  it  is  not  necessary  that
corporate  decision  makers  make  conscious  decisions  to  cooperate  with  others  for
corporations  to be  acting in  complementary ways  toward shared  goals.  See  infra Part
VI.B  (providing  evidence  of how  dispositionism  has  been  promoted  by commercial
interests).
260  See id.
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V.  BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO DEEP CAPTURE
A.  Shallow Capture
One cannot mention regulatory agencies without adding the observation that, of
course, such agencies are likely  to be  'captured'  by  the interests they are supposed
to -regulate. To suggest that matters are any different from this is to mark oneself
as hopelessly naive, or even disingenuous.
-James  Q. Wilson
261
The  basic  story  of  regulatory  capture  has  become  so  well
known-indeed,  such a truism-that we  think it appropriate  to begin
as Steven  Croley began his recent retelling:  "You've heard  all  of this
before  ."6
Because  no  one  wants  us  to  rehearse  the  details  yet again,  and
because  we  also  value  efficiency,  we  will  base  our  introductory
overview  on  the  brief  rendition  offered  by  an  extremely  credible
source.  In  his  Memoirs of an Unregulated Economist, 26
3  George  Stigler
describes  how he  came  to the work  central  to his winning the Nobel
Prize  in  Economics.
264   According  to  Stigler,  prior  to  his  work,
academic  economists  writing  about state  policies  commonly  offered
their  advice  on  "what  [the  government]  should do,  or refrain  from
doing.''2 6 '  They  published  their  normative  conclusions  naively
believing  that  governments,  charged  with  enhancing  the  public
welfare,  would  readily  heed  sound  prescriptions.  But  after  "two
centuries" of being disregarded on issues  like free  trade, Stigler and a
few other economists  came  to believe  that government  officials were
266 not very  interested  in  the  "truths" of  economics.  It  was  time  to
"undertake  the  different  and  more  fundamental  task  of explaining
261 James Q. Wilson,  Introduction, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION,  supra note 238,
at ix.
262  Steven P. Croley, Public  Interested  Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.  7, 9  (2000).
263  STIGLER, supra note 70.
264  Also  significant  was  Stigler's  work  on  the  "economics  of information."  See
generally George  J.  Stigler,  The  Economics  of Information, 69 J.  POL.  ECON.  213
(1961)  (calling  on  economists  to  pay  more  attention  to  the  importance  of
information,  for  example,  in  ascertaining  market  price);  George J.  Stigler,  An
Introduction to  Privacy in  Economics  and Politics,  9  J.  LEGAL  STUD.  623  (1980)
(demonstrating  how economic  analysis illuminates choices in favor of privacy and
the concealment of information).
265 STIGLER, supra note 70, at 114.
266  Id. at 114-15.
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what  states  actually  do,  of  discovering  what  are  the  forces  that
determine which policies will actually be adopted by a government.
'
,2
67
Stigler began that undertaking  (much of it with co-author  Claire
Friedland)  by  examining  "the  actual  effects  of  economic  regu-
lations." 6  By  understanding the effects of regulation, he believed  he
could  infer  something  about  the forces  that created  the  regulation.
Through  empirical  testing  unlike  any  that  had  previously  been
conducted,23)  he  discovered  that  several  prominent  regulatory
policies  of  the  1960s-including  the  regulation  of  electricity  rates
and  the  SEC's "elaborate  review of the  prospectuses for  new security
issues"-were  not  having  the  effects  or  yielding  the  benefits  that
ostensibly  motivated  them.
27°   To  be  sure,  the  regulations  were
creating benefits.  The problem was  that those benefits were  accruing
to the wrong recipients.  For instance,  the beneficiaries  of electricity-
rate  regulation  were  large  commercial  customers  instead  of  con-
sumer  households.  Additionally, the  effect  of the  SEC  reviews  was
to inhibit competition  and raise the public's costs.
From  these  and  similar  findings,  the  now-dominant  conception
of  regulation  emerged:  the  "general  theory  of  the  behavior  of
governments" 27 2  is  that "groups possessing  political  influence  use the
political  process  effectively  to increase  their  incomes.  "213  According
to  the  "economics  of  regulation,"  as  this  approach  was  initially
dubbed, 74 causal  relationships and the direction of influences are the
267  Id. at  114.  Reflecting  the  immodesty  that seems  to  characterize  those  who
employ  this approach, see supra text accompanying  notes  71-75,  Stigler went out of his
way  to add  that it was  "economists  [who]  initiated the theoretical  study of the  actual,
in  contrast to  the desired, functions of the state," because "[o]f all the social scientists,
only  economists  possess  a  theoretical  system  to  explain  social  behavior."  STIGLER,
supra note 70, at  115.
268  STIGLER, supra note 70, at 115.
269  Id. at 117-18.
270Id. at 116-17.
271  Id. at  116;  see also George  G.  Stigler  & Claire  Friedland,  What  Can Regulators
Regulate? The Case of  Electricity, 5J.L. & ECON.  1, 7-8 (1962)  (describing how commercial
customers benefited from regulation).
272  STIGLER, supra note 70, at 118.
279  Id. at 120.
274  Stigler, like  many  of his contemporaries,  eschewed  an anthropomorphic  view
of the  state  and, true  to  the  tenets  of his  discipline,  looked  for  answers  under  the
assumptions  that governments  are  made  up  of individual  people  who  are  rational
actors,  and  who  therefore  behave  according  to  the  very  same  principles,  and  in
response  to  the same sorts of incentives, that motivate  market participants.  What  they
assumed  was  true of private choice,  Stigler and his contemporaries  assumed  was also
true of "public choice"  (the  name  given  to  the  now-immense  field  of research  that,
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reverse  of  what  had  been  supposed.  The  seemingly  autonomous
administrative  agency  is,  upon  inspection,  captured, 2 7 5  and  the
seemingly  constrained  industries  are  liberated  and  enriched.
Consequently,  the  industry  tail  wags  the  regulatory  dog.  As  Stigler
laments,  "no matter  how  disinterested  the  goal  of public  policy,  the
policy  is  bent to help  politically  influential groups  at  the  cost of the
less influential.'
7 6  And the problem is not just that for every winner,
there  are  losers-the  real  kicker  is  that  the  winners  often  win  less
than the losers lose.
277  Regulation  is, in a word, inefficient.
278
The finding that industries tend to benefit from  regulation led to
another question  for Stigler:  "Why are some  industries and activities
regulated  by  the  state,  and  not  others?,
279   One  of  the  most
significant developments  that emerged  from  this  dismal  perspective
on regulation  was a set of insights  regarding  the  sources  of political
influence-or,  as  we  would  put  it,  power.  As  Stigler  recounts,
economists  could explain, for example:
[W]hy  smaller  groups  do  better  than  large  in  the  political  arena.
[First, t]he  smaller group  is  more  cohesive:  It is easier  to  organize  the
small group, collect  funds  for  lobbying,  and  keep  it informed.  There
are  only  about 70,000  beekeepers  concentrated  in  a  few  western  states
(yes,  there  is  a federal  program  for them)  but  millions  of occasional
consumers  of honey.  And  secondly,  it  pays  each  member  of a  small
group  to invest  resources  in  politics,  because  the  payoff will  be  larger.
Each  beekeeper  gets  hundreds  of times  as  much  out  of  the  federal
program as each  taxpayer loses.2
s°
Such  insights  regarding  how  groups  of  individuals  could
effectively  coordinate  their  behavior  in  pursuit of common  interests
were  more  the product  of some  of Stigler's  contemporaries  than  of
for the most part, has a similar premise).  See supra text accompanying  notes 303,  314-
17 (discussing dispositionism of regulators).
275  This  is  not meant  to imply that the people  who  run agencies are captured by
the  process.  According to  the  basic  theory, their interests  are advanced  by  the  quid
pro  quo  inherent  in  the  process.  See  George  Stigler,  The  Theory  of Economic
Regulation, 2 BELLJ.  ECON.  & MGMT.  Sci.  3,  12-13  (1971)  (arguing that regulators
may not antagonize  regulated firms because  they want to keep their options open
for a high-paying job with a firm  upon departing the  regulatory agency).
276  STIGLER,  supra note 70, at 119.
277  Id. at 118-20.
278 This was one of several ways in which  neoclassical economics was attempting to
demonstrate  how  good  regulatory  intentions  tend  to  create  unintended  (i.e.,
inefficient)  consequences.  For an  overview, see  Milton  Friedman,  BRIGHT  PROMISES,
supra  note 208, at 127-28.
279  STIGLER,  supra note 70, at 118.
280 Id. at 119.
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Stigler himself:  But before leaving  our discussion  of Stigler,  a few
observations are in  order regarding his important contributions.
Look  carefully  at  the  structure  of  Stigler's work-at  least  as  we
have  summarized  it.  Stigler  was  challenging  a  long-held  conven-
tional wisdom  that governments  and their agencies  create  beneficial
regulations.  Underlying  that  conventional  wisdom  was  the  supp-
osition  that regulatory  processes  were  fair and  that regulators  were
dispositionally  motivated  to  serve  the  public  interest.  Stigler's
challenge  to  those suppositions was  initiated  by his  discovery  that, in
fact, a sanguine  view  of our  regulatory  institutions  had no  empirical
basis  and  that,  if  anything,  those  institutions'  actions  were
counterproductive  to  their  espoused  goals.  To  explain  the
phenomenon,  Stigler looked  to the  outside  influences on  regulators
and  described  how  different  groups  were  able  to  exert  power  over
the  regulators.  Thus,  Stigler  contested  the  reassuring conventional
wisdom  that  our  institutions  are  neutral  and  well-functioning  and
rejected  the  idea  that the  stated  goals  of regulators  are  controlling.
He  did  so  by  downplaying  dispositional  factors  and  emphasizing
situational factors.  By taking situation  seriously, he raised  the issue
of power  inasmuch  as  situations  are  largely  defined  by  allocations
and  dynamics  of power.  As  Stigler  and many  others writing in  this
area have  taken  for granted  (without ever  actually  using the  term),
power is central.
In  this  way,  Stigler's  work  on  the  economics  of regulation  pro-
vides  a paradigmatic  example  of power economics.  We believe  that
this Article  finds confirmation  in the fact that Stigler and other
economists  stopped  there-why,  in  other  words,  neoclassical
281 See,  e.g.,  MANCUR  OLSON,  THE  LOGIC OF  COLLECTIVE ACTION:  PUBLIC GOODS
AND  THE  THEORY  OF  GROUPS  53-57  (1971)  (discussing  the  effectiveness  of  small
groups);  RUSSELL  HARDIN,  COLLECTIVE  ACTION  42-45  (1982)  (reviewing  Olson's
analysis of  the correlation  between  group size  and  effectiveness).  This  topic  of what
interests  will  be best  able  to influence  regulation  is central  to  power economics  and
our theory of deep  capture.  We  hope to return  to it in  much greater  detail  in future
works.  In any event, we hope readers might begin  to see  its relevance  for questions far
broader than simply administrative  regulation.
282  This  is  not  to  say  that  Stigler  and  other  scholars,  did  not  still  see  an
important-we  think  too  important-role  for  dispositions.  The  work  he  began
initiated  a great deal of scholarship  that assumed  that regulators  were dispositionally
inclined  to be  captured.  See,  e.g.,  George J. Stigler,  Can Regulatory Agencies Protect the
Consumer?,  in THE  CITIZEN  AND  THE  STATE:  ESSAYS  ON  REGULATION  178,  181
(1975)  (arguing that regulators and regulation  have  often  failed to  protect the public
interest relative  to  the interests  of the regulated  industry because  "the logic and basic
forces  of regulation ...  dictate what  type  of men  ...  will  typically  be appointed"  and
emphasizing dispositional  factors).
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economics  has  not  evolved  into  to  power  economics  and  why
capture  theory has not evolved  into deep capture  theory.
B.  Deep Capture: An Historical  Example
I,  Galileo [Galilei],  ...  seventy years of age, arraigned  personally for judgment,
kneeling before  you  Most  Eminent and Most  Reverend  Cardinals Inquisitors-
General  against heretical depravity in all of Christendom, . . swear that I have
always believed,  I  believe now,  and with God's help I  will believe in the future
all  that  the  Holy  Catholic  and  Apostolic  Church  holds,  preaches,  and
teaches ....  I  have  been judged  vehemently  suspected  of  heresy,  namely  of
having  held  and  believed  that  the  [S]un  is  the  center  of  the  world  and
motionless and the [E]arth is not the center and moves.
Therefore,  desiring to  remove from the  minds of Your Eminences and eveiy
faithful Christian this vehement suspicion, rightly conceived against me,  with  a
sincere heart and unfeigned  faith I abjure, curse, and detest the above-mentioned
errors and heresies, . . . and I swear that in  the future I  will never again say or
assert,  orally  or in  writing, anything which  might  cause  a  similar suspicion
about me ....
-Galileo  Galilei...
With  the  foundation  of  shallow  capture  in  place,  we  can  now
build upon it, or dig beneath it, to introduce  deep capture.  To  catch
your  first glimpse  of the phenomenon,  recall  the  Galileo  story.  We
argued,  in a  flip  of Posner's  version  of the  story,  that it  was  Galileo
who  was  committed  to  realism  and  Bellarmine  who,  like  legal
economists,  was wed  to an unrealistic, reductionist  model. 2 4
Let us  push the analogy further.  Galileo was,  for most of his  life,
devoted  to  the  idea  that humans  could, through  methods  of obser-
vation,  discover  and  make  sense  of the  natural  order.8'  He  was
committed  to  basing  theories  about our world  and  the place of it in
the  universe  on  all  the  evidence  and  clues  available  for  human
inspection,  even if doing so challenged widely held self-affirming  and
283 Galileo's Abjuration ofJune 22,  1633,  in THE  GALILEO  AFFAIR,  supra note 234,
at 292, 292.
284 See supra text accompanying  notes 230-36.
285 In 1611,  Galileo described  his research methodology this way:
Over  a  period  of  two  years  now,  I  have  tested  my  instrument  (or rather
dozens  of  my  instruments)  by  hundreds  and  thousands  of  experiments
involving  thousands and  thousands of objects,  near and far,  large  and small,
bright and dark; hence  I do not see how  it can enter the mind of anyone  that
I have simple-mindedly remained deceived  in my observations.
DANIELJ.  BOORSTIN,  THE DIscovERERs  316  (1983).
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28s, faith-based  beliefs  about  the  Earth's  centrality  in  the  universe.
Recall  that  Galileo  lived  at  a  time  when  most  people  believed
themselves  to  inhabit  a  stationary  world.  The  intellectual
establishment of the Renaissance,  controlled  to a large  degree  by  the
Catholic  Church,  perceived  human  knowledge  as  a  fundamentally
static thing.  Certain  environmental  features  seemed  obvious:  the
Earth  was  not  moving,  and  the  Sun  was  rotating  about  the  earth.
The  validity  of those  notions  was  bolstered  by  everyday  experience
and  found  confirmation  in  several  biblical  texts,  and  in  the  basic
assumption that heaven reigned  above the Earth and hell below.8
286  Galileo  had,  in  his  lesser-known  work  in  mechanics,  divined  the  truth  of
Copernicus'  revelations  long  before  his  invention  of  the  telescope.  GIORGIO  DE
SANrILLANA,  THE  CRIME  OF  GALILEO  5-6  (1955).  But  Galileo  was  aware  of  how
Copernicus had  been  mocked  and  marginalized  for  expressing  those  views  and  thus
opted  to wait until he had  compelling proof before  endorsing Copernican  ideas.  Id.
at 11.  In  a letter to Kepler, Galileo  remarked:
Like  you,  I  accepted  the  Copernican  position  several  years  ago  and
discovered  from  thence  the  causes  of  many  natural  effects  which  are
doubtless  inexplicable  by  the  current  theories.  I  have  written  up  many
reasons  and  refutations  on  the  subject,  but  I  have  not  dared  until  now  to
bring  them  into  the  open,  being  warned  by  the  fortunes  of  Copernicus
himself....
Id.  The telescope  provided  Galileo  with what he thought would  be "irrefutable  proof
to  any  man  in  good  faith,"  id.,  or, with  what  we  might  describe  as  evidence  so
irrefutable  as  to pierce  the ambiguity supporting the then-conventional  view.
287  At the same time, it is  important to note that the Catholic  Church  was  not an
institution  that inherently spurned  logic and  empirical study.  Its guiding philosophy,
Scholasticism,  represented  an attempt to wed  divine revelation, buttressed  by faith, to
Aristotelian  logical deduction.  Id. at 56-57.  Thus,  the Church  had no  problem  with,
and actually  encouraged, Aristotelian  science  that generally  limited itself to  the  basic
study of the natural world.  Id.
What the  Church  (and  with  it, most of European  society)  valued  above  all  else,
however,  was  not  creativity  but authority.  Hence,  the  intellectual  establishment
inhabited,  and  later  critiqued,  by  Galileo  was  in  many  ways  profoundly  backward-
looking,  in  the  sense  that  the  "the  progressive  nature  of  human  knowledge"  was
entirely alien to it.  WILLIAM R. SHEA, GALILEO'S  INTELLEcTUAL  REvOLUTION:  MIDDLE
PERIOD,  1620-1632,  at 31  (1972).  Traditional  science  and philosophy were  rooted  in
the  insights of the  Bible  and  the work  of Ancient  Greek thinkers  (notably  Aristotle).
Scholars were to approach  such authorities, not as advocates of debatable propositions,
but as bodies of revealed  truth from whom added insights could then be gained via the
process  of deductive  reasoning.  See  PIETRO  REDONDI,  GALILEO:  HERETIC  52,  54-55
(Raymond  Rosenthal,  trans.,  Princeton  Univ.  Press  1987)  (1983)  ("Nature-the
Aristotelian  professors  of  philosophy  said-has  spoken  through  the  mouth  of
Aristotle.").
288  See,  e.g.,  Psalms  103:11  ("For,  as  high  as  heaven  is  above  the  [E]arth  ... 
Matthew 11:23 ("[W]ill you be exalted to the skies?  No, brought down to the depths!").
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Galileo,  informed  by  the  work  of  fellow  astronomical  realist
Copernicus,2
89  was  interested  in  exploring  and  studying  elements  of
our planet and  the celestial  bodies  whirling "above" it for  hard-to-see
clues  into  the  reality  of  celestial  dynamics.  Mathematics  and  a
telescope  both  provided  critical  lenses  through which  he could  get  a
*  290 better view.
Using  these  tools,  Galileo  helped  to  turn  the  dominant
Aristotelian  model of the universe, and our place in it, on its head. 9'
289  Galileo wrote of Copernicus'  dedication  to realism:
And so  he began  to investigate  what the system  of the world  could really  be
in  nature, no longer for the sole  convenience  of the pure astronomer, whose
calculations  he had complied  with, but in order to come to an understanding
of such a noble physical problem;  he was confident that, if one had been  able
to  account for mere  appearances  by means of hypotheses  which are not true,
this  could  be  done  much  better  by  means  of  the  true  and  physical
constitution of the world.
Galileo's  Considerations  on the Copernican  Opinion  (1615),  in THE GALILEO  AFFAIR,
supra note  234, at 70,  74  (1989).
290  Galileo stated that:
"Philosophy  is  written  in  this  grand  book  the  universe,  which  stands
continually open  to our gaze ....  But the  book cannot  be understood unless
one  first learns  to  comprehend  the  language  and  to  read  the  alphabet  in
which  it  is  composed.  It is written  in  the language  of mathematics,  and  its
characters  are triangles,  circles, and other geometric figures, without which  it
is  humanly impossible  to understand a single  word of it ......
DAVA  SOBEL,  GALILEO'S  DAUGHTER  16  (1999)  (quoting  Galileo's  The  Assayer,  in
STILLMAN DRAKE,  GALILEO  (Oxford  Univ. Press, 1996)  (1980)).
Galileo's  use of mathematics  is  crucial.  The  notion  of scientific  empiricism  was
not, in  and of itself, offensive  to  the Aristotelian  mindset  embraced  by the  Church.
Yet, in contrast to Aristotle's relatively simplistic system that relied entirely on concrete
observations  that human  beings  could make  with  their own  senses,  Galileo posited  a
framework of analysis that was just as abstract and theoretical as that of the Scholastics.
See REDONDI,  supra note  287, at 52-53 (describing  the intricate process of deciphering
The Assayer).  In  doing  so, Galileo  saw  himself as a  kind  of "philosopher of nature,"
whose work was every bit as important to  the project of understanding Creation  as that
of the moralist or the theologian.  Id. at 53.  Thus, to the established  intellectual  and
religious hierarchy, Galileo's ideas were deeply threatening.
M Neither Galileo  nor Copernicus was  the first to  discover the basic astronomical
insights that later made each of them famous.  Indeed, many of the early "discoveries"
associated  with  the  origins  of  modern  science  had  been,  in  other  cultures,  long
known.  As Dick Teresi  recently summarized:
[Tihe  ancient  Indians,  long  before  Copernicus,  knew  that  the  [E]arth
revolved  around  the  [S]un  and,  a  thousand  years  before  Kepler,  knew  that
the orbits  of the  planets  were  elliptical;  the  Arabs  invented  the  observatory
and named most of our  popular stars;  the  Chinese mapped  the sky;  and  the
Amerindians  noted important  events  with daggers  of light or optical  snakes
that thrill us  to this day.
DICK  TERESI,  LOST DISCOVERIES:  THE  ANCIENT  ROOTS  OF  MODERN  SCIENCE-FROM
THE  BABYLONIANS  TO THE  MAYA  92-93  (2002).  The belief that Copernicus  or Galileo
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It  is  important  to  note,  however,  that  the  Aristotelian  model  (as
enhanced  through  Ptolemy's  refinements) 29)2 provided  an  adequate
"as if'  theory, for most purposes.  Through  theory and observation,
Galileo  removed  the  Earth  from  its  stable  center, around  which  the
Sun  was  revolving,  and  placed  the  Sun  at  the  immovable  center  of
the  Earth's  rotations.  Put differently,  by  studying  our astronomical
situation  more  closely,  Galileo  discovered  our  astronomical
fundamental attribution  error attributing the  movement of the  celestial
situation  to  the  centrality  and  fixity  of  the  Earth  instead  of
attributing  our  own  movement,  like  that  of  the  other  heavenly
bodies,  to  the  celestial  situation.  Galileo  did  not  provide  absolute
proof  for  his  challenging  worldview,  although  he  believed  the
telescopic  observations  were  sufficient  to  overturn  the  geocentric
model.  What  he  did  provide  was  a  refined  theory  and  new
observations-such  as  the  discovery  of four  moons  orbiting Jupiter,
the  phases  of  Venus,  and  an  exegesis  of  the  tides-that  strongly
discovered  that  the  Earth  circled  about  the  Sun  is  tantamount  to  saying  that
Columbus  discovered  South  America.  It  is  accurate  only  from  an  ethnocentric
vantage  point,  a  problem  that plagues  many  of our  presumed  accuracies.  See supra
text  accompanying  notes  28-30  (explaining  the  social  psychological  findings  that
people  tend to view themselves  in self-affirming ways  and make mental adjustments  to
preserve that self-image).
292  Aristotle  originally  proposed  that all  celestial  bodies  were  immutable  perfect
spheres,  the Earth  being  fixed  at  the  center.  See  SOBEL,  supra note  290,  at  170-71
(describing the geocentric  Aristotelian  world  view  in  contrast to  the views of Salviati,
Galileo and others).  Ptolemy reasoned  that this must be so, since  "if the  [E]arth  were
not at the center of the stellar sphere, we  should not be able to always  see half of this
sphere;  but we  do  see  it ....  Galileo's  Reply  to  Ignoli  (1624),  in THE  GALILEO
AFFAIR, supra note 234, at 154,  168.  When one looks  at two  fixed stars opposite  each
other,  such  that one  rises  when  the  other  sets,  this  shows  that  the  part of the  sky
above  the  Earth  is  equal  to  the  part  below,  and  consequently  that  each  is  a
hemisphere, and, since this phenomenon  is observable for all horizons,  that the Earth
is  at  its  center.  See  id. at  168-69  (explaining  the  basis  for  Ptolemy's  reasoning).
Galileo  called  the  argument  "beautiful  and worthy  of Ptolemy" but  pointed  to  the
(now  obvious)  alternative  explanation  that "if we  let  this sphere  be  still  and  let the
terrestrial  globe  turn  on  itself  (as  Copernicus  does),  then  regardless  of where  it  is
placed  the same  thing will happen  to the  two  fixed  stars,  namely their simultaneous
rising and setting."  Id.
293  See  Albert  Van  Helden,  Plolemaic System,  at http://es.rice.edu/ES/humsoc/
Galileo/Things/ptolemaic-system.html  (last visited Oct. 31,  2003)  ("Ptolemy was  able
to  account for the  motions  of heavenly  bodies  within  the  standards  of observational
accuracy  of his  day.  The  idea  was  to  break  down  the  complex  observed  planetary
motion into components  with perfect circular motions.").
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suggested  that  the  astronomical  situation  was  far  more  influential
than the  then-dominant geocentric view  allowed  .
We  want  to  push  this  analogy  even  further.  Despite  Galileo's
compelling  evidence  that  the  Earth  revolved  around  the  sun,  he
appeared  to have been wrong.  To  be sure,  we might look today and
judge  that  he  was  (comparatively)  right,  after  all.  But forget  for  a
moment  the revival  and celebration  of Galileo's pre-abjuration  views,
beginning  in  the  eighteenth  century,  and  temporarily  ignore  his
stature  today  as  a  father  of  modern  science.  Instead,  imagine
yourself living  in  early seventeenth-century  Italy.  It  is  Bellarmine's
view-informed  by  biblical  passages,  religious  authorities,  popular
perceptions,  experience,  and  naked-eye  observations-which  con-
firms  your  intuitions and  the formal  positions  of the  most  powerful
groups  and institutions  in  Italy.)G  And  it  is  Galileo, not  Bellarmine,
294  Of course,  Galileo's  theory was  more  complicated  than  the  geocentric  view
and  consequently  left  many  questions  unanswered.  Among  other  problems,  a
heliocentric  Earth,  without  gravity  (a  concept  which  was  unavailable  at  the  time)
could  neither  rotate  nor revolve  without  sending  its  occupants  flying.  The  fact  that
most  of the Earth's  objects  seemed  fairly secure  (with the  exception  of the  tower  in
Pisa)  was  a  major reason  that  he  (incorrectly)  turned  to  the  tides for support of his
view.  See SOBEL,  supra note 290,  at  75  (outlining the  problems  with Galileo's  theory
that the principle of gravity, then undiscovered, would have  explained).
Legal  economists justify eschewing  realism  in  the name  of maintaining  a  theory
that  is  falsifiable.  As  the  Galileo  story  indicates,  however,  there  are  major problems
with  that justification.  First,  there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that the  more  realistic  a
model,  the  less falsifiable  it is.  That much is  clear from Posner's  own  example of the
debate  between  Galileo  and  Bellarmine.  See  supra text  accompanying  note  230.
Bellarmine's  theory was  clearly  neither realistic nor falsifiable.  Second, even if more
realistic  theories are less falsifiable, that fact does not  justify ignoring reality.  Absent a
meta-rule  explaining  how  realism  and  falsifiability  are  to  be  traded  off  (again,
assuming that there  is such a tradeoff),  identifying  the problem  does not identify how
the  tradeoff  should be  resolved.  Thus,  Posner's  claim  seems  to  be  a  makeweight
argument  against  realism.  Furthermore,  if  Posner's  position  is  that  his  theory  is
superior  because  it  is  falsifiable,  then  he  needs  to  acknowledge  that it has,  indeed,
been  thoroughly falsified  (or been  rendered,  by his  defenses,  non-falsifiable).  As we
discuss  elsewhere,  many  previous  economic  theories  have  been  falsified,  including
those  that  resemble  the  simplistic  models  of  law  and  economics.  See  Hanson  &
Yosifon,  supra note  30  (discussing biology's  theory of "spontaneous  generation"  and
economists'  theories of intertemporal choice, revealed  preference, and assumptions  of
"perfect  information"  and  "stable  preferences"  have  been  more  or  less  falsified.");
Hanson  et al.,  supra note 84  (arguing that Posner's positive theory of tort law has been
falsified or is non-falsifiable, and provides an alternative  positive theory of tort law).
295  Albert Einstein himself dubbed Galileo  "the father of modem  physics-indeed
of modern science altogether."  SOBEL,  supra note 290, at 326.
296  As expressed in the Papal  Condemnation of  June  22,  1633:
That  the  [S]un  is  the  center  of  the  world  motionless  is  a  proposition,
which  is  philosophically  absurd  and  false  and  formally  heretical  for  being
explicitly contrary  to Holy Scripture;
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who  recants  and  renounces  his  earlier  "findings"  and  opinions.
Chances  are  that  you,  that  we,  would  have  believed  Galileo  was  a
heretic and  never doubted  the  process  that "proved" him  to  be one.
From  this  perspective,  Bellarmine  was  obviously  right, and  Galileo,
clearly wrong.
So  how  could  one  of  the  greatest  scientists  of  all  time  be  so
wrong?  The  answer is  obvious,  indeed  it  is  one  of the  reasons  that
the  story  is  so  well  known:  the  scientific  community  was  not
sufficiently  insulated  from  powerful  institutions  with  a  stake  in
297 scientific  outcomes.  More  concretely,  because  Galileo's  work  was
threatening  to the  Catholic Church  and its teachings,  and because  of
the  Church's  encompassing  power,  Galileo  was  under  intense
pressure-indeed,  was  ultimately  convicted  by  the  inquisitors-to
"restate"  his  views  on  the  structure  of  the  universe.  Galileo's
recantation  was  the  result,  not  of  scientific  observation,  but  of
religious  persecution  and  the  very  real  threat  of a  horrible  death  .
' '
The  situational  forces  behind  Galileo's  "restated"  views  are  thus
unmistakable.  Galileo  made  his  recantation  decision  with  the
equivalent  of  a  gun  to  his  head.  Of  course,  as  we  have  argued
That  the  [E]arth  is  neither  the  center of  the  world  nor motionless  but
moves even  with  diurnal  motion  is  philosophically  equally absurd  and false,
and theologically at least erroneous  in the Faith.
Sentence ofJune  22,  1633, in THE GALILEO AFFAIR,  supra note 234, at 287-88.
297  The  adherence  to  the  Ptolemaic  model  by  university  professors  was  a
recurrent  theme  in  Galileo's  attempt  to  bring  forth  evidence  to  support  the
Copernican  view.  Professors  from  Pisa  to  Bologna  to  Padua  rejected  the  telescope:
Magini,  professor  of  astronomy  in  Bologna,  promised  the  new  planets  would  be
"extirpated from the sky."  DE SANTILLANA,  supra note 286, at 9.
Daniel Boorstin  nicely summarizes  the sweeping threat of Galileo's  findings  to
the  fabric  of  conventional  theological  and  philosophic  understandings  of  the
universe:
Each  of  his  simple  observations  shook  another  pillar  of the  Aristotelian-
Ptolemaic universe.  Now,  with  his very  own eyes,  Galileo  had seen  fixed stars
beyond his capacity to count them (Was  the Universe infinite?).  He had seen
that the moon was not more perfect in shape  than the earth itself (Was there
perhaps no difference, after all,  between  the substance of celestial  bodies and
that of  the  Earth?).  The  Milky  Way  then  proven  to  be  simply  a  mass  of
countless  stars  (Was  there  nothing,  after  all,  to  the  Aristotelian  theory  of
celestial exhaltations?  Were heavenly processes  not essentially different from
those on  Earth?).
BOORSTIN,  supra note 285, at 320.
299  See SOBEL,  supra note 290 at 4,  171  (describing  how Dominican  friar Giordano
Bruno was burned at the stake  in  1600 in  Rome  for asserting heliocentric  views of the
world, a fact of which Galileo was aware).
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throughout  this  Article,  such  situational  pressures  are  rarely  so
obvious.
This  can  all  be  expressed,  somewhat  stylistically,  in  Stiglerian
terms.  In  recanting,  Galileo  was  "captured"  by  the  Church  much
like,  say,  the  now  defunct  Civil  Aeronautics  Board  was  once  said  to
be  captured  by  the airline  industry.3 00  He  claimed  to be  saying what
he believed  "with sincere  heart and unfeigned  "h,, 30'  independent
of any  pressure  from  the  Church,  when  in  fact  he  was  serving  the
Church's interests, despite  his own  beliefs.
C.  Deep Capture: Histoy Repeating  Itself
[TIhere have been opened up to this vast and most excellent science, of which my
work  is merely  the beginning, ways and means by which other minds more  acute
than mine will explore its remote corners.
-Galileo  Galilei
2
1.  Some Deep Implications  of Shallow Capture
In  identifying  the  phenomenon  of  capture,  Stigler  and  his
contemporaries  obliterated  the  once-conventional  view of regulation.
They  refuted  the  naive  presumption  that  had  long  been  protected
behind  the  ambiguous  (and, therefore,  easily defended)  concept  of
"the  public  interest,"  and  provided  a  far  more  realistic  (albeit
disturbing)  account  of  the  sources  and  effects  of  regulation.
Regulation  was  "caused"  less  by  public-spirited  and  well-advised
regulators  and  more  by  the  situational  constraints  imposed  upon
them  by  competing  economic  entities,  with  the  most  powerful
entities  wielding  the  most  influence.  In  other  words,  Stigler,
identified  and  substantially  overturned  what  might  be  called  the
regulatory fundamental attribution error.  The  older  "public  interest"
regulatory  theory  maintained  a  kind  of  dispositionist  view  of  a
constant figure,  evaluating  influences,  measuring public welfare,  and
300  See  generally Bradley  Behrman,  Civil Aeronautics Board, in WILSON,  supra note
238, at 75.
301  Galileo's Abjuration ofJune 22,  1633,  in THE GALILEO  AFFAIR, supra note  234,
at 292, 292.
302  GALILEO  GALILEI,  Two  NEW  SCIENCES  153-54  (Henry  Crew  &  Alfonso  De
Salvio, trans.,  Macmillan  1914)  (1638).
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making  decisions  accordingly. 303  Regulatory  theory  essentially  rested
on a view of the regulator as a rational  actor whose stable preferences
were  in the  public  interest.  By studying  the  regulator's  actions  and
ignoring  the  regulator's  words,  economists  like  Stigler  were  able  to
see new  patterns and  surmise some  of the  situational  influences  that
generated them.
But  Stigler's  work  barely  breaks  the  surface  of situationism  and
identifies  only  a  very  shallow  form  of  capture.  When  one  takes
seriously  the  power  of  the  situation-exterior  and  interior30 4-- one
can begin  to understand  the potential  depths of capture.  There  are
several  ways  in  which  capture  is  likely  to  run  much  deeper  than
Stigler,  or  others  applying  and  advancing  his  insights,  have
recognized.
2.  The Depth of Capture
Again, returning  to Galileo's  story may help  make  evident what is
invisible  in  our  midst.  First,  as  the  Catholic  Church's  efforts
revealed,  there  are  other capture-worthy  and  capturable  institutions
and individuals  beyond  merely administrative  regulators.  Recall  that
Galileo had  no  official  regulatory  authority  either in  the  state  or  in
the  Church.  What he  had was  a  certain  level  of public  legitimacy,
and  therefore  power,  as  a  renowned  scientist.3°   His  theories,
evidence,  and  conclusions  were  important  as  a  confirmation  of, or
306 challenge  to,  the  "truth"  of  the  Church's  teachings.  As  a result,
Galileo's  positions  were  well  worth  capturing.  Similarly,  today  any
institutions  or individuals  capable  of influencing existing wealth  and
power  distributions  will  be  subject  to  the  pressures  of capture.  In
this sense,  Stigler and  those who  subscribe  to his  theory are,  like  the
public-interest  theorists  they replaced,  far too shallow.
If  administrative  regulators  are  vulnerable  to  the  forces  of
capture  by  certain  interests,  as  most  everyone  agrees  they  are,  then
303  See  STIGLER,  supra  note  70,  at  114-15  (asserting  that  recent  theories  on
government  behavior  no  longer  attribute  public  policies  to  the  suggestions  of
informed economic  advisors, but rather characterize  policies as  a response  to pressure
from interested parties who aim to benefit from them).
304  See  supra Part  II.E  (briefly  describing  "interior" and  distinguishing  it  from
"exterior").
305  See SOBEL, supra note  290,  at 6-7  ("Galileo found himself lionized  as another
Columbus for his conquests....").
306  Id. at  11-12  (describing  Galileo's  complex  relationship  with  religion  and  the
Catholic Church).
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the  likelihood  of  a  deeper  capture  seems  undeniable.  There  is
nothing special about administrative  regulators-except, perhaps,  the
general  concern  that  they  may  be  captured.  Virtually  every  other
institution  in  our  society  seems  just  as  vulnerable.  After  all,
contemporary  scholars  and  commentators  have  rarely  even
considered,  much  less  taken  seriously, the problem  of deep  capture.
Given  that nescience,  one  would  expect  other institutions  to  be
constructed  without  heed  to  the  dynamics  of  capture.  In  a
world  without  foxes,  a  farmer  will  not  guard  the  hen-house.  And
because  deep  capture  occurs  situationally-outside  of view  by,  and
with  the  induced  consent  of,  the  captured-any  loss  of  eggs  will
either go unnoticed or will be perceived  as natural and just.
There is a second general way in which  traditional capture  theory
is  too  shallow.  To see  this,  it  is  necessary  to  look  deeper  than  the
behavior  of  the  captured  institutions  and individuals.  Beneath  the
surface  of behavior,  the  interior  situation  of relevant  actors  is  also
subject  to  capture.  Indeed,  much  of  the  power  of deep  capture
comes from the fact that its targets include  the way  that people  think
and the way that they think  they think.
The  Catholic  Church  would  have  been  far  less  troubled  by
Galileo,  we  suspect,  if he  had  not been  writing  and  publishing  his
ideas  broadly  in  an  attempt  to  persuade  others  to  reject  then-
conventional  wisdom.
° 7  Eschewing  the  scientific  conventions  of his
day,  Galileo  published  many  of his  discoveries  not  in  Latin  but  in
Italian.  He  was  committed  to altering the  opinions  of people  in his
society,  not  simply  to  recording  his  measurements  for  a  narrow
scientific  audience  .0   It  was  the  danger  Galileo  posed  to  the
Church's basic  knowledge  structures-which  were  embraced  by most
of  the  intelligentsia  and  lay  people  of  the  time-that  led  forces,
including  vested  academic  interests,  to  urge  the  Church  to  literally
M7  Galileo  was  well-known  and  well-liked  by prominent  Catholics,  including  the
Medicis and Pope  Urban VIII.  DE SANTILLANA,  supra note 286, at 118,  160-62.  Thus,
the  pressure  applied  by  the  Inquisitors  might  have  been  reduced  had  Galileo
attempted only  to persuade  fellow professors  or  the Church  hierarchy.  By taking his
case to the Italian  prelates, princes, gentlemen, and  men of business,  however, and by
writing  in  Italian  rather  than  Latin,  Galileo presented  a significant  challenge  to  the
Church.  See MARIO  BIAGIOLI,  GALILEO,  COURTIER:  THE PRACTICE OF SCIENCE  IN  THE
CULTURE  OF  ABSOLUTISM  33-37  (1993)  (analyzing  Galileo's  use  of  patronage
relationships as a source of power throughout his career).
308  See  BoORSTIN,  supra note  285,  at  323-25  (describing  Galileo's  campaign  to
"interest literate laymen in this new way of thinking").
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capture  Galileo.3°   Galileo's  work  went  beyond  offering  a  simple
challenge  to established propositions such  as geocentric  cosmology;  it
advocated  an entirely different intellectual  and moral  approach,  one
that aimed  to discredit the  "cult" of tradition 10  Thus, when  Galileo
advanced  heliocentricism,  as he did in his famous letter to the  Grand
Duchess Christina, he did so in the context of a more comprehensive
rejection  of the view of knowledge  as nothing more than a set of pre-
ordained revelations:
[W]ho wants the human mind put to death?  Who  is going to claim  that
everything  in  the  world  which  is  observable  and  knowable  has  already
been seen and discovered?  ...  one must not, in  my opinion  ...  block the
way  of  freedom  of  philosophizing  about  things  of  the  world  and  of
nature,  as  if  they  had  all  already  been  discovered  and  disclosed  with
certainty.  Nor  should  it  be  considered  rash  to  be  dissatisfied  with
311
opinions which are almost universally accepted  ....
The  message  that common  sense  notions  should  be  challenged
was  deeply  threatening  to  the  Catholic  Church  of  the  seventeenth
century,  which  defined  faith  as  it  had  since  the  Middle  Ages-as
obedience to the teachings of religious authorities.  The highest crime
an  individual  could  commit  was  that  of  heresy-the  word  itself
deriving  from  the Greek word  hairesis, meaning "choice. 3 1   In  order
309  Following the  guilty verdict, at which time he was seventy years old, Galileo was
imprisoned  in  his  own  home  for  the  remainder  of his  life.  Like  so  many  radicals
before and after him, Galileo continued  his work while imprisoned, smuggling out of
captivity  two  books for  publication  under  an assumed  name, which  would  ultimately
become  the  basis  for  the  theory  of dynamics  and  gravity  developed  by  Sir  Isaac
Newton.  Boorstin  notes  that  Galileo's  imprisonment  was  mitigated  somewhat
before his death:
Eventually  the  Pope  allowed  him  the  companionship  of  a  young  scholar,
Vincenzo  Viviani,  who reported  Galileo's death  on January  8,  1642,  a  month
before his  seventy-eighth  birthday.  "With philosophic and Christian  firmness
he  rendered  up his soul  to  its  Creator, sending  it, as  he liked  to believe,  to
enjoy and to watch  from a closer vantage  point  those eternal  and immutable
marvels  which  he,  by  means  of a  fragile  device,  had  brought  closer  to  our
mortal eyes with such eagerness and impatience."
Id. at 326-27.
310  See REDONDI,  supra note 287, at 501.
311  Galileo's  Letter  to  the  Grand  Duchess  Christina  (1615),  in  THE  GALILEO
AFFAIR,  supra note 234, at 87, 96-97.
312  BERNARD  HAMILTON,  THE MEDIEVAL  INQUISITION  13  (1981).  Heresy  extended
far beyond  the  act  of challenging  the  Church's  central  theological  teachings;  any
intellectual  project  that  called  into  question  the  Church's  fundamental  intellectual
authority  was  subject  to  censure.  Thus,  Cardinal  Bellarmine  condemned  the
Copernican  cosmology  as heretical  not only  (or principally)  because  it ran  afoul of a
few  passages  in  the  Bible,  but  because  it  stood  in  sharp  contrast  to  a  fundamental
Aristotelian  law of physics,  which  said  that "the  [E]arth,  insofar, as  it  is  the  greatest
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to prevent  the wider  populace  from  realizing  that a "choice" existed,
Galileo had to be silenced.
Those  in  power  thus  captured  the  institutions  and  individuals
that  threatened  their  dominant  position,  including  an  individual
scientist  capable  of altering  ideas  or  knowledge  in  a  way  that  might
weaken  their  power.  They  did  so  through  a  process  intended  to
suggest that Galileo freely  chose his recantation  and resultant silence.
Galileo,  wisely,  did  not proclaim  that he  was  being  forced  to  recant
under  the  threat  of death;  he  stated  instead  that  he  was  trying  to
clarify  the  possible  confusion  that  his  errors  had  created  and  make
clear that he,  upon  reflection,  "abjure[d],  curse[d],  and  detest[ed]
the  above-mentioned  errors  and  heresies  . . ."3'3  The  Church  thus
applied  situational  pressure  to  generate  the  appearance  of
"dispositional" recantation.  And  the  people  at  that  time,  inasmuch
as  their  knowledge  structures  and  understanding  of  the  world  were
influenced  by  the  Church,  and  insofar  as  the  Church  managed  to
squelch  other  ideas  or  knowledge  structures,  were  also  deeply
captured.
Understanding  that capture is  directed at both  our exteriors and
interiors clears up some confusion and debate  in the  shallow capture
literature.  When  Stigler's evidence  of capture  emerged,  economists,
political  scientists,  and  public  choice  theorists  got  busy  trying  to
identify  the  precise  mechanics  of  the  regulatory  black  box  that
Stigler  mostly ignored.  True  to  form,  they  began  with  the  rational
actor model of human behavior and sought to explain capture  as the
consequence  of  the  self-interested,  maximizing  dispositions  of
314 individual  regulators.  Yet,  while  simple  formulations  have  given
way  to  increasingly  elaborate  ones,3"  public-choice  theory  is  still
dogged  by  the  fact  that  it  is  unrealistically  "cynical"  (meaning  that
the  assumed  dispositions  of  regulatory  actors  are  perceived  to  be
weight, tends naturally to that natural point which is the center."  REDONDI,  supra note
287,  at  39.  Because  the Church  had accepted  Aristotle as  the final  authority on  the
laws of nature, all others were bound to do the same.  Id.
"13  Galileo's Abjuration of June  22,  1633,  in THE GALILEO  AFFAIR,  supra note  234,
at 292.
314  This is yet another example of the tendency to infer dispositions from actions.
See  supra text  accompanying  notes  150-78  (describing  several  experiments  in  which
participants  tended  to  overestimate  the  role  of disposition  even  when  situational
influence  should be obvious).
315 See,  e.g.,  DONALD  P.  GREEN  &  IAN  SHAPIRO,  PATHOLOGIES  OF  RATIONAL
CHOICE  THEORY:  A  CRITIQUE  OF  APPLICATIONS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  47-71
(1994)  (analyzing  the  failure  of traditional  rational  choice  theory  to  explain  voter
turnout).
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unrealistically  selfish).  After  all,  many  governmental  actors  and reg-
ulatory agents often claim, and actually  seem to be,  motivated by  the
public  interest  and  try  to  act  that  way;3 16  that  is,  many  regulators'
actions  appear  more  consistent  with  their  ideological  beliefs  than
with a narrow conception  of self-interest17
The  problem  with  shallow  capture  is  not  that  it cannot  always
explain  the  part  played  by  the  dispositions  of regulatory  actors,  but
rather  that it takes  dispositions  so  seriously  in the  first  place.  Deep
capture  makes  clear  that  people's  intentions  and  beliefs  may  have
little  to  do  with  their  behavior  and  that, insofar  as  they  do,  those
intentions and beliefs are part of what interests compete to capture.
When  Catholic  astronomers  of  the  seventeenth  century  stated
that they believed,  as  most profoundly  did, that the  Earth was at the
center  of the  universe,  deep  capture  was  at work.  Their  astronomy
was  part of a  larger, interconnected  set of truths  taught  to  them  in
seminary  and  reinforced  at  many  turns-some  seen,  some  unseen
-in  their  society.  Similarly,  lay  people  had  no  reason  to  dispute
those  truths and faced situational  influences just as  powerful,  despite
being  less  visible,  as  the  gun  to  the  head  or  fire  to  the  feet  that
Galileo  experienced.  That  a  regulator  may  act  out  of  ideological
dispositions  no more  implies that  she  is  free  from  capture  than  the
changing lengths of shadows on  a summer afternoon implies  that the
sun  is revolving around  the Earth.
316  See, e.g.,  Mark  Kelman,  On Democracy-Bashing:  A  Skeptical Look  at the Theoretical
and "Empirical"  Practice  of the Public Choice Movement,  74 VA.  L. REV.  199,  217-23  (1988)
(arguing that shifts  in public policy demonstrate that public leaders are not motivated
purely by self-interest);  see also DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRIcKEY,  LAw AND PUBLIC
CHOICE:  A  CRITICAL  INTRODUCTION  31  (1991)  (describing  evidence  that  "one
factor  in  how  a  legislator  votes  is  simply  that  legislator's  view  of  the  public
interest").
317  See FARBER &  FRIcKEY,  supra note 316,  at 24-25,  28-33  (discounting  the public
choice  theory as the  sole explanation  for legislators'  actions).  In such circumstances,
the literature  sometimes  accommodates  such  ideological  behavior  by treating  it  as  a
manifestation  of self-interest.  See generally  Joseph  P.  Kalt & Mark A.  Zupan,  Capture
and Ideology in Law and Economics, 74 AM.  ECON.  REV.  279  (1984); James  B.  Kau &
Paul  H. Rubin,  Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling  in Congressional  Voting, 22 J.L.  &
ECON.  365  (1979).  Instead  of  pursuing  the  analytic  inquiry  that  this  increasingly
non-falsifiable  definition  of self-interest would  entail,  scholars  relying  on  it  typically
just move on, leaving  the dispositionist rational actor whole and ready to be employed
for the next analysis.  A critical  realist approach  places  the exploration  of the nature
of preference  formation,  and the  location of its influences, at the  start of an analytic
inquiry,  instead  of  avoiding  it  as  an  unfortunate  impasse  to  simple,  if  unrealistic,
analyses and seemingly clear policy conclusions.
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The  question  that  should  be  asked  is  not:  "Who  among  the
regulators  is  corrupt  or  so  selfishly  motivated  as  to  disregard  the
'public  interest?"'  The  question  that  should  be  asked  is:  "Who
among us is  the most  powerful and most capable  of deeply capturing
our exteriors  and interiors  and, even,  of capturing what  we mean  by
the  'public interest?"'
3.  The Invisibility of Capture
By "deep capture,"  then, we are referring  to the disproportionate
and  self-serving  influence  that  the  relatively  powerful  tend  to  exert
over  all  the  exterior and  interior situational  features  that  materially
influence  the  maintenance  and  extension  of  that  power-
including  those  features  that purport  to  be,  and  that we  experience
as,  independent,  volitional,  and  benign.  Because  the  situation
generally  tends  to  be  invisible  (or  nearly  so)  to  us,  deep  capture
tends to be as well.
This  raises  the question:  if deep  capture  is  so  hard  to  see,  then
why  is  it  so  obvious  in  the  Galileo  example?  There  are  several
reasons.  To begin with,  at the  time,  we  doubt that it was  so visible.
We suspect  that few  observers  saw  anything untoward  or illegitimate
about  Galileo's  inquisitorial  experience  or any  reason  to  doubt the
"knowledge"  that it produced.
18  The situational pressures  that, to  us,
were  glaringly  excessive  during  the  Inquisition  were  probably  not
perceived  as excessive at the time.
The  situational  forces  confronting  Galileo  may be  easier  for  us
to  see now because we  live in  a  radically different environment.
We  are  looking  at another generation  of people  in  another  country
318  Cf  REDONDI,  supra  note  287,  at  303  (suggesting  that  news  of  Galileo's
condemnation,  although  greeted  "by  a  salvo  of Aristotelian  criticism,"  did  not  rise
above the  level of "routine academic skirmishes").  Galileo's  trial itself was, of course,  a
hidden  proceeding-a  series  of private  interrogations  that  the world  did  not  learn
about until after the fact.  Id. at 326.
319  Such  situational  pressures  are  less  likely  to  be visibly  employed  today.  The
fact  that  burning  people  at  the  stake  is  now  considered  to  be  an  unacceptable
violation  of human  rights  does  not mean  that blatant  situational  force  is  no  longer
used to elicit the appearance of free, voluntary action.  The still-significant  problem of
"forced confessions"  is just one of many possible  examples of that phenomenon.  See
Jim Dwyer  & Kevin  Flynn,  New Light on Jogger's Rape Calls Evidence into Question, N.Y.
TIMES,  Dec.  1,  2002,  at Al  (discussing  recent  evidence  that  the  convictions  in  the
Central  Park jogger  rape  case were  based  on  confessions  that likely  were  coerced);
Susan  Saulny,  Convictions and Charges  Voided  in  '89 Central Park Jogger Attack,  N.Y.
TIMES,  Dec.  20,  2002,  at Al  ("[L]awyers  for  three of the  men..,  contend  that  the
confessions were coerced  by the police.").
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whose situational  worldviews  we  reject and whose  victim,  Galileo,  we 520  ,
revere.  They  are  "them,"  and  Galileo  is  "us."  People  are
motivated  to  attribute  bad  outcomes  to  in-group  members  .
The contrast is heightened by  the historical  construction  of the event
as  a  lesson  on  the  horrors  of  the  Inquisition  and  the  dangerous
distortions  that result  when  religion  is  allowed  to  dominate  (or,
we might  say, "capture")  science.  The  role  of disposition  and  deep
capture  in  the  Galileo  story  is,  today and  to us,  conspicuous,  almost
palpable.  But seeing  our own  situation  and its deep capture  is not.
4.  Learning  from History
For  some  of  the  same  reasons  that  it  is  difficult  to  convince
people  that they would  have  been  influenced  by  the situational  cues
in  the  Milgram  experiment,3 2 2  it  is  nearly  impossible  to  convince
people that they live in, and are part of, a deeply captured  world.  To
make our preliminary  case,  therefore,  we will attempt to demonstrate
that the situation  today is very similar  to the  situation  that existed  in
Galileo's Italy.  Because  the existence  of deep capture  is  easy to  see
and accept  there,  by observing it, we  may be  better  able  to see  and
accept deep capture  now.  Perhaps  by seeing that we are subject to  a
parallel  influence  over  a  parallel  issue,  we  may  be  able  to  more
clearly see ourselves, not in the heroic Galileo,  but in the complacent
and complicit adherents  of the common  sense  of his day,  or even  in
the reactionary Bellarmine.
a.  Institutions to deeply capture
The  first parallel  is  the existence of an institution or collection  of
institutions  with  immense  wealth  and  power  and,  thus,  both  the
ability  and  desire  to  influence  exterior  and  interior  situations  to
enhance  those  advantages.  In  the  Galileo  story,  that  collection  of
320  The  rehabilitation  of Galileo as  an object of reverence was  not accomplished
until  the  nineteenth  century, when  his  cause was  taken  tip by  radicals  like  Auguste
Comte  who  portrayed  him as a "martyr of the religion  of humanity."  REDONDI,  supra
note  287,  at  321.  Today,  Galileo  is  depicted  in  a  similar-if not somewhat  anach-
ronistic-light  as a great crusader for scientific  fact against the superstitious monolith
that was the early modern  Catholic  Church.  As  the  Indigo Girls sing, "Galileo's head
was on the block, the crime was  looking up the truth."  INDIGO GIRLS,  Galileo, on RITES
OF  PASSAGE (Sony Music Entertainment  1992).
321  See Hanson & Yosifon,  supra note  30  (describing  some  phenomenon  between
groups); supra note 110  (discussing actor-observer bias).
See supra  text accompanying notes  86-100  (outlining the Milgram experiment).
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institutions is,  for the sake of simplicity, often treated  as an individual
actor under  the  heading  of "the Catholic  Church"  or  "the Vatican."
Today, we  hypothesize  that  the  institutions  with  the  means  and  the
motive  to  engage  in  deep  capture  are  large  corporations. 23  In
virtually  any  present  metric  and  manner  of  understanding  power,
corporations  easily qualify as immensely powerful.
Let  us start  with  corporations'  immense  wealth,  a  fundamental
component  of  power  in  our  market  economy.  As  is  so  often
emphasized  by  legal  economists,  resources  have  a tendency  through
market  processes  to  move  to  those  who  value  them  most,  as
324 measured  by  relative  willingness  to  pay.  Willingness  to  pay,  of
course,  is  heavily determined  by ability to pay.  No institutional  actor
controls  as  much wealth  in  so  concentrated  a fashion  in  our society
today  as  do  corporations  and  those  individuals  with  an  important
stake  in  promoting  the  power  of  corporations. 32'  Thus,  valuable
resources  (including influence  over the  situation)  tend  toward  those
with  the greatest ability to pay-that is, corporations.
Large  corporate  interests  have  several  other  power  advantages
beyond  their wealth-advantages  that likely  help  them  to amass that
326 wealth  in  the  first  place.  For  instance,  like  Stigler's  beekeepers,
they  enjoy  a  common  single  interest  and thus  an  advantage  in  the
competition  to  influence-an  assertion  that  finds  considerable
support  in  the  shallow  capture  literature. 3 7   Insofar  as  each
corporation is  devoted to the single  goal  of profit maximization,  they
are,  even  as  they compete in  the marketplace,  collectively  committed
323  Of course, there  are many  dimensions of power,  many of  them  overlapping.
We  believe  that  this  theory  also  predicts  the  operation  of  power  in  other  social
institutions  and  along  other  dimensions  and  sources  of power,  including  species,
gender, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation,  age, and physical attractiveness.
324 See  supra  text  accompanying  notes  117-21  (discussing  the  ways  in  which
measuring  value  by  willingness  to  pay highlights  a  disposition  while  overlooking  an
important situational element-namely, ability to pay).
325  See  supra  note  253  (providing  evidence  of  the  wealth  controlled  by
corporations).  Corporate interests, to  be sure,  are not without competitors,  such  as
churches,  foundations,  nonprofit  organizations,  labor  unions,  trial  attorneys,
aggregations  of consumers, and individual  consumers.  In subsequent work we hope
to examine  the  relative  power of such  institutions  vis-A-vis  corporations,  and also
the ways  in which all  of those institutions  are  themselves  targets of deep capture
by large commercial interests.
32F  See supra text accompanying  note  280  (describing beekeepers'  advantages  over
honey consumers in influencing beekeeper regulations).
.,  See supra Part V.A (summarizing  that literature)
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to  a  uniform  regulatory  end:  the  creation  and  maintenance  of  a
world that maximizes profit opportunities .
Moreover,  corporations  are-in  part  because  of  market
processes-profoundly  effective  at  uncovering  and  exploiting  the
most  efficient  and  reliable  means  of  influencing  people  and  insti-
tutions,  a  pursuit  that  will  extend  through  situational  influences. 29
Advertising,  marketing,  lobbying,  and  public  relations  are  only  the
most  obvious activities  that corporations  have  refined  in their profit-
maximizing  pursuits.  Even  those  practices  are  largely  obscured  by
our  dispositionism  and  largely  invisible  in  our  theories°-an
obscurity  that renders  them  all  the  more  effective.  In future work,
we  hope  to describe  those  practices  in  more  detail.  For  now,  our
point is that the situation of market competition  has led corporations
to  become  far more  expert  at manipulating  situational  factors  than
other institutions  or individuals have  had the  need  or wherewithal  to
accomplish.
Finally,  the  livelihood  or economic  well-being of the  majority  of
our  population  is  perceived  to depend  directly  or indirectly  on  the
health  of corporations-individually  and  collectively.  For  example,
many  people  work  for  corporations,  many  people  invest  in  corpor-
ations,  and,  more  generally,  the  overall  health  of  the  economy,  in
which  most  of  us  feel  we  have  a  significant  stake,  is  perceived  to
depend  on the collective  health  of corporations.  Corporate  scholars
Henry  Hansmann  and  Reinier  Kraakman,  for  instance,  recently
described the expanding base of shareholders  as follows:
Stock  ownership  is  becoming more pervasive  everywhere.  No longer
is it confined  to a small  group of wealthy citizens.  In the United  States,
this  diffusion  of  share  ownership  has  been  underway  since  the
beginning  of the  twentieth  century.  In  recent  years,  however,  it has
accelerated  substantially.  Since  the  Second  World  War,  an  ever-
328 See  supra  text  accompanying  notes  257-59  (briefly  describing  shared
commercial  ends);  Chen  & Hanson,  Illusion  of Law  I,  supra note 84  (analyzing  the
schemas of corporate  law and how it benefits corporate interests)
329  See Hanson  & Kysar,  Taking Behavioralism Seriously I, supra note 251,  at 724-43
(describing and predicting methods  by which  manufacturers  manipulate  consumers);
Hanson  &  Kysar,  Taking  Behavioralism Seriously  I,  supra  note  251,  at  1428-1501
(illustrating  consumer  manipulation  tactics,  including  those  used  by  the  tobacco
industry).
330 See  Hanson  &  Kysar,  Taking Behavioralism Seriously  I,  supra note  251,  at  725
("[S]cholars...  have  failed  to  see  that  manufacturers  can  take  advantage  of such
manipulability."  (emphasis omitted));  Hanson  & Kysar,  Taking Behavioralism Seriously
II, supra note 251, at 1548-49  (describing  "Viscusi's failure  to consider how the industry
itself might have influenced consumer risk perceptions and preferences").
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increasing  number of American workers  have  had their savings  invested
in  corporate  equities  through  pension  funds.  Over  the  same  period,
the  mutual  fund  industry  has  also  expanded  rapidly,  becoming  the
repository  of an  ever-increasing  share  of  nonpension  savings  for  the
331
population at large.
This  is  not just an  academic  point.  President  George  W.  Bush
has been  emphasizing this theme repeatedly in the wake of corporate
debacles  since  he  took office.  In response  to Enron  revelations,  for
instance, he explained:
The  reason  that a single  bankruptcy  can  cause  so  much  concern  in
America  is that more Americans than ever have  invested  their money in
public  corporations.  Today,  about  80  million  Americans  own  stock,
either  individually  or  through  their  pension  plans.  This  is  one  of the
causes  for  the  expansion  in  personal  wealth  over  the  past  20  years.
This  has  been  an  incredibly  positive  development for  America.  Stock
ownership  allows  citizens  from  all  walks  of life  to  own  a  part  of  the
economy  and  to  share  in  its  growth.  The  people  who  run  public
companies  owe  a special  obligation  to  these  investors,  many  of whom
have  put their savings and future  security on  the line.
33
2
The  widespread  sense  that  our  collective  welfare  turns
importantly  on  the  wealth  and  success  of  corporations  empowers
corporations.  It does  so  by giving the  general  population  a stake  in
the  health of those institutions  that are already the  most wealthy  and
influential in our culture.  As  Hansmann  and Kraakman  put it:
No  longer  do  labor  and  capital  constitute  clearly  distinct  interest
groups  in  society.  Workers,  through  share  ownership,  increasingly
share  the  economic  interests  of other  equity-holders.  Indeed,  in  the
United  States,  union  pension  funds  are  today  quite  active  in  pressing
the view  that companies  must be  managed  in  the  best interests of their
shareholders.
3 3 3
331  Henry  Hansmann  & Renier Kraakman,  The End of Histoy for Corporate Law, 89
GEO. LJ. 439,  452 (2001)  (citations omitted).
332  President  George  W.  Bush,  President  Outlines  Plan  to  Improve  Corporate
Responsibility, Remarks  at Malcolm  Baldrige  National Quality Award  Ceremony (Mar.
7,  2002),  available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020307-
3.html;  see also President  George  W.  Bush,  President  Reiterates  Call  for Corporate
Responsibility, Remarks  to Employees of America  II  Electronics  (Mar.  8, 2002),  2002
WL  14547111  ("We've  got  thousands  of  citizens  who  own  shares  of  publicly  held
companies,  many  in  pension  plans,  mutual  funds,  a  lot  of them  direct  ownership.
And  this  country  must hold  corporate  CEOs-CEOs  of publicly  held  companies,  to
the  highest  of  high  standards."),  available at  http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2002/03/20020308-4.html.
3  Hansmann  & Kraakman,  supra note  331,  at 452.
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In  this  way,  according  to  Hansmann  and  Kraakman,  "a  public
shareholder class" has developed  into "a broad and  powerful interest
group  in  both  corporate  and  political  affairs  across  jurisdictions"
334 promoting corporate  interests.
b.  Fundamental attribution  errors
The second major parallel between  our world and  Galileo's is  the
existence  of  a  widely  held  attributional  intuition  that  is  false,  but
generally  viewed  as  a  "truth"-and an  obvious  one  at  that.  At that
time,  it  was  about  what,  if  anything,  moved  the  Earth  and  the
celestial  bodies  "above" it.  Now,  it  is  about  what moves  us and  our
institutions.33
c.  Incentives to deeply capture
The  third parallel  is that in our world,  too, those in power have  a
stake  in  maintaining  the  apparent veracity  of that "truth" and,  thus,
in  heavily  promoting  it.  Instead  of the  Catholic  Church  sustaining
geocentricism  and  dismissing  Galileo's  observations  regarding  the
role  of  astronomical  situation,  today,  in  our  world,  it  is  large
corporate  interests  promoting  dispositionism  and  dismissing  obser-
vations regarding  the influence of exterior  and interior situations  on
behavior.
i.  The stakes of geocentricism
To the Catholic Church,  maintaining an allegiance  to the biblical
account  of astronomical  structure,  no  matter  how  logically dubious,
was  extremely  important.  Although  Galileo  himself saw  no  tension S 3363
between  his  scientific  findings  and  his  Catholic  faith,'  portions  of
934  Id.
335  Note  that  in  both  cases,  the  attributions  are  self-affirming.  We  like  to  see
ourselves  as thinking,  free actors,  and we  like  to  think of our  Earth  as  being  placed,
apparently  by God, at the center of the universe.
336Galileo wrote that:
[T]hough the Scripture  cannot err, nevertheless  some  of its interpreters  and
expositors  can sometimes  err in various  ways....  [N]ature  is inexorable  and
immutable, and she does not care at all whether or not her recondite  reasons
and modes of operations are  revealed  to human understanding  ....
...  [T]herefore,  whatever  sensory experience  places  before our eyes or
necessary  demonstrations  prove  to  us concerning  natural  effects  should  not
in  any way  be  called  into  question  on  account  of scriptural  passages  whose
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the  Catholic  hierarchy  saw  in  his  discoveries  the  direct
contradiction  of  several  theological  tenets.
3
3
7   In  their  eyes,
such weakened  links threatened  to destroy a whole  chain  of logic
upon which  the Church relied. 33 s
The  insistence  on  intellectual  conformity  in  scientific  and
philosophical  subjects  was  intimately  connected  to  the
Church's  reaction  to  a  far  more  fundamental  challenge  to  its
authority, that of the Protestant  Reformation.  That  Galileo was
linked  in  the  minds  of  many  Catholic  Church  leaders  to  the
Protestant  Reformation  is  ironic,  since  Galileo  probably
objected  to the Protestant's  literal  interpretations  of the Bible,
if not their reformist  spirit, even  more than  he  did  to  Catholic
orthodoxy.
3 3 9   At  the  same  time,  Protestantism  seemed  to  be
advancing  the  same  kind  of challenge  to  core  Catholic  beliefs
that  Galileo's  scientific  approach  posed  to  Aristotelian
naturalism. 4 °  On  a  broader  level,  at  its  inception,  Protestant-
ism  was  fundamentally  anti-authoritarian  in  the  sense  that  its
leaders,  beginning  with  Luther,  encouraged  the  radical
decentralization  of religious  authority  and  the  rationalization
words  appear  to  have  a  different meaning,  since not every statement  of the
Scripture  is bound to obligations as severely as each effect of nature.
Correspondence  from  Galileo  to  Castelli  (Dec.  21,  1613),  in THE  GALILEO  AFFAIR,
supra  note 234, at 49,  49-50.
337  In  1546,  at  the  Fourth  Session  of  the  Council  of  Trent,  Church  leaders
launched  the Counter-Reformation,  declaring that:
[Nbo  one  relying on  his  own judgment  shall,  in  matters  of faith  and  moral
pertaining  to the  edification  of Christian  doctrine ...  presume  to  interpret
[the  Holy  Scriptures]  contrary  to  that sense  which  holy mother  Church,  to
whom it belongs to judge  of their true sense and interpretation,  has held and
holds, or even contrary to the unanimous teachings of the Fathers.
Maurice A. Finocchiaro,  Introduction to THE GALILEO  AFFAIR,  supra note 234;  see also id.
at 11-12 (summarizing the political background of the Counter-Reformation).
338 As one scholar of Galileo has noted:
Bellarmine's  logic  is  relentless.  If God is  the author of Scripture, everything
in  the  Bible  is  true, whether  it  is  essential  to salvation  or  merely  a  piece  of
accidental  historical  information.  And  his  reason  for  this  is  of  crucial
importance.  "It is necessary to  believe  them because they were written." ...  This
truth  condition,  which  is  certainly  not  limited  to  only  Bellarmine's
presentation,  was  clearly destined to clash  with Galileo's scientific standard  of
truth.
RiCHARDJ.  BLACKWELL,  GALILEO,  BELLARMINE,  AND THE BIBLE 32  (1991).
33Q Cf  DE  SANTILLANA,  supra note  286,  at  326-27  (noting  that  Galileo  was  an
"anticlerical Catholic," not a Protestant).
340  See REDONDI,  supra note  287, at 209  (describing  the Protestant challenge to the
Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation).
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of scriptural  interpretation.  The  result  was  a  more  personal,
individualized  experience  and  interpretation  of the  scriptures.
To  the  Catholic  hierarchy,  this  was  the  work  of  the  devil.  And
maintaining  a  strict  biblical  understanding  of  astronomy  was  of
critical  importance  in  their  broader  battle  against  diabolical
corruption of Church dogma. 34'
ii.  The stakes of dispositionism
Similarly,  today,  large  corporate  interests  have  a  great  deal  at
stake  in  maintaining  and  promoting  a  dispositionist  worldview.  As
we argued  earlier,  it is  possible  to  speak  of a  "corporate  interest" in
maximizing  profit  not  because  corporations  are  dispositionally
motivated,  but  because  there  are  robust  and  stable  situational
pressures encouraging  corporations  to act  "as if'  they want to pursue
that end. 342
341  The battle was not played  out merely in the minds of Europeans-great armies
also were clashing on European  soil.  On the  eve of Galileo's trial, the Thirty Years War
(1618-1648)  was  going extremely badly for the Catholic side.  In 1632,  the  Protestant
King of Sweden,  Gustavus Adolphus,  broke through  the  armies of the  Catholic  Holy
Roman  Emperor in Germany and advanced on  Italy.  He probably would  have crossed
the Alps and marched  on  Rome  itself but for his  own untimely death  that same year.
See  id. at 231.  It  was  at this  time,  in  February  of 1632,  that Galileo  published  The
Dialogue, in  which  he  called  into  question  the  entire  framework  of  Aristotelian
cosmology advanced  by  the  Church.  See DE  SANTILLANA,  supra note  286,  at 38,  186.
(acknowledging  dispute between Galileo  and Aristotelians  and citing  1632 as the date
of  publication).  So  it  was  that  Galileo  slammed  into  an  entire  framework  of
intellectual,  spiritual,  and  political  power and  authority  that  already  felt  itself to  be
under attack.  Consequently, the Pope was in no mood to be indulgent, especially since
Bellarmine had forbidden Galileo  to advance  heliocentrism in  1616.  In response  to a
plea by the Tuscan ambassador for lenience,  the Pope supposedly "exploded in anger,"
saying that in his "perverse  material," Galileo  had, "dared enter where he should  not,
into  the  most  grave  and  dangerous  subjects  that  one  could  possibly  raise  at  the
moment."  REDONDI, supra note 287, at 256.
Had  Galileo and his discoveries come earlier, at a time when  the Catholic Church
was  not losing  power and  influence,  his  findings  and  ideas  might  have  met  a  more
hospitable audience.  Indeed,  it was  not until well  into the twentieth  century and the
current Pope's  tenure  that the  Church apologized  for  silencing  Galileo.  See William
D. Montalbano,  Earth Moves for Vatican in Galileo Case, L.A. TIMES,  Nov.  1, 2002, at A3
("The  Roman  Catholic  Church  has  admitted  to  erring..,  in  formally  condemning
Galileo  Galilei  for  entertaining  scientific  truths  it  long  denounced  as  against-the-
Scriptures  heresy.");  Alan  Cowell,  After 350  Years,  Vatican  Says  Galileo  Was Right:  It
Moves,  N.Y.  TIMES,  Oct.  31,  1992,  at  Al  ("More  than  350  years  after  the  Roman
Catholic  Church  condemned  Galileo,  Pope John  Paul  II  [will]  rectify  one  of  the
Church's  most  infamous  wrongs-the  persecution  of  the  Italian  astronomer  and
physicist for proving the Earth moves around the Sun.").
.42  See supra text accompanying  notes  248-51  (noting  the situational pressures
on  market  actors  to  maximize  profits);  see also Hansmann  &  Kraakman,  supra note
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And,  in  a  similar  vein, just  as  one  can  speak  of  corporations'
individual  interests,  one  can  also  speak  of their  shared  or  collective
interest.  Although  corporations are  often  in direct competition  with
one  another,  they share  a  collective  interest  in maximizing  profits-
which  translates  to an  interest  in  maximizing  available  markets  and
minimizing  profit-reducing  regulation.  Phenomena  such  as  trade
associations  for  lobbying,  industry-  and  sector-wide  advertising  and
public  relations,  and  illegal  collaborative  activities  such  as  price-
343 fixing,  evince  these  shared  interests  amongst  competitors.
Coordinated  lobbying  efforts  for policy  initiatives  like  NAFTA34 4 and
for one-or-another  political  candidate,  demonstrate  a shared  corp-
orate  interest across  markets.  But corporations  share  an interest  in
more  than just promoting,  for  example,  global  trade  policy.  They
also  share  a deeper interest in promoting  certain perceptions of global
trade  policy,  and  of  many  other  issues  that  can  influence  their
common  pursuit of profits.  It is  our contention  that a dispositionist
worldview  benefits  both  individual  corporations  and  the  shared
corporate  interest,  and  that  corporations  therefore  individually  and
jointly  will  act  situationally  to  promote  it.  Because  this  claim  is  a
major  feature  of  our  larger  thesis,  and  because  defending  it  is
somewhat complex,  it will be the topic of a separate article. 4 6  We
urge  the  reader  to accept, or at least suspend  disbelief in,  this claim
until  we  can  flesh  it out  and  (we  hope)  thoroughly  substantiate  it.
For now, we  will only cursorily highlight portions of that article.
One  important  reason  that  corporations  have  a  stake  in
dispositionism  is  that  it  is  the dispositionist  perspective  that largely
justifies  their  profit-seeking  behavior  as  socially  beneficial.  If
consumers  are  assumed  to  be  dispositional-that  is,  if  they  act
according  to  a  stable  set  of preferences  that  only  they  can  access
directly-then  it  plausibly  follows  that  the  best  way  to  maximize
331,  at 441-42  (describing the  "interests" of institutions-profit maximization);  Chen
& Hanson,  Illusion of Law I,  supra  note 84 (describing those situations in detail).
3  See also supra notes 256-60 and accompanying  text  (making a related point and
providing some evidence  in support). 344
See  Coalition of Business Interests is Mobilizing Support for NAFIA,  10  Int'l Trade
Rep.  (BNA)  314,  at  314-15  (Feb.  24,  1993)  (reporting  that  a  coalition  of business
interests  comprised  of  over  a  thousand  organizations  was  lobbying  in  support  for
NAFTA).
345 See  David  R.  Lagasse,  Undue Influence:  Corporate Political Speech,  Power and the
Initiative Process, 61  BROOK.  L.  REv.  1347,  1385  (1995)  (describing  the  collaborative
creation of the  Business Roundtable  as a corporate  lobbying organization).
.146  SeeJon Hanson,  Adam  Wright  &  David  Yosifon,  The  Situational  Stakes  of
Dispositionism (unpublished  manuscript, on file with authors).
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welfare  is  to  allow  consumers  to  satisfy  their  preferences  through
free-market  transactions.  It  is  through  free  markets  that  otherwise
invisible  preferences  are  satisfied  (and  revealed)  through  mutually
beneficial  transactions that enhance overall  social welfare.  As  profit-
maximizing  entities, corporations  act  to  maximize  social  welfare  by
serving  consumers'  supposed dispositional preferences.  Profit is  the
substantiation  of  those  welfare-enhancing  transactions  and  is  there-
fore,  by  definition,  good.  In  short,  profit-maximizing  corporations
act in the public interest:
47
A  dispositionist  worldview  is  similarly  valuable  to  the  corporate
interest  because  it  helps  minimize  profit-reducing  regulation.
Markets, which allow the free exercise of dispositions,  are understood
as  more  responsive  to  consumer  preferences  than  regulators  who
lack  good  information  and  the  appropriate  incentives.  The
dispositionist  presumption  translates  to  a  presumption  against
regulatory  intervention  even  against  visible  harms,  for  the  actors
involved  are  presumed  to be  choosing  the  inevitable  risks  that  gave
rise  to  those  harms.  Regulatory  intervention  is  warranted  only  in
circumstances  in  which  markets  demonstrably  fail  to  respond  to
consumer  dispositions-for  instance,  when  consumers  clearly  lack
information  or  when  a  transaction  creates  significant  negative
externalities.  But,  even  in  the  presence  of  such  market
imperfections,  calls  for  regulation  may  be  rebutted  on  the  grounds
that imperfect markets  might be preferable  to imperfect regulations.
Expressions  like  "the  nirvana  fallacy"  and  "the  law  of unintended
consequences"  have  been  coined  to  capture  this fallback  defense  of
markets.
3 4
Dispositionism  also  helps  support  common  arguments  for  why
regulators  cannot  be  trusted.  Regulators,  like  the  rest  of us,  are •349
presumed  to be  motivated  to  satisfy  their self-interest,  ) an  end that
is  often  in  tension  with  their  purported  goal  of serving  the  public
interest.  Regulators  are  often  depicted  as  concerned  with  job
security,  career  advancement,  and  larger  budgets,  as  well-meaning
but  ill-informed  bunglers,  or as  zealous  intermeddlers  seeking  to
347 Aspects of this script are described  in  Chen & Hanson, Illusion of Law I, supra
note 84.
348  See Melvin Aaron Eisenberg, Bad Arguments in Corporate  Law, 78 GEO. L.J.  1551,
1551-52  (1990)  (discussing the  use of the Nirvana  Fallacy to defend markets);  Kenneth
Sanney, Cyberjacking, Mousetrapping and the FTC Act:  Are Federal Consumer Protection  Laws
Helping  or Hurting Online Consumers?, 3 VAND. J.  ENT. L. & PRAc.  221,  233  n.40 (2001)
(defining the  law of unintended consequences and discussing  its invocation).
349  See supra text accompanying  notes 7, 303 & 314.
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impose  their visions  of society upon  otherwise  free  consumers.  Such
dispositions are likely to lead to wrongful  interference in free choices
and,  consequently,  inefficient  outcomes-the  apparent  dispositional
mechanism behind Stigler's findings.
Another benefit  of dispositionism  is that  it helps to  preserve  and
legitimate  the  status  quo,  in  which  corporations  are  the  wealthiest
and  most  powerful  entities.  Dispositionism  places  consumers,  not
corporations,  in  the  driver's  seat.  Corporations  are  viewed  as  com-
peting  to  fulfill  consumers'  desires  in  a  fair  competition;  they  are
viewed  as  having  no  role  in  creating  or  influencing  consumers'
behavior.  If consumers are unhappy with one or another outcome  of
that competitive  process,  they are  rebuffed with  the observation  that
the process  is fair and that consumers have no one but themselves  to
blame.  If consumers  claim not to  like a given  market outcome,  they
can  be  told  to  change  their  consumption  choices,  reexamine  their
perceived preferences,  or take  it up with their fellow consumers.
In  addition,  corporations  gain  in  innumerable  ways  from  the
general  human  tendency-reflected  in  the  fundamental  attribution
error-to  attach  disproportionate  weight  to  what we  see  and  to  see
only  a  small,  salient  subset  of  our  environs  and  interiors.  This
phenomenon  has  many  manifestations  that  tend  to  benefit  large
commercial  interests.  For example,  when the situation  is not obvious
(as  is  generally  the  case),  people  believe  they  are  acting
autonomously  when  they  are  actually  responding  to  unseen
situational cues.  Not only do they miss  the situational  influence,  they
don't  believe  there  is  a  situational  influence.  Consumers  are  like
competitors  in a sprint, who,  not seeing  the  track,  presume  that it is
flat  and  fair.  The  runners  measure  their  dispositions-talent  and
drive-according  to  the  outcome  of  the  race,  without  regard  to  its
situation.  In  such  a  setting,  corporations  can  camouflage  their
situational  manipulations  behind  reassurances  that  those  subject  to
them  are, in fact, dispositionally moved.  That same  tendency permits
corporations  to attribute particularly  egregious  corporate  activities  to
the  dispositions  of  the  handful  of  human  actors  involved  or  the
rather  unique  corporate  disposition  (culture)  of  one  corporation,
and  not to larger situational  influences  that might implicate,  say,  all
corporations or all of corporate law.
Galileo's  conflict  with  the  Church  was  not  a  neutral  scientific
debate.  It had profound implications  for power-who  would  have  it
and  how  it  would  be  wielded-in  seventeenth-century  Europe.
Similarly,  the  divide  between  dispositionism  and  situationism  is  not
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an academic  point.  It has profound implications  for the  distribution
of  power  in  our  society.  Large  corporations  have  a  stake  in  a
dispositionist  worldview  because  it  helps  them  create  and  maintain
vast  situational  power.  Indeed,  by  promoting  a lopsided  worldview,
based  on  individual  stable  preferences  and  autonomous  individual
choices,  corporations  can  actually  curtail  individual  autonomy  and
alter  perceived  preferences.  That  is  possible,  we  assert,  because  of
dispositionism.
D.  The Deep Capture  Hypothesis
The universal spirit of the laws, of evey  country is always  to favor the strong
against the  weak  and  those  who  have  against  those  who  have  not.  This
difficulty is inevitable, and it  is without exception.
-Jean Jacques Rousseau  3
5
0
The  twentieth  century  has  been  characterized by  three  developments  of great
political importance:  the growth of democracy,  the  growth of corporate power,
and the growth  of  corporate propaganda as  a  means  of protecting corporate
power against democracy.
-Alex  Carey'
5
All of  the  key elements  are  in  place.  As  with  Galileo's capture,
today  we  have  an  extremely  powerful  institutional  force  with  an
immense  stake  in  maintaining,  and  an  ability  to  maintain,  a  false,
though  intuitive,  worldview.'"  Our basic  hypothesis  (and prediction)
is  that  large  commercial  interests  act  (and  will  continue  to  act)  to
capture  the  situation-interior  and  exterior-in  order  to  further
entrench  dispositionism.  Moreover,  they  have  done  so  largely
undetected,  and without much  in  the way  of conscious  awareness  or
collaboration.  Hence,  large  corporate  interests  have,  through
350  JEAN-JACQUES  ROUSSEAU,  EMILE  236  (Allan  Bloom  trans.,  Basic  Books  1979)
(1762).
351  ALEX  CAREY, TAKING  THE RISK OUT OF DEMOCRACY:  CORPORATE  PROPAGANDA
VERSUS  FREEDOM AND  LIBERTY 18  (Andrew Loh rey ed.,  1995).
352  It is important  to note that the deep capture  prediction  that large commercial
interests  will  wield  disproportionate  influence  over  "knowledge"  is  not  limited  to
simply  dispositionism  and  dispositionist  tendencies.  We  use  dispositionism  as  an
extremely  important  example  of pro-commercial  "knowledge."  For other examples,
see  Chen  & Hanson, Illusion  of Law  I,  supra note 84  (describing the deeply-captured
schemas of policymakers and corporate  law).
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disproportionate  ability  to  control  and  manipulate  our exterior  and
interior situations, deeply captured our world.
This  is  a  hypothesis  that  finds  support  not just in  the  axiom  of
history  repeating  itself,  although  the  lessons  of  history  do  indeed
provide  significant support.  And  it is  a hypothesis  that follows  from
more than just laboratory and field experiments  of social psychology,
although  that  literature  alone  should  be  sufficient  to  reverse  our
current  presumptions  . The  deep  capture  hypothesis  is  also  the
logical  extension of several  basic  economic  insights,  including  those
associated  with  capture  theory  and  market  theory-informed  by  a
realistic  understanding  of  the  human  animal  (or  situational
character).  The  question  remains,  however,  whether  such  a
provocative,  counterintuitive  hypothesis  finds  much  support  in  the
various institutions  that shape our exterior and interior situation.
VI.  SOME  EVIDENCE  OF THE DEEP CAPTURE HYPOTHESIS
The  deep  capture  hypothesis  is  too  provocative  to  leave  totally
undefended,  but  covers  too  vast  a  set  of institutions  to  adequately
defend here.  Much  of the  remainder  of this Article,  therefore,  will
be  devoted  to  providing  a  sample  of  observations  that  provide
support for our  framework.  The sample  is intended  to  foster open
minds  in  our  readers  (if  not  to  thoroughly  destabilize  existing
dispositionist  worldviews)  until  we  can  return  with  a  more  fulsome
defense of, and more compelling evidence  for, our claims.
Here,  we  will  attempt  to show  that history  is,  as  usual,  repeating
itself-that  we  live  in  a  world  much  like  that  of  Galileo. 5 4   The
dispositionist  worldview,  which  is  so  valuable  to  the  most  powerful
institutions  in  our  culture,  is  widely  accepted  in  our  population  as
common-sensical,  even  though  that  view  is,  according  to  the  best
available  evidence,  fundamentally  lop-sided.  Furthermore,  those
powerful institutions  use  their power to  advance  that view  by  actively
promoting  it  themselves,  by  rewarding  others  who  do  so,  and  by
seeking  to  penalize  or delegitimate  those  who  challenge  it.  Again,
further  evidence  regarding  (1)  precisely  how  dispositionism  is
incorrect,  (2)  exactly  how  dispositionism  serves  large  commercial
interests (and not the public interest),  and  (3)  how, in practice, deep
capture  occurs are the  topics of research now in progress.
353 See Hanson & Yosifon,  supra note 30.
'454  See  supra pp.  307-12  (describing  Galileo's  struggle  against  the  intellectual
establishment of the Renaissance).
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In  this  Article,  we  are,  like  Stigler was,  initially  concerned  with
just  the  consequences  of  (de)regulatory  actions.  Unlike  Stigler,
however,  we  look  less  at  who  benefits  from  particular  regulatory
changes and more at what the  regulators  say, for it is in framing their
regulations  and  in  assuming  one  or  another  vision  of  the  human
being that  they  reveal  their dispositionism.  Furthermore,  we  define
"regulation"  far  more  broadly  than  Stigler  did,  to  include,  as  we
believe  his  analysis  should  have,  all  institutions  that  could  possibly
influence  the  fortunes  of large  commercial  interests.
35
5  In this  Part,
we will  touch on only a few of those.
A.  Some Shallow Evidence of Deep Capture
Experience should teach us  to  be  most  on our guard to protect  liberty when  the
government's purposes are beneficial.  Men born to freedom are naturally alert to
repel  invasion of their liberty  by  evil-minded  rulers.  The  greater dangers to
liberty lurk in  insidious encroachment by  men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding.
-Justice Louis Brandeis'
First, we  will  consider  the  view of human  beings  adopted  by the
sort  of  administrative  regulatory  institutions  that  Stigler  and  his
cohorts  did  focus  on.  Take,  for  example,  the  Federal  Com-
munications  Commission  (FCC)  and  Chairman  Michael  Powell's 3 5 7
355 See  supra text  accompanying  notes  305-17  (explaining  why  Stigler's  shallow
capture theory and evidence  have far deeper implications than he appreciated).
356 Olmstead v. United States,  277 U.S. 438, 479  (1928).
357 Michael Powell, son of Colin Powell, was appointed by President Clinton to  the
Commission  in  1997  and was  designated Chairman  by President Bush  in  2001.  Since
joining  the  FCC,  Powell's  deregulatory  rhetoric  has  coincided  with  wide-ranging
deregulatory  action.  It  may  be  helpful  to  highlight  a  few  of  the  key  deregulatory
actions  of the  FCC  within  the  past several  months.  On  February  20,  2003,  the FCC
voted  to  eliminate  regulations  that  required  the  Bell  telephone  companies  to  lease
broadband  Internet  access  to  competitors  at discounted  rates.  Jonathan  Krim, FCC
Delivers Mixed  Vote  on  Competition:  Phone Giants Prevail on High-Speed Internet, WASH.
POST,  Feb.  21,  2003,  at  A].  On  May  15,  the FCC  voted  to  eliminate  a  40-year-old
standard  that restricted  the leasing  of airwaves.  The  new regulation  allows  airwaves
license-holders  to  work out leasing deals  without prior FCC  approval.  Yuki  Noguchi,
FCC to Let  Companies Sublease Airwaves, WASH.  POST,  May  16,  2003, at E5.  On June  2,
the  FCC  relaxed  regulations  that  limit  the  cross-ownership  of  newspapers  and
television  stations.  Frank Ahrens,  FCC Eases Media  Ownership Rules:  Party-Line Vote
Clears Way for  More Consolidation,  WASH.  POST, June 3, 2003, at Al.  The FCC regulation
would combine  two cross-ownership  rules-one  preventing newspaper  and  broadcast
station  ownership  in  the  same  city  and  another  limiting  radio  and  TV  station
ownership  in  the  same  market-into  a  single  rule  that  would  lift  most  current
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conception of consumers and the  corresponding presumptions  about
markets and regulation:
I  am  committed  to  building  policy  that  is  centered  around  market
economics.  At  times,  this  foundation  of  my  thinking  is  often
questioned  as being  somehow  anti-consumer.  In a  television  interview,
the question  goes something like  this:  "Many consumer groups  express
grave  concern  that  your  laissez-faire  approach  will  harm  consumers.
They  say  you  are  out of touch  with  consumers  and  living  in  an  ivory
tower.  What  say you?"
I am  always a little puzzled by this question, for  the premise of it has
been  so  thoroughly  discredited  in  this  nation  and  in countries  around
the  world that it should  be beyond  challenge.  Market systems, far from
being  the  bane  of  consumers,  have  unquestionably  produced  more
consumer welfare  than any other economic model  devised  by mankind.
How  is  it  that  anyone  can  argue  that  the  pro-market  policies  of  the
United  States  have  not  yielded  enviable  productivity  in  our  economy,
jobs for our citizens, a  higher standard  of living  than nearly  any other
country in  the world,  and  a  tradition  of innovation  and  invention  that
has brought new products, tools  and services  to our citizens?
A  well-structured  market  policy  is  one  that  creates  the  conditions
that empower  consumers:
It  lets  consumers  choose  the  products  and  services  they  want-
which  is their right as free citizens.
It  allows  market  forces  to  calibrate  pricing  to  meet  supply  and
demand.  Consumers  get  the  most  cost-efficient  prices  and  enjoy  the
benefits of business efficiencies.
The  result for  consumers  is  better,  more  cutting  edge  products,  at
lower prices.
Contrary  to  the  classic  bugaboo  that  markets  are  just  things  that
favor  big  business  and  big  money,  market  policies  have  a  winning
record  of delivering  benefits  to  consumers  that  dwarfs  the  consumer
record  of  government  central  economic  planning.  Thus,  if  you  are
restrictions.  Frank Ahrens, FCC Plan to Alter Media Rules:  Spurs Growing  Debate, WASH.
POST,  May  28,  2003,  at  Al  [hereinafter  Ahrens,  FCC  Plan].  The  plan  would
substantially  raise  the number of  television stations  a  company  may own  and allow a
company to reach  up  to 45%  of the national  audience,  up from  35%.  It would also
relax  a  ban  on  newspaper  and  broadcast  cross-ownership  in  local  markets.  Mark
Wigfield  & John  R.  Wilke,  FCC Plan Draws Fire:  Senators Introduce Bill to Keep  Current
Media-Ownership Limits, WALL  ST. J.,  May  14,  2003, at B4.  The decision  has  met with
strong resistance.  Senators and House Representatives both sponsored bills that would
return  the cap on television ownership  to 35%.  Frank Ahrens, FCC  Rule Fight Continues
in Congress:  Opponents of Ownership Consolidation Also  Plan Legal Strategy, WASH.  POST,
June  4, 2003, at El.  In fact, on September  16, the Senate voted 55 to 40 to override all
of the new media ownership  rules.  Frank Ahrens, Senate Votes  to Block FCC Media Rules,
WASH.  POST, Sept. 17, 2003, atA14.  The White House has refused to back down.  Id.
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truly committed  to serving  the  public interest, bet on  a winner  and bet
on  market  policy.
3'
6
Thus,  Powell  views  consumers  as  "free  citizens,"  who  should
therefore  be  allowed  to "choose the products and services  they want."
And, according  to that conception  of consumers,  free choice  should
be enabled  through  "market systems,"  which are  the best mechanism
ever  "devised  by  mankind"  for  "delivering  benefits  to  consumers,"
"empower[ing]  consumers," and  thereby producing "more consumer
welfare."')
There  are  other  noteworthy  features  of Powell's  remarks.  For
example,  Powell  frames  his  goals  in  terms  of  serving  the  "public
interest," but this  is  the  same  type  of assertion  that  Stigler  claimed
could  not  be  trusted.
3 60   And  certainly  this  "trust" issue  has  been
raised."  But  Powell  reassures  critics  by  claiming  that  deregulation
tends  toward  the  "public  interest:"  "In  capital[ist]  economies,"  he
writes,  "the  central  premise  is  that  the  interests  of  producers  (i.e.,
money-makers)  and consumers need  not diverge,  but, in fact, can  be
synchronous."3 6   That  may  be  true,  but  it  is  equally  true  that  a
358 Michael  K.  Powell,  Chairman,  Federal  Communications  Commission,
Consumer  Policy  in  Competitive  Markets,  Remarks  Before  the  Federal  Communica-
tions  Bar Association,  at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Powell/2O01/spmkpI06.html
(June  21,  2001).
I59  Id.; see also Stephen Labaton,  Policy Defeat Puts E  C.  C. Chief in Awkward Spot, N.Y.
TIMES,  Feb.  22,  2003, at C1 ("Powell  ...  has set an  ambitious  agenda  of relaxing  or
removing  many  regulations  that  have  limited  the  nation's  largest  media
conglomerates  from becoming bigger or entering new markets.").
See supra text accompanying notes 282, 303  (describing Stigler's critique  of the
supposed neutrality and public spirit of regulatory agencies).
61 At  a  three-hour  hearing  on June  4,  2003,  before  Republican  Senator John
McCain's  Committee  on  Commerce,  Science  and  Transportation,  many  senators
expressed  criticism over several of Powell's  FCC decisions,  most prominently  the  vote
to  allow  broadcast  networks  to  buy more  television  stations.  See,  e.g.,  Frank  Ahrens,
Senators Attack FCC Rules:  Most on Oversight Panel  Sign on to Revise Changes,  WASH.  POST,
June  5, 2003, at E4 ("'It looks  for all the world like you  could not or would not stand
up  to corporate  interests  .... ')  (quoting Democratic  Senator Byron  L.  Dorgan);  id.
("'Where  in the world do you find the grounds for 45 percent?"')  (quoting Democratic
Senator Ernest F. Hollings).
362  Powell,  supra note  358.  Much  of Powell's rhetoric  is  based on  the  idea that
regulations  inhibit innovations  that would  directly  benefit the  public.  In  defending
the vote  to allow airwaves  license-holders  to  lease  without prior  FCC approval,  Powell
said,  "'[o]ur decision  unlocks  value  trapped  for  too many years in  a regulatory box."'
David  Ho,  FCC Votes  to Let  Cell-Phone Finns Lease Airwaves,  PHILA.  INQUIRER,  May  16,
2003,  at C2  (quoting  Powell).  He  added  that the  decision  "'will  expand  spectrum
access  for innovators and entrepreneurs, increasing the number and variety of wireless
applications  available  to consumers."'  Id. (quoting Powell).
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central  p'remise  behind  regulation  is  that the  interests of producers
and  consumers  sometimes  do  diverge.  As  if  to  respond  to  that
potential  criticism,  Powell  takes  a  page  from  Stigler's  scholarly
agenda, writing:
I  am  the  first  to  admit  that  deregulation  for  its  own  sake  is  not
responsible  policy.  What  is good  policy  is  to carefully  examine  rules  to
determine  if  they  are  actually  achieving  their  stated  purposes,  or  if,
instead,  they  are,  in  fact,  denying  consumers  value  by  impeding
efficient  market  developments  that  these  consumers  would  welcome.
Regulations  are  not innocuous  simply because  they are  promulgated in
the name of consumers.  No  matter how worthy the purpose,  rules  that
constrain  markets can,  in  fact, deny or delay  benefits  to  the consuming
public."'
Stigler himself could hardly  have said it better.  If you want to be
sure  that  regulations  (or  deregulations)  actually  serve  the  public
interest,  then  look  at  their  effects.  Thus,  Powell's  vision  of
consumers,  like  that  of virtually all  of the  country's  most  prominent
regulators,  appears  to  be  very  close  to  the  one  that George  Stigler
complained  regulators generally lacked.
But our hypothesis  is  that shallow  capture  is  still  a  problem,  in
part  because  the  advantages  favoring  large  business  interests  in  the
competition  for  regulatory  influence  have  not changed,  even  if the
Powell  sees  the  recent  move  to  deregulate  cross-ownership  rules  as  similarly
bolstering the public interest by expanding consumer choice.  According  to Powell,  in
situations where  a  corporation  has received  a waiver  to own  both  a newspaper and  a
television  station  in  the  same  city,  the  result  has  been  better  local  news  coverage.
Ahrens,  FCC Plan, supra note 357,  at Al.  In addition,  he  has suggested that network
owned-and-operated  television  stations  typically  produce  more local  news  than  those
not owned  by  networks.  Id.  In  his  words,  it "'has  become  more difficult  to  simply
assert that an  ownership restriction  is essential  to promoting diverse  viewpoints  where
so  many  outlets  and  owners  thrive  .... '"  Associated  Press,  FCC to  Vote  on  Media
Ownership Rules, SAN DIEGO UNION  TRIB.,  Mar. 28,  2003, at C2 (quoting Powell).
Powell  also justifies  the  cross-ownership  changes  by claiming  they  help support
public-interest programming.  In  his view,  if cable continues  to eat away at broadcast,
public-interest  programming will be jeopardized  because  cable channels are under no
FCC  obligation  to  provide  such  programming.  Ahrens,  FCC Plan, supra note  357.
Allowing media companies  to buy more stations, which  typically return profits of 20  to
30%,  would help  ensure  continued  free,  over-the-air  public-interest  broadcasting  to
the roughly 15%  of viewers who do not have cable or satellite  television.  Id.
Although  Powell  has  described  public-interest  programming  as  necessary,  he  is
uncomfortable  with  the  FCC  deciding  what  it  should  be.  "'If  you're  using  the
government  will  to  impose  "castor oil" or  "eat your vegetables"  programming,  you'd
better  be  a  little  bit  concerned  that  you're  going  to  allow  three  of  five  unelected
officials to unduly impose what they prefer to see on TV.'  Id. (quoting Powell).
Powell,  supra note 358.
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conceptions  of consumers, markets,  and regulations have.  Thus,  the
same evidence  that, to many scholars,  might  constitute  proof of the
absence  of shallow  capture,  strikes  us  as  evidence  of deep  capture
-the  faith in pro-market, anti-regulation  dispositionism.364
364 While  our  main  emphasis  in  this  Article  is  on  how  corporations  indirectly
capture  the  way we  see  and  understand  the world,  we  do  not mean  to  suggest  that
corporations  are  not  expending  a  great  amount  of energy  on  directly  influencing
regulators as well.  In anticipation  of the FCC's recent decision on how Bell telephone
companies  lease lines to competitors, "[t] he Bells spent hundreds of millions of dollars
in a furious  lobbying campaign  to convince  Congress and the  FCC that they could not
be  expected  to  push  broadband  out  into  rural  areas,  or  invest  in  new,  advanced
networks, if they were forced  to then lease them to rivals."  Krim,  supra note 357, at A].
Moreover,  between  1999  and  2002,  the  top  twenty-five  media  companies  spent  $82
million  on  lobbying  the  FCC  and  Congress  and  contributed  $26.7  million  in
individual,  PAC,  and soft money donations.  Ctr. for  Responsive Politics,  Tracking the
Payback:  Media  Ownership, at http://www.opensecrets.org/payback/issue.asp?issueid
=MOl&CongNo=108  (last visited Oct. 16, 2003).
One of the main forces behind  the FCC's recent decision  to  relax regulations that
limit  the  cross-ownership  of newspapers  and  television  stations  was  Victor  Miller,  a
media  analyst  at  Bear  Stearns.  Coincidentally,  Bear  Stearns  has  banking  and
underwriting  relationships  or  has  rated  stocks  in  at  least  fifteen  media  companies
directly affected  by the  FCC's proceedings.  Mark Wigfield,  Bear Stearns Analyst Helps
FCC Reshape Ownership Rules, WALL  ST. J.. June  2.  2003. at Cl.  Yet.  the  media  ties do
not appear to  have  resulted  in Miller's  advice being  discounted.  According  to Susan
Eid,  Counsel to the  FCC Chairman,  Miller "'is  enormously helpful  as you  sort through
the economic  issues and financial issues  in the industry."'  Id.  (quoting Eid).  In  the
words of Eid, "'His analysis is rock-solid."'  Id. (quoting Eid).
Miller's  example  highlights  a  general  trend.  "Wall  Street's  views  have  become
increasingly  important  at  the  FCC  since  the  1996 Telecommunications  Act  began
substituting  market  competition  for  regulation  as  the  best  way  to  ensure  that  the
nation's airwaves  are used in the public interest."  Id.  Today, the FCC appears  to  rely
heavily on non-governmental  private data for a range of critical regulatory factors such
as  "ownership,  audience  reach  and  cable  subscribers."  John  Dunbar,  Ctr.  for Pub.
Integrity, A  Penchant  for Secrecy:  Why  is  the FCC So Determined to Keep  Key Data  from the
Public?, at http://www.openairwaves.org/telecom/report.aspx?aid=18  (May  22,  2003).
A more general  reliance on  corporations,  analysts,  and investors  in policy  making has
led  some  critics  to  question  the  neutrality  of  the  regulatory  process.  Between
September 2002 and June 2003, the nation's top broadcasters  had over seventy face-to-
face  meetings  with  FCC  officials  behind  closed  doors.  Bob  Williams,  Ctr.  for  Pub.
Integrity,  Behind  Closed  Doors:  Top  Broadcasters Met  71  Times  With  FCC Officials, at
http://www.publicintegrity.org/dtaweb/report.asp?ReportlD=526&L1  =10&L2=I 0&L3
=0&L4=0&L5=0  (May 30, 2003).
The  closed-door  sessions,  which  are  officially  called  ex  parte  meetings,  are
allowed  under  FCC  rules.  The  meetings  are  not  recorded,  nor  are  the
participants  required  to  keep  detailed  minutes  of  the  sessions.  Non-FCC
people  who  participate  in  the meetings  are  supposed  to  file  a  notice  of the
session  by the end of the  following day.  The  notice  is  supposed to  include  a
summary of what was discussed.
Id.  During that same period,  the FCC  met with  two major consumer groups only  five
times.  Id.  Faced  with  this  heavy  lobbying,  even  Powell  has  begun  to  question  the
benefits of an increasingly close relationship  with interest groups:  "'I do think..,  that
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sometimes  it  gets  out of hand ....  I  often  think  that we  need  time  to  do our  work
rather than hear pitches."'  Id. (quoting Powell).
But then as bad as "pitches" are, they may not be as troubling  as the "perks" passed
on  to FCC employees  in  recent years  by big business.  The Center for Public  Integrity
reports that companies and industry groups paid $2.8 million over the past eight years
for  2,500  trips  by  agency  officials.  Bob  Williams  & Morgan Jindrich,  Ctr. for  Pub.
Integrity,  On  the Road Again-And Again:  FCC Racks  up $2.8 Million  Travel Tab  with
Industries They  Regulate, at http://www.openairwaves.org/telecom/report.aspx?aid=15
(May  22,  2003).  Ninety-eight  of the  trips  were  to  London,  which  is  not even  in  the
FCC's jurisdiction.  Id. The  biggest sponsor happened to be the National  Association
of Broadcasters.  Id.
There are still other unsettling statistics concerning  the  "revolving door" between
industry and regulators.  For example, before coming  to the FCC, Powell worked at the
law firm of O'Melveny & Myers LLP, of which the GTE Corporation was a major client.
GTE later merged with  Bell Atlantic to form Verizon,  the largest local phone company
in  the  United  States,  but  Powell  never  recused  himself  from  participating  in
deliberations  or votes  relating  to  either  company.  Nathaniel  Heller,  Ctr.  for  Pub.
Integrity,  New  FCC  Chairman  Had  Big  Telephone  Player  as  a  Major  Client,  at
http://www.public-i.org/dtaweb/report.asp?ReportD=135&L1=]0&L2=70&L3=1  5
&L4=0&L5=0&State=&Year=2001  (Feb.  13,  2001).  To be  sure,  his  actions  appear to
have been within the letter of the law.  The  Code of Federal  Regulations requires only
a  one-year  cooling-off period.  5  C.F.R.  §  2635.502(b) (1) (iv)  (2003).  However,  one
wonders how well his actions comport with the spirit of that law.  Since the time Powell
took  office  through  the present, Verizon  has  had  many regulatory  issues  before  the
FCC,  relating  from  cell  phones  to  the  Internet.  And  in  his  role  as  Commissioner,
Powell has often  taken the pro-Verizon  position,  bemoaning what he sees as the harsh
"interconnection  and market-opening requirements" imposed on GTE and others.  Id.
Passing through that same door, but in  the opposite  direction,  Dorothy Attwood
quit  her job last year  as  chief of the  FCC's  Wireline  Competition  Bureau  and  two
months  later  was  working  at  SBC  Communications,  guiding  the  telecom  company
through  the FCC policies on local  telephone  competition that she  helped draft.  John
Dunbar,  Ctr.  for  Pub.  Integrity,  The  FCC's  Rapidly  Revolving  Door,  at  http://
www.public-i.org/dtaweb/report.asp?ReportlD=510&L1  =10&L2=10&L3=0&L4=0&L5
=0 (Feb. 19,  2003)  [hereinafter Dunbar, FCC's  Rapidly Revolving Door].  Attwood was not
a  minor player.  As  Powell stated  several  months  before Attwood  departed,  "She has
played an integral role in the FCC's implementation of the Telecommunications Act of
1996,  and  in  shaping  our  policies  in  the  transition  to  a  more  competitive
telecommunications  environment."  Press  Release,  Federal  Communications
Commission,  Powell  Announces  Changes  in  Wireline  Competition  Bureau  1,  at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-223658A  (June 21,  2002).
Yet,  according  to  the letter of the  law,  she  was  not senior  enough  to  fall under  the
"cooling-off  period"  ban.  5  C.F.R.  §  2637.204  (2003).  Since  she  began  at  SBC,
Attwood  has met with FCC officials,  including Powell's senior legal advisor, four times.
Dunbar, FCC's Rapidly Revolving Door, supra.
Attwood and Powell  are not anomalies.  In fact, over the last decade, several dozen
FCC workers  have  crossed  the  busy threshold from  regulated industry  to regulator  or
the other way around.  Id.  Some have  taken to  straddling the worlds on both sides  of
that threshold.  Former FCC  Chairman  Richard Wiley  is  now  a senior partner at  the
lobbying firm  of Wiley,  Rein  & Fielding  LLP.  Steven  Weiss,  Interview:  Richard Wiley,
CAPITAL  EYE  (June  2,  2003), at http://www.capitaleye.org/inside.asp?ID=85.  He often
appears  on  the  so-called  eighth  floor  of the  FCC  to  lobby  key  decision  makers  on
behalf of media clients like Belo Corporation, Clear Channel, and Gannett.  Id.
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Not everyone  is  turning  a  blind  eye  to  the  matter.  On June  13,  2003,  Senator
McCain  proposed  a reauthorization  bill that would  give  the FCC  greater authority  to
regulate and limit the "revolving door" influence  on  the agency.  Statement by Senator
John  McCain  on  the  Federal  Communications  Commission  Reauthorization  Act  of
2003  (June  13,  2003),  available at  http://www.senate.gov/~commerce/newsroom/
printable.cfm?id=205012.  To decrease  the  influence  of the  media  industry,  the  bill
would  bar  top  staffers  from  lobbying  for  one  year  after  leaving  the  FCC.  See  id.
(recounting  the  various  elements  of  the  reauthorization  bill).  It  would  also  bar
companies and other interest  groups from paying  travel  expenses of FCC officials  for
flights to nongovernment sponsored conferences, meetings, and events.  Id.
Unfortunately,  these  remedies  may  not ultimately  solve  the  regulatory  capture
dilemma because  they do not go far  enough.  They do not acknowledge  the problem
that people  perceive  the playing  field  as reasonably  level  even  when  it is  not.  In  the
debate  leading  up  to  the  recent  changes  in  media  ownership  rules,  former  FCC
Chairman  Riley saw a fair tournament of ideas between consumer  groups and  media
corporations:  "[A]  lot of players have gotten onto the field and are participating  in the
process at the commission.  So there's a lot of lobbying, pro and con."  Weiss, supra. In
his opinion:
Money  may permit you to  get in the  door, but I don't think  it buys  people's
votes.  Members  of Congress are  elected because  they  have  strong viewpoints
and  they're very well-informed people.  I don't think they're  bought and sold
quite  as effectively or quite  as much as people  allege  in the campaign finance
area.
Id. That he once ran the agency, he believes,  is largely irrelevant:
Decisions  of the commission  are  made  on  the  merits.  I don't want  to  put
myself or other former  commissioners  down,  but it's what you're bringing  in
there  in  terms  of  the merits  that is  going to win  cases  at  the  FCC.  I  truly
believe  that.  Hopefully  people  who  know  the commission  process  can  help
their clients sort through it, but...  I don't think anybody rolls  over because  a
former  chairman  or former commissioner  comes in....  I've won  some,  I've
lost some, and I think that's true of other lawyers around town.
Id.
We do not claim  that there  is  no competition  for regulatory influence,  or that all
commercial  interests  will  always  agree  on  every regulatory  policy, or  that one  side  of
the competition  will always  win.  There does appear to be a playing field, and, as these
examples illustrate,  the competition  over regulatory policy can  be robust.  See Stephen
Labaton, FCC.  Chief Talks of Frustration  and Surprise, N.  TIMES,  Sept.  22,  2003, at C1
(describing  the  competing  interests  in  regulatory  policy).  The  existence  of  a
competition,  however,  is  not proof of a  fair,  meritocratic  process,  as  Wiley seems  to
suggest.  It is still possible to predict which groups  will be advantaged or disadvantaged
by the playing field and the rules of the game.  And that is  the stuff of shallow capture.
Furthermore,  and  this  is  a  major  theme  of  this  Article,  there  are  ways  of
conceptualizing  human  actors,  markets,  and  regulations  in  a  way that  is  broadly pro-
commercial.  As  we  have  argued,  the  dispositionist  perspective  that  frames  the
discussions  and  debates  about  regulatory  policy  itself tends  toward  pro-market  and
anti-regulatory policies.  That is part of what we mean by deep capture.
Consider  the  following  metaphor:  In  Major  League  Baseball,  there  are  thirty
teams, which compete not just on the field in games, but also off the field in recruiting
the best players to  play for their teams.  While on-the-diamond  competition  is  played
on a level field, the off-the-field  competition  is  not; the wealthiest teams  have a huge
advantage  in  recruiting  top players  because  they  can  offer much  higher salaries.  So
while there  is still some competition-you  still  have  to  throw strikes and score  runs-
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Finally,  it  is  worth  pointing  out  how Powell  dismisses  those  who
doubt  that  faith.
36 5   He  finds  such  apprehensions,  not  just
"puzzl[ing] ,'3  but  "so  thoroughly  discredited  ...  that  [his  view]
should  be  beyond  challenge., 3 67  A  major  part  of  the  discrediting
comes  from  the  fair competition  that is  presumed  to  have occurred
in  the  global  marketplace  of  political-economic  systems,  a
competition  that  led  to  the  "winning  record"  of  markets  and  a
"higher  standard  of  living  [in  the  United  States]  than  nearly  any
other  country  in  the world."3 6  The  not-very-hidden  implication  is
that  those  who  don't embrace  his  views  are  favoring  a  turn  toward
"central  economic planning,"  perhaps  even  communism. 369  Powell,
in  other  words,  dismisses  what  he  calls  "the  classic  bugaboo  that
markets  ...  favor  big  business  and  big  money 37°  by  raising  the
familiar specter of the totalitarian  bogeyman.
371
off-the-field  situational advantages  have  tremendous impacts on  on-the-field outcomes.
In  1999,  for example,  all eight teams  that made  the  playoffs  were  among the  top ten
highest salaried  teams in  the league.  Although  the tenth-highest  salaried team  made
the playoffs  and the  fourth-highest did  not, none  of the  twenty  lowest salaried  teams
made it.  In the  1999 World Series, the team with the league's highest payroll,  the New
York Yankees,  defeated  the  team  with  the  league's  third-highest  payroll,  the Atlanta
Braves.  While there is a playing field,  the playing field  is not level,  and the situation of
the playing field affects outcomes.  See Lani Canfield Fisher, October is For the Rich, 19J.
CosMic  BASEBALL ASS'N  (2000)  (describing the  payroll figures  for major league  teams
and  their  relationship  to  post-season  appearances),  at  http://cosmicbaseball.com/
jcbal9_octo.html.
365 Powell's  convictions  as  to  the righteousness  of deregulation  are  unflappable.
After being challenged  by those  calling for more  public  input into the FCC's changes
to  media  ownership  rules,  Powell  retorted:  "'You  don't  govern  just  by  polls  and
surveys...  We have  to exercise  difficult judgments and abide by the law.  If all  of our
rulemaking  was just a case  of put them out and  take a referendum,  things would  be a
lot easier."'  Ahrens, FCC Plan, supra note 357 at Al  (quoting Powell).  "'I have had to
make  peace  with  myself, to  know  myself, to  know with  every  fiber of my being  and
intellect  and  faith  with  the  law  that  this  is  the  right  answer,  at  least  in  the  short
term.... Though  it's not the popular answer.'  Frank Ahrens, FCC Set to Vote on Easing
Media Ownership Rules, WASH.  POST, June  2, 2003, at A6 (quoting Powell).
366  Powell, supra note 358.
367  Id.
368  Id.
369  Id.
370  Id.
371  Powell is quite adamant in this respect:
I don't  know of another  economic  system  in  the  history  of the  world  that's
produced  as  much consumer welfare  for its citizenry  as American  capitalism
has.  You  name  to  me  the  state  central  plan  system  that  better served  the
maximum consumer welfare of its citizens as the free market did  in American
stock capitalism?  I think  that's the penultimate  conclusion  of the  end of the
20th  Century  that  not  only  did  democracy  prevail,  as  a  social  value  and
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A  look  at  the  Federal  Trade  Commission  (FTC),  whose  "efforts
are  directed  toward  stopping  actions  that  threaten  consumers'
opportunities  to  exercise  informed  choice,
3 7 2  is  similarly  revealing.
The  current FTC Chairman,  Timothy  Muris,  seems  to share  Powell's
preference  for free  markets,  and  for all  the  same  reasons.  In  1980,
for instance, Muris wrote  (with a co-author)  that
[t]he  relatively  unregulated  marketplace  has  significant  advantages  in
allocating  resources  and  promoting  consumer  welfare.  The  market
tends to  minimize waste  by permitting  continuous  individual  balancing
of  economic  costs  and  benefits  by  consumers  and  producers.  In
addition, greater  productive efficiency  and more innovation  result from
the reliance on market incentives.  Competitive  markets also  reduce the
need  for  central  collection  of  information;  their  price  signals  allow
producers  and  consumers  to  respond  quickly  to  change.  Finally,
competitive  markets  tend  to  decentralize  power  and  make  decisions
that  are  fair  in  the  sense  of being  impersonal.  For  these  reasons,
reliance  on  the market should  be  the norm. S73
More  recently,  he  has  supplemented  that  pro-market  view  by
emphasizing the  need for certain  types of regulatory interventions  in
political value, but the capital economy prevailed as  the leading  environment
for the welfare of citizens and for the ferment of innovation  and revolution.
Transcript  of  Conversation  Between  FCC  Chairman  Michael  K.  Powell  and  Sam
Donaldson  at  the  NAB  2001  Convention  4  (Apr.  24,  2001),  available at http://
www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Powell/2001/spmkpIO2.pdf.
372 Fed.  Trade  Comm'n,  Vision,  Mission  &  Goals,  at  http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/
mission.htm  (last updated June 17,  1999).
Kenneth  W.  Clarkson  &  Timothy  J.  Muris,  Constraining the  Federal  Trade
Commission:  The  Case of Occupational Regulation, 35  U.  MIAMI  L.  REV.  77,  81  (1980)
(citation omitted).  The FTC  made a similarly revealing statement in  1978:
The  public  policy of this country favors  the  existence  of free  markets  to  the
maximum  extent  possible.  While  the  complexity  of the  modern  economy
often  necessitates  a  departure  from  free  market  organization,  as  a  general
proposition  a  market-perfecting  solution  to  a  perceived  problem  is
preferable.  There  should  be  a heavy  burden  of proof on  those  who  would
opt for a different form of economic organization  ....
Advertising  of Ophthalmic  Goods  and Services,  43  Fed. Reg.  24,001  (June  2,  1978).
Former FTC Commissioner  Thomas B.  Leary stated  that, "consumer  freedom  implies
the  right to buy in open  markets  .... " Thomas  B.  Leary,  Freedom as the Core Value of
Antitrust in the New  Millennium, 68 ANTITRUST  L.J. 545,  553  (2000); see also Thomas  B.
Leary,  Commissioner,  Federal  Trade  Commission,  The  Federal  Trade
Commission  and  the  Defense  of  Free  Markets,  Remarks  Before  the  David  T.
Chase  Free  Enterprise  Institute,  Eastern  Connecticut  State  University  (Oct  7,
2002)  [hereinafter  Leary,  Defense  of Free  Markets]  (describing how  the  FTC  is
devoted  primarily  to  protecting  the  freedom  of sellers  to  sell  and buyers  to  buy
what they choose  and the  role  of efficiency-oriented  scholars  in  promoting that
now-conventional  view  of  the  FTC),  available at http://u  v.ftc.gov/speeches/
leary/willimantic.pdf.
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markets.  In  1991,  for  instance,  he  wrote  that  "[o]ne of the  crucial
roles  for  government,  as  we  are  seeing  in  Eastern  Europe,  is  to
define  and  allocate  property  rights. ' 3 74  And  although  he  acknowl-
edges the  need for certain  types of regulation when a market fails, he
cautions  that
it  is  important  to  talk  about  the  concept of  market  failure  with  care
because  the  issue  is  failure  compared  to  what.  In  the  real  world,
institutions  are  imperfect,  both  government  institutions  and  market
institutions.  It  makes  no  sense  to  compare  an  imperfect  reality  to  a
hypothetical  perfection.  A vast  literature  exists  on  government failure,
as  large  as or larger than the literature  on market  failure.
With  that caution,  Muris appears  to be  emphasizing the  work  of,
among  others, George  Stigler, for  Muris goes  out of his  way  to stress
that
[g]overnment  agencies  are  not run  by  philosopher  kings  who  descend
from  Olympus  to  protect  us.  Instead,  government  agencies  are,
themselves, governed  by rules that constrain  what they can  do, and they
are run  by individuals who are striving  to advance  or succeed, just as we
all  are.  These  constraints and  incentives  will  influence  how an  agency
376
acts  in the public interest.
Muris  also  describes  how  FTC regulation  of  advertising  has
moved  from  protecting  industry  members  from  competition  toward
serving consumers by encouraging  competition 7
Again,  the  chairperson  of a  major  federal  regulatory  institution
seems  to  embrace  the  dispositionist  case  for  markets-as  does  the
Commission  itself. T s  Again,  that  regulator  seems  quite  sensitive  to
374 TimothyJ. Muris,  Economics and Consumer  Protection,  60 ANTITRUST  L.J.  103,  104
(1991).
375 Id.
376 Id. at 105-06.
377 See id. at 117  (contrasting the competition-motivated  FTC enforcement  in  the
1950s and 1960s with the consumer-oriented  policy that developed  in the 1970s).  •
378  See,  e.g.,  H.R. REP.  No.  98-156,  pt.  1, at 37  (1983)  ("Normally we  expect  the
marketplace  to  be  self-correcting,  and  we  rely  on  consumer  choice-the  ability  of
individual  consumers  to  make  their  own  private  purchasing  decisions  without
regulatory  intervention-to  govern  the  market.");  Leary,  Defense  of Free  Markets,
supra note 373, at 5  (describing the  "New  Learning-  an efficiency-orientated  view of
antitrust  [as],  today, mainstream competition law").  According to Leary:
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the  insights  of  shallow  capture  theory.  And,  again,  we  would
conclude  that, insofar as Chairman  Muris  fails  to consider  the role  of
exterior  and  interior situation,  his  views  and,  indeed,  his  position  at
379, the FTC, evince  deep capture.
We  could continue  in  this vein at some length, but for everyone's
sake,  we  will  stop here: s°  In the  following  Section,  we aim  to dig  a
little  deeper  and  provide  some  illustrative  examples  of how  other
"regulators,"  from  courts  to  hard-hitting  news  networks,  reflect  and
contribute  to deep capture.
Although  we  may  differ  on  the  facts  of individual  cases,  all  of my  [FTC]
colleagues agree  that the objective is  to maximize  efficient outcomes.  We  all
start in the  same place  and we are all trying  to do the same  thing.  This broad
consensus  is a great demonstration  of the power of ideas and, in  my view,  has
made an immense contribution  to consumer welfare.
Id.
79  Although we  were  unable to  find much of his writing, it is widely understood
that  Hal  Stratton,  Chair  of the  Consumer  Product Safety  Commission  has  similar,
strong  pro-market, anti-regulation  presumptions.  See, e.g.,  New Mexico Attorney  General
Stratton Repudiates NAAG's  Horizontal Guidelines, ANTITRUST  & TRADE  REG.  REP.,  Issue
No.  1314, at  869-70  (May  7,  1987)  (describing Stratton's  objection that the merger
guidelines  proposed  by  the  National  Association  of  Attorneys  General  ("NAAG")
"needlessly  impose  government  regulation  in  the  market  place"  in  a  way  that
"unnecessarily interfere [s]  with market forces" and "that will prejudice both legitimate
business reorganization and consumer  welfare");  Hal Stratton, Attorneys General in State
of Collusion, WALL ST.J., June  10,  1988, at 22,  col. 4  (attributing NAAG's movement  in
this  direction  to  "[s]ome  ambitious,  high-profile  attorneys  general  [that]  ...  are
using  the  cover  of  'consumer  protection'  to  impose  their  own  anti-business,  pro-
government-regulation  views  on  the entire  nation  and  are  bypassing  the  legislative
process  to put in place  'enforcement  guidelines'  that Congress  itself refuses to  pass").
One critic complains that Stratton
inhabits a world in which government has no right to tell business what to do,
a world where  consumer choices are  the best marketplace  regulators, a world
in which  product-liability  lawsuits  stifle  innovation.  This would  be  the  same
world in which  consumer products never are  unsafe, only used incorrectly  by
careless  people.  In other words, a fantasy world.
Editorial,  From Bad  to  Worse,  THE  BLADE  (Toledo),  Nov.  28,  2001,  available  at
http://www.toledoblade.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?Date=20011128&Category=OPINI
ON02&ArtNo=  I 1280045&Ref=AR.
380 For  a  different  but  complimentary  analysis  of  the  pro-market  and  anti-
regulation  schemas of policymaking, see Chen & Hanson,  Illusion of Law I, supra note
20031242  UNIVERSITY  OF  PENNSYLVANIA  LA W REVIEW
B.  Some Less Shallow Evidence of  Deep Capture
The  myth  that holds  that the great corporation is  the puppet of the  market, the
powerless servant of the consumer, is, in fact, one of the devices by  which its power
is perpetuated.
-John  Kenneth Galbraith 38'
Consider  briefly  courts.  Consider,  for  instance,  the  1979
dispositionist  language  of  then-Chief Judge  Irving  Kaufman  of  the
Second Circuit:
[N]o  one  can  determine  with  any  reasonable  assurance  whether  one
product  is  "superior" to another.  Preference  is  a  matter  of individual
taste.  The  only  question  that  can  be  answered  is  whether  there  is
sufficient  demand  for  a  particular  product  to  make  its  production
worthwhile,  and  the response,  so  long  as  the free  choice  of consumers
is preserved, can only be  inferred  from the reaction  of the market:'
Kaufman,  in  now-common  fashion,  treats  the  market  as  little
more  than  a  highly  responsive  conduit  of  stable,  exogenous
consumer  preferences.  The  preferences  and  free  choices  of  the
consumers  come  first,  and  the  success  or  failure  of  the  product
comes second, depending on  its  ability  to satisfy those preferences.
More  recently,  Judge  Frank  Easterbrook  has  expressed  a  similar
deference  to markets,  adding that, with  respect  to  reducing  at least
some  kinds  of  personal  injury  risks,  courts  should  defer  to  the
incentives  of the  marketplace  rather  than  attempt  to  fashion judge-
made  incentives.  As  he  puts  it, market  incentives,  "[i]mperfect  as
they  are, . . . work  better  than  the  alternatives  the  legal  system  can
offer."3 84  In  this  vein,  too,  we  could  go  on.  After  all,  like Judge
Easterbrook,  many  of  the  most  prominent  and  influential  judges
today  made  their  careers  as  academics  devoted  to  promoting  the
dispositionist  views  of  law  and  economics  and  libertarianism,
including:  Judge  Ralph  Winter,  Judge  Stephen  Williams,  Justice
381 JOHN  KENNETH GALBRAITH,  THE AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 258-59  (1977).
382  Berkey Photo v. Eastman  Kodak Co.,  603 F.2d 263, 287  (2d Cir. 1979).
383 Thus,  "in  its  advertising,  a  producer  is  ordinarily  permitted,  much  like  an
advocate at law, to bathe his cause  in the best light possible."  Id.
384  Carroll v. Otis Elevator Co.,  896 F.2d 210, 217  (7th Cir.  1990)  (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring).
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Stephen Breyer, Justice Antonin Scalia, and, of course, Judge Richard
Posner.  Moreover,  some  who  did  not  begin  as  academics
nonetheless  rose  to  fame  and  influence  in  significant  part  because
hard-core dispositionism  was  central to their judicial  identity, such  as
Judge  Alex  Kozinski,  Judge  Michael  Luttig,  and  Justice  Clarence
Thomas.  Indeed, at this moment in history,  it  is difficult to imagine
that any federal judge will  be appointed  or promoted  who does  not
substantially  embrace  the  hard-core  dispositionism  promoted  by
President  Bush,  his  advisors,  and  the  Federalist  Society,  which  now
has immense  influence over thejudicial  selection process.
Dispositionism,  as we have  already indicated
386  and will return  to
below,  also  dominates  legal  academia.  For  instance,  when,  in  the
mid-1980s,  the  American  Law  Institute  (ALl)  amassed  a  large,
381 somewhat  representative 7 ,  cast  of influential  tort scholars  to  assess
the  tort system  and  to  recommend  possible  reforms,  those  scholars
began  their substantial  work  by  embracing  dispositionism.  In  their
words:
Utilitarian  theorists  ...  accept  as  a  factual  premise  that  people  are
generally the bestjudges of what actions will  maximize their own  utility.
This premise  implies  that society  should strive  to let states  of affairs  be
determined  by  the  choices  of the  individuals  affected  rather  than  by
public decision makers.
We  reject  hard  paternalism  here  both  because  we  find  it
unpersuasive  and  because  we  think that most Americans  do not accept
385 See Martin  Garbus,  A  Hostile Takeover:  How the Federalist Society is Capturing  the
Federal  Courts, AM.  PROSPECT, Mar.  2003, at A16 (discussing the increasing influence  of
the  Federalist  Society  on  both  legal  and  non-legal  affairs).  By  2001  the  Federalist
Society  had  become  so  powerful  that  President  George  W.  Bush  felt  comfortable
eliminating  "the  longstanding  role  in  the  evaluation  of prospective  judges  by  the
resolutely  centrist  American  Bar  Association  (ABA),  whose  ratings  had  long  kept
extremists  and  incompetents  off  the  bench.  Today  the  Federalists  have  more
influence  in judicial-selection  than  the  ABA  ever had."  Id.  The  group's  efforts  have
also been directed beyond judicial appointments and clerkships  through "publications,
strategy sessions and panel discussions."  Id. at Al 7.  With  millions of dollars of backing
from  pro-market  organizations such  as  the John  M.  Olin  Foundation,  the  Federalists
have  attacked  individuals  and  agencies  who  attempt  to  regulate  business,  and  have
celebrated  those espousing dispositionism.  Id. at A16.
386  See supra Part I.B.
387  SeeJames A.  Henderson, Jr.,  Revising Section 402A:  The Limits  of Tort  as Social
Insurance,  10  TOURO  L.  REv.  107,  114-15  (1993)  (describing  the  committee
membership  as "a balanced  representation  of well-known  plaintiffs'  lawyers  and well-
known defendants'  lawyers").
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it.  Hence,  we  suppose  that,  presumptively  at  least, consumers  should
choose the accident level.
s 8
The idea that consumers  "choose the accident level,"  might strike
some  readers  as  an  unfamiliar  notion.  Few  of us  are  conscious  of
having  much  influence  over,  much  less  selecting, the  accident  level.
But what the ALI  Reporters  are indicating, of course, is that through
decentralized  individual  choice,  a  collective  determination  or
variety  of determinations  is  made  by  consumers.  The  belief  that
consumers  best know  their  own  interests  and,  through  choice-based
behavior, are best able  to act on that knowledge,  is sometimes known
as  consumer  sovereignty-the  normative  principle  that  the  ALI
Reporters explicitly endorsed3 89
The  ALI  Reporters'  terms  are  revealing  (not  to  mention,
constraining).
390   "Hard  paternalism"  conjures  up  notions  of
considerable  governmental  interference-something  akin  to  central
planning. 9 "  In underscoring the rejection of such an approach  by
"Americans,"  the  Reporters  seem  again  to  be  implicitly  using  the
shadow  of  the  then-freshly  fallen  Soviet  Union  as  an  important
justification  for  embracing  pro-market  dispositionism  and  rejecting
any alternative.
Whether  the ALI Reporters  were  in  fact making such an analogy,
we  (and  perhaps  they)  cannot  know.  But we  do  know  that  legal
scholars  have  been  explicit  in  making just  that  comparison.  For
example,  in a recent article, Robert Lande  writes:
An optimal level of consumer  choice, which  has elsewhere  been  termed
"consumer sovereignty"  is  the  state  of affairs  where  the  consumer  has
the power to define  his or her own  wants and  the ability  to satisfy  these
wants  at  competitive  prices.  The  concept  of  consumer  choice  even
embodies  some  implicit  notions  about  the  rights  of the  individual  in
the broader  society;  it is  implicitly part of the Western  world's response
to Marxism  and the other totalitarianisms  of the Twentieth  Century.392
388  ALl,  1 ENTERPRISE  RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  PERSONAL  INJURY:  REPORTERS'  STUDY
205-07  (1991)  (citation omitted).
389  See id. at 204-08  (justifying their commitment to consumer sovereignty).
390 See  id. at  203-32  (illustrating  the  ALl  Reporters'  use  of the  common,  though
false, dichotomy between  a "pure" market solution  and "hard paternalism").
391  See id. at 207  (noting that according to  hard paternalism,  "people do not have
preferences  so  much  as  they  have  'interests"'  and  that  "the state  should  choose  the
legal  rule  that  is in  the  citizens'  real  (rather than  their  subjectively  perceived)  best
interest").
392  Robert H. Lande,  Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal of Antitrust, 62 U.  PITT. L.
REv.  503, 503 (2001)  (citations omitted).
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Again,  the  belief  in  dispositionism  appears  to  be  motivated,  at
least  in  part,  by  a  fear  that  any  other  belief  would  place  us  on  a
slippery slope  toward  totalitarianism.
But there  is  more  to it than  that.  If one  looks beyond  the  legal
reporters  and  law  reviews,  one  will  encounter  many  other,  far  less
formal,  "regulatory" institutions  that seek to promote  dispositionism.
In  these  contexts,  the  goal  seems  to  be  to  present  to  consumers  a
vision  of ourselves  that we  want to hold-a  self-affirming  image  that
we  are  not  being  moved  by  the  situation.  For  example,  Fidelity
Investments  tells us:
You  are  not  the  kind  of  investor  who  blindly  reacts  to  each  and
every  new  market  condition.  You're  informed.  You're  involved.
You're  focused.
Being  in  control  of  your  financial  future  has  never  been  more
important.
THERE  ARE  BULLS  AND  BEARS.  BUT YOU  ARE  A  THINKING
ANIMAL.
393
In  other words, you,  unlike  all  the other  animals on  the  planet,
are  uninfluenced  by  situation.  You  think, you  prefer,  you  choose,
and you thereby enjoy dispositional control of your life.
Advertisers  do  not  mind  casting  the  shadow  of  those  un-
American  totalitarian  regimes to drive  the self-affirming  dispositionist
point home.  For  instance,  one  cable  news  network  recently  placed
this ad:
393  Fidelity Investments,  Advertisement,  N.Y.  TIMES,  July  14, 2002,  §1,  at  15.  In
light of recently  burst  bubbles and  other  corporate  debacles,  it  is  unsurprising  that
other strategies  include  actually  emphasizing cognitive  quirks.  A  recent TIAA-CREF
advertisement reads:
Economist  Robert  Shiller  wonders  why  we  have  such  faith  in  the  utter
rationality  of  markets  when  we  can  be  kinda,  you  know,  irrational.  Bad
judgment,  lousy  information,  half-baked  strategies-there  are  times  when
money  brings  out  the  worst  in  people.  That's  why  Professor  Shiller's
retirement dollars  are invested with  a  company  whose level-headed  thinking
stands  out in  a world  where  impulse  and  intuition  are  bucking  intelligence
and insight.
Teacher's  Ins.  & Annuity  Ass'n-Coll.  Ret.  Equities  Fund,  Advertisement,  ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Jan./Feb. 2003, at 84-85.  Thus, the ad  encourages  those  with  doubts  in
their own  rationality  to trust the  rationality of a dispositionalized  institution and  the
benevolence  of  privatized  paternalism.  The  company  is  our  agent  (or  friend)
looking out for our  interests and  avoiding  the  pulls of our flawed  disposition  (here
portrayed  as  "irrationality").  The  ultimate  message  is that  the  rational  dispositional
choice of investors can correct for the flawed dispositional choice  of investments:  you
+ TIAA-CREF  = rational  dispositional actor.
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What  makes  America.  . . America?  It's  the  freedom  to  have  an
opinion  . ..  the  freedom  to  speak  your  mind.... [W]e  know  you  can
think for yourself.  When  it comes  to covering the  news,  we don't have
an  agenda  ...  and  don't  take  orders  from  anyone.  Just  like  every
American.  Just like you.  America's  News Channel  MSNBC.
394
The  point seems  to  be  not just that  Americans  are  situationally
independent  (able  to  think what they  want to  think and  speak  what
they want  to speak),  but also  that MSNBC is  uninfluenced by outside
forces.
MSNBC's  competitor,  FOX  News  Channel,  takes  the
dispositionist  view  a  step further  and  credits  its  own  success  to  the
free-choice-making  dispositions of its viewers:
Thanks  to the American  people.  You've  made  FOX  News  Channel
the most watched, most trusted  name in news.  As  active  participants  in
the American  experience, you ensure  a free and fair press for all. --  ,  -395
We Report.  You  decide.
And:
For the  3 out of 4 Americans who  believe  the  news is biased, we present
something  quite  rare:  a  news  network dedicated  to providing  fair and
balanced  coverage.  It's  cable  news  for  the  independent  thinker,  24
hours a day.
This  practice  of  portraying  the  consumer  as  nobody's  fool  is
extremely  widespread.  According  to some  analysts,  two  of the  most
common  themes  of  cigarette  advertising  historically  were  "choice"
and  "autonomy., 39 7  The  Marlboro  Man,  as  we  will  highlight  below,
was nothing  if not free and  autonomous.  And  this imagery  was not
exclusive  to men.  The demise  of the  taboo  against women  smoking,
394 MSNBC, Advertisement, N.Y. TIMES,  Apr. 12, 2002, at Al1.
395  FOX News Channel, Advertisement,  N.Y. TIMES,Jan.  21,  2003, at C3.
396 FOX  News Channel, Advertisement, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15,  1997,  at D16.  But cf
Bill Carter  &Jim  Rutenberg,  Fox News Head Sent a Policy Note to Bush, N.Y. TIMES,  Nov.
19,  2002,  at  A27  (describing  claims  of connections  between  FOX  News  and  the
Republican  Party); Jim  Rutenberg,  Cable's War Coverage Suggests a New  "Fox  Effect"  on
Television Journalism,  N.Y. TIMES, Apr.  16, 2003, at B9  (asserting that FOX  News  "casts
aside traditional  notions of objectivity  [and]  holds contempt for dissent");  Matt Wells,
TV  Watchdog Checks  Claims of Bias on Murdoch Channel, GUARDIAN  (London),  May  8,
2003,  at 5  (explaining  investigation  in  the United  Kingdom  into  the  alleged  bias  of
FOX News).
397 See WORLD  HEALTH  ORG.,  WOMEN  AND TOBACcO  4-5  (1992)  (noting that the
early twentieth  century witnessed  the  beginning of public smoking  by women as  they
sought  to  assert  their  newfound  emancipation;  this  habit  increased  greatly  during
World War  II  as women  contributed  to  the war effort and smoking became  associated
with working, independence,  emancipation, and patriotism).
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and  the  concomitant  doubling of potential  cigarette  consumers,  was
reinforced by a clever public relations campaign devised by Edward  L.
398 Bernays.  To  cap off that campaign,  Bernays  enlisted  the  coopera-
tion of feminist Ruth  Hale  to organize  a contingent of ten  cigarette-
puffing  women  to  walk  down  New  York's  Fifth  Avenue  in  the  1929
Easter Parade.  The feminists'  involvement was  billed and reported  as
an  act of protest and  a  call  for equality.
3
9  And  the cigarettes  were,
themselves,  described  as  "torches  of  freedom. °   So  it  was  that
American  Tobacco  managed,  through  public  relations,  to  promote
smoking in the name  of liberation  and autonomy.  A look at Virginia
Slims'  more  recent  advertising  campaign  slogans  from  1968  until
today  reveals  that  the  beat  goes  on:  "You've Come  A  Long  Way,
Baby," "It's a Woman Thing," "Find Your Voice," and  "See Yourself as
a King.,
401
The  similarity  of  "seeing  yourself  as  a  king"  and  "consumer
sovereignty"  is  hard  to  miss  and  may  not  be  an  accident.  The
message  not  only  encourages  consumers  to  purchase  cigarettes,  it
also suggests some of the larger possible  stakes that commercial  inter-
ests have in dispositionism.  After  all, if the  consumer is  king, then it
is  hard  to justify  making  manufacturers  pay  for  simply  following
orders.  And  this  ability  to  place  responsibility  squarely  on
consumers-to say  in a tort case, for instance, that they "assumed  the
risk"  of  their  actions-has  been  fundamental  to  the  tobacco
industry's  success  in  selling a  product  believed  to  cause  more  than
402 440,000  premature  deaths  per  year  in  the  United  States  alone.
398 See  LARRY TYE,  THE  FATHER  OF SPIN:  EDWARD  L.  BERNAYS  AND  THE  BIRTH  OF
PUBLIC  RELATIONS  ch. 2  (1998)  (discussing Bernay's efforts  in the  1920s and  1930s  to
encourage  women  to  smoke);  see  also  CASSANDRA  TATE,  CIGARETTE  WARS:  THE
TRIUMPH  OF "THE  LITTLE  WHITE  SLAVER"  105-17  (1999)  (describing  how such  efforts
reinforced,  but did not initiate, cigarette smoking  by women, and describing  many of
the situational-social,  political, and economic-forces  that were more influential).
39  See  Stuart  Ewen,  Overrated and  Underrated: Public Relations  Campaign, AM.
HERITAGE,  May/June  2000, at 77,  77-78  (describing and quoting  Bernays's conception
of the campaign);  Steve Craig, 'Torches of Freedom':  Themes of Women's Liberation
in American Cigarette Advertising 8 (Feb.  25,  1999)  (noting that the campaign sought
to distinguish cigarettes as "explicit symbols of a woman's  defiance of traditional  social
norms"),  available  at http://www.rtvf.unt.edu/people/craig/pdfs/torches.PDF.
400  Ewen,  supra note 399.
401  See Campaign  for Tobacco-Free  Kids,  Warning:  Smoking is a Women's Issue,
at  http://tobaccofreekids.org/reports/women/  (last  modified  May  31,  2002)
(describing the tobacco industry's historical targeting of women and girls).
402  SeeJon D.  Hanson  &  Kyle  D.  Logue,  The Costs of Cigarettes:  The Economic Case
for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107  YALE  L.J.  1163,  1171  (1998)  (describing  the
long-time  trend of holding smokers  responsible  for their resulting health  problems);
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Thus, an important reason  that sellers might embrace and  encourage
dispositionism  is  their  hope  of  shifting  responsibility  and  avoiding S ••  403
costly regulation or liability.
A  recent  Pfizer  Forum  advertisement  echoed  that  message:
"Medical  professionals  must help  patients  understand  that  in  return
for  greater  power,  control,  and  choice  over  the  services  and
treatments  they  receive,  they  must  bear  greater  responsibility  for
their  own  care."4 0 4   The  pharmaceutical  company's  message,  which
comes  at  a  time  when  it  seems  to  be  facing  growing  threats  of
405 liability,  taps into a well-established  human tendency:  where  we see
the  ingredients  of  autonomous,  volitional,  preference-satisfying
disposition, we place responsibility.
4 ° 6
see also Ctrs.  for Disease  Control  & Prevention,  Annual Smoking-Attributable Mortality,
Years of Potential  Life Lost, and Economic Costs:  United States 1995-1999, 51  MORBIDIThY  &
MORT.ALiY WKLY REP.,  Apr. 12, 2002, at 300  (reporting  the 440,000  figure and noting
that smoking continues  to  be  the  leading  cause  of preventable  death  in  the  United
States).
403 SeeJon  D. Hanson  &  Douglas A. Kysar,  The Failure  of Economic Theory and Legal
Regulation, in  SMOKING:  RISK,  PERCEPTION,  AND  POLICY  229,  253-54  (Paul  Slovic ed.,
2001)  (describing  how  the  cigarette  industry  adopted just  that  strategy  and  its
success).
404 Liz  Kendall,  Pfizer  Forum,  Advertisement,  Improving Healthcare by  Empowering
Patients,  ECONOMIST, July 13, 2002, at 10 (explaining that patients can and should take
on  more responsibility regarding their own healthcare).
405  See Editorial, No Access to Law, 9 MULTINAT'L  MONITOR  (June  1988)  (describing
lawsuits and settlements over a heart valve produced  by Pfizer),  at http://multinational
monitor.org/hyper/issues/1988/06/mm0688_03.html;  Elisa  Odabashian,  Consumer
Union,  Concealed Danger:  Who  Is  Really Behind  the Bid to  Kill  the Calfornia Corporate
Criminal Liability Act,  at http://www.consumersunion.org/products/pfizenvc900.htm
(Apr. 24, 1996)  (suggesting that Pfizer has lobbied against a California liability statute
in order to avoid criminal sanctions and further fines).
406  We  feel  it  is  important  to  reemphasize  that  we  intend  only  to  scratch  the
surface  of the  evidence for, and mechanisms  of, deep capture  in  this Article.  Future
work,  much  of it  well  in  progress,  will  flesh  out  the many  ways  that  dispositionism
benefits  powerful  interests,  particularly  large  commercial  interests,  and  the  mostly
situational mechanisms-both  abstract and practical-of deep capture.
On  a  similar  note,  we  recognize  that  our  small  sample  of  evidence  has  the
potential  for  bias,  as we  have  searched  for  evidence  to  support  our  hypothesis  and
have  postponed  any  attempt  to  consider  contrary  evidence  or  to  talk  much  about
overall  trends.  Still,  at  this point,  we  do  not  believe  that  the  trends  that  we  are
suggesting  are  all  that  controversial.  For  an  overview  of some  of  the  relevant
trends,  see  Chen  &  Hanson,  Illusion  of Law  I,  supra note  84.  With  those  who
would  claim  that  our  examples  are  on  the  extreme  side  of  the  dispositionism
spectrum,  we  might agree but would argue  that they represent the  vast bulk of the
most  influential  policymakers  and  policy  theorists  today.  In  any  event,  we  believe
that  those  who  do  not  occupy  that  extreme  are  nonetheless  fairly  described  as
dispositionists.  For evidence  supporting  that claim, see  Hanson  & Yosifon,  supra
note 30;  infra Part VII
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And  so  we  see  countless  instances  of  groups  latching  on  to
consumer  sovereignty  in  order  to  meet  the  threats  of heightened
regulation  and liability.  Take, for example,  the Center for Consumer
Freedom,  "a  nonprofit  coalition  supported  by  restaurants,  food
companies,  and  consumers  working  together  to  promote  personal
responsibility  and protect consumer choices.,
4 07  The group is  one  of
several  created  by  Berman  and  Company,  a  public  relations  firm
headed  by  Richard  Berman,  whose  numerous  projects  have  been
heavily  funded  by  the  tobacco,  alcohol,  and  restaurant  industries. 4
The  Center  for  Consumer  Freedom  has,  among  other  things,
published  and  broadcast  numerous  advertisements  purporting  "to
stand  up  for  common  sense  and  personal  choice"40)-by which  it
seems to mean, stereotypes and dispositionism.  In one advertisement,
the group warns:
YOU  ARE  TOO  STUPID ...  to make your  own  food  choices.  At  least
according  to  the  food  police  and  government  bureaucrats  who  have
proposed  "fat taxes"  on foods  they don't want you  to eat.  Now  the trial
lawyers  are  threatening  class-action  lawsuits  against  restaurants  for
serving America's  favorite foods and drinks.  We think they're  going too
410
far.  It's your  food. It's your drink. It's your  freedom.
To those suggesting that the  food industry is partially  responsible
for the  obesity epidemic,41'  the Center for Consumer Freedom main-
tains  its  hard-line  dispositionism:  "We  need individual  solutions  for
individual  problems.  And  the  best  individual  solution  is  personal
responsibility. 412  And just behind  that dispositionism  lurks  the total-
itarian bogeyman.  Richard Berman, for instance,  describes those with
whom he disagrees as
407  See  Ctr.  for  Consumer  Freedom,  What is  the  Center  for Consumer Freedom?,  at
http://.w.consumerfreedom.com/mainjfaq.cfm  (last visited Oct. 15, 2003).
408 See Ctr.  for  Media  & Democracy,  ActivistCash.com/Center  for Consumer Freedom,
IMPROPAGANDA  REV.  (last visited Oct. 15,  2003)  (claiming that Berman  receives  advice
and  funding  from  industry  representatives),  at  http://www.prwatch.org/improp/
ddam.html.
409  Ctr. for Consumer Freedom, supra note 407.
410  Ctr. for Consumer Freedom, Advertisement,  U.S. NEWS & WORLD  REP.,  May 27,
2002,  at 21.
411  See,  e.g.,  KELLY  BROWNELL  &  KATHERINE  BArrLE  HORGEN,  FOOD  FIGHT:  THE
INSIDE  STORY  OF THE  FOOD  INDUSTRY,  AMERICA'S  OBESITY CRISIS  AND  WHAT  WE  CAN
Do ABOUT IT (2003).
412  Ctr.  for  Consumer  Freedom,  Obesity:  Individual Problem Demands Individual
Responsibility, at http://www.consumerfreedom.com/headline_detail.cfm?HEADLINE
ID=1962  (June 11,2003).
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aggressors  [who]  are  a  blend  of self-anointed  "food  police"  activists;
overzealous  public health  "experts" who'd like  to  raise  our children for
us;  advocates  of  "Twinkie  taxes";  lawmakers  who  use  the  cudgel  of
government  to appear "enlightened" enough  to be  re-elected;  and,  yes,
those  trial  lawyers  who  smell  a  payday  where  most  of  us just  smell
dinner.
41 "
And  to  underscore  the  point,  the  Center  for  Consumer  Freedom
labels a recent book criticizing the food industry's role in contributing
to the obesity epidemic  as a  "'Big Brother'  Manifesto." 4 4
C.  Some Cross-Cultural  Evidence of Deep Capture
My  research has led me  to the conviction that two  utterly different approaches to
the world have maintained themselves for thousands of  years.  These approaches
include profoundly dfferent social relations, views about the nature of the world,
and characteristic  thought processes. Each of these orientations-the  Western and
the Eastern-is  a self-reinforcing, homeostatic  system.  The social  practices promote
the worldviews; the worldviews dictate the appropriate  thought processes; and the
thought processes both justify the worldviews and support the social practices.
-Richard E.  Nisbett 
15
The  previous  Sections  provided  a sample  of evidence  suggesting
that various  regulatory  institutions  are,  indeed,  highly  dispositionist.
This  evidence  should  not  be  surprising,  given  that  social
psychologists  have  demonstrated  that  we  humans  tend  to  see  the
world dispositionally.  So, although  the  evidence might be  consistent
with  our  deep  capture  hypothesis  and  might  well  reveal  a  major
cause  for concern,  it may  only evince  a  shared  cognitive  illusion-a
worldview  that  emerges  solely  from  forces  outside  of  anyone's
control.
An  important  implication  of  deep  capture  is  that  our
dispositionism  is,  at  least  in  this  market-oriented  culture,  more
413  Richard  Berman,  All-out Assault by  Food Cops:  Vhen  Will  it End?, USA  TODAY,
Aug.  15,  2002,  at  A13;  see  also Richard  Berman,  Beef Against Fast Food Could Lead to
Economic Indigestion, BOSTON  HERALD, June  21,  2003, at  16  ("Laugh  now if you  must,
but this  is  serious  business.  How long  before  parents  are  criminally  accountable  for
allowing their kids to  be obese?  How long before  restaurants  post width  scales  at the
fast-food counter similar to the height scales on amusement  park rides?").
414  Ctr. for Consumer Freedom,  Would  You  Take Dietary Advice from this Man?: Kelly
Brownell's  "Big  Brother"  Manifesto,  at  http://vvw.consumerfreedom.com/article
_detail.cfm?ARTICLE_ID=125  (Aug.  26,  2003).  For  a  look  at  the  supposed
"manifesto," see BROWNELL  & HORGEN,  supra note 411.
415  RicHARD  E.  NISBETT,  THE  GEOGRAPHY  OF  THOUGHT:  How  ASIANS  AND
WESTERNERS THINK DIFFERENTLY...  AND WHY, at xx  (2003).
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profound  than it would otherwise  be.  Corporations  exercise  their
enormous  power  over  situation  to  encourage  and  reinforce
dispositionism because  it is valuable  to them.  This presumes  that the
basic contours of our outlook are  malleable, that even dispositionism
is not stable but is subject to situational  influence.
A  question  thus  emerges  as  to  whether  dispositionism  reflects
anything  more  than  our  hardwiring  as  humans-a  shared  interior
situation.  The answer seems  to be  that it does.  As  we  have  already
indicated,  dispositionism  varies  somewhat  across  contexts.  Thus,
exterior  situation  matters  too.  Social  psychologists  have  begun
looking more specifically  at the significance of culture.  In  a revealing
study by Takahiko Masuda and Richard Nisbett, for example, students
at  Kyoto  University  and  the  University  of  Michigan  were  shown
animated  underwater  scenes  containing  images  of various  undersea
objects, such as rocks, small fish, plants, and a "focal  fish. 416  The focal
fish was  larger, brighter  and  faster moving  than  the others-the  sort
of  characteristics  that  would,  according  to  conventional
understandings,  make  them  more  salient  to  the  observer.4
"v  After
viewing  the  scenes,  students  were  asked  to  describe  what  they  saw.
Predictably,  American  students  spoke  immediately  of the  focal  fish
(e.g.,  "a trout, moving off to the left") and only later added references
to  its  surroundings.41 8   The Japanese  students,  on  the  other  hand,
tended  to  begin  by  describing  the  context  (e.g.,  "It looked  like  a
pond"). 4 1 9  During the course of their descriptions, students from both
universities  made  roughly  equal references  to the  focal  fish, but  the
Japanese  participants  made  over  sixty  percent  more  references  to
contextual  elements  and  twice  as  many  references  to  relationships
with  inanimate  aspects  of the  environment  (e.g.,  "the big  fish  swam
past a rock") .420
According  to Nisbett, such evidence  confirms  the hypothesis  that
members of some cultures  are more inclined to take  in the world as if
through a wide-angle lens, whereas members  of other cultures tend  to
see  the  world  as  if  through  a  zoom.
4 2'  Nisbett  argues  that  this
416  NISBET',  supra note  415,  at  89-92;  Takahiko  Masuda  &  Richard  E.  Nisbett,
Attending Holistically Versus Analytically:  Comparing the Context Sensitivity of Japanese  and
Americans,  81 J. PERSONALITY&  SOC.  PSYCHOL. 922,924-25  (2001).
417 Masuda & Nisbett, supra note 416, at 924.
418 NISBETT, supra note 415, at 90.
419  Id.
420  Id.
4  Id. at 89.  Recognizing  the  differences  between  self-conceptions  in  the  East
and  in  the  West  has long  been  a  theme  in  both  anthropology  and  philosophy.  See
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distinction  across  cultures  has  ancient  roots  and  may  even  help
explain why the Chinese made connections that Aristotle and Galileo,
with their telescopic vision, missed:
The  Greeks'  focus  on  the salient  object  and  its  attributes  led  to  their
failure  to  understand  the  fundamental  nature  of  causality.  Aristotle
explained  that a stone falling  through the air is due  to the stone  having
the property of 'gravity.'  But of course  a piece of wood tossed into water
floats instead of sinking.  This phenomenon Aristotle explained as being
due to the wood having  the property  of 'levity'!  In both  cases  the focus
is  exclusively on the object, with no attention  paid  to the  possibility that
some  force  outside  the object might be relevant.  But the Chinese  saw
the world  as consisting  of continuously  interacting  substances,  so  their
attempts  to  understand  it  caused  them  to  be  oriented  toward  the
complexities of the entire  'field,'  that is, the context or environment as  a
whole.  The  notion  that events  always  occur  in a field  of forces  would
have  been  completely  intuitive  to the Chinese.  The  Chinese  therefore
had  a kind of recognition  of the principle  of 'action  at  a distance'  two
thousand  years  before  Galileo  articulated  it.  They  had  knowledge  of
magnetism  and acoustic resonance, for example, and believed  it was  the
movement  of the moon  that caused  the  tides,  a fact that eluded  even
Galileo.
4 2 2
Thus,  the  tendency  goes  beyond  perception  of non-human  objects
and  is  revealed  as  well  in  how  "Easterners"  and  "Westerners"
conceptualize  and construe social contexts."'
KUNDA,  supra note  20,  at  515,  (noting  that anthropologists  have  long  explored
cultural  differences  in self-perception  and social understanding)  (citing  CULTURE
THEORY:  ESSAYS ON  MIND,  MIND  SELF,  AND  EMOTION  (Richard  A. Schweder & Robert
A. LeVine, eds. 1984));  see also Clifford  Geertz, The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the
Concept of Man,  in NEW VIEWS  OF  THE  NATURE  OF MAN  (J.  Platt ed.  1966).  For  a
collection  of Geertz's  influential  writings  on  cultural  anthropology,  see  THE  IN  TER-
PRETATION  OF  CULTURES:  SELECTED  ESSAYS  BY  CLIFFORD GEERTZ  (1973).  More
recently, social psychologists  have begun  to demonstrate and examine  the difference.
One of their  key discoveries  is,  as we  will  review  in  this  Section,  that  dispositionism
varies  across  cultures.  See  generally KUNDA,  supra note  20,  at  515-60  (comparing
differences  in  social  cognition  amongst  different cultures,  and  in  particular  between
Easterners and Westerners).
422  KUNDA, supra note 20, at 21-22.
423  We  recognize and apologize for the breadth of these  categories.  To date, the
distinctions  by  social  psychologists  have  rarely  been  refined  much  past  those  of
"Easterners" and  "Westerners."  Still, as broad  and inadequate  as those  two  categories
may be, they represent a key  advance  over the nearly complete  lack of categories  that
otherwise  exists  in  many  social  scientific  theories  and  lay  theories  of human  actors.
And that criticism, we  confess, applies to much of social  psychology and to virtually  all
of this  Article, which  too  frequently speak of "human" tendencies-as  if there  is just
one  relevant  category  of  humans  as  revealed  through  studies  of  mostly  college
students.  This practice is particularly striking in  light of the fact that, as we'll describe,
the work comparing "Easterners"  and "Westerners" has demonstrated significant  cross-
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The  evidence  about cultural variations  in dispositionism  provides
some  additional  support  for  our  hypothesis  that  humans  are  both
"individually" and "culturally" dispositionist, but it may  go further.  It
suggests  that  dispositionism  is  greatest  where  the  situational
influence of large corporate  interests  has likely been greatest.
Recall  the  fundamental  attribution  error  that  is  at  the heart  of
dispositionism  fallacy-the  tendency  to  miss  the  influence  of
situation  and  to  overstate  the power  of disposition in  understanding
one's  own  and  other  people's  behavior.  Earlier,  we  described  the
centrality of that bias to human perception and experience. 424  Cross-
cultural  comparisons,  however,  indicate  that  the  fundamental
attribution error may be more fundamental  in Western  societies than S  . 425
it is  in  other societies.  People  in  Asia,  for example,  appear  to  be
less  prone  to see  disposition  than  are Westerners.42   The  "focal  fish"
experiment provides some support for that conclusion.  This disparity
cultural  differences.  See infta text accompanying  notes  425-50;  see also NISBETT,  supla
note 415, passim (providing evidence  of how groups in different parts of the world not
only  think  about different  things,  but actually  think  differently).  Future  work  will
likely yield  a more refined understanding of how we  conceptualize our worlds  and of
how those conceptualizations reflect and influence  those worlds.
Additionally, we  may find that much of the cognitive  processes and emotions  that
social psychologists have understood as involuntary  may be somewhat malleable.  That,
at least,  was  a  recurring  theme  at  a very  recent two-day  conference  and  discussion
entitled, Mind and Life XI:  Investigating the Mind:  Exchanges Between Buddhism and the
Biobehavioral  Sciences on How the Mind Works, (held at MIT,  Sept. 13-14,  2003, and  co-
sponsored  by  the  McGovern  Institute  at MIT  and  the  Mind  and  Life  Institute,  and
attended by, among others,  Daniel Kahneman,  Daniel  Gilbert, and  the Dalai  Lama).
For an overview of the conference  and materials, see, Mind & Life  Inst.,  Mind and Lfe
XI:  Investigating the Mind, at http://www.investigatingthemind.org/index.html  (last
visited  Nov. 22,  2003).  For  a brief account of some  of the  exchanges  and  dynamics
that led to the conference and research  that has been  initiated in  reaction to previous,
related  conferences  and  discussions,  see  Stephen  S.  Hall, Is Buddhism  Good for  Your
Health?, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,  Sept. 14, 2003, at 46.
The  problem  is  not just that the category  "human" is  too broad.  In  fact, it may
also be too narrow.  We suspect that our conceptions of other animals will demonstrate
that "humans"-there we  go  again-are  unique  in fewer  ways  and  to a  lesser degree
than  "humans" have  historically tended to believe.  For recent general  accounts  along
those  lines, see JEFFREY  MOUSSAIEFF  MASSON  &  SUSAN  MCCARTHY,  WHEN  ELEPHANTS
WEEP:  THE  EMOTIONAL  LIvES  OF ANIMALS  (1995);  GEORGE  PAGE,  INSIDE THE ANIMAL
MIND  (1999).
424  See supra text accompanying notes  86-107 (discussing various studies that reveal
the persuasiveness  of the fundamental attribution  error).
r, See KUNDA,  supra note  20,  at  525-33  (discussing  several  studies  that compare
Western  and  Eastern  paradigms  about  dispositional  and  situational  attribution);
NISBETI,  supra note 415, at  123-27  ("Westerners  tend to assume that events are caused
by the object and Asians are inclined to assign  greater importance  to the context.").
426  KUNDA,  supra note 20, at 526-27, 529-32.
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has  been  demonstrated  in  numerous  experiments,  including
variations  of the  famous  pro-Castro,  anti-Castro  speech  experiment
highlighted above.27
In the basic version of that study, recall, subjects who knew that a
student had been  instructed  to write  and deliver a  pro-Castro  speech
nevertheless  thought  that  the  views  the  student  expressed  in  her
speech  were  representative  of her  true  dispositional  beliefs. - 8  The
same  dispositionist mistake  appeared  when  the  study was  conducted
with  a  group  of  East  Asian  subjects-that  is,  subjects  at  first
429 overstated  the  role  of  disposition  in  the  students'  speeches.  A
number of similar  studies  have  documented  this  basic  commonality
between  Westerners  and  Easterners  in  the  tendency  to  overstate
disposition. 43 °   Social  psychologists  therefore  do  believe  that
dispositionism,  in  its  most  basic  form,  is  a  widely  shared  human
431 tendency.
43
Differences  begin  to emerge,  however, when  the basic  design  of
the  experiment  is  altered  to  highlight  the  role  of  the  situational
pressure  even  more  prominently  to  subjects-by,  for  example,
placing  the  subject  in  the  target's  shoes  and  requiring  her  to
write  an  essay  that  takes a  particular  stance.  American  subjects
continue  to  exhibit  the  fundamental  attribution  error  in  significant
proportions, while East Asians become far more likely to acknowledge
432 the  role of situation  in  the  speeches  they hear.  This  variation  in
dispositionism  has  recurred  in  several  studies  comparing  Eastern  to
Western  subjects. 4 33   Such  cross-cultural  differences  in  the  power  of
427 Id.  at  532-33  (concluding  that  "East  Asians  are  more  likely  than  North
Americans  to pick  up on cues  pointing to the importance  of situational constraints");
see  also Eric  D.  Knowles  et  al.,  Culture and the Process of Person Perception:  Evidence for
Automaticity Among  East Asians in  Correcting  for Situational Influences  on Behavior, 27
PERSONALITY  & Soc.  PSYCHOL.  BULL.  1344,  1348-54  (2001)  (discussing an experiment
that asked students from the United States and Hong Kong to characterize  the attitude
of a speaker, based  on the  speaker's speech  about  a political  issue).  For our earlier
description of the Castro experiments, see supra text accompanying note  155.
42  See supra text accompanying  note 155.
429  KUNDA, supra note 20, at 532.
430  Id. at  525-32  (discussing  several  studies focusing  on the dispositional  tenden-
cies  of Westerners  compared  to  non-Westerners);  NISBETr  supra note  415,  at  125
(explaining  that  "the  illusion  is  sufficiently  powerful  that  even  East  Asians  are
susceptible").
I  KUNDA,  supra note  20,  at  532;  Fiske  et  al.,  supra note  195,  at  915,  930-33;
Knowles et al., supra note 427, at 1354.
432  KUNDA, supra note 20, at 532; NISBEY  supra note 415, at 125.
433  KUNDA,  supra note  20  at 525-32;  Fiske et al.,  supra note  195,  at 930-33.  Other
studies have yielded more specific  evidence of the contours of cultural difference and
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the  fundamental  attribution  error suggest that, although  disposition-
ism  may  be  universal,  the  degree  of  dispositionism  varies  across
cultures.34  Overall,  the  findings  suggest  that dispositionism  is  itself
subject  to  situational  influence,  a  reality  that  helps  to  make  deep
capture possible.
Another  dimension  to  these  cross-cultural  experiments  confirms
that hypothesis.  In  a  number  of studies,  people  who  are  from  the
East  but living  in the  West  exhibit an  outlook  that falls  between  the
strong  dispositionism  seen  in  Western  subjects  and  the  weaker
dispositionism  seen  in Eastern  subjects. 3   A compelling  explanation
how  it manifests  in  broader outlooks  and  motivations.  One  study  of American  and
Japanese  subjects,  for  example,  compared  self-enhancement  biases  in  Western  and
Eastern  subjects.  Groups of American  and Japanese  subjects  were  asked to  provide a
list of examples of situations  that they felt had enhanced  their self-esteem,  and others
that they felt  had diminished  it.  See Shinobu Kitayama  et al.,  Individual and Collective
Processes in  the  Construction of  the  Self:  Self-Enhancement in the  United States  and Self-
Criticism in Japan, 72 J.  PERSONALITY  & Soc.  PYSCHOL.  1245,  1249-54  (1997);  see  also
KUNDA,  supra  note  20,  at  542-47  (summarizing  Kitayama's  experiments).  The
researchers  then took  a list of four hundred  responses  culled from both  groups and
administered  the  list  to  new  subjects,  again  comprised  of American  and Japanese
subjects.  Id. at  544.  The  subjects were  asked  to  select  the situations  that they  felt
were  applicable  to  themselves,  and  how  their self-esteem  had  been  affected  by  the
situation.  Id.  The  results  revealed  strikingly  different  self-perceptions  between  the
American  and Japanese  subjects.  American  subjects  exhibited  a  more  pronounced
self-serving  bias,  claiming  that  a  higher  proportion  of  the  self-enhancing  situations
applied  to  themselves  than  did  the  Japanese  subjects.  So  significant  was  that
tendency  among  Westerners  that  it  held  true  even  for  self-enhancing
characterizations  that  had  been  provided  by  the  earlier Japanese  subjects;  that  is,
Americans  were  more  likely than Japanese  subjects  to claim  that those characteriza-
tions applied  to themselves.  Id. at 546-47.
The  self-enhancement  tendency  is  one  aspect  of  the  broader  dispositionist
character  that  social  psychology  has  documented  in  Western  society.  See supra text
accompanying  notes  194-95; see also Hanson  & Yosifon,  supra note 30.  The results
of  the  above  study, and  others  like  it, suggest  that the  tendency  to see  oneself  as
interacting  with  the  world  as  a  stable  dispositional  actor  is  more  pronounced  in
individuals  in  Western  society  than  it is  among people  in  the  East.  Related  studies,
for example,  demonstrate  that self-enhancement  biases  are  less prevalent  in  the  East
than  in  the  West.  See  KUNDA,  supra note  20,  at  538-43  (recounting  a  study  that
suggested Canadians demonstrate a greater self-enhancing bias  than do Japanese).
434  "All  these  studies  point  to  the  same  conclusion.  Westerners  tend  to  view
social behavior  as  driven  by internal,  stable  dispositions  such  as  traits  and  attitudes.
In contrast,  Easterners tend to view social behavior  as determined  by the individual's
interTersonal  relations,  roles, circumstances,  and cultural milieu."  Id. at 531.
See id. at 540  (describing studies that show  that Asian Canadians'  dispositionist
tendencies  fall somewhere between  the dispositionist tendencies of Asians and those of
European  Canadians).  In  the  self-enhancement  study  discussed  above,  see  supra
note  433,  Japanese  subjects  living  in  the  United  States  were  less  prone  to  self-
enhancement  than American subjects,  but more prone  than Japanese subjects  living
in Japan.  KUNDA,  supra note  20,  at  546.  Another  study  found  that  Canadians  of
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for  these  findings  is  that  when  subjected  to  different  situational
influences-that  is, different cultures-people  develop  differences  in
436 how  they  perceive  behavior.  In  other  words,  situation,  not
dispositional  factors  such  as  biology  or  race,  makes  the  difference.
And  importantly  for  our  deep  capture  thesis,  the  Western  cultural
situation  appears  to  drive  people  into  a  deeper  dispositionism  and
away  from  situationism.  Undoubtedly,  differences  in  basic  outlook
remain  among  the  many subcultures  within Western  society.
437  The
general  patterns, however,  are reasonably  clear  that dispositionism  is
stronger  in  the  West  than  in  the  East,  and  that  the  situational
influences  of  Western  culture  powerfully  alter  outlooks  toward
dispositionism.
4 s
The  evidence  suggesting  a  greater  sensitivity  in  Eastern  society
than in Western society to situational influences  over behavior  at first
appears  to  challenge  explanations  of  the  fundamental  attribution
error that are rooted in the mechanics  of human perception.  In our
earlier  discussion  we  stressed,  as  have  social  psychologists,  that  one
reason for the fundamental  attribution  error is  the relative  facility of
seeing  individual  behavior  compared  to  the  situational  influences
that  may  give  rise  to  it.
4 39   Our  limited  perceptual  and  cognitive
resources focus  on what is stark and  miss what is  subtle.  Therefore,
we  see  the  person  who  would  administer  painful  shocks  to  a  test-
subject  as  dispositionally bad or  sadistic, rather  than  account  for the
myriad of situational  influences  that help account for that behavior. 44 °
Notably for  our  thesis, social  psychologists  have  not abandoned  the
basic  perceptual  explanation  of  the  human  tendency  to  overstate
Asian  heritage  exhibited  self-enhancing  biases at rates  lower than those registered  by
European Canadians, but higher than those that were seen in Japanese  subjects living
in Japan.  Steven J.  Heine  &  Darrin  R.  Lehman,  The  Cultural Construction of Self-
Enhancement:  An  Examination of  Group-Serving Biases,  72  J.  PERSONALITY  &  SOC.
PSYCHOL.  1268,1278  (1997).
436  See KUNDA, note 20, at 540  ("Canadians of Asian heritage who  may be assumed
to  absorb  Asian  culture  at  home  while  being  exposed  to  North  American  culture
everywhere else show[]  some but not total adoption  of Western  cultural patterns.").
See id. at 549-56  (describing studies on  differences in  outlook between  people
in the Northern and Southern  United States).
438  Of course,  it  should  be  recognized  that cross-cultural  social  psychology  is  a
nascent field;  findings  are at  this point preliminary,  and  more will  be learned  about
differences  between  the  social  psychologies  of different  cultures  as  this  field  grows.
See KUNDA,  supra  note  20, at 547-49  (cautioning that the work in  this area is at an early
stage and therefore "not conclusive").
439  See  supra  text  accompanying  notes  19-23,  13945,  182-96  (defining  the
fundamental attribution error and describing some of the causes).
440 See supra text accompanying notes 86-99  (discussing the Milgram experiments).
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dispositionist explanations of behavior.  Indeed,  this basic perceptual
account  explains  the  baseline  of similarity  seen  in the  cross-cultural S  441
Castro speech experiments.
According  to  social psychologists,  the  ultimate  divergence  in  the
commitment  to  dispositionist  explanations  is  a  product  of  the
difference  in  the  two  cultures'  lay  theories  of  the  relationship
between  individuals  and  society.'  In  the  West,  the  perceptual
foundation  of the fundamental  attribution  error is surrounded  by lay
441  Supra notes  425-31  and  accompanying  text;  see  also David  M.  Buss,  Human
Nature and Culture:  An Evolutionary Psychological Perspective, 69 J.  PERSONALITY 955, 968
(2001)  (acknowledging  a  universal  human  nature,  and  recognizing  that  the human
mind contains many complex psychological  mechanisms  that are  selectively activated,
depending on  cultural contexts).
442  Cf  KUNDA,  supra  note  20,  at  537-38  (concluding  that  maintaining  and
enhancing one's self-esteem,  [which  is linked  to dispositionism],  is more  important  in
Western  cultures  than  in  Eastern  cultures  because  of differing  views on  the  relation
between  the  individual  and  society).  The  Japanese  legal  system  seems  to  reflect
elements  of  their  lay  theories,  which  focus  on  the  role  of  the  individual  as
interdependent  with the collective.  See, e.g.,  Koichiro Fujikura, Administering  Justice in a
Consensus-Based  Society, 91  MICH.  L.  REv.  1529,  1541-42  (1993)  (discussing the position
of Hamilton  and  Sanders  that in Japanese  society  "those  who  insist  on  their legal
rights  may be seen as  free  riders, exploiting  the collective  benefit, and  modern  legal
reforms  in Japan  can be  interpreted  as  a  'process  of constant  adjustments  to  thwart
the  corrosive  impact of litigious free  riders  on  a nonlitigious  legal  order"')  (quoting
V.  LEE  HAMILTON  & JOSEPH  SANDERS,  EVERYDAY JUSTICE:  RESPONSIBILITY  AND  THE
INDIVIDUAL  IN  JAPAN  AND  THE  UNITED  STATES  193  (1992));  V.  Lee  Hamilton  &
Joseph Sanders,  Punishment and the Individual in the  United States and Japan,  22  LAW  &
Soc'Y  REV.  301,  304  (1988)  (suggesting  that  in Japan,  "the  individual  is  seen  as
operating  in networks  and contexts...  [so]  sanctions  for wrongdoing  are influenced
by  individuals'  embeddedness  in  roles");  Erik  W.  Ibele,  Government  Regulation  of
Technology Licensing in the Pacific Rim:  The Legacy of Industrial  Policy, 15  WiS.  INT'L L.J.
299, 301  (1997)  (noting that the "collective  focus is evident  in the language of Article
I  of the Japanese  Patent  Law  which  states,  'the  purpose  of  this  Law  shall  be  to
encourage  inventions  by  promoting  their  protection  and  utilization  so  as  [sic]  to
contribute  to  the  development  of industry"')  (quoting  Tokkyoho  [Patent  Law],  Law
No.  121  of 1959, art. 1, translated  in [VI Japan]  EHS Law Bull. Series No. 6850A, at SA-A
2  (1994));  Mark  A.  Levin,  Essential Commodities and Racial  Justice:  Using Constitutional
Protection ofJapan's  Indigenous Ainu People to Inform Understandings  of the United States and
Japan, 33  N.Y.U.J.  INT'L  L.  & POL.  419, 484-88  (2001)  (discussing  the conception  of
individualism  in  Japan  and  how  that  outlook  has  shaped  interpretation  of  the
American-influenced,  individualistically-worded  constitution);  Glenn  Theodore
Melchinger,  For the  Collective Benefit:  Why Japan's New  Strict Product Liability Law  is
"Strictly Business,"  19  U.  HAW.  L.  REv.  879,  931  (1997)  (arguing  that Japan's  new
products  liability scheme  may seem  toothless  by  our  standards  because  it  takes  the
cost of social conflict into account);  Masumi Anna Osaki, Comment,  A  Look at Damage
Awards Under  Japan's Trademark Law and Unfair Competition Prevention Law, 8  PAC.  RIM
L.  &  POL'Y  J.  489,  492  (1999)  ("Traditional  collectivist  values  that  frown  upon
personal  gain  have  contributed  to  the  inadequate  enforcement  of  individual
intellectual  property  rights  in Japan  . ..  [and  have]  traditionally  resulted  in  limited
awards ..  "),
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theories  of  the  self  as  an  autonomous,  free,  dispositionally  stable
individual.'"'  In  this fashion,  the fundamental  attribution error  serves
to  confirm  the dispositional  worldview for Westerners.  On the other
hand,  cultures  in  the  East  entertain  lay  theories  that  portray  the
individual  as  situated  in  an  array  of  interdependent  social
relationships  in  which  roles,  rather  than  individual  actors,  are
emphasized. 444  Social  psychologists,  thus, attribute  to culture  the fact
that  Eastern  subjects  appear  to  correct  more  easily  for  the
fundamental  attribution  errors  received  from  basic  perceptual  cues
than  do  Western  subjects. 44"  That  explanation  finds  support  in  a
number  of cross-cultural  studies.  For instance,  individuals  who  have
been  "multiply enculturated"-that  is,  exposed  extensively  to  two  or
more  cultures-can  be  situationally  primed  to  activate  the  causal
schemas  characteristic  of  either  culture.  In  one  study,  students  in
Hong Kong were shown  one of the following:  Western images  (such
as a cowboy on a horse), Eastern images  (such as a dragon), or neutral
446 images  (such  as  a  landscape)..  Afterwards,  when  making  causal
attributions,  subjects  in  the  first  group  were  most  dispositionist,
subjects in the  second group were  most situationist, and those  in the
control group fell  in between.44'  Studies  by developmental  psycholo-
gists have found that Eastern  and Western  children  exhibit  common
fundamental  attribution  errors  and,  unlike  their  parents,  Eastern
children  do  not correct for those errors  when  situational  constraints
443  See supra text accompanying  notes  194-95;  see also Hanson & Yosifon, supra note
30.
444  See KUNDA,  supra note  20, at 537-38  (noting that Eastern  cultures  tend toward
the notion  that individuals are highly interdependent with  others in  society).  But see
Yohtaro Takano  & Eiko Osaka, An  Unsupported Common  View:  Comparing  Japan and the
U.S.  on  Individualism/Collectivism, 2  ASIAN  J.  Soc.  PSYCHOL.  311,  316-30  (1999)
(reviewing  empirical studies  comparing conceptions of individualism  and  collectivism
in the  two  nations, and finding  that the standard  view, which  holds thatJapanese are
more collectivist than Americans, is based on  flimsy grounds and  might be attributable
to  the fundamental  attribution error).
445  See  supra notes  416-23  and  accompanying  text  (reviewing  experiments  that
illustrate this hypothesis).
446 Ying-yi  Hong,  et  al.,  Bringing Culture out in Front:  Effects  of Cultural Meaning
System  Activation on Social  Cognition, in PROGRESS  IN  ASIAN  SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY  139,
14146 (Kwok Leung et al. eds.,  1997).
447 Id.  at  146.  Researchers  have  discovered  the  same  situational  sensitivity  to
cultural  primes  on  the part of Asian  Americans.  See  Kaiping  Peng  &  Eric  Knowles,
Culture, Education, and the  Attribution of Physical Causality, 29  PERSONALIY  &  SOC.
PSYCHOL.  BULL.  1272,  1279-83  (2003)  (demonstrating  that  culturally  instilled  folk
theories affect Chinese Americans'  interpretations of physical phenomena).
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are highlighted.
44
"  Having not yet learned the  situational  lay-theories
that  their  culture  provides,  their  perceptions  appear  to  rest on  the
limitations  that  give  rise  to  the  fundamental  attribution  error  in
Easterners  and Westerners alike. 44
It  is  important  to  note  that  Easterners'  tendency  to  correct  for
dispositional  overstatements  is  itself an  unseen,  subtle  process.  The
studies  revealing  the relative  depth  or shallowness  of the fundamen-
tal attribution error show that the adjustments for situation are often
made  automatically;  they  are  not the  result  of a  conscious,  explicit,
intentional adherence  to an  ideology  or worldview.
450  The  difference
in  outlook,  driven  by  cultural  differences,  is  attributable  to  unseen
processes,  not  dispositional  choice.  Consequently,  while  exterior
situation  helps  explain  the  depth  of  our  dispositionism,  that
influence  is  registered  automatically,  beneath  our  conscious  control
in the situations of our interiors.
The fact  that  situational  influence  determines  the  depth  of our
dispositionism  is  extremely  advantageous  to  corporations,  which,  as
we  have  indicated,  have  an  interest  in  encouraging  such  an
outlook.4 5 '   The  capture  of  this  outlook  can  be  accomplished  by
exercising power over situation,  a pursuit  that is  itself enabled  by the
strength  of  the  dispositionist  theories  that  support  corporate
452 power.
448 See KUNDA,  supra note 20, at 527 ("Cultural differences  in attribution appear to
emerge  only in  mature  individuals  who  have been  well-socialized  into  their culture's
view of the  person.");  see, e.g.,  Joan  G.  Miller,  Culture and the Development of Everyday
Social  Explanation, 46  J.  PERSONALIY  &  SOC.  PSYCHOL.  961  (1984)  (comparing
attributions  of Indian  Hindu  children  with  those  of American  children  and  finding
that children  in  the  two  cultures  did not differ in  the sorts of explanations they  gave
and that explanations did not begin  to take culturally scripted form until adolescence).
449  See KUNDA,  supra note  20,  at 526-27  (discussing  the  findings  of  Miller,  supra
note 448, with  regard to Eastern children's attribution behavior).
450  See Knowles  et al.,  supra note 427,  at 1354  ("East Asians...  have  the  ability  to
automatically correct [dispositionist]  inferences in light of situational constraints.").
451  See  supra  Part  V.C.4.c.ii  (arguing  that  a  dispositionist  worldview  benefits
corporations,  both individually and collectively).
452Hence,  one  might  expect dispositionism  to  grow  more  robust in  the  East,  as
Western  corporations  strive  to  maximize  profits  in  Eastern  markets.  On  the  other
hand,  we  might  expect  to  see  differing  methods  of deep  capture  in  markets  where
dispositionism  is less  pronounced.  Certainly,  even  in  the West,  there  is  evidence  of
corporate  appeals to  group identities  and situationist  conceptions, such  as  is  seen  in
patriotic  or racially identified messages.  It is  the situation,  and not our dispositionism
directly,  that  makes  deep  capture  possible.  If deep  capture  can  be  accomplished
more effectively or more efficiently  by  promoting other worldviews,  then such efforts
may take different forms in  different cultures.
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D.  Some Direct  Evidence of  Deep Capture
As  we  just  reviewed,  evidence  about  cultural  variation  of
dispositionism  is  consistent  with  our  deep  capture  hypothesis  in  a
number  of  ways.  However,  that  evidence,  by  itself,  does  little  to
demonstrate  that  corporate  efforts  are  an  important  cause  of  the
heightened  dispositionism  of the  West.  Many would  argue  that any
causal  connection  is  actually  the  reverse  of  the  one  we  have
hypothesized.  For instance, the  prominence and  success of commer-
cial  interests  in  America  could  well  reflect  the  heightened
dispositionism of Americans.
There  is  almost certainly some truth  to that view.  The American
self-conception  is  one  of individualism, a sibling  concept of what  we
refer  to  as  dispositionism.  This  individualism  seemed  to  emerge
without  much  obvious  encouragement  by  large  commercial  interests
and  is  sometimes  associated  with  people  like  Henry  David Thoreau,
who  seem  anything but deeply  captured.  President  Herbert  Hoover
saw individualism  as  the  cornerstone  of the American  character  (or
disposition):
Individualism  has  been  the  primary  force  of American  civilization
for three centuries.  It is our sort of individualism  that  has supplied the
motivation  of America's  political,  economic, and spiritual  institutions in
all  these  years.  It  has  proved  its  ability to  develop  its  institutions  with
the changing scene.  Our very form of government  is the product of the
individualism  of our  people, the demand  for  an equal  opportunity,  for
a fair chance.
The American  pioneer  is  the  epic  expression  of that individualism,
and  the pioneer spirit  is the  response  to  the  challenge  of opportunity,
to  the  challenge  of nature,  to  the  challenge  of  life,  to  the  call  of the
frontier.5
3
In  this way, Americans  have long seen their individualism  as both
obvious 5 4  and  the  most  significant  factor  behind  their  relative
economic  and  political  success.  That  self-affirming  self-conception
may,  however,  be  yet  another  example  of  the  fundamental
attribution  error.  In  our  view,  attributing  our  success  to  our
individualist  disposition  misses  the  more  significant  role  of  our
453 HERBERT HOOVER,  AMERICAN  INDIVIDUALISM  63-64 (1922).
4A  Of course, as we  have  emphasized, the  fact that something is obvious does not
mean  it  is  entirely  true.  See  BARRY  ALAN,  SILAIN,  THE  MYTH  OF  AMERICAN  INDI-
VIDUALISM:  THE  PROTESTANT  ORIGINS  OF AMERICAN  POLITICAL  THOUGHT  21  (1994)
("Contrary to popular belief, Americans in the years surrounding the Revolution were
not adherents of political  individualism  . . ").
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situation,  which  itself  has  fostered  success  and  rendered  more
plausible  our self-conception.  Put differently, the American  pioneer
may  not  be  "the  epic  expression  of ...  individualism,  as  many
tend  to  presume.  Rather,  the  individualism  is  as  much  the  conse-
quence  of  the  existence  of  a  valuable  situation,  including  an
immense frontier.i
455  HOOVER,  supra  note 453, at 63.
456  Again,  the cultural disposition of individualism  may well  reveal more  about the
situation  than  is  commonly  recognized.  See  supra text accompanying  notes  444-49
(discussing  the  link  between  a  culture's  regard  for  individualism  and  that culture's
tendency  toward  dispositionism).  "The frontier" provided  to  those  who  ventured  to
America a  chance  to change  their  lives-an escape  in  some  cases,  an opportunity  in
others.  By  sailing  West  to  get  to  America  and  then  "going  West" once  here,  the
situation would  have seemed far less constraining:  gone were many of the shackles of
religious  persecution,  population  density,  employment  pressures,  and  rigid  class
norms.  Those  who survived and thrived did so perceiving  they had acted according to
their choices.  Seemingly boundless  land and natural  resources, together with growing
markets  and  changing  technologies,  provided  many  Americans  with  a  strong
perception  of self-reliance  and self-determination.  To a large degree, that perception
held  true-but  largely  because  the  situation  permitted  it.  In  other  words,  the
freedom that we attribute to the disposition  of individuals may more  accurately be the
consequence  of  the  options  afforded  by  the  situation  in  a  "land of opportunity."
Particularly when  compared  to  the Old  World-where  famine,  poverty,  and political
strife  rendered  the situation  oppressive and salient-the  New World would  have  felt
to many people  (particularly young, strong, entrepreneurial,  free,  and white  men)  as
a  land  where  disposition  decided  one's  fate.  Again,  the  frontier  on  which  the
American  pioneer  was  permitted  to  venture  was  itself  a  great  situational  source  of
both perceived individualism and this country's success.
With  that commentary,  we have here  inadvertently stumbled  into the midst of a
long-standing historiographical  battle.  The  classic work  that initiated  that battle  was
written  in  the  late  nineteenth  century  by  Frederick  Jackson  Turner.  FREDERICK
JACKSON  TURNER,  The Significance of the Frontier  in American History (1893),  reprinted in
THE  FRONTIER  IN  AMERICAN  HISTORY  1  (1920).  Turner  challenged  the  then-
conventional "germ theory" that the American  character was  a dispositional  legacy  of
the Old World  and emphasized  instead  the situational  effects  of the frontier in giving
shape to a distinctly American disposition.  In his words:
[T]o the frontier the American  intellect owes  its striking characteristics.  That
coarseness  and  strength  combined  with  acuteness  and  inquisitiveness;  that
practical,  inventive  turn  of mind,  quick  to  find  expedients;  that  masterful
grasp  of material  things, lacking  in  the  artistic but  powerful  to  effect great
ends;  that restless,  nervous  energy;  that dominant  individualism,  working for
good and for evil, and withal that buoyancy and exuberance  which  comes with
freedom-these  are  the  traits  of the  frontier, or  traits called  out elsewhere
because of the existence of the frontier.
Id. at 37.  A century of historical analysis and debate has discredited many of the details
of Turner's frontier  thesis.  See, e.g.,  Donald Worster,  New  West,  True West:  Interpreting
the  Region's History, 18  W.  HIsT.  Q.  141,  144-46  (1987)  (rejecting  the  process  idea
central  to Turner's thesis, preferring instead to define the West as a fixed  geographical
region).  But  there remains,  we  believe,  a strong  case  that situation-including  our
interior situation,  which  may  be  motivated to  see  ourselves  as  the rugged individuals
20031262  UNIVERSITY  OF  PENNSYLVANIA  LAW REVIEW
Be that as  it may, the fact that different cultures  tend to be more
or  less  dispositionist  reveals  how  dispositionism  can  itself  be
influenced  by  the  situation,  thus  leaving  the  door  open  for  deep
capture.  However,  it  does  not,  in  and  of  itself,  provide  direct
evidence  of deep  capture.  If our  culture  is  especially  dispositionist,
one would  expect our legal  theorists, lawmakers,  and  laws 4 5 7  to share
or  reflect  that  fundamental  bias.  Similarly,  one  would  expect
advertisers  to  reflect  that same  view,  by  design or not, in  marketing
their  products  in  America.  The  Marlboro  Man,  as  a  cigarette-
smoking  frontiersman,  may  reflect  little  more  than  a  shared  sense
that he is  us and we  are him:  autonomous,  free,  and unfettered,...
the epic expression  of individualism." 8  Thus, to support  the  portion
of the  deep  capture  hypothesis  that  predicts  that  large  commercial
interests  actively  and  sometimes  consciously  promote  dispositionist
worldviews  directly,  we  need  a  different  sort  of  evidence,  a  small
sample of which we will highlight here.
Fortunately, providing  evidence  is  quite  simple.  All  one  has  to
do  is point to  the  hundreds of billions of dollars spent each  year on
advertising,  marketing,  and  public  relations.
4 9  Large  commercial
entities  are  using  and  developing  the  sort  of  social  psychological
research of which  the rest of us  are either ignorant or dismissive.  As
one  of us  has  argued  at length  (with  Doug  Kysar),  marketing  texts
and  marketing  firms  are  steeped  in  an  understanding  of  the
460
powerful  role  of  situation.  Moreover,  they  use  what  they  know
(and  learn  from  market  experience)  to  manipulate  consumer
perceptions and behavior.
that Turner  idealized-plays  far more  of a  role in  defining  who  we  are,  or like  to
believe  we are, than we  recognize.  Cf JARED  DIAMOND,  GUNS,  GERMS &  STEEL:  THE
FATES  OF  HUMAN  SOCIETIES  25  (1997)  ("History  followed  different  courses  for
different peoples because of differences among people's environments....").
457 For  examples  of  the  influence  of dispositionist  presumptions  on  laws,  see
Hanson  &  Yosifon,  supra note  30  (examining  dispositionism  in  contract,  tort,  and
criminal  law);  infra text accompanying  notes  598-614  (describing  the  dispositionism
inherent in contract law).
458  See also Bruce  A. Lohof,  The Higher Meaning of Marlboro Cigarettes,  3 J.  POPULAR
CULTURE  441,  447  (1969)  (comparing  the  Marlboro  image  to  Frederick  Jackson
Turner's vision of the frontier).
459  See Ticker, BRILL'S  CONTENr,  Oct. 2000, at 33  (detailing  the level of advertising
expenditure  in the United States).
460  For a discussion  of this point, see Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism  Seriously
II, supra note 251.
For more on this idea, see  id.; Hanson  & Kysar,  Taking Behavioralism  Seriously I,
supra note 251; Hanson  & Kysar,  Taking Behavioralism Seriously III, supra note  257.  See
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We  will  not  review  that  work  here.  For  now,  we  hope  it  is
sufficient  to  point  out  that  when  social  psychologist  Robert  B.
Cialdini 462  wrote  his  popular  book,  Influence:  The  Psychology  of
Persuasion, 4'3  he  devoted  one  of  six  main  chapters  to  the  Milgram
experiments  and  their lessons for  marketing. 6 4  A review of the  book
in  the Journal of Retailing raved  that  "[Influence]  could  be  required,
profitable  'weekend  reading'  for business  majors. ''   Another  review
stated  that  "[fWor  marketers,  [this  book]  is  among  the  most
important  books  written  in  the  last  10  years.,
466   Similarly,  many
other  marketing-oriented  writings  on  consumer  behavior  under-
score  the  importance  of situation  over  disposition  in  determining
individual behavior.  "An actor in a  play  takes  his  cue from  a line or
some  other  happening  or  event.  The  human  mind  takes  its  cue
from  its intentions  and  its  immediate  environment.  Such  cues  can
influence what we think about next.,
467  Such  is the  starting point for
one influential marketing  guide promising  to "demystif[y]  the  effects
of advertising  and  describ[e]  some  of the  psychological  mechanisms
underlying  them...  written primarily for those who  foot the bill for
advertising and those who produce  advertising. ""8
Marketing and advertising  practices  thus reveal  the deep, though
apparently  unseen,  irony  in  the  advertisements  that  we  summarized
earlier.469  Advertisers  commonly  present  to  us  a  vision  of ourselves
that  confirms  our  self-affirming,  dispositionist  (and  non-manipula-
ble)  self-image.  They  do so,  it would  seem,  in order  to  manipulate
our perceptions and behavior.  The manipulation  apparently works,
as revealed by their choice  to continue doing so at a substantial  cost.
In  a way,  that is our entire  case in  a nutshell.  We are  subject to
influence  and manipulation  from  sources  that we  do  not  see  or do
also Hanson &  Kysar, supra note 403 (showing how tobacco manufacturers  manipulate
consumer perception and preferences to increase profits).
462 Robert  B.  Cialdini  is  the  Regents'  Professor  of  Psychology  at  Arizona  State
University in Tempe.
+53 ROBERT B.  CIALDINI,  INFLUENCE:  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  PERSUASION  (rev.  ed.
1993).
464  Id. at 208-36.
465 Roger A. Dickinson, Influence, 60J. RETAILING,  Winter  1984, at  126,  128  (book
review).
466 Alan J.  Resnik, Influence:  Science &  Practice,  23 J.  MARKETING  RES.,  Aug. 1986, at
305, 305  (1986)  (book review).
467 MAX SUTHERLAND  & ALICE  K. SYLVESTER,  ADVERTISING  AND  THE  MIND  OF THE
CONSUMER:  WHAT WORKS,  WHAT DOESN'T,  AND WHY 17 (2d ed.  2000).
468  Id. at 4.
469 See supra text accompanying notes 393406.
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not  consider  relevant.  Those  with  the  ability  to  influence  those
sources  wield  immense  influence  over  us,  while  we  continue  to
believe  that  we  are  acting  independently,  according  to  our  prefer-
ences.  We  conclude  that  advertising  works,  but  deny  that  it
works  on  us.
470   But,  to  borrow  one  of the  oldest  strategies  in  the
book,  do  not  take  our  word  for  it-listen  to  what  those  in  the
industry  say  about  what  they  do.  For  example,  the Web  site  for
Burson-Marsteller, a public relations  firm,  has  this  to  say  about  their
industry:
What  makes  public  relations  so  important  is  that  people's  opinion
of ...  a  company,  or  a  company's  products  or  services  is  to  a  great
extent  beyond  that ...  company's  control.  A  public  relations  agency
offers  these  ...  companies  the  resources  necessary  to  make  today's
incredibly  diverse  influences  work  for  them.  It  accomplishes  this  by
having messages about the...  company or company  product or service
communicated  through  a  credible third party such  as  a tnsted journalist,
physician,  television  or  radio  commentator,  entertainer,  or  influential
Internet  figure.  In  essence,  a public relation agency  optimizes  the power of
endorsement  by  successfully  influencing  those  who  influence  a  targeted
•  471
audience.
Hill  and  Knowlton,  one  of Burson-Marsteller's  chief competitors
and  the  firm  responsible  for  designing  the  tobacco  industry's
response  to  evidence  that  smoking  caused  lung  cancer,4'  describes
their role in very similar terms:
Powerful  communications  that  make  a  difference[,]..,  that  can
transform,  inspire,  move  and educate  is  why  we  exist.  This  power  can
be  accessed  by  our  clients  wherever  and  whenever  they  need  it;  in
specialist  arenas  and  in  global  campaigns;  in  the  corridors  of
470  SeeJEAN  KILBOURNE,  CAN'T  BUY  MY  LOVE:  HOW  ADVERTISING  CHANGES  THE
WAY  WE  THINK  AND  FEEL  27  (1999)  ("U]ust  about  everyone  in  America  still  feels
personally exempt from advertising's  influence.");  see also Emily Pronin, Daniel Y.  Lin
& Lee  Ross,  The Bias Blind Spot:  Perceptions  of Bias in Self Versus Others, 28  PERSONALITY
& SOC.  PSYCHOL.  BULL.  369,  370-78  (2002)  (summarizing several studies finding  that
people  see  motivational  and  cognitive  biases  much  more  readily  in  others  than  in
themselves).
471  Burson-Marsteller,  Inc.,  Why  You  Need  a  PR Firm,  at  http://vww.bm.com/
resources/whypop.html  (last visited Mar.  5,  2003)  (emphasis added).
472  See  KAREN  S.  MILLER,  THE  VOICE  OF  BUSINESS:  HILL  &  KNOWLTON  AND
POSTWAR  PUBLIC  RELATIONS  121-45  (1999)  (remarking on Hill  & Knowlton's  role  in
"promot[ing]  the notion  that the case against smoking  has not been  proved," and  the
later description of Hill  & Knowlton's work as "one of PR's best finger-in-the-dike jobs
ever").
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government;  in  the  financial  centers  and  in  the  minds  of  consumers
everywhere.
473
Richard  Berman's  public  affairs  firm,  Berman  and  Company,
which  represents  the  cigarette,  restaurant,  and  alcohol  industries,
describes in like fashion its bold mission to "[c]hange  the debate" for
the sake of its clients:474
Many PR firms promise  access  to the media.  Law firms pledge  to defend
their clients.  Lobbying  firms  promise  access to  friendly legislators.  At
Berman and Company we do all this.  But we go further.  We change  the
debate.  If necessary,  we start the debate.
...  Our  success  is based  on  three  core  competencies:  credible
research  as  the  foundation  for  effective  messages  disseminated  via
475
aggressive  communications.
By  analyzing  the  way  marketers,  advertisers,  and  public relations
firms view us, it is clear that we  are not as  dispositional as  we  think we
are.  A  major  sector  of  our  economy  is  making  a  huge  profit  by
maintaining  two visions  of the  human  animal.  The  public vision  is
often  that  of  the  dispositional,  independent,  rational  actor.  The
private  vision  is  that  of  the  situational  character,  capable  of
manipulation  through  situational  influence.  Those  with  the  greatest
stake  in  perpetuating  the  illusion  that  we  are  dispositionists
encourage,  promote,  and  market  our  dispositionism,  in  significant
part  because  doing  so  helps  make  the  situation  that  much  more
invisible.  It is  largely through  the  unseen  situation that consumers,
like  other  individuals,  institutions,  and  entities  in  our  culture,  are
deeply captured.
From this vantage  point the Marlboro  Man  reveals himself not as
a  reflection  of  what  we-advertisers  and  consumers  alike-all  see
about ourselves.  Rather,  he  embodies  that  dispositionist self whom
marketers  want  us  to  see,  but  whom  they  understand  is  almost  as
fictional  as the Marlboro  Man himself.
The  Marlboro  Man  first  saddled  up  in  the  1950s,  as  part  of  a
concerted  effort  by  Philip  Morris  to  attract  male  smokers  who  may
473  Hill  & Knowlton,  Homepage,  at http://wwv.hillandknowlton.com/global  (last
visited Oct. 24, 2003).
474  Berman & Co.,  Homepage,  at http://www.bermanco.com/  (last visited Oct. 24,
2003).
475 Id.;  see infra text accompanying  notes 483-500  (describing  in  more  detail  the
use  of third-party  spokespeople  for  credibility,  and  detailing  some  of the  particular
strategies and tactics used to create and maintain  access to such third parties).
2003]266  UNIVERSITY  OFPENNSYL VANIA  LAW REVIEW
have  been  frightened  by  then-fresh  reports  of  the  health  risks  of
476 smoking.  Marlboro  was  a  filtered  brand  that had  originally  been
marketed,  with  limited  success,  as  a  woman's  cigarette  behind  the
slogan  "Mild  as  May.
4 7 7   The  cowboy  image  eventually  proved  the
most popular  of a group of potential  pitchmen,  including explorers,
sailors, athletes and other rugged men.47  In a  three-page  spread  in
the January  1957  issue  of Life  magazine, 479  the  caption  read,  "The
Marlboro  Man  speaks  for himself. 40  Introducing  his Western  way
of life, the Marlboro  Man  states:  "Own  my own  ranch  .. .[I]  ride
from one  end  of it  to  the  other  every  day... I  like  the  life  a  man
leads out here  .. .the  good feeling of being your own  boss.",
48   Over
the  next  four  decades,  the  Marlboro  Man  would  help  Marlboro
become,  in  the  words  of  a  Phillip  Morris  competitor,  "the  most
valuable  brand  item  in  the  world."
8 2   The  cowboy  image  was  so
successful  because  it  tapped  into  the  same  American  ideal  of  the
independent  frontiersman  that  Hoover  credits  as  the  "primary  force
of American  civilization:,
48 3
476 The tobacco  industry refers  to the  publication of the first lung cancer reports
as the "Big Scare," a transformative  moment for virtually all  industry practices, not just
their advertising.  Plaintiff's Complaint at  68-73,  Commonwealth  ex rel. Fisher v.
Philip  Morris,  Inc.  (Pa.  Ct.  Com.  Pl.  Apr.  1997)  (No.  2443),  available  at
http://www.attorneygeneral.gov/ppd/tobacco/complaint.cfm;  see also Hanson  &
Kysar,  Taking Behaviorism Seriously 1I,  supra note  251,  at  1483-87  (describing  the
"Big Scare"  and the  industry's initial  concerted  response).  See generally Richard
Doll,  Cancer  by  the Carton,  READER'S  DIG.  (Dec.  1952).
477 See Katherine  M. West,  The Marlboro Man:  The Making of an American Image, at
http://www.people.virginia.edu/-tsawyer/mman/mman.html  (last  visited  Oct.  24,
2003)  (describing the evolution of the Marlboro marketing campaign).
478  Lohof, supra note 458, at 443-44  (noting that by the early  1960s the cowboy had
surpassed  these  other  concepts  and  "was  promoted  to  supremacy");  see  also  Leo
Burnett,  Advertisement,  The  Marlboro Sto"y,  NEW  YORKER,  Nov.  15,  1958,  at  4143
(describing the marketing campaign of Marlboro in the 1950s).
479 Advertisement,  The Marlboro Man:  What's He Like, LIFE,Jan.  21,  1957, at 7,  7-9.
480  Id. at 8.
481 Id. at 8-9.
482 Cover  Letter,  MKTG.  INTELLIGENCE  DEP'T,  BRIT.  AM.  TOBACCO  Co.,  How
MARLBORO  LED THE  PACK,  (1994),  available at http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/
batco/OCR/100/177.txt  [hereinafter  BATCo  REPORT].  According  to  the  report,
"Marlboro  [i]s the  most successful  brand in  the history of consumer marketing,  more
so even than Coca Cola, which  has a higher awareness  level but lower profitability....
[I]n  1993,  Financial  World reported  that  [the  Marlboro  Man  was]  the world's most
valuable trademark[,]  valued at $39.5 billion."  Id.
483  See supra text accompanying note 453  (quoting Hoover)  (discussing individual-
ism as the cornerstone of American character).
[Vol.  152:129THE SITUATION
[T]he  cowboy  proved  to  be  the  advertising  "Big  Idea"  achieving
universal  appeal.  During the  1950s and  60s  the popularity  of American
cowboy  films  meant  that  for  most  people  the  cowboy  became  [tihe
symbol  of America  and  the American  "dream,"  cutting  across  barriers
of sex, and social and cultural  divisions.
...  [T]he  underlying themes  of adventure, freedom,  independence,
being  in  charge  of your  destiny,  open  spaces  and  escapism  for  the
urban  dweller  have  proved  appealing to  several  generations.  They  still
have  contemporary  relevance;  the cowboy  is an icon of sturdy inde 4endence,
the kind of  person who chooses to smoke, a quiet defender of free choice.
That  the  Marlboro  Man  portrays  an  image  of  "free  choice"
should  come  as  no surprise.  It is  more  than  an appeal  to an  active
American  script; it also deepens  that script.  Of course,  it also  helps
to  sell  a product that most would  agree  gains  its appeal  from almost
entirely  situational  sources.  Those  sources  can  be  either  exterior
situational  influences,  such  as  peer  pressure,  or  interior  situational
influences,  such  as  addiction.  From  that  perspective,  it  is  striking
that  "autonomy" and  "free  choice"  are  the  banners  behind  which
cigarettes  are  sold  and  the  self-image  that  consumers  gain  from
smoking  them.  To  confirm  this  (incorrect)  self-image,  cigarette
advertisers portray smoking as  something we simply  choose to do.
The  R.J.  Reynolds  Tobacco  Company  used  similar  means  to
attract  young  customers  to  smoke  Camels.  As  one  internal
memorandum  put  it,  "Advertising will  rely  on  clearly  aspirational
appeals  (the  me  I  want  to  be  versus  the  me  I  am)  to  provide  the
motivation  for  target  smokers  to  select  CAMEL., 4s5  A second  RJR
memorandum states:
484 BATCo REPORT,  supra note 482, at 7-8  (emphasis added).
485 Memorandum  Regarding  CAMEL  New  Advertising  Development  from  R.T.
Caufield,  R.J.  Reynolds,  to D.N.  lauco,  R.J.  Reynolds  2  (Mar.  12,  1986),  available at
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/cgi/getdoc?tid=pil75dOO&fmt=pdf&ref=results
[hereinafter  Memorandum  from  R.T.  Caufield].  Camel's  campaign  had  two  goals.
First, it attempted  to  convince young  smokers  that Camels  give  them  the masculine
ideal  of "strength,  authenticity  and  self-confidence."  Id. at  3.  "Reinforcement  of
masculinity  is  an  important  want  among  a  large  percentage  of males  and  this  is
particularly true among  less educated and younger adult males.  (i.e.,  CAMEL's prime
prospect)."  Id.  Second, the advertising campaign sought to
create  the  perception  that  CAMEL  smokers  project  a  non-conformist,  self-
confident cool attitude which  is admired by their peers.
Aspiration  to be perceived  as cool/a  member of the in-group  is one  of the
strongest influences affecting the behavior of younger adult smokers.
Personality  attributes  respected  by  target  smokers  and  inherent  in  their
definition  of cool  include  a  degree  of rebellion  or non-conformity,  along
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The fragile, developing  self-image  of the young person  needs  all  of the
support and enhancement  it can  get.  Smoking  may appear  to enhance
that  self-image  in  a variety  of  ways.  If  one  values,  for  example,  an
adventurous,  sophisticated,  adult  image,  smoking  may  enhance  ones
self-image.  If one values  certain characteristics  in specific  individuals  or
types and those  persons or  types  smoke,  then  if  one  also  smokes  he  is
psychologically  a  little  more  like  the  valued  image.  This  self-image
enhancement  effect  has traditionally  been  a strong  promotional  theme
486
for cigarette  brands and should continue  to be emphasized.
Again,  cigarette  manufacturers  know  exactly  "who  we  are"-we
are  beings  who  want  to  believe  that  we  are  autonomous,  free
choosers, but who, in reality, are very susceptible  to situational forces.
We are  especially susceptible  to situations  that make  us  feel  as  if we
really  are  free  choosers  acting  according  to  our  own  will.  These
advertising  campaigns  seek  to exploit our situational weaknesses.  As
a result, cigarette  smoking,  a deadly addiction,  becomes  the epitome
of free choice. 487
As Americans, we  see ourselves as particularly immune  to the role
of situation.  We  see "individualism  as  the primary force" in defining
our  institutions  and  our  lives.  In  fact,  we  are  not  immune  to
situation,  nor  are we  as  individualistic  as  we  suppose.  The  fact that
profit-driven  actors  spend  billions  of dollars  per year  to  promote  a
false  dispositionist  image  of ourselves  is direct  evidence  of both  of
those claims and of deep capture.
with  the self-confidence  to remain  in control  of the somewhat  risky, exciting
lifestyle associated with these characteristics.
Id. at  4.  The  irony  is  striking-RJR  is  trying  to  convince  people  they  are  "self-
confident  non-conformists"  by  using  advertising  that  situationally  manipulates  this
very aspiration.
486  Memorandum  from  Claude  E.  Teague, Jr.,  R.J.  Reynolds,  Research  Planning
Memorandum  on  Some  Thoughts  About  New  Brands  of  Cigarettes  for  the  Youth
Market  7  (Feb.  2,  1973),  available at http://tobaccodocuments.org/rjr/502987357-
7368.html.
487  Widely  produced advertising campaigns  can affect the self-images of everyone,
not just those who  purchase  cigarettes.  They reinforce  our tendency to see  ourselves
as dispositional free choosers.  RJR recognized  this:
Campaigns  which  rely  on  literal  depiction  of smokers  to  communicate
desired  user  imagery  will  ensure  that  models  and  situations  selected  are
highly  relevant  and  appealing  to  not  only  target  smokers  but  broader
demographic  groups  as  well.  Additionally,  the  exploratory  will  cover
approaches  which  employ  universal  cues  and  symbols  that  effectively
communicate  the  strategies  with  motivational  value  that  transcends
demographics.
Memorandum  from R.T. Caufield,  supra note 485, at 2.
[Vol.  152:1290THE SITUATION
E.  Some Deeper  Evidence of Deep Capture:  The Puzzles Revisited
We  have  reviewed  a sample  of the  evidence  indicating  that pro-
commercial  dispositionism  has  been  widely  accepted  as  the
presumptive  starting  place  for  policy  analysis.  Many  administrative
regulators, judges,  and  legal  scholars,  like  most  consumers-from
cigarette  smokers,  to  investors,  to  television-news  enthusiasts-take
dispositionism  as  the obvious  truth.  Implicitly,  we have  also  reviewed
one of the most  common  and effective  strategies  for promoting pro-
commercial  views.  Before  explicitly  naming that  strategy,  it may  be
helpful  to  return  briefly  to  the  Milgram  experiments  and  some
variations  of the  rendition that we described  above.
1.  The Demand for Credible  Messengers
With numbing regulaity good people were seen to knuckle under the demands of
authority and perform actions that were  callous and severe.  Men  who  are in
everyday life  responsible and decent were seduced by  the trappings of authority,
by  the  control  of  their perceptions,  and  by  the  uncritical acceptance of  the
experimenter's definition  of the  situation, into  performing harsh acts....  A
substantial proportion of people  do what  they  are told  to  do,  irrespective of the
content of the act and without limitations of conscience, so  long as they perceive
that the command comes from a  legitimate authority.
-Stanley  Milgram488
After  discovering  the  unexpected  power  of the  situation  in  his
initial  experiment,  Milgram  altered  the  situation  in  the  hope  of
making visible some  of the previously unseen influences.  One of the
key  factors  he  varied  was  the  credibility  or  authority  of the  person
who gave  orders  to the teacher.  In  the  basic  experiment, recall  that
the  person  prompting the  teacher  to continue  shocking appeared as
a  scientist,  complete  with  a  white  lab  coat.  He  seemed  to  have
considerable  knowledge  and authority.  When Milgram  replaced  that
"experimenter"  with  an  "ordinary  man"  to  give  the  orders,  the
percentage  of teachers  who  administered  the  maximum  shock  (450
volts)  dropped  from  approximately  sixty-five  percent  to  twenty
percent.4s 9   Apparently,  the  same  words  were  less  persuasive  or
488 Milgram,  Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority, supra note 86,
at 74-75.
489  MILGRAM,  OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY,  supra note 86, at 93-97.  As part of the
experiment, when "teachers" refused to go on, the common man, in apparent disgust,
would  assert  that he  would  take  over administering  the  shocks.  Id. at  97-99.  The
action  was met  with strong  resistance-virtually  all  protested  and  five  out  of sixteen
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influential  when  they  came  from  a  less  credible  or  authoritative
source.  In  addition,  when  Milgram  replaced  the  one  lab-coated
experimenter  with  two  lab-coated  authorities  who  gave  contradictory
orders,  the  complete  compliance  percentage  dropped  to  zero.
9   In
that variation,  teachers  could  more easily justify ending  the shocking
because  one person  with  authority  was  encouraging  them  to  do so.
Those  and  other variations  help  make  clear  that  the  credibility  of
the messenger  is often more important  than the message itself.
49 '
This  underscores  an  important  element  of  the  deep  capture
hypothesis:  the  quest  to  promote  certain  ideas  will  include  an
endeavor  to locate,  create,  and sponsor credible  means of conveying
those  ideas.  Often,  those with the  greatest stake  in an idea  have, for
precisely  that  reason,  questionable  credibility  when  speaking  on
behalf  of  the  idea.  Thus,  the  search  for  an  effective  means  of
communication  often includes a search for trustworthy spokespeople.
The  public  relations  firm  Burson-Marsteller  makes  the  point  in just
those  terms when  it describes  its  primary  strategy as  that of "having
[one's]  messages  ...  communicated  through  a credible  third party"
in order to "influenc[e]  those who influence  a targeted audience."
4 92
Berman  and Company emphasizes  that the "key"  to its success  "is
getting  the  most  credible  messengers  to  carry  the  strongest
messages.
493   To  access  such  credible  messengers,  Berman  and
Company developed what it calls an "academic research network:,
494
We commission  more than a dozen major research  projects each year to
independent academics at leading research universities, including:
"  University of Chicago
"  Florida State University
*  University ofTexas
"  Johns Hopkins University
subjects  took  physical  action  to  prevent  the  confederate  from  completing  the
experiment.  Id.  As  Milgram  noted, subjects "felt free  to threaten  the  common  man
and  were  not  reluctant  to  criticize  his judgment  or  personally  chastise  him;  their
attitude contrasts sharply with the deferential politeness subjects invariably displayed  in
other experiments, when an authority was at the helm."  Id. at 97-98.
490 Id. at 105-07.
491 See generally CIALDINI,  supra note  463, at  216-29  (describing some examples  of
people's  willingness  to  obey  authority  and  how  "compliance  professionals"  take
advantage  of that willingness).
492  Burson-Marsteller, Inc., supra note 471.
493 Berman  &  Co.,  at  http://www.bermanco.com/public_affairs.cfm  (last  visited
Oct. 25, 2003).
494 Berman  &  Co.,  at http://www.bermanco.com/research.cfm  (last  visited  Oct.
25,  2003).
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"  University of Wisconsin
*  Massachusetts Institute  of Technology
"  University of North Carolina
"  University of California, Los Angeles
"  Boston University
*  Michigan State University
The credibility of the material produced  by these  independent research-
ers  is unparalleled among "brand name" trade associations,  law firms, or
49;5 consultants active in the public policy arena.
Berman  and  Company  relies  on  several  other  tactics  to  create
favorable,  credible third-party messengers for its clients:
Sometimes,  the  best  messengers  are  line  managers  from  affected
employers.  We  have  more  than  a decade  of  experience  building  and
maintaining  sophisticated  grassroots  activation  systems  through  which
managers  can have maximum impact with a minimal investment of time.
CEOs  of major employers, working in  teams managed by Berman  and
Company,  repeatedly  deliver  powerful  messages  to  key  legislators  and
the White  House.
Whether drawing industry allies from associations, think  tanks, or the
private sector, Berman and Company reaches  out to potential allies on a
daily  basis,  providing  data,  information,  and  refined  messages  that
others  use  to  make  their  cases-and  ours-in  the  policy  arena.  Our
clients  benefit  when  more  allies  use  our  research  and  repeat  our
messages.
When  Berman  and Company publishes  research  from independent
academics,  we  craft  our publicity  efforts  so  that the  authors'  credibility
shines in the legislative spotlight.
Sometimes,  uncommon  allies  can  get  more  attention  than
"traditional"  spokespersons.  Our  staff  has  developed  strong  ties  to
individuals who are often perceived  as "anti-industry" but who agree with
496 focused messages that we seek to publicize.
To  aggressively  disseminate  the  credible  third-party  messages,
Berman  and  Company  attempts  to  "design  unique  programs  for
maximum impact in the debate ...  [and  to]  stick with the issue  for as
long  as  it  takes  to  win."4"  Those  programs  include  creating  and
maintaining  "web  sites  that  constantly  elicit  the  'Wow!'  factor  from
,,498  499 users.  ConsumerFreedom.com,  discussed above,  is an example of
that creative approach.  To "change the debate," that Web site seeks to
expose  and  resist  "the  Nanny  Culture"-"the  growing  fraternity  of
495 Id.
496  Berman & Co.,  supra  note 493.
497 Berman & Co., supra  note 494.
498  Berman & Co.,  supra  note 493.
499  See supra  notes 407-14 and accompanying text.
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'food  cops,'  health  care  enforcers,  militant  activists,  meddling
bureaucrats, and violent radicals who think they 'know what's best for
you'"-"and protect consumer choices."
° 0 0
The  same  basic  principle  was  at work  in  the  Galileo  story:  the
Catholic  Church  dealt  with  Galileo's  threatening  astronomical  views
by  having  its  own  worldview  "communicated  through"  Galileo's
recantation. 50'  Likewise,  the  principle  seems  to  underlie  Stigler's
basic shallow capture  message:  institutions or groups with  the  requi-
site  power employ the  legitimacy  of regulators  to advance  their own
interests.
5 0 2
2.  The Creation of Credible  Messengers
There is a vast range of interconnected  evidence  (too vast  to do
justice  to  in this  subsection)  of pro-commercial  interests investing
to  deeply  capture  the  many  "credible  third  parties"  that  might
influence  the  many  "targeted  audiences"  (including  all  of  us)  to
accept  pro-commercial  worldviews.  In  this  subsection  we  will  focus
on a small sample of that evidence.  Although  the  sample  is  small,
it will hit close  to home  for much of our audience  and will,  we hope,
strike  a  more  direct and  personal  chord  than  the  Galileo  discussion
may have.
Consider  the  world  of  legal  scholarship.  Large  business
interests  have  attempted  to  locate,  create,  and  sponsor  the
production and dissemination  of pro-commercial  legal scholarship  by
legal  scholars  who  have  served  as  credible,  if  often  unwitting,
spokespeople  for business  ends.  More  specifically,  consider some  of
the  evidence  regarding  the  goals  and  influence  of the John  M.  Olin
Foundation.
According to the Olin Foundation's Web site,
the  general  purpose  of  the John  M.  Olin  Foundation  is  to  provide
support  for  projects  that  reflect  or  are  intended  to  strengthen  the
economic,  political  and  cultural  institutions  upon  which  the American
heritage  of constitutional  government  and  private  enterprise  is  based.
The  Foundation  also  seeks  to  .. .encourag[e]  the  thoughtful  study
500  Ctr. for Consumer Freedom,  supra note  407.
50 See supra text accompanying  notes  297-314  (reviewing and  evaluating Galileo's
recantation).
52 See supra Part V.A (summarizing Stigler's arguments and evidence).
503  In  work  now  in  progress,  we  provide  a  more  fulsome  description  of that
evidence.
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of the connections  between  economic  and political  freedoms,  and  the
cultural  heritage  that sustains  them.
5 0 4
To  advance  that  goal  the  Olin  Foundation  has,  among  other
things,  awarded  tens of millions of dollars  to  prominent  law  schools
for the  promotion  of law and  economics  scholarship.  Over the  past
twenty  years,  Olin  money  has  established  law  and  economics
programs,  or "centers," at several prominent  law schools:  the Univer-
sity  of  Chicago,  Yale,  Stanford,  Harvard,  Columbia,  Georgetown,
Duke,  the  University of Michigan,  the University of Pennsylvania, 5  •  .05
George  Mason,  and  the  University  of Virginia.  In  1999,  a year  in
which  the  Foundation  paid  out  almost  $20  million  in  grants  to
organizations  around  the  country," 06  Harvard  Law  School's John  M.
Olin Center for Law,  Economics, and Business was  in the  middle of a
four-year,  $6  million  grant, 0 7  Yale  Law  School's  John  M.  Olin
Program  in  Law  and  Economics  was  in  the  middle  of  a  three-year,
504 John  M.  Olin  Foundation,  Inc.,  History and General Purposes, at http://w.
jmof.org/history-purposes.html  (last visited Oct. 26, 2003).
LAWRENCE  C.  SOLEY,  LEASING  THE  IVORY TOWER:  THE CORPORATE  TAKEOVER
OF ACADEMIA  137  (1995);  Michael  L.  Rustad  & Thomas  H.  Koenig,  Taming the  Tart
Monster:  The American Civil  Justice  System  as a Battleground  of Social Theory, 68  BROOK.  L.
REV. 1, 76 tbl.2 (2002).
506 John  M.  Olin  Foundation,  Inc.,  Total  Grants Paid,  1999,  at http://ww.
jmof.org/grants_1996.html  (last visited Oct. 26, 2003).
507 John  M.  Olin  Foundation,  Inc.,  Schedule of Grants,  1999:  H,  at http://www.
jmof.org/grants/1999h.htm  (last  visited  Oct.  26,  2003).  An  Olin  grant  helped
establish  Harvard  Law  School's  Law  and  Economics  Program  in  1985.  Olin  Gift
Expands Law and Economics at HLS,  HARv.  L.  BULL.,  Summer 1998,  at 30.  Further
support then  led  to  the  1995  opening  of  the  Olin  Center  at  Harvard  Law  School,
"now  the  world  leader  in  educating  students,  training  academics,  and  promoting
scholarship  in  law  and  economics."  Id.  "Among  [the  Olin  Center's]  academic
offerings  are  three  economic  analysis  seminars,  courses  on  the  economics  on
regulation and antitrust, classe5  on law and economics  and on empirical methods,  and
a  new course,  Analytical  Methods  for  Lawyers,"  for which  the  Olin  Center faculty  is
developing  a textbook  for adoption  across  the country.  Press  Release,  Harvard  Law
School,  Harvard  Law  School  Receives  $10  Million  Grant  from  John  M.  Olin
Foundation,  at  http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2003/05/19_olin.php  (May  19,
2003)  [hereinafter  Harvard  Law School Press Release].  Beyond the  classroom,  "[t]he
Olin  Center supports  more  than  twenty John  M.  Olin  Fellows  each  year  to conduct
research on  topics ranging from corporate governance  to prenuptial agreements."  Id.
Much  of the sponsored  scholarship  has  involved the application  of economic  analysis
to  controversial  issues,  including  Professor  Kip  Viscusi's  criticism  of  tobacco  and
smoking  regulation.  Id.;  see  also  VISCUSI,  supra  note  15,  at  145  (arguing  that
government  policy  "should  not  be  to  deter  smoking  but  to  provide  information
concerning  the  variety  of smoking hazards"  so  that consumers  can  make  their  own
choice).
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$1.9  million  grant,"s  and  the  University  of  Chicago  Law  School's
John  M. Olin  Program  in Law and Economics  was  in the middle  of a
six-year,  $2.5  million  grant.  5119  In May 2003, Harvard  received another
grant from the Olin Foundation,  this time for $10  million, "the largest
foundation grant in the law school's 186-year history."
51 0
Olin  money,  as  we  will  describe  in  more  detail  in  subsequent
work,  has  a  significant  influence  not  only  in  encouraging  certain
types  of scholarship,"  but  also  in  increasing  the  credibility  of that
scholarship.  It establishes  "centers" dedicated  to  law and economics
theory,  provides  funding  for  journals  through  which  law  and
economics  scholarship  can be  stamped  with  the  legitimacy  of "peer
review"  by other legal  economists,  finances  a  series  of workshops  to
encourage  efficiency-oriented  scholars  to share and test their views  at
elite  law  schools,  and  gives  scholarships  and  fellowships  to  top  law
students who participate in law and economics seminars and produce
law and  economics  scholarship51 2  In  short, Olin  money has  helped
to  create  and  advance  a  critical  mass  of legal  scholars,  who  begin
with  the  strong  dispositionist  axioms  of neoclassical  economics,  who
write  largely  for  one  another  and  policymakers,  and  who  view
themselves  (and  are  viewed  by  many  others)  as  the  only  genuinely
social scientific members  of the legal academy.
The  success  of  the  Olin  Foundation's  funding  of  law  and
economics  seems  fairly  dramatic.  Professor  Steven  Shavell,  the
director  of  Harvard  Law  School's  Olin  Program,  recently  provided
one  measure  of that  achievement.  Professor  Shavell  surveyed  the
academic  appointments  at  the  "top  10"  law  schools  over  the  last
508 John  M.  Olin  Foundation,  Inc.,  Schedule of Grants, 1999:  Y,  at http://www.
jmof.org/grants/ 1999y.htm  (last visited Oct. 27, 2003). 509John  M.  Olin  Foundation,  Inc.,  Schedule of Grants, 1999:  U,  at http://www.
jmof.org/grants/1999u.htm  (last visited Oct. 27,  2003).
510  Harvard  Law School  Press  Release,  supra note  507.  The  gift is  a testament  to
the great success of the Center in  achieving the goals of the Olin Foundation.  In the
words ofJames  Piereson,  executive director of the Olin  Foundation, "[t]he  school has
made  an impressive  commitment to  the field of law and  economics and has  created a
very strong program  of teaching and research.  We hope this gift will enable  the school
to build on this record of success."  Id.
511  For  a  recent  critique  of the John  M.  Olin  Foundation's  neoconservative
influence  in law schools, see Rustad  & Koenig, supra note 505, at 74-77.
512 SOLEY,  supra note  505,  at  5-6,  14041.  Not all  institutions  have  accepted  the
Olin  Foundation's  handouts.  "A  short-lived  program  in  Law  and  Economics  was
offered at UCLA during  the  1980s,  but was  abandoned  after a curricultim  committee
found  that  the  program  was  'taking  advantage  of  students'  financial  need  to
indoctrinate  them  with  a  particular  ideology."'  SOLEY,  supra note  505,  at  137,  140
(quoting UCLA curriculum committee).
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decade.
5 13   Of forty-three  total  placements,  he  found  that,  twenty-
three were Harvard Law School graduates, and  ten of those had been
Olin fellows.
14  As Professor  Shavell told the Boston  Globe, "[i]n  the
long run, we're  going to have  a heck of an impact on who's teaching
at the leading law schools, and what the students are learning."5
We  would  go  further.  The  Olin  Foundation  and  the  law  and
economics scholarship  that it has subsidized  have  already had "a heck
of an impact."  Indeed,  the scholarly project that the Olin  money has
sponsored  is  the same  project  that is  widely understood  today  to  be
the  dominant  paradigm  for policy  analysis. 56  Professor  Shavell  has
emphasized  that  the  economic  analysis  of  law  "has  changed  the
nature  of  legal  scholarship,  influenced  legal  practice,  and  already
proven  its  tremendous  value  in  policymaking  and  business."
5 1 7
Furthermore,  the  Olin  Foundation's  Board  of  Trustees  recently
declared  that  their  contributions  have  "supported  a  wide  range  of
scholars  and  writers  who  significantly  changed  the  content  and
direction of American  academic and political  discussion.  ,5
1 8
Of course,  the  fact that  the  Olin Foundation  poured  millions  of
dollars into  promoting law and  economics  does not necessarily  imply
that those  investments played a significant causal role in  the stunning
success  of  the  now-dominant  paradigm.  It  may  be,  as  most  of its
proponents  presume,  that  law  and  economics  was  destined  for
greatness solely on the merits, and  that Olin money simply facilitated
an inevitable  process that was already underway. 5
a.  A  market test
There  are  several  reasons  to  suspect,  however,  that  the  Olin
Foundation's  support,  combined  with  numerous  other  situational
influences,  has played  a pivotal  causal  role  in  the  success  of the  law
and  economics  movement.  First,  the  success  of law and  economics
appears  to map  closely  with  the  precise  ambitions  and  strategies  of
513  See Thomas C. PalmerJr.,  The Right to Self-Destruct, BOSTON  SUNDAY GLOBE,  Apr.
29,  2001,  at  DI (discussing  Shavell's  work  in  the  context  of the  Olin  Foundation's
impending dissolution).
514  Id. at D3.
515  Id.
516  See supra text accompanying  notes 57-64.
517 Olin Gift Expands  Law and  Economics at HLS, supra note 507, at 30.
518John M.  Olin  Foundation,  Inc., Board  Resolution  (Sept. 20, 2000),  available at
http://www.jmof.org/wes.htm.
51"  See supra text accompanying notes 68-81.
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the  key  individuals  behind  the  Olin  Foundation:  John  Olin,  the
founder  of  the  organization,  and  William  Simon,  its  longtime
president.  After  leaving  his  position  as  Treasury  Secretary  in  the
Nixon and Ford Administrations,  Simon wrote  two  best-selling  books
that  outlined  his  conservative  and  pro-commercial  beliefs  and  his
agenda  for  implementing  them.  Simon  was  a  prominent,  early
exponent  of  the  dispositionist,  neoliberal  worldview  that  seeks  to
promote  private  enterprise  and  to  minimize  the  role  of
government-a  worldview  shared by John  Olin.  They  also  shared  a
belief that American  universities  at the  time  produced  ideas  and
graduates  that  were  dangerously  antithetical  to  those  ends.  To
Simon,  this  problem  was  tantamount  to  a  war  of  liberty  versus
totalitarianism-a war with  three fronts:
1.  Funds  generated  by business...  must  rush  by  multimillions  to
the aid of liberty,  in the  many  places where  it is beleaguered.
...  [Foundations  established  by such funds must]  serve  explicitly as
intellectual  refuges  for  the  non-egalitarian  scholars  and  writers  in  our
society  who  today  work  largely  alone  in  the  face  of  overwhelming
indifference  or hostility.  They must  be  given  grants,  grants, and  more
grants  in exchange for books, books, and more books.
2.  Business  must  cease  the  mindless  subsidizing  of  colleges  and
universities  whose departments  of economics,  government,  politics  and
history  are  hostile  to  capitalism  and  whose  faculties  will  not  hire
scholars whose views are otherwise.
...  America's  major  universities  are  today  churning  out  young
collectivists  by  legions,  and  it  is irrational  for  businessmen  to  support
them.
3.  Finally,  business money must flow  ...  to media which  are  either
pro-freedom  or,  if not necessarily  'pro-business,'  at  least professionally
capable  of a  fair and  accurate  treatment  of procapitalist  ideas,  values
and  arguments.  The  judgment  of  this  fairness  is  to  be  made  by
businessmen  alone-it is their money that they are  investing.
These  are  the  three  fronts  on  which  to  act aggressively  if we  are  to
create  a sophisticated  counter-force  to the rising despotism.  One  of my
own  first actions on  leaving the post of Secretary  of the Treasury was  to
accept the job of president of the John N.  [sic]  Olin Foundation,  whose
520  WILLIAM  E.  SIMON,  A  TIME  FOR  TRUTH  (Berkley  Books  1979)  (1978)
[hereinafter  SIMON,  A  TIME  FOR  TRUTH];  WILLIAM  E.  SIMON,  A  TIME  FOR  AcTION
(1980).
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purpose  is  to  support  those  individuals  and  institutions  who  are
521
working to strengthen  the free  enterprise  system.
Thus, Simon, with the support of the Olin Foundation, was trying
to alter the playing field  on which  academic  debate  takes  place-and
trying  to do  so situationally.  Furthermore,  he  understood  that  the
dispositionism  of law  and  economics  is  pro-business  and  that  many
alternative views,  otherwise  successful  in the marketplace  of ideas, are
not.  Simon presented  American  individualism,  much as  ad agencies
presented  the  Marlboro  Man,  as  the  American  tradition  and  the
source  of America's  greatness.  However,  like  the  Marlboro  Man's
creators,  Simon  seemed  to appreciate  that  such  individualism,  to  be
embraced  as  deeply as Philip  Morris,  Simon, and others desired, had
to be heavily promoted,  and  reinforced  if it is  to be widely accepted.
And  he  further  understood  that  the  situation  can  and  should  be
manipulated  by,  among  other things,  choosing  particular  academics,
programs,  and  scholarly  camps  to  give  "grants,  grants,  and  more
grants in exchange for books, books, and more books.'5
22
In  light  of  Simon's  (and  thus  the  Olin  Foundation's)  pro-
business  mission,  there  is  good  reason  to  believe  that  the  Olin
Foundation's  sizeable  law  and  economics  investment  was  money
well spent.  The point  is  strengthened  when  one  considers  that  the
Foundation  engaged  in  a  kind  of  "stage  financing"  of  these
programs:  grants were intended to last for only a few years,  at which
point  the  Foundation  would  consider  whether  to  renew  its
523 contribution  to  a  particular  program.  The  fact  that  the  Founda-
521  SIMON,  A TIME FOR TRUTH,  supra note 520, at 246-50.
522  Id. at 247.
523  We  suspect  that such  financing  arrangements  may  have  had some  influence
over the kind of work that was produced  under the  auspices  of each program, just as
economists  generally  tend  to  assume  that  such  financing  arrangements  can  have
incentive  effects  over  those  subject  to  them.  See,  e.g.,  Francesca  Cornelli  &  Oved
Yosha,  Stage Financing and the  Role  of Convertible Securities,  70  REv.  ECON.  STUD.  1
(concluding  that venture  capital  financing  can  affect the short-term  behavior of  the
entrepreneur);  see also Paul A.  Gompers,  Optimal Investment, Monitoring,  and the Staging
of Venture Capital, 50 J. FIN.  1461,  1461  (1995)  ("[T]he  staging  of capital  infusions
allows  venture  capitalists  to  gather  information  and  monitor  the  progress  of firms,
maintaining the option to periodically abandon  projects.").
John  M.  Olin,  having  witnessed  the  leftward  trend  of the Ford  Foundation
during  the  1960s and  1970s,  specified  that  all  resources  of the  Olin Foundation
were  to  be  spent within  one  generation  of his  death  in order  to prevent  its co-
option.  Shawn  Zeller,  Conservative Crusaders, 35  NAT'L J.  1286,  1290-91  (2003).
Although  currently  allocating  the  remaining  assets of the  Foundation,  with  the
idea  of  closing  down  by  2005,  the  Olin  board  may  be  making  further
arrangements  to  ensure  that  Olin's  goals  are  not disappointed.  In  the  same
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tion continued to renew many grants provides  strong evidence that it
believed  that  its  investments  were  generating  worthwhile  returns
in terms  of encouraging  pro-commercial  worldviews  (and  discourag-
524 ing alternatives)  among students, academics, and policymakers.
b.  Re-imagining the marketplace of ideas
This  leads  to  a  second  general  reason  to  suspect  that  Olin's
investments  have  played  a  critical  causal  role  in  the  success  of  law
and  economics.  As  we  noted  at  the  outset  of  this  Article,  the
dominance  of law  and  economics  is  puzzling  when  one  attempts  to
make  sense  of  it  without  considering  situational  forces.  Law  and
economics has  been  subject  to many  (largely unanswered)  criticisms
by extraordinarily  respected  legal academics,  and its success  seems  to
have  surprised  both  its  critics  and  some  of its  proponents.
5 25  If  the
success  of  law  and  economics  does  not  square  easily  with  the
idealized image of a neutral tournament of ideas,  then that raises the
possibility  that  its  success  reflects  some  largely  unseen  situational
influences.
To advance  this argument further, we ask the reader  to consider
how to answer the following question:  which  bird, species A  or
species  B,  has been  more  successful  in  the evolutionary  process
of natural  selection?  If  you  are  like  us,  we  suspect  that  your
first  thought would  be  to compare  the  relative  numbers  of the
two  birds.  With  a little  more  time,  you  might  decide  that you
would also like  to know about relative  sizes since  at equilibrium
the environment  could probably  sustain  fewer  large  birds  than
small  birds.  Controlling  for  habitat  needs  you  would  seem  to
have  a simple, but fairly accurate,  measurement process.
Now let us make  the question a little more  concrete:  which bird,
the  bald  eagle  or  the  chicken,  has  been  more  successful  in  the
evolutionary  process  of natural  selection?  Shall  we  do  the  math?
There  are  approximately  70,000  bald  eagles  in  North  America,  a
statement detailing the  $10  million grant to Harvard  Law School,  the Center for
Law,  Economics  and  Business  announced  that an  "external  advisory  committee"
was  being  set  up  "to  assist  the  faculty  in  guiding  its  programs"  in  the  future.
Harvard  Law  School  Press  Release,  supra note  507.  While  the  structure  of  the
committee  has  not  yet  been  discussed,  it  seems  likely  that  one  purpose  of  the
committee  will be to serve as a substitute for stage-financing.
524 See  supra note  510  and  text  accompanying  note  518  (providing  more  direct
evidence that the Foundation's leaders believe  that their efforts have been successful).
525 See supra text accompanying notes 35-64.
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number  that  is  up  considerably  in  recent  years  following  the  bald
5126 eagle's near extinction  . It is  a little  harder to know just how many
chickens there are in this country at any given moment, but our rough .1.  527
calculations put the number somewhere between  1.75 and 2  billion.
That  means  that  for  every  bald  eagle  there  are  twenty  to  thirty
thousand chickens.
Even  discounting  the  figure  slightly  to  take  into  account  the
eagle's larger  size  and  habitat  requirements,  the  numbers  are  clear:
the  standard farm  chicken  is  the  bald  eagle's evolutionary  superior.
But that finding  seems  absurd.  We  know  the  bald  eagle  as  our
national  bird,  a  symbol  of  strength  and  power.  Eagles  are
extremely  well  adapted  for  survival  in  nature,  given  their  superb
flying,  hunting,  and  nest-building  abilities  .
2 8   For  centuries,  bald
eagles  thrived,  and  according  to  one  history,  they  may  have  once
numbered half a million .
They  existed  along  the  Atlantic  from  Labrador  to  the  tip  of  south
Florida,  and  along  the  Pacific  from  Baja  California  to  Alaska.  They
inhabited  every  large  river  and  concentration  of  lakes  within  North
America.  They nested  in  forty-five  of the  lower forty-eight  states.  One
researcher  estimated  an  eagle  nest  for  every  mile  of  shore  along
526  Hope  Rutledge,  American  Bald  Eagle  Information,  at  http://www.Baldeagle
info.com  (last updated Aug. 26, 2003).
527  There are  two general  categories of chickens:  "broilers," which  are raised  and
slaughtered  for  meat,  and  "layers,"  whose  primary  purpose  is  to  produce  eggs.
Livestock,  Env't  &  Dev't  Initiative,  Poultry  Production  (Broilers  and  Layers),  at
http://lead.virtualcenter.org/en/dec/toolbox/Indust/IndPProd.htm  (last visited  Oct.
26, 2003).  Approximately  8.5  billion broilers were slaughtered  in the United States in
2001.  NAT'L  AGRIc.  STATISTICS  SERV.,  U.S.  DEP'T  OF  AGRIC.,  POULTRY  SLAUGHTER:
2001  ANNUAL  SUMMARY  2  (2002),  available  at  http://jan.mannlib.cornell.edu/
reports/nassr/poultry/ppy-bban/pslaan02.pdf.  Assuming  that  broilers  have  an
industry life expectancy of approximately  two months, the number of broilers existing
at  any  one  moment  is  something  close  to  1.5  billion.  See  Save  Animals  From
Experiments  (SAFE),  Profiling New  Zealand's Shameful  'Clean,  Green  Living,  at
http://www.safe.org.nz/campaigns/factory/animalprofiles.php  (last  visited  Oct.  25,
2003).  Their  actual  life expectancy-if  they  were  not slaughtered-would  be  fifteen
to twenty years.  Id.  There are approximately  337 million layers  alive at any one time.
NAT'L  AGRIC.  STATISTICS  SERV.,  U.S.  DEP'T  OF  AGRIC.,  CHICKENS  AND  EGGS:  2002
SUMMARY  1 (2003)  available at http://jan.mannlib.coriell.edu/reports/nassr/poultry/
pec-bbl/lyegan03.pdf  [hereinafter  NAT'L  AGRIC.  STATISTICS  SERV.,  CHICKENS  AND
EGGS].  Adding broilers and  layers together, the  number of chickens  alive at any one
moment in this country appears to be somewhere between  1.75 and 2 billion.
528  NELTJE BLANCHAN,  BIRDS THAT HUNT AND ARE HUNTED  326-28 (1905).
529 Hope  Rutledge,  History of  the  Bald Eagle, at http://www.baldeagleinfo.com/
eagle/eagle1 .html  (last visited Oct. 25,  2003).
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Chesapeake  Bay.  They  congregated  on  the  lower  Hudson,  and  were
extremely abundant  along the  coast of Maine.530
So then we  have missed something.  In determining that chickens
are  more  fit  than  eagles  to withstand  nature's  trials  and  challenges,
we  have  ignored  critical  situational  influences.  Why  are  there  so
many  more  chickens  than  eagles?  The  more  obvious  and  correct
explanation  is  that  humans  value  chickens  in  a  way  that  they  have
not valued bald eagles.
Indeed,  there  are  robust  markets  in  both  chickens  and  eggs.5
3'
According  to  a  recent  industry-sponsored  survey,  Americans  con-
sume,  on  average,  eighty-one  pounds  of chicken  per year-a  figure
that appears  to  be  going  up  and  that  represents  "the  highest  per-
capita consumption  of any of the major  meats. ' ' 532 They also consume
approximately 260 eggs  per year.  Unsurprisingly,  market pressures
ensure  that there are many chickens  alive at any given  moment.
Well,  if bald  eagles  are so  fit, why did they nearly go  extinct and
why are  there still  so few of them?  The following  history of the bald
eagle helps  to shed light on  a  different  sort  of situational  influence
on  the  bald  eagles'  stature  than  is  imagined  in  any  idealized,
unrealistic  "natural selection"  script.
There  is  no  single  cause  for  the  decline  in  the  bald  eagle
population.  When  Europeans  first  arrived  on  this  continent,  bald
eagles  were  fairly  common.  As  the human  population  grew,  the  eagle
population  declined.  The  food  supplies  for  eagles  decreased,  because
the  people  hunted  and  fished  over  a  broad  area.  Essentially,  eagles
and  humans  competed for  the  same  food,  and  humans,  with  weapons
530 Id.
531 We have been unable to ascertain  which  came first.
532  Press  Release,  Nat'l  Chicken  Council  & U.S.  Poultry  & Egg  Ass'n,  Boom  in
Chicken  Consumption  Has  Room  to  Grow  (May  1,  2000),  available at http://www.
eatchicken.com/statistics/pr_050100.cfm.  According  to John  Bekkers,  chairman  of
the  National  Chicken  Council,  one  important  reason  for  the  growing  "success"  of
chicken  is  its convenience.  Id.  "'The  simple fact  is that chicken  fits, better  than any
other  meat,  the  hectic,  harried,  time-crunched  lifestyle  that  so  many  people  lead
toda."  Id. (quoting Bekkers).
American Egg Board, Egg Consumption Through the Year, at http://www.aeb.org/
eggstravaganza/egg-consumption.htm  (last visited Aug.  25,  2003);  see also INT'L  EGG
COMM'N,  INTERNATIONAL  EGG  MARKET:  REPORT  No.  67  (2002)  (finding  per
capita  egg  consumption  in  the  United  States  was  251.8  in  2000  and  252.6  in
2001),  available  at  http://www.internationalegg.com/html/reports/report67/
Iusa.pdf.  There is a striking similarity between  the 252 eggs consumed per person
and  the  256  eggs  produced  by  the  average  laying  chicken.  See  NAT'L  AGRIC.
STATISTICS  SERV.,  CHICKEN  AND  EGGS,  supra note  527,  at  1  (providing  estimate  for
average  laying chicken).
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at  their  disposal,  had  the  advantage.  As  the  human  population
expanded  westward,  the  natural  habitat  of  the  eagles  was  destroyed,
leaving  them  fewer  places  to  nest  and  hunt,  which  caused  the
population  of bald eagles to decline sharply by the late  1800s.
By  the  1930s,  people  became  aware  of the  diminishing  bald  eagle
population,  and in  1940  the  Bald  Eagle  Act was  passed.  This  reduced
the  harassment  by  humans,  and  eagle  populations  began  to  recover.
However,  at  the  same  time  DDT  and  other  pesticides  began  to  be
widely used.  Pesticides  sprayed  on  plants were  eaten  by small  animals,
which  were later  consumed  by birds of prey.  The  DDT poison  harmed
both  the adult birds and the  eggs that they laid....
More  than  100,000  bald  eagles were  killed  in  Alaska  from  1917  to
1953.  Alaskan  salmon  fisherm[e]n  feared  they  were  a  threat  to  the
534 salmon  population.
According  to  that  history,  the  threat  to  eagles  was  not  that  they
were  ill-equipped  to  survive  in  nature,  but  that  their  success  as  a
species  did not appear to  serve  the interests  of humans.  Indeed,  the
eagles  competed  with  human  interests,  including  commercial
interests.
As  a  result,  the  grand,  and  once  ubiquitous,  bald  eagle  was
pushed  toward  extinction.  Meanwhile,  chickens were raised in  huge
numbers  to  meet  the  increasing  demand  for  their  eggs  and  meat.
The  relative  success  of chickens  over  bald  eagles,  then,  has  little  to
do with  the  survival  of the  fittest and a lot to do with "the  survival of
the tastiest" or "the survival  of the profittest."
In light of that competition  among birds, look  again  at how  legal
scholars  tend  to  measure  the  success  of various  schools  of thought.
As  we  reviewed  earlier,  legal  academics  generally  assume  that  they
are  competing in some neutral tournament wherein  ideas evolve  and
good  ideas  become  more  prominent  while  bad  ideas  disappear.
According  to this view,  the  tournament benefits  the outside world by
generating and announcing  the winning ideas, which are then relied
upon to help  make  effective  and  desirable  policy.  Thus, when  some
ideas  are  more  commonly  accepted,  are  attracting  larger  audiences
and  are  having  more  influence  outside  of  law  schools,  the
assumption  is  often  that those  ideas,  like  the  bald eagle,  soar  above
their ground-bound,  clucking  competitors.
But here is  the problem:  the  competition  among ideas may  have
much in  common  with  the  imagined  competition  between  chickens
534  Rutledge, supra note 530.
535 See supra text  accompanying notes  12-18  (discussing  the  presumption  that law
and economics emerges from a level playing field  in a tournament of ideas).
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and  eagles.  That  is,  in  both  contexts  there  appear  to  be  very
significant  demand-side  factors  that help determine  which  ideas  will
be  most  prevalent  and  seemingly  most  successful.  For reasons  that
we  have  already  highlighted,  the  "winners"  will  be  those  ideas  that
are valuable  to the  more  influential  participants on  the  demand-side
of the marketplace-specifically, pro-commercial  interests.
With  that in mind, consider again  how legal economists  measure
their own  success.  Richard  Posner writes:
Economic  analysis  of law  has  grown  rapidly,  has  become  the  largest,
most  pervasive  interdisciplinary  field  of legal  studies  in  the  history  of
American  law,  has  palpably influenced  the  practice  of law  and judicial
decisions,  has  launched  lucrative  consulting  spin-offs,  has  spawned
courses  and  textbooks  in  economic  analysis  of  law,  has  influenced
legislation  (economic  analysts  of  law  played  an  important  role  in  the
deregulation  movement),  has  made  it  de rigueur for  law  schools  of the
first and second  ranks  to have  one or more economists on  their faculty,
has  seeded  a  number  of its  practitioners  in  university  administration
and  the federal judiciary, and  has  now crossed  the Atlantic  and  begun
5i36 making rapid gains in Europe.
Similarly,  recall  legal  economist  Thomas  Ulen's  brief history  of
the triumph of law and economics:
Law and economics  has been  one of the most successful  innovations
in  the  legal  academy  in  the  last  century.  This  intellectual  revolution
began  modestly in  the  1960s  and  1970s  with  a  few  important  and
innovative  articles and a comprehensive,  masterful text that showed  the
possibilities  of the  field.  Then,  in  the  1980s  the  field  exploded  into
respectability  and  prominence-becoming  a  regular  course  in  the
curricula  of  the  best  law  schools,  a  vibrant  legal  research  style  that
figured  in  a  torrent  of  important  books  and  articles,  a  force  that
transformed  many  faculty  from  exclusive  practitioners  of  traditional
doctrinal  research  to  a  more  social-science-oriented  research,  and  a
substantial  justification  for  important  public  policy  changes.  By  the
early  1990s, economic  analysis  suffused  a  modern  legal  education,  even
one devoid of an explicit course  in law and  economcs.537
Posner  and  Ulen  make  no  mention,  and  seem  to  have  no
conception,  of  the  role  played  by  outside  forces  in  creating  the
appearance  of  successful  ideas.  Posner  emphasizes  the  "rapid
536 Posner,  supra note  11,  at 275;  see also POSNER,  FRONTIERS,  supra note  13, at 35
("It  is not merely an ivory-towered  enterprise,  especially  in  the  United  States, where
the  law  and  economics  movement  has  influenced  legal  reform  in  such  fields  as
antitrust law,  the regulation  of public  utilities and  common  carriers,  environmental
regulation,  [and]  the calculation  of damages  in personal  injury suits .. ").
537  Ulen, supra note 69,  at 434.
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growth" of the discipline just  as  Ulen notes  the field's  "explosion" in
the  1980s.  But neither  seems  mindful  of possible  situational  contri-
butions  to that explosive  growth,  much  less  the  fact that  it occurred
in the  1980s when  the Olin Foundation  began  to invest significantly
in sponsoring various  law and economics  programs.5  Posner speaks
of the "spawning  courses  and  casebooks,"  while  Ulen  comments  on
the "torrent of important books and  articles."  But neither  mentions
that  the  Olin  Foundation's  targeted  efforts  encouraged  such  a
spawning  and a torrent through  "grants, grants,  and more  grants.
'
,
539
Posner recognizes  the "lucrative"  consulting opportunities created  by
law  and  economics,  without  considering  what  makes  the  ideas  so
lucrative  in  the  first place  or what those  lucrative  opportunities  may
indicate  about  why  the  school  of  thought  is  thriving.  Ulen
emphasizes  that  law  and  economics  provides  a  "substantial
justification  for  important  public  policy  changes,"5 40  and  Posner
highlights,  more  specifically,  the  fact  that "economic  analysts  of law
played  an  important  role  in  the  deregulation  movement.''54 1   But
neither  seems  to  notice  just  how  valuable  that  justification  for
deregulation  is  to large  commercial  interests  or how  it lines  up with
the  specific  pro-market  and  deregulatory  planks  of  the  Olin
Foundation's mission.  Ulen notes that "economic  analysis suffuse[s]
a  modem  legal  education," 542  while  Posner  maintains  that  it  "has
palpably  influenced  the  practice  of  law  and judicial  decisions...
[and]  legislation.543   But  neither  considers  that  such  profound  ef-
fects  might  well  have  been  the  precise  ambition  of  powerful
individuals,  entities,  and  groups  in  our  society  with  the  means  to
influence  those important institutions through the situation.
In  short, as we  stated  at the  outset of this Article,  there  appears
to  be  a  blindness  to  situational  influences  over  legal  scholarship.
And  Posner  and Ulen  are  by  no means  unusual in  falling  subject to
this fundamental attribution error.  Even the  staunchest  critics of law
and  economics  rarely, if ever, consider,  much  less  challenge,  its situ-
ational advantages.
538  See, e.g.,  SOLEY, supra note 505, at 137-40  (discussing various grants made by the
Olin Foundation to programs of law and economics in the late  1980s).
539 See  supra text accompanying  notes  521-22;  SIMON,  A TIME  FOR  TRUTH,  supra
note 520, at 247.
540  Ulen, supra note 69, at 434.
541  Posner, supra note  11,  at 2
75.
542  Ulen, supra note 69, at 434.
5  Posner, supra note 11,  at 275.
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As  we  have  been  arguing,  however,  the  situation  is  often  as
significant  as  it  is  invisible.  Where  Posner,  Ulen,  and  most  legal
scholars  tend  to  see  a  marketplace  of  ideas  in  which  supply-side
participants  determine  the winners,  we  see a marketplace  of ideas  in
which  demand-side  actors  are  wielding  an  immense,  unseen
influence  over  the  playing  field  and,  in  turn,  the  winners.  Where
Posner, Ulen,  and  most  other legal  scholars  see  a neutral,  fair  (and
perhaps even natural)  competitive process separating  the fit from  the
unfit,  we  see  large  numbers  of  chickens,  ensconced  in  elaborate
institutions  devoted  to promoting  the birds'  growth  and productivity
for a particular end-an end that has little to do with a robust and fair
tournament of ideas.
We opened  this Article  asking  why legal  economists  have tended
not  to  apply  their  own  sort  of  market  analysis  to  help  them
understand  their success.  We posited several  explanations, which  we
have  expanded  on  slightly in  this  Section.  Before  moving  on,  we
want  to  emphasize  that we  perceive  ourselves  to  be  providing  what
legal  economists  have  not:  a  type  of  economic  analysis  of  the
economic  analysis  of law.  The  claim  that legal  academia  is  deeply
captured  strikes  us  as  consonant,  not  only  with  Stigler's  shallow
capture  theory,  but  also  with  the  sort  of  "consumer  sovereignty"
arguments that inform  the vast majority  of legal-economic  analyses.
We end  this Part with  several  assertions.  First, the  deep  capture
of legal  academia  is  the result of far more situational influences  than
just those created  by the  Olin Foundation's  funding efforts.  Second,
the  consequences  of the  deep  capture  of legal  academia  are  many,
varied,  and  immense.  And,  third,  the  deep  capture  of  legal
academia  is,  we  believe,  only  a  small,  though  important,  part  of  a
much  more  comprehensive  web  of  situational  influence  over
"regulatory" institutions in  this country and, increasingly, around  the
world.  Evidence  for those  assertions  is,  again,  the  subject of future
work.
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VII.  A THEORY OF ATIRIBUTIONAL PRESUMPTIONS
I started with the belief that every person who came to  the  laboratory was free to
accept or to  reject the dictates of authority.  This view sustains a conception of
human dignity insofar as it sees  in each man a  capacity for choosing his own
behavior. And  as it turned out,  many subjects did, indeed, choose to  reject the
experimenter's commands, providing a powerful affirmation of human ideals.
-Stanley  Milgram544
We have argued  that law and  economics  is highly  dispositionist
45
and that its success in legal academia and in policymaking has been a
function  of the  situational  demand  for such  a  dispositionist  theory.
In  that  way,  the  exterior  situation  of  the  market  for  legal-policy
theory  has  strongly  promoted  law  and  economics  because  of  its
generally pro-commercial  dispositionist assumptions and analyses.
As we noted at the  outset, however,  the  misbegotten attributional
tendencies  that we  are  highlighting  in  this  Article  are  by  no  means
limited  to  legal  economists.  The  dispositionism  of human  beings  is
fairly  universal-though  the  particular  contours  of its  manifestation
vary  across  cultures,  groups,  individuals,  and situations.  The funda-
mental  attribution error is just that-a strong tendency  in all humans
to  see  only  the  most  salient,  moving  features  of our  exteriors  and
interiors,  like  the sun  moving across  the  sky, or our own  behavior  in
a moment, and  to  attribute  cause and  agency  to what we  see.  This
urge  to  downplay  the  rest  is  an  animalian tendency.  Thus,  dis-
positionalizing  legal  economists  as  dispositionists,  while  maintaining
the view that the rest of us are not, would only repeat that error.  We
are  all,  because  of  our  shared  interior situation,  more  or  less
dispositionists.
It  is  important  that  we  are  not  misunderstood.  The  phrase
"more or less" in the  last sentence  is key.  Our thesis is not that all of
us  (or  that  any  of  us)  are  wholly  dispositionist,  unable  in  any
circumstance  to  recognize  the  possible  role  of the  situation behind
people's behavior.
546  Neither do we assert that all  of us  (or any of us)
544  Stanley Milgram,  Issues in the Study  of Obedience:  A  Reply  to Baumrind, 19  AM.
PSYCHOL. 848, 851  (1964).
545  See  supra  Part  I.B  (introducing  the  idea  that  legal  economists  have
overestimated  the role of dispositional influences on their success).
546 As  emphasized  above,  cultural  causal  schemes,  motives  and  other  variables
influence  the degree  to which groups and individuals tend to appreciate  the situation.
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are  wholly  situational,  unable  to  act  according  to  our  own
preferences  or attitudes  and  entirely  driven  by  unseen  forces.  We
believe  that  we  are  all  both  dispositionists  and  situationists  in
construing our  world  and  that  we  are  all,  in fact,  both dispositional
and situational.
Recognizing  the significance  of the situation  does not  imply that
disposition  is  irrelevant.  Disposition  often  plays  some  role,  and
sometimes  a  quite  important  role,  in  people's  behavior.  Indeed,
even  in  Milgram's  famous  demonstration  of  the  power  of  the
situation,  a  sizeable  minority  (and,  in  some  renditions,  a  clear
majority)  of subjects  refused  to  obey  the experimenter's  instructions
to  continue  the  shocking.547  Moreover,  if situational  considerations
are  substantial,  stable,  and  consistent  enough,  the  dispositional
assumption  may become  a more reliable  heuristic for understanding
our world.4s
If dispositions can  in fact play a major situation-independent  role
in a  person's behavior,  or if the  "as  if'  dispositional  assumption  can
sometimes  be  justified,  then  the  question  emerges:  is  the
fundamental  attribution error  really  so important  in  legal  questions,
in  theory,  in  practice,  and  in  social  debate?  Should  policymakers
and policy  theorists really concern  themselves with it?
We  have  already  begun  our  answer  to  that  question  in  this
introductory Article and will continue  to do so in subsequent articles.
Our answer has numerous  components,  including what follows  here.
The  tendency  to  see  disposition  and  overestimate  its  significance,
while  missing  the  situation  or  underappreciating  its  effect,  is  quite
robust.  When  the  situation  is  observed,  it  is  usually  only  a  small,
particularly salient piece of the whole.  Furthermore,  the way  an issue
is  framed-as  dispositional  or  situational-can  have  an  immense
effect  on  what  attributions  people  make  about  behavior.  Here  is
See supra text accompanying  notes  415-23  (noting corporate  motivation  and  cultural
variations in dispositionism).
547  See  MILGRAM,  OBEDIENCE  TO AUTHORrIY,  supra note 86, at 35 tbl.2  (identifying
the various percentages  of subjects who refused to obey).
548  And so it is  that we treat corporations  as having a set of stable  preferences that
they pursue  systematically  over  time.  There  is  a  strong and  stable  set of situational
forces,  including  corporate  law,  regulatory  law,  the  single maximand  of profit, and
the  markets  for  products,  managers,  and  capital.  These  fairly consistent  situational
influences  may  allow  for  a  relatively  precise  dispositionist  perspective  on  corporate
behavior.  See  supra notes 253-54  and accompanying  text  (discussing how situational
forces make corporations  behave as if their primary goal is profit maximization).  Still,
we would caution that a more  realistic analysis of corporate  conduct is in order, a task
that is beyond the scope of this Article.
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where  deep capture  comes  in:  the  framing  of an  issue  is  one  of the
situational  factors  that can  be disproportionately  influenced  by  those
with  the  motive and  power to  do so.  We  have  argued  that  those  in
power  have  significant  stakes  in  promoting,  among  other  things,  a
generally  dispositionist  framing  of  an  issue.  Those  stakes  have,
indeed,  led  to  investments  attempting  to  influence  the  situation,
including  the  production  and  distribution  of  legal-theoretic
knowledge  that  is  strongly  dispositionist  in  orientation.  Taken  to-
gether,  those  elements  suggest  that  the  fundamental  attribution
error  is playing  an immense  and influential role in our policyrnakers'
worldviews and in  their policies.
Our thesis  can  thus be understood  as  a positive  theory  intended
to  explain  our  presumptions  about  where  the  threshold  between
disposition  and situation  lies and  how  high it stands.  When  do we
recognize  the  role  of situation?  And  what  portion  of the  situation
will we  tend to acknowledge?  Thus far,  our primary  focus has  been
on  describing,  understanding,  and  critiquing  the  attributional
presumptions  of law  and  economics.  Our argument  has been  that
law  and  economics  scholars  recognize  only  a  tiny  portion-that  is,
just  a  few  of the  most  salient features-of  the  situation.  We  have
focused  primarily  on that theory, in part, because of its preeminence
and,  in  part,  because  we  believe  that  its  success  both  reflects  and
critically reinforces deep capture.  But our thesis has implications  for
legal  theory  and  for  laws  and  policies  that  seem  well  outside  the
purview of law and economics.  In fact, the ubiquity of dispositionism
in  our  legal  theories  and  laws  likely  facilitates  the  reception  of  law
and economics's more formal, axiomatic rendition.
A.  Legal-Theoretic Presumptions
In  this  Section,  we  want  to  suggest  how  the  fundamental
attribution error leads  to dispositionist  presumptions, not just in  law
and economics,  but also  in  other mainstream  legal  theories,  and  in
social  policies  that  reflect  such  theories.  Though  we  believe  this
problem  can  be seen  in many, if not all, areas  of contemporary  legal
scholarship,  it suffices for our introductory  purposes  to illustrate  the
point  with  reference  to  a  familiar  and  important  common  law
subject:  contract  law.
549   Consider  the  power  of  dispositionism
549  In an  excellent article that we discovered  only as this one  was  in  its very final
stage,  Lee  Ross  (the  same  Lee  Ross  whose  work  we  have  relied on  throughout)  and
Donna  Shestowsky  have  recently  considered  the  implications  of  situationism  for
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lurking  even  in  traditional,  that  is  to  say  non-economic,  scholarship
in contract law.
1.  The  Classical Theory of Contract
In  his  influential  work,  Contract as Promise,  Professor  Charles
Fried  builds  his  case  for  a  classical  will  theory  of  contract  on  a ....  551
foundation  of  positive  presumptions  steeped  in  dispositionism .
For  theorists  like  Fried,  a  contract  represents  the  legal
manifestation  of "autonomous self-determination.'  Contracting  is,
from  that  perspective,  a  quintessential  expression  of  individual
freedom.  So  central  is  the  concept of autonomy in  the  classical  will
theory  of contract  that, for Fried,  it  provides  the very basis  of moral
authority  for  the  principle  of contractual  obligation.  "The  moral
force behind contract as promise is autonomy:  the parties are  bound
to their contract because they have chosen  to be.'
53
Fried  appreciates  that, to  sustain  this view  of contracts,  we  must
be  confident  that  the  choices  embodied  in  contracts  do,  in  fact,
represent  the  expression  of  the  individual  wills  of  the  parties
involved.  How  can  the  traditional  contract  theorist  be  certain  that
disposition  is behind  contractual  decision  making and not situation?
Enter  the  doctrine  of duress."4   In  his  attempt  to  explain  modem
contract  doctrines  through  his  will  theory,  Fried  insightfully
acknowledges  that,  far  from  playing  an  outcast  or  ancillary  role  in
conventional  contract  theory,  the  doctrine  of  duress  and  its
criminal  law.  See Lee  Ross  & Donna Shestowsky,  Contemporay Psychology's Challenges to
Legal Theory  and Practice,  97  Nw.  U.  L.  REv.  1081,  1100-14  (2003).  Their  focus  on
criminal  law provides a useful complement to our analysis of contract law and confirms
our belief that dispositionism infects most, perhaps all, areas of law.  Their article also
usefully considers some of the possible  policy implications  of situationism for criminal
law.  Id.
550  CHARLES  FRIED,  CONTRACT  AS  PROMISE:  A  THEORY  OF  CONTRACTUAL  OBLI-
GATION  (1981).
551 See  id.  at  2  ("The  regime  of  contract  law,  which  respects  the  dispositions
individuals  make  of their  rights,  carries  to its  natural  conclusion  the liberal  premise
that individuals  have  rights.  And  the  will  theory of contract, which  sees  contractual
obligations  as  essentially  self-imposed,  is  a fair  implication  of liberal  individualism."
(footnotes omitted)).
552  Id. at 94.
553 Id.  at 57.
554 Fried  also  addresses  related  areas  of  contract  law  such  as  mistake  and
unconscionability.  Many of his  arguments  are  overlapping  and  we  believe  that our
observations here  readily apply to these related areas as well.  See id. at 58-63,  103-09.
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counterparts  are  central.5'  According  to  Fried,  "these  doctrines
perform  distinct  functions  that  are  not  only  compatible  with  the
concept of contract as  promise but even  essential  to  it. '  Put in our
terms,  Fried's treatment  of the  doctrine  of duress  plays  an  essential
part in defining the depth of his theory's dispositionism.
It  runs deep.  As  he  begins  his discussion  of duress,  Fried  never
questions  the  basic  dispositionist  conception  of  the  contracting
agent.  Duress is  only identified  as something that thwarts  or exploits
a will  that remains exogenous  to the duress:
Certain  contracts  are  claimed  to  be  unfair  although  the  parties
entered into them with  their eyes open.
...  The  victim  of duress  is  all  too  aware  of what  is  happening  and
what will  happen  to  him.  Duress  relates  not to rationality  or cognition
but to freedom  or volition  ....  [Contract  as promise]  excludes  cases  in
which  a  person's  assent  is  not  voluntary.  If  I  am  hypnotized  into
signing  a contract  or if my hand  is  moved  by another  to  make  a mark
signifying assent,  I have  not promised.'
With  such  a  starting  point,  only  the  most  salient  kinds  of
situations,  and  not necessarily  the most  powerful,  will  find  their way
into  the  doctrine  of  duress.  Fried  acknowledges  that  the  forced
signature  and  the  hypnotized  nod  are  just  "gross  instances  of
involuntary  apparent  assent"  and  claims  that  there  are,  in  fact,
"many  kinds  of situations  in which  it does  not seem  right  to  treat  a
knowing act of agreement as binding because  in one  way or another  it
is felt that there was no fair choice."55 "8  But  this concession  is not an
"open-ended  invitation[]  to  rearrange  the  understandings  people
have  reached.,5
59  Indeed, Fried  goes on  to map a precise  and rather
closed-ended  set of situations  that may, consistent with  the will theory
of contract, be treated as constituting duress. 560
Keeping close to the case law  (as  he must  to sustain his project  of
both  explaining  and  justifying  modern  contract  law),  Fried
recognizes  only  the  most salient kinds  of situational  impediments  as
creating  duress.  The clearest case  for Fried, beyond the two above,  is
555  Id. at 93.
556  Id.
557 Id. at 92-93 (footnote omitted).
58  Id. at 93-94.
559  Id. at 93.
5W  See,  e.g.,  id. at  95-96  (offering  examples  of duress  and  noting  that  duress  is
characterized  by a high degree of coercion).
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that  now  familiar  trope-the  gun  to  the  head:  "An  armed  robber
threatens  his victim  on  a  dark  and  lonely  street:  'Your  money  or
your life."5'"1
Fried  explains  that what  is  troubling  about  this  case  is not  that
there is no choice, for clearly there is:  "[t]he  shrewd  and brave  man
who  hands  his  wallet  over  to  an  armed  robber  makes  a  calculated ,,  •5656
decision. "'  Rather,  what  is  at  issue  is  the  fairness  of the  choice.63
To fashion  a principle  through which  to apply the doctrine  of duress
in more difficult cases  and  across the sweep  of contract  law requires,
Fried  concludes,  a  normative  determination  about  what  is  a  fair
choice.'54  For Fried, then,  the doctrine of duress may be managed  by
his theory  of rights:  "[a]  proposal  is not coercive  if it offers what the
proponent has a right to offer or not as he chooses.
"
,
65
This  rights  analysis  generates  for Fried  a  relatively  clear  view  of
the parameters  of duress.  Because  the robber has no right to  threat-
en your life  to get your money, contracts made in such  situations are
not  enforced.  But,  at  the  other  end  of  this  spectrum,  merchants
have  a  right  to  offer  their  wares  on  extremely  onerous  terms,  so
contracts  entered  with  them  should  be  enforced.  Our  present
concern  is  not  so  much  with  showing  why  we  disagree  with  this
particular  doctrinal  conclusion,  but  in  demonstrating  the  narrow
dispositionist  direction  that the  analysis  has  taken.  Fried  began with
a  case  in  which  the  threatening  situation  was  not  only  extremely
conspicuous,  but  where  the  element  of choice  was  also  clear.  In
looking  beyond  that  extreme  case  for  a  general  theory  of  duress,
Fried  presumes  that  the  same  basic  function  of dispositional  choice
remains  in  place.
66   This  dispositionism  blinds  the  theory  to  the
enormous  power  of  the  situation.  It  ignores  the  fact  that
situation shapes the very  thoughts and behavior that manifest  as the
561  ld. at 95.
562  Id. at 94.
563 See id. at 5  ("For  promissory obligations  to  be  truly self-imposed,  the promise
must  have  been  freely  given.  If this  means  no  more  than  that the  promisor  acted
intentionally,  then  even  an  undertaking  in  response  to  a  gunman's  threat  is
binding.").
564 See id. at 97  ("These  conundrums  should be sufficient  to show that we  cannot
escape  using some normative  criterion  to distinguish offers from threats.").
Id.
566  In  a  footnote, Fried  dismisses  one  source  of opposition  to  the  dispositional
presumption.  "Sometimes it  is said  that poor people do  not understand  contractual
provisions  or  are  unable  to  calculate  risks  rationally.  Such  arguments  are  often
patronizing  as  well  as  paternalistic.  Where  they are  valid,  the  doctrine  of mistake
offers  some relief."  Id. at 105 n.*.
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choices  Fried  crowns  with  a dispositionist  presumption.  For  us,  an
inquiry, which is  clearly called for but wholly unanswered  by this  kind
of  classical  will  theory,  is  whether  and  in  what  way  the  situation
influences  choice.
Fried  concludes  his  analysis  without  ever  moving  beyond  the
"conundrums"  raised  by  the  most  salient  kinds  of situational  forces
-that  is,  beyond  those  "bad  acts"56 7  that  can  fit  within  the  basic
dispositionist  framework.  In  an  interesting  parallel  with  economic
theorists,  the  closest Fried  gets  to  taking  up  the  situation  on  a
broader  scale is  with  respect to  poverty-when people do not have
enough  money  to  properly  manifest  an  otherwise  dispositionally
determined will.
56s  However, Fried,  like  the contract law he describes,
is  very hesitant  to allow  the  doctrine  of duress  to  play much  part in
ameliorating  the  challenges  posed  by  that  kind  of  situationist
consideration.  Keeping  the  doctrine  of  duress  from  undermining
"the moral status of calculated  choices as  embodied in bargains"  is "a
make-or-break  challenge  to  the  liberal  economic  theory  of  the
market.,56
1  It  is  a  threat  to  the  regime  of  "free  men  freely
contracting.
5 1
0
To  the  extent  that  poverty  remains  a  situation  in  need  of
attention,  Fried  offers  what  is  also  a  familiar  riposte,  that  the
situation  should  be  handled  by  the  tax-and-transfer  system,  not
contract.  Hence,  in  the  end,  the  dispositionism  that  Fried  begins
with,  and  which  he  is  so  deeply  committed  to,  not  only  drastically
limits  what  kinds  of situations  are  cognizable  within  the  concept  of
567  Interestingly,  Fried  titles  this  section  of his  treatment  Bad Samaritans.  Id. at
109.  See also supra text accompanying  notes  163-81  (reviewing  a social  psychological
study  replicating  the  biblical  parable  of  the  Good  Samaritan  and  suggesting  that
whether or not a person  will act "as if'  they are  a Good Samaritan  may have  less to do
with  the  person's  disposition  than  with  the  situation  in  which  the  person  finds
herself).
568 See supra text accompanying  notes  116-29  (summarizing economists' analysis  of
the theoretical problem posed by poverty).
,69 FRIED,  supra note  550,  at  94.  For  Fried,  the  slippery  slope  of the  poverty
situation  is  perilous.  "If... duress focuses only  on the relative  wealth  or advantages
of the  parties  to  a  transaction  and  disparities  in  these  are  held  to  undermine  the
voluntariness of the  choice,  then  we  might just as  well redistribute  directly,  holding
the rich but not the poor to  their bargains."  Id.
570  Id. Cf  Chen & Hanson, Illusion of Law  I, supra  note  84 (describing the way the
perception  of system threat has strengthened  reliance on  policy schemes);  Hanson  &
Yosifon,  supra note  30  (describing  the  more  general  phenomena  as  discovered  by
social  psychologists);  infra text accompanying notes 639-97  (using Southern  slavery as
an illustration of how system  threats help to promote dispositionism).
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duress,  but  also  what  can  be  done  with  the  doctrine  in  those
situations  that it does recognize.
Fried  does  not go  much  further  than  this  with  the  concept  of
duress,  and  we  need  not  go  further  here  to  make  our  basic  point.
Conventional  contract  theories,  of  which  we  believe  Contract  as
Promise is  an  influential  and  representative  example,  are  steeped  in
dispositionism  even  in those areas that purport to be most concerned
with  the situation.  The lack  of any critical  examination  of the  basic
dispositionist  presumptions  in  such  legal  theories  results  in  a
fundamental  failure  to  account  for  the  role  of  the  situation  in
shaping our conduct.  It marks  an abdication  of any  realistic  inquiry
into  the  basic  forces  shaping  our  own  behavior  beyond  what
571 common  sense  and  our  intuitions  will  provide.  Behind  this  ten-
dency is  the fundamental  attribution  error, which  social psychologists
have shown  is widespread  in humanity,  that we have argued  is  at the
core  of  conventional  economic  theory,  and  that,  as  this  example
suggests, is also robust in more traditional  legal theories.
2.  The Dispositionism of Post-Classical Contract Theory
The  classical  will  theory  of  contract  has  been  subjected  to
withering critique by generations  now of "modem"  or "post-classical"
contract  theorists.7 2  The  critiques,  which will  not be rehashed  here,
571  Like  many  traditional  theorists,  as well  as  legal  economists,  Fried  repeatedly
takes  comfort  in  the  fact  that  his  analysis  comports  with  common  sense.  See,  e.g.,
FRIED,  supra note  550,  at  6  ("In  developing  my  affirmative  thesis  I  ...  propose  to
perennial conundrums solutions  that accord with  the idea of contract  as promise and
with  decency  and  common  sense  as well.");  id. at  105  ("What  needs  probing  is  the
notion of substantive unfairness.  Analysis  reveals  it to be two  parts sentiment and one
part common  sense.").  As  we have been  arguing, common  sense  with  respect to  the
relative roles of disposition and the situation is fundamentally flawed.
572  The basic legal  realist analytic  critique  of the  classical  approach  has been  the
claim that fundamental doctrines  in contract law are far too public, and  the intent of
parties far too  difficult  to discern,  for the  will  theory to explain  contract.  The  basic
political critique  has been that so strongly privileging individual  "will"  in contract  law
unfairly disadvantages those without bargaining  power.  Both of these critiques,  while
not our focus here, are consonant with our views of both classical and modem contract
law.  The  historical  and  intellectual movement  from "classical"  to "modern" contract
theory has been  a subject of sustained  analysis  by contract theorists.  For an overview,
see  P.S.  AT1YAH,  THE  RISE  AND  FALL  OF  FREEDOM  OF  CONTRACT  (1979);  HORWITZ,
supra note  200,  at  33-63;  Jack  Beatson  &  Daniel  Friedman,  Introduction,  From
"Classical"  to Modern Contract  Law, in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAw 3  (Jack
Beatson  & Daniel  Friedmann  eds.,  1995);  see alsoJay  M.  Feinman,  Promissory Estoppel
and Judicial Method,  97  HARv.  L.  REv.  678  (1984)  (examining  the  development  of
promissory  estoppel  as  one  of many  reforms  meant  to  resolve  the  contradiction  in
classic contract theory between freedom and coercion).
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share a common  legacy in the American  legal  realist tradition,  which
provided  both  analytical  and  political  reasons  for  doubting  the
classical  approach.  Our purpose  here  is  to show  that  although  the
"modern" approach  begins  by rejecting  the will  theory of contract, it
continues  to  embrace  an  unwarranted,  and  profoundly  limiting,
dispositionism.  While  the  post-classical  tradition  has  questioned  the
clarity of central concepts in classical theory, the legal realist approach
has  nevertheless  held tightly  to the  basic  tenets of dispositionism  we
have been reviewing  here.  Our  very limited goal in  this Section  is  to
provide  further evidence  that dispositionism  reaches  far beyond  law
and economics  in contemporary legal theory.
We  will  sketch  the  dispositionism  in  modem  contract  theory
through  the  work  of  Karl  Llewellyn,  specifically  in  his  concept  of
"situation  sense.,57 3  We  take  this approach  for several  reasons,  not
only because  an article  that is entitled  The Situation, and  that makes
the claims we are developing here, would  be remiss not to engage  the
legacy  of  situation  sense,  but  also  because  Llewellyn's  work  was
seminal  and  is  prototypical  of  the  basic  legal  realist  approach.
Moreover, Llewellyn's work has been extremely  influential in the post-
classical  contract  theories  and  positive  law  that  have  followed  his
work. 74
573 Of course,  we  will  not offer  a  comprehensive  treatment of Llewellyn's  great
contribution to legal theory.  Wejoin  a long list of commentators who  have noted that
"[a]ny  effort  to  summarize  Llewellyn's  elaborate  theory  and  the  importance  of
'situation  sense'  is  bound  to  fall  short."  David  Shapiro,  Continuity and  Change in
Statutory Interpretation,  67  N.Y.U.  L.  REV.  921,  941  n.103  (1992).  In our view, of all the
recent  efforts  to  summarize  Llewellyn's  work,  Professor  Rakoff's  comes  closest  to
accomplishing the feat.  See Todd  D. Rakoff, The Implied Terms of Contracts:  Of "Default
Rules" and "Situation  Sense," in GOOD FAITH  AND  FAULT  IN CONTRACT  LAW,  supra note
572, at  191,  214  (defining Llewellyn's  conception  of "situation  sense"  as a "process  of
thinking" that considers  "the implications  of various  legal  rules,  matched  up  against
reasonably  intricate  models  of social  situations, and  brought  together in  light of the
force of all the claims to be made").
574  Llewellyn  has  also  had  a  tremendous  influence  on  the  development  of
contemporary  contract  theory  and  law  through  his  contribution  to  the  Uniform
Commercial  Code.  See  Lisa  Bernstein,  The  Questionable Empirical Basis  of Article 2s
Incorporation  Strategy:  A  Preliminary Study, 66  U. CHI.  L.  REV.  710,  712  (1999)  (noting
that Llewellyn was  a "principle drafter" of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code);
Richard Danzig, A  Comment on the  Jurisprudence  of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27  STAN.
L. REV.  621, 624-27 (1975)  (offering examples of Llewellyn's influence on the Uniform
Commercial Code); Feinman, supra note  572, at 698 ("The method of analysis perhaps
most characteristic  of the  modern cases  may  be characterized  in  the language  of its
principle exponent,  Karl Llewellyn,  as  'situation sense."');  Allen  R. Kamp,  Between-the-
Wars Social  Thought:  Karl Llewellyn,  Legal Realism and the Uniform Commercial Code  in
Context, 59 ALB.  L.  REV.  325,  370  (1995)  (considering whether  the Uniform  Commer-
cial Code  reflects Llewellyn's notion  of "reasonableness").
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Llewellyn  opens  Part  I  of the  Common  Law  TraditionF his  most
sustained  exposition of situation sense, with an announcement  that it
is now common knowledge, 76 that psychologists have  undermined the
epistemological  ground  on which  the  classical  tradition  once  firmly
stood:
When  the  psychologists  began  to  look  into  how  people  go  about
reaching decisions, the question  they were  concerned  with  was:  how do
people  get  to  a  decision  at  all,  to  any  decision,  when  faced  with  a
problem-situation  out of life?  Roughly,  they arrived  at the  conclusion
that if it was a true problem-situation, i.e.,  if it was really a puzzler, then it
was  seldom  that  the  actual  deciding  was  done  by  way  of  formal  and
accurate deduction  in the manner of formal logic.  The common process
was  rather  one  either  of sudden  intuition-a  leap  to  some  result  that
eased the tension;  or else  it was  one of successive  mental experiments  as
imagination  developed  and  passed  in  review  various  possibilities  until
one  or  more  turned  up  which  had  appeal.  In  any  ordinary  case  a
reasoned justification for the result represented a subsequent job, testing
the decision  against  experience  and against acceptability,  buttressing  it
and making it persuasive to self and others.
Today all of this  is so familiar and obvious as to bore, but there were
reasons why, four or five decades ago, it shocked our legal world. 77
Llewellyn's  actual  account  of modern  contract  theory,  however,
reveals  that  legal  scholars  have  been  too  quickly  "bore[d]"  by  the
social  scientists'  challenge  to  conventional  views  about  the  human
mind, and so have failed  to truly incorporate  its teachings.  To begin
with, interior and exterior situations  influence far more than just our
ability to reason our way through  "puzzlers."  Logic and deduction as
the primary causal  forces behind our behavior are, we now know, the
exception  to the rule.
More  generally,  in  the  development  of  his  notion  of  situation
sense,  Llewellyn was  unaware of the basic lessons about the  situation's
unseen power,  that  psychology,  especially  social  psychology,  has  now
578 demonstrated.  After  opening  the  Common  Law  Tradition with  a
575 KARL  N.  LLEWELLYN,  THE  COMMON  LAW  TRADITION  (1960).  Although  the
book contains  his  most compendious  discussion  of situation sense,  he developed  the
concept  in  somewhat  piecemeal  fashion  over  the  course  of over  three  decades  of
influential scholarship.
576  The phrase  "announcement  that it  is  now  common  knowledge,"  which  aptly
describes the quote  that follows,  may in a sense sum  up the  task of the legal  analyst in
situation-sense theory.
577 LLEWELLYN,  supra note 575, at 11.
578  See  supra text  accompanying  notes  82-100  (discussing  early  experimental
evidence  of  the  situation's  power  to  influence  behavior);  see  generally  Hanson  &
Yosifon, supra note  30 (providing  more extensive  evidence of that power).  Of course,
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recognition  of  the  warning  signs  about  our  sense  of  ourselves,
Llewellyn  readily  disregards  his  own  cautions  by  the  middle  of his
book, claiming that situation sense can  clarify what psychology has left
obscure:
The  argument  has  been,  however,  that  whereas  about  other  areas  of
reaching  tough  decision  the  psychologists  and  sociologists  and  other
experts are still groping for more than indications..,  yet in our area [of
study]  the  clustered  steadying  factors  combine  with  our  traditions  of
craft...  to  provide  the  wherewithal  to  reasonably  satisfy  even  the
seemingly  unreasonable  demands  made  upon  judges]  by  the  men  of
law and by the citizens who are  the law-consumers.5
9
Llewellyn  sees the legal analysts'  willingness to move  ahead  of the
social  scientists'  struggles  with  mere  "indications"  about  human
decision  making  as  a great advantage  of modern  legal  theory.  This
confidence  is supported  by his basic  dispositionist  presumption  that
human thought processes  are relatively transparent, and that there is
a  fairly  obvious  causal  relationship  between  men  and  women's
preferences  and  their  behaviors  or  choices.  To  be  sure,  not  every
influence is spottable, but, as Llewellyn puts it,
the unspottables  either cancel out or operate rather on  the surface  than
at the root of the deciding, or else hit the crux ...  too rarely  to do more
than slightly decrease the percentage  of available  correct forecasts.  This
includes such very occasionally vital factors as the day's news, insomnia, a
secretary's or clerk's  sickness or blob, the euphoria from a son's engage-
ment to the right girl, and three hundred  assorted other "irrelevant" but
real  stirrers  of the  man.  I discard  them  not  as  negligible,  but  as  not
altering a basic workable  reckonability  from  other and  reachable  factors
alone.
For Llewellyn,  as with Fried, there  is little cause  for concern about
"unspottable" influences on the mind, and consequently little concern
for  ever-present  though  "unspottable"  situational  influences  on
behavior.  In  this way,  Llewellyn's  situation  sense  is  a rejection  of
when  Llewellyn wrote, the power of the situation was  much  less well understood, even
by social psychologists.
579  LLEWELLYN,  supra note 575, at 155.
580  LLEWELLYN,  supra note  575,  at  131.  Llewellyn's  comments  here  parallel  the
reactions of many legal  economists to  the challenges  posed  by social  psychology.  See
Hanson  and  Kysar,  Taking Behavioralism Seriously I, supra note  251;  Hanson  &  Kysar,
Taking Behavioralism Seriously II, supra note 251;  Hanson  & Kysar,  Taking Behavioralism
Seriously II,  supra note 257.
581  Unspottable, that is, within a strong dispositionist mindset.
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classical formalism  to be replaced, not by social  scientific inquiry, but
by "common sense" realism. 82
Llewellyn's  confidence  in  the  reliability  of  common  sense
situation-sensing  is further boosted by his assurance  that beyond those
assorted  pedestrian  distracters  of humankind,  there  is  no  reason  to
suspect  that  more  venal  distractions  might  make  situation-sensing
problematic.  His prose aroused  to full flare, Llewellyn  writes,  "if you
take the  personnel of the  appellate bench as  an entirety, arranged  in
the familiar bell-shaped curve ...  [and]  knock on that bell, there may
be  a  bit  of  dullness  in  the  ring,  but  it  rings  true. '5 3   So  it  is  that
Llewellyn  reassures himself and his readers thatjudges, like the rest of
us, are not "unduly easy to bamboozle." s 4
We  believe  that  Llewellyn's  situation  sense  is  badly  underdevel-
oped.  Our illusion  of dispositionism  and  blindness  to the  power  of
situation  renders  us  all,  Llewellyn  included,  more  or  less
bamboozled5""  Llewellyn  reveals  his  own  when  he  writes  that  "the
situation,  however  eloquent,  [can]  operate  only  insofar  as  its  elo-
quence  [can]  reach ear and understanding of the particular  court or
judge. '8 6  Yet  it  is  precisely  where  attention  to  situation  is  blocked
582  Though a precise  definition  of "situation sense,"  is notoriously absent, see supra
note  573  and  accompanying  text,  its  common  sense  eclecticism  is  betrayed  in
Llewellyn's description  of the concept as a "compound[] of Isness and Oughtness and
what have  you more  .... [  LLEWELLYN,  supra note 575, at 61.  See also id. at  121  ("The
evidence  for  this  [i.e.,  that  otherwise  good  rules  can  be  twisted  out  of  shape  by
attempts  to  do justice  in  'hard  cases']  draws  on  more  than  'common  knowledge'
(which  can  so  often  be  unmasked  as  common  superstition);  it  draws  on  that  most
uncommon knowledge which I call horse sense, the balanced shrewdness  of the expert
in the art.").  As  far as what goes into this compound, for Llewellyn, "the main guide is
felt sense and decency."  Id. at 135.  Professor  Rakoff comments  that "[i]t appears that
Llewellyn  was in some fashion  endorsing a method of practical wisdom."  Rakoff, supra
note  573,  at  202.  The question  though  is just what  method  guides  the  practice  of
situation  sense.  Llewellyn's  explanation  has  often  been  characterized  as
"unmethodical."  See, e.g.,  id. at 203  (suggesting  that Llewellyn  offers  "many examples
[but]  no  clear  description  of a  method").  Our  concern  is  not  so  much  that it  is
"unmethodical" but rather that the method it embraces is dispositionist.
583  LLEWELLYN,  supra note 575, at 130.
584 Id. at  262.  Llewellyn's  claims  about  the  abilities  of judges  often  rest  on  an
implicit and sometimes explicit appeal  to the reader to see that 'judges are  like  other
human beings...."  Id. at 131.
585  We  concur with  Llewellyn  that the problem  with  post-classical  contract  law is
not that it is naive about the extent to which judges are corrupt or the difficulties  they
have paying attention.  For us,  the problem is  in Llewellyn's  presumption  that, if those
factors alone can  be discounted, there  is little else to worry about.
E186  LLEWELLYN,  supra note 575, at 157.
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from  the ear and  the  understanding by  dispositionism  that situation
can have its greatest power.
In  addition  to  shaping  Llewellyn's  conception  of the  situation-
sensing  analyst,  dispositionism  further  limits  his  conception  of  the
situation  under  inspection.  Situation  sense  involves  observing  and
analyzing  the  "immanent law '
,5s 7 of type-situations among contracting
parties.  The raw material for this study, the focus of the type-situation
inquiry,  is  an  inquiry  into  patterns  of  choices  and  conduct  by
individuals.  The  search  is  for  indications5s  of dispositional  intent
within different kinds of type-situations.  When Llewellyn  implores the
legal analyst to "see it as it works" he  is asking the analyst to follow how
the type-situation  has been composed  by  the  dispositional  actors  that
make it up.  There is no injunction in Llewellyn's method to seek and
account for unseen situational  influences in type-situations.  As  David
Charny  summarizes,  "[i]t  is  apparent  that  Llewellyn  thought  that
custom  was  somehow  expressive  of the  attitudes,  preferences,  and
'mentality'  of the transactors themselves ....  ,,589
This  is  because  the  situation-sensing  analyst  is  urged  to  look  at
that which  is obviously  there, rather  than that which may  be hidden.
And what is  obviously  there is  individual  behavior,  evidence  ready to
confirm  the dispositionism  of the  sensor.  Thus,  Llewellyn  counsels
that  "the  best  safeguard  against  counsel's  mispainting  [of  the
situation,  in an effort  to manipulate the judge]  lies in visualizing the
hands-and-feet  operations  in  the  picture,  seen  as  a going  scheme,  a
working  setup.  Such  operating  aspects  are  curiously  hard  to
fake  ....  ,,511  The judge  is  thus instructed  that, in  his search  for  the
"immanent  law"
91  of situation,  a  reliance  on  what  is  obvious  will
587  See  infra  note  591  and  accompanying  text  (briefly  discussing  the  term
"immanent law").
588  See supra text  accompanying  notes  578-82  (discussing  Llewellyn's  brush  past
social sciences' difficulties in discerning indications of human decision making).
589  David  Charny,  The  New  Formalism in  Contract, 66  U.  CHI.  L.  REV.  842,  846
(1999).  Charny is interested in the extent to which the customary practices of areas of
industry  are  legislated  or stipulated  by  hierarchical  associations,  and  the  extent  to
which the trade customs  promulgated through  such associations  have a formal quality
reminiscent  of  classical  approaches  to  contract  law-hence,  the  new  formalism  in
contract.  Id. at 842-43.
590 LLEWELLYN,  supra note 575, at 261.
591 Llewellyn  initially  quotes  the  term  "immanent  law"  from  the  German  legal
theorist Levin Goldschmidt:
"Every  fact-pattern  of common  life,  so  far  as  the  legal order  can  take  it  in,
carries within itself its appropriate,  natural rules, its right law.  This is a natural
law which  is  real, not imaginary;  it is not a creature of mere reason,  but rests
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"safeguard"  against mlspaitlng.  This  "realism"  is  a strictly positive
realism,  not a  critical  realism,  and  so  it  is  another  symptom  of  the
widely shared  perspective  in legal  theory that begins  by  overlooking
situation  .f
Were  we  to extend  this  discussion  further,  we would  argue  that
the  unreconstructed  dispositionism  we  find  in  classical  and  post-
classical  contract  theory  can  be  seen  in  most  other  areas  of
contemporary  legal  theory  as  well.  The fundamentals  of Llewellyn's
situation-sense  approach  remain  highly  influential  in  leading  non-
on  the solid foundation  of what  reason  can  recognize  in  the nature  of man
and  of the  life  conditions  of the  time  and  place;  it  is  thus  not eternal  nor
changeless  nor  everywhere  the  same,  but  is  indwelling  in  the  very
circumstances  of life.  The  highest  task  of law-giving  consists  in  uncovering
and implementing this immanent law."
Id.  at  122  (quoting  Levin  Goldschmidt,  Der Entwurf eines  Handelgesetzbuchs fir  die
Preussischen Staaten [Draft Trade Code  for the Prussian  States], pt. 2, reprinted  in 4 KRrISCHE
ZEITSCHRIFT  FOR  DIE  GESAMMTfE  RECHTSWISSENSCHAFr  289  (Dernburg  et  al.  eds.,
Heidelberg,  Bangel & Schmitt 1857)).
592  AsJay Feinman states:
The  method of situation-sense  begins  with  fact  scrutiny, in  which  the court
analyzes  and  categorizes  the  facts  as  might  a  lay  person  familiar  with  the
context  of the dispute.  The  fact scrutiny  may  reveal  a  consensus regarding
applicable  values  within  the affected  group or within  society as  a whole; at a
minimum, such scrutiny will limit the range of acceptable  choices.  The court
then determines the  appropriate legal remedy for the situation.
Feinman, supra note 572, at 702.
593  Llewellyn  rejects  attempts  by  critics  to  categorize  situation  sense  and  legal
realism as a philosophy in general or as a form of positivism in particular.  LLEWELLYN,
supra note 575,  at 508-09.  For Llewellyn,  situation  sense  is  an  approach  to decision
making  that  encourages  the  decision  maker  to  see  each  situation  "fresh"  while
positivism  is  a  philosophy  giving  legitimacy  to  law  because  it  is  law.  See  Karl  N.
Llewellyn,  The  Normative, the Legal, and the Law-Jobs:  The Problem of  Juristic Method, 49
YALE  L.J.  1355,  1370-72  (1940);  see  also  HORWITZ,  supra  note  200,  at  208-12
(summarizing  the  critique  of  Llewellyn's  situation  sense  on  grounds  that  it  is
positivism).  "Why should  realism, which  starts  out as a  reform  movement, carry in  its
loins  [an]  essentially reactionary principle?"  Id. at  211  (quoting L.L. Fuller, American
Legal Realism, 82 U. PA.  L. REV. 429, 461  (1934)).
Our  critique  is  somewhat  different.  Beyond  the  question  of whether  other
concerns will inform  the judgment, we  claim that there is  too much positivism  even  in
that component which  is attempting to discern  the "type-situation."  Our claim  is  that
the  type-situation  cannot  be  properly  seen  unless  it  is  viewed  from  a  critical realist
perspective.  Post-classical  contract theory ultimately  rests  on  the faith  that "situation
sensing" provides, as Professor Rakoff puts it, "good ground" for legal decision  making.
Rakoff, supra note 573, at 223; see also id. at 228 ("In short, situation-sense  is a very good
method  for determining  what the default  rules  of contract  law should  be.").  In our
view the  trouble  is that what  is  obvious  to  the situation-sensor  will  only  confirm  and
encourage dispositionist "mispainting."
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economic approaches  to criminal  lawY  civil  rights and constitutional 595  596r•  5917  ewl  o
law, 595  statutory interpretation,  and international  law.  We  will  not
pursue  this  exegesis  further here,  however.  Our purpose  has  solely
been  to  illustrate  that  conventional  legal  theorists,  like  legal
economists,  begin their legal  analysis  with dispositional  assumptions
and, even when claiming to be situationally sensitive, set the threshold
unrealistically high.
B.  Legal Presumptions
The attribution error does not stop there.  Our laws  and  policies
reflect  the  same  lopsided  perceptions.  That  is,  our  laws  and
policies-formal  and  informal-mirror  our human  perceptions  and,
for all  the  reasons  that people  generally  do, place  the  threshold  for
recognizing  the situation higher than they should.
To be  clear,  this  is  not a claim that our laws  totally miss  the  role
of all  situational  influences.  It  is  a claim  that only  the  most salient,
unambiguous  situational  features-and  only  those  that  have  fairly
straightforward  implications  for  a  generally  dispositionist  legal
regime-will  be  appreciated.  As  with  legal  theory,  dispositionist
presumptions  play  a  governing  role  in  many,  if not  most,  areas  of
law.  To  continue  this  limited  exposition,  we  will  again  limit  our
focus to contract law.
The  basic dispositionist presumptions seen  in Fried's classical will
theory of contract are reflected  in contemporary  contract law.'"  The
Restatement  (Second)  of Contracts, for  example,  fashions  a  theory  of
594 See, e.g.,  Mark Kelman,  Interpretive  Construction in the Substantive Criminal  Law, 33
STAN.  L. REV. 591  (1981)  (applying situation-sense  approach  to the analysis of criminal
law).
595 See, e.g., Richard  H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment,  Content Neutrality, and the First
Amendment  Dog  That Didn't Bark,  1994  Sup.  CT.  REV.  1,  40-41  (1995)  (urging  the
application  of "contextualization"  to constitutional law problems, although  noting that
"[c]elebrations  of  situation  sense  and  practical  reason  frequently  dissolve  into
philosophical mush").
596  See,  e.g.,  David  L.  Shapiro,  Continuity and  Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67
N.Y.U.  L.  REV.  921,  941  (1992)  (noting that  a situation-sense  approach  to  statutory
interpretation is "not without defenders  and not without force").
See,  e.g.,  LEON  E.  TRAKMAN,  THE  LAw  MERCHANT:  THE  EVOLUTION  OF
COMMERCIAL  LAW  93  (1983)  ("Judges  are  compelled  to  synthesize  how merchants
think  and  act  if  the  common  law  is  to  progress  as  international  commerce
pro  resses.").
556s Of course,  this is  unsurprising  given  that Fried's  project  is  in  part a  positive
theory  of modern  contract  law.  See  supra text  accompanying  notes  551-71  for a
discussion  of Fried's theory of contract.
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contract  that  is  rooted  in  the  principle  of dispositional  intent.  A
contract  "requires  a  bargain  in  which  there  is  a  manifestation  of
mutual assent.  . . . ,,Q  Assent is understood  in terms of dispositional
intention:  "[t]he  conduct  of a party  is  not effective  as  a manifesta-
tion of his assent unless he intends to engage  in the  conduct  ....  ,6
Of course,  at the  margins  of  contract  law  there  are  a  few  instances
when,  because  of  intense  situational  forces,  the  dispositionist
presumption  may  be rebutted.  For  example,  the  Restatement (Second)
acknowledges  the  problem  of "improper pressure  in  the  bargaining
process,  in  the  form  of  either  duress  or  undue  influence.
6 °
Nevertheless,  even  the  doctrine  of  duress,  the  doctrine  most
preoccupied  with  situation,  is  wedded  to  a  strong  dispositionist
foundation.  Like  legal  economists  and  conventional  legal  theorists,
the  law  can  see  the  situational  power  of a  gun  to  the  head,  but it
602 does not see very much more.
Consider  the  scope  of the  doctrine  of  duress  as  it  has  been
applied  in  Massachusetts,  which  has,  like  most  states,  long  since
adopted  the  basic  view  found  in  the  Restatement  (Second).6 0   The
doctrine  actually  makes  infrequent  occurrences  in  the  annals  of
Massachusetts  cases, no doubt because of the extremely narrow range
of  situations  to  which  it  applies.  This  is  not  to  gainsay  its
fundamental  importance,  however,  for  as  Fried  recognized,  even  in
its  absence,  the  doctrine  serves  to  sanctify  the  great  range  of
599  RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF CONTRACTS  §  17 (1)  (198 1).
600  Id.  §  19(2).  The Restatement consistently  refers back  to  this  section  as  stating
the Ieneral  rule of assent  in contracts.
Id. ch.7, topic 2, introductory note.
602  The  same  is  true  in  other areas  of the  law.  In tort law,  courts  recognize  the
limits of property  rights when  salient situational conditions  of "necessity" are  in play.
A  sudden,  unexpected  tempest,  for  instance,  will  mute  the  consequences  of  the
otherwise  dispositional  act of trespass.  See,  e.g.,  RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF  TORTS
§  197(1)  (1965)  ("One  is  privileged  to enter  or remain  on land in  the  possession  of
another  if  it  is  or reasonably  appears  to be  necessary  to prevent serious  harm  to  the
actor ...  ").  In criminal  law,  killing a person  in  the "heat of passion"  is  treated as a
less egregious  offense  than committing  the same act in  "cold blood."  See, e.g.,  United
States  v.  Bradford,  344  A.2d  208,  215  (D.C.  1975)  ("The  purpose  to  kill  is  in  legal
contemplation dampened where the killer has  been provoked or  is acting in the heat
of passion  ....  ).
603 See,  e.g.,  Avallone  v. Elizabeth  Arden  Sales  Corp.,  183  N.E.2d  496,  499  (Mass.
1962)  (explicating  the  principle  of duress  as  "[c]onduct  by  one  party  which  causes
another to  enter  into a  contract 'under  the influence  of such  fear  as precludes  him
from  exercising  free  will  and judgment"'  (quoting  RESTATEMENT  OF  CONTRACTS
§  492(b)  (1932))).
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contracts  the  enforcement  of which  go  unimpeded. ° 4  Where  duress
is  explicitly  addressed,  Massachusetts  courts  have  adopted  a  highly
dispositionist  conception  of it.  As  a  recent  Massachusetts  appellate
court summarized  in Randall v.  Rapoza,  60 '  "To avoid a contract on the
basis of duress, a party must show that conduct by the other party  [to
the  contract]  caused  him  to  enter  into  the  contract  'under  the
influence of such fear as precludes  him from exercising  free  will and
judgment.' 6 06  The court further explained  that:
[t]o  show  economic  duress  a  party  must show  that  he  has  been  the
victim  of a wrongful  or unlawful  act  or threat,  and  such  act  or  threat
must  be  one  which  deprives  the  victim  of  his  unfettered  will.  As  a
direct result of these  elements, the  party threatened  must be compelled
to make a disproportionate  exchange  of values. ° 7
The defendant in Randall,  who  was sued on a promissory note he
had  signed,  told  the  court  that  he  had  entered  the  contract,  under
duress  "'because  of  [Randall's]  attitude  and  demeanor'  [and]
'his  harassment."'6 8  He  also  told  the  court  that  he  was  having
marital  troubles  and  was  not "'thinking  straight,"'  and  that  he  had
been  on anti-depressant  medication when he  entered  the  contract.6°)
The  Massachusetts court, unsurprisingly, found that these allegations
fell "far short of painting a picture of duress" because  "[h]is  decision
was  not  an  'arbitrary  determination,  capricious  disposition  or
whimsical  thinking. '"' 6 0
Randall provides  a  typical  example  of the  role  that duress  plays
in reported  cases in Massachusetts.  Our purpose is not to provide  an
exhaustive  account of its application, but rather to highlight  that the
"picture"  of duress  made  out by  the  broad  strokes  of the  doctrine
demonstrates  the  deep  dispositionist  presumptions  of  contract  law
generally.  It  is  presumed,  for  example,  that  in  the  typical  case,
where  duress  is  not  present,  the  choices  represented  by  a  contract
are  the  product of "unfettered will." 6 1
1  While  this might  seem like  a
604  FRIED,  supra note 550, at 93-95.
605 Randall v. Rapoza, 2001  Mass. App. Div. 153  (2001).
606  id. at 156 (quoting Coveney v. President of Coll. of Holy Cross, 445 N.E.2d  136,
140  (Mass.  1983)).
607  Id.
608 Id. (alteration  in original)  (quoting Rapoza Aff.).
609 Id. (quoting Rapoza Aff.).
610  Id.  (quoting  Bembe  v.  McKesson  Wine  &  Spirits  Co.,  388  N.E.2d  309,  314
(Mass.  App. Ct.  1979)  (quoting Davis  v.  Boston  Elevated  Ry.  Co.,  126  N.E.  841,  844
(Mass.  1920))).
611  Id.
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high standard,  the  benefit of the  dispositionist presumption  actually
makes  it  the  routine  case.  Despite  Rapoza's  contentions  to  the
contrary,  the  Randall court  concludes  that  the  contract  he  entered
into  was  in fact  a manifestation  of his "unfettered  will,"  and  refuses
to find that the doctrine  of duress  is applicable.12
As  the  law  is  described  in  Massachusetts,  only  the  most
conspicuous  external  sources  of  influence  will  be  recognized  as
constituting  duress.  The court  cites as  its only example  "signing...
at the point of a gun., 613  The  fundamental  attribution  error at work
here sharply limits  the  range of relevant situations  to only those that
can  be  narrowly  attributed  to  the  vivid  "bad  act"  of  another
individual.  The  court's explication  also reveals a miserly view of what
kind of internal situation  will  be permitted  to implicate  the  doctrine
of duress.  Only  the  most palpable  kind  of internal  situation will  be
seen  as  evidencing  duress-fear.  As  we  have  described,  there  are
certainly  many  other  features  of  our  internal  situations  that  can
exercise  as  much  influence  over  our  conduct  as  does  the  more
palpable  situation  of  fear,  yet  those  remain  hidden  by  our
dispositionism  and  are  unseen  in  the  law.  Restricted  by  this
dispositionist  framework,  the  common  law  of  contract  has  not
developed  categories of influence beyond salient external  threats and
internal  fears  through  which  parties  can  formulate  their  claims.
Unless  a choice  can be shown  to have  been  arbitrary, it  is presumed
to be the  expression of an unfettered  will.  With the  presumption  set
so  high,  parties  can  strive  only  to  drum  up  those  aspects  of  their
situations  that  catch  the  dispositionist  eye.  Against  the  situational
threshold  of  a  gun  to  the  head,  harassing  phone  calls  and  anti-
depressant  drugs  will  easily  fail  to rebut  the  strong  presumption  of
unfettered  will.
Contract  law,  like  many  areas  of  law,  recognizes  a  point  where
the situation  is seen  to be so significant  that it renders unreliable the
dispositionist  assumptions  that  would  otherwise  govern.  Making
someone  liable  for  outcomes  over  which  she  wielded  comparatively
little  dispositional  control  and  where  her  situation  is  relatively
controlling would be  unjust, unfair,  or inefficient,  depending  on the
theoretical  focus.  If, as  we  hypothesize,  the  threshold  in  the  law  is
fundamentally misplaced,  then  the law in many of these areas  may be
fundamentally  unjust,  unfair,  or  inefficient.  Put  differently,  if  the
612  Id.
613  Id. at 155-56.
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situation was as  profoundly recognized  in our laws  as  it  is influential
in  our  lives,  the  role  of  the  situation  would  be  presumptively
paramount, rather than presumptively  irrelevant.t4
C.  Social Policy Presumptions: Learning  from History Again
There are  other places  to  look to  try to  assess  the  significance  of
dispositionism.  If  our  hypothesis  is  correct  that  the  fundamental
attribution error contributes to  false impressions and self-understand-
ings,  and  misguided  legal  theories  and  laws,  then  it should  find
support  in  the  major  social  policy  disputes  that  animate  and  define
our  history.  Furthermore,  there should  be  some  evidence  that  the
dominant  view  will  typically  be  one  that favors  those  in power-just
as  the  geocentric  view  so  clearly  served  the  interests  of the  Catholic
Church  in  the  seventeenth  century  and,  as  we  are  arguing,  the
person-centric view serves the interests of corporations today.
Providing  such  evidence  is  also  a  topic  of  further  work  in 615
progress.  For now, we can highlight the major  thrust of that work,
which  is  that  the  power  of the  dispositionist  presumption  has  had,
and  is  now having,  an immense  effect  on both  the  framing and  the
resolution  of  virtually  every  major  social  policy  debate-from  the
obesity  epidemic  to  the  War  on  Terrorism.  Although  we  will
postpone  defending  that  claim,  it may  be  illuminating  to  highlight
one  particularly  revealing  and  tragic  example  from  our  history:
slavery.  We  have  chosen  that social  policy  issue  to  spotlight because
we  have  suggested  in  this  Article  that  power-even  oppressive,
totalitarian  power-can  be  exercised  through  the  unseen  situation,
in  part,  through  the  creation  and  promotion  of  dispositionist
worldviews.  Because  slavery  provides  one of the  most salient uses  of
power  in  United  States  history,  demonstrating  the  role  of
dispositionism  in  enabling  that  oppression  provides  especially
compelling  evidence for our claim.
6  14  We  should not  be  understood  as  arguing  that  the  outcome  in  Randall was
necessarily  incorrect.  Our point is  that the  reasoning  is  based  on a flawed  vision  of
what moves us-a flaw  with  implications  that may extend  well beyond  this  case,  the
doctrine of duress, or even the  law of contracts.
615 See, e.g.,Jon Hanson, David Yosifon  & Adam  Benforado, Broken Scales:  Obesity
andJustice in America  (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
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1.  The Teacher's  View of the Learner
First, to  set  the  stage,  it may  be  helpful  to  return  to  Milgram's
basic  research,  in  which  he  manipulated  hundreds  of  subjects  to
behave in  a way that contradicted  his and others'  initial  expectations
and  thereby  revealed  the  otherwise  hidden  power  of the  situation.
The teacher was  given  a situation-induced  "preference"  to  shock  the
learner, a "preference" that in most cases led  teachers  to continue to
increase  the shocks  all  the  way  to 450  volts  (beyond  the  point when
the  learner  fell  silent  after  screaming  in  agony).' 6   The  focus  of
social  psychologists  analyzing  those  experiments  has  long  been  on
certain  situational considerations,  such  as  the authority  conferred  on
the  experimenter  by,  say,  his  white  lab  coat,  in  creating  that
"preference." 6 7
But  an  interesting  issue  emerges-one  that  has  received
comparatively  little  attention-about  a  different  situational  factor:
that  is,  the  teacher's  perception  of the  learner's  dispositions.  The
learner  was  one  of Milgram's  confederates,  but he  was  assigned  his
position  as  learner  by  an  apparently  (but  not  actually)  random
process.  The teacher  then  observed  the  learner voluntarily  agreeing
to  be  strapped  into  the  chair,  understanding  that  he  would  be
shocked.
6
"  The  fact  that  subjects  in  Milgram's  study  appeared  to
make  a  free  choice  to  enter  into  a  "contract"  may  be  central  to
understanding  the  large  number  of teachers  who  administered  the
maximum shock level of 450 volts.
619
Once  they had  committed  to  participating,  the  teachers  felt as  if
they were obligated  to continue with and, in most cases, complete  the
experiment  even  when  they  believed  they  were  inflicting  pain  or
actually  harming  the  learners. 62 0  The  sense  of  obligation  (and  the
formal  appearance  of a contract)  was  likely strengthened  by  the fact
that teachers were  paid $4.50  for their services prior to beginning  the
experiment.
62'  It was  also likely bolstered by the very structure of the
616 Milgram, supra note 88, at 376.
617  For  a  discussion  of some  variations  of Milgram's  experiment,  see  Hanson  &
Yosifon, supra note 30.
618 Milgram, supra note 88,  at 373.
619  Id. at 377.
620 Id.
621  Id. at 372, 378.  However, Milgram also notes that the results of the experiment,
when conducted with unpaid subjects,  were  "very similar  to  those  obtained with  paid
subjects."  Id. at 377 n.4.
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experiment, in which  the shock  level  was increased  in only very  small
increments  of 15  volts.  Because  the  learner  did not protest initially,
teachers  continued  to  flip  the  switch,  experiencing  little  internal
conflict.  Once the  learner did  complain,  however, it was  difficult  to •6  2 2
stop, even though many teachers experienced  cognitive dssonance.
To  reduce  this  dissonance,  people  seek  ways  to  justify  their
actions.  In Milgram's original  experiment, the  teacher's  initial agree-
ment to administer  the  first shock  to  the  learner  most likely created
internal  pressure  to  continue  with  the  experiment.
62
1  With  each
incrementally higher shock level,  the teacher had tojustify his actions,
and once he justified a particular  shock level,  it became increasingly
difficult to determine  the level at which he should cease shocking  the
learner:
How  could  they  say,  in  effect,  "OK,  I  gave  him  200  volts, but not  215
-never  215!"?  Each  succeeding  shock  and  its justification  laid  the
groundwork  for  the  next  shock  and would  have  been  dissonant  with
quitting;  215  volts  is  not that  different  from  200,  and  230  is  not that
different from  215.  Those  who did  break off the  series did  so  against
enormous internal  pressure to continue.24
The  fact  that  the  learner  willingly  provided  answers  without
complaint  through  shock  level  twenty  in  the  initial  experiment
seemed  to provide proof that he, too, had accepted  the  terms  of the
agreement. 62 5  It was only when things started not to go his  way  (when
he started  to get many answers wrong)  that he  refused  to honor the
terms-a repudiation  of the  rules  of contract.  From  the  teachers'
perspective,  both  they  and  the  learner  had  voluntarily  agreed  to
participate  in an experiment  for $4.50;  the learner had no  reason to
complain  (or  void  the  contract)  because  his  position  was  assigned
through  a  fair  and  random  process.
6
2
6  In  the  words  of  Milgram,
62  Id. at 377-78.  Cognitive dissonance  is a feeling of internal discomfort produced
when a  person  holds two  or more inconsistent cognitions-in  this case,  the desire  to
fulfill  the  terms of a valid  contract and  the desire  not  to harm  another  person-and
performs an action-here, shocking the learner-that  is inconsistent with the person's
customary positive  self-conception.  See ELLIOT  ARONSON  ET  AL.,  SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY
174-76  (4th  ed.  2002)  (defining  and  explaining  "cognitive  dissonance");  Hanson  &
Yosifon,  supra  note  30  (discussing  the  cognitive  dissonance  and  several  related
phenomena and their relevance for law and legal  theory).
623  Milgram,  supra note 88, at 294.
624  Id.
625  Milgram, supra note 88, at 378.
626  Id. at 377.
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"[t] hat he later becomes an involuntary subject does not alter the fact •,  1•  •  - •  ,,621
that, initially, he consented to participate without qualication.
It  is  noteworthy,  we  think,  that  in  Milgram's  film,  Obedience, the
learner  went  out  of  his  way  in  front  of  the  teacher  to  stop  and
carefully  examine  the  shock  generator,  with  all  its  levels  and
6,28 warnings.  And  we  suspect  that  the  teachers  tended  to  see  the
learner  as  someone  who  freely  and  knowingly  chose  to  participate
and  who,  in  essence,  wanted,  perhaps  even  deserved,  to  be
shocked-at  least  up  to  some  level.  Indeed,  the  situation-induced
preference  to  shock  the  learner  might  well  have  solidified  that
629 perception.  In  this  sense,  the  learner  could  be  understood  as
having accepted  his lot and having  assumed the risk  that it entailed.
Put  differently,  the  learner  appeared  to  "reveal  his  preference"  for
getting shocked.
Of course,  it is important  to  note  that while  theories  of contract
can be powerful forces ofjustification,  outweighing complaints  by the
victim,  they do not appear strong enough to overcome  fully the voice
6320 of  credible  authority.  Milgram  attempted  to  test  the  power  of
contract notions by structuring a variation of the experiment in which,
before  signing  the  release  form,  the  learner paused and  stated,  "I'll
agree to be in it, but only on condition that you let me out when  I say
627  Id.
628  OBEDIENCE,  supra  note  149.
629  Some  anecdotal  evidence  provides  loose  support  for  this  account.  First,  as
noted above,  none of the teachers ever went to find out if the learner was  okay.  Supra
text  accompanying  note  180.  It  is  as  if  the  teachers  felt  that  they  were  not
responsible  for  the  learner's  condition-in  other  words,  that  the  learner  was
responsible  for  himself.  In  addition,  there  is  some  evidence  that  the  teachers
dispositionalized  their own actions-blaming  themselves for the bad "preference" that
was  "revealed"  by  their  actions.  According  to  lore  among  social  psychologists,
Milgram  was able  to  include only  one  example of a person  flipping the  final  switch
(450  volts)  in  his  famous  documentary  about  the  experiments,  Obedience, because
none  of the many  others who  did so were  willing  to  be shown  on film.  Presumably,
they did not want  to be shown as  "bad people."  Milgram  included several  after-the-
fact  interviews  of subjects,  some  of which  revealed  how  the  subjects  attributed
their  actions  to  their  own  dispositions.  See,  e.g.,  MILGRAM,  OBEDIENCE  TO
AUTHORITY,  supra note  86,  at  54  ("As  my  wife  said,  '[ylou  can  call  yourself
Eichmann.'  I hope  I  can  deal more  effectively  with any future  conflicts of values
I encounter.").  Given  that they dispositionalized  their own  behavior-behavior that
was  anything  but  flattering-it  seems  likely  that  they  also  would  have  partially
dispositionalized  the learner's behavior.  See supra  note 110 (describing the heightened
tendency  to  attribute  bad  outcomes  suffered  by others-as  compared  to  those  we
stiffer ourselves-to disposition).
630  See MILGRAM,  OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY, supra note 86, at 66 (finding that "the
social  contract doctrine  is a feeble determinant of behavior").
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so; that's the only condition. '' "s  The changing  of the contract seemed
to  have  some  effect.  Approximately  a  quarter  of the  teachers,  who
defied  the  experimenter's  authority,  raised  the  fact that  the  learner
had  explicitly  conditioned  her  consent  to  participate  in  the
experiment. 632  A number of other teachers  mentioned their concern
with the "legalities" of the experiment.
633  However, sixteen of the forty
teachers  continued to the end of the experiment,  as compared  to the
twenty in  the control,  thus showing the  enormous power of authority
even in the face of contract forces. 634
But suppose Milgram had  tested the  issue  further.  Suppose  that
the  teacher  arrived  first  and  that  he  watched  as  the  learner  was
dragged  to  the  room  in  shackles  and  strapped  into  the  chair
involuntarily  while begging, "Please, please,  I never agreed  to be part
of this  experiment,  I  was just walking  by  on  my  way  to  the  library!"
Or,  for  a  less  vivid  version,  suppose  the  teacher  watched  as  the
learner  willingly  sat in  the  chair  under  the  false  impression  that  he
was going  to participate  in a sleeping experiment and  that the  straps
were on the chair simply to measure sleep patterns.
We  suspect  that  such  variations  in  the  experimental  protocol
would  have  had  an  even  more  significant  effect  than  the
conditional  contract  on  the  teacher's  willingness  to  shock  the
learner.  To  put  it  in  more  general  terms,  we  believe  that  a
person's willingness  to harm another depends  heavily  on whether  or
not that person  perceives  her victim  to  have  dispositionally assumed
such  a risk.
There  is,  as  it  turns  out,  considerable  social  psychological
635 evidence  that is consistent  with that understanding.  Perhaps  more
importantly,  however,  there  is  also  depressingly  weighty  support
within  the  annals  of history.  When, for instance,  Nazis  murdered
millions,  many  did  so,  secure  in  their  belief  that  their  victims
deserved  to be  exterminated,  for the  benefit  of the  human  species
636 and  the  advancement  of  evolutionary  trends.  The  tendency  to
631  Id. at 64.
632  Id. at 65.
633  Id.
634  Id. at 66.
635 See Hanson  & Yosifon,  supra note  30  (summarizing  relevant evidence  of the
'just  world"  hypothesis  and  the  system-affirming  motive  in  social  psychology).
For a sample of that work, see authorities cited  infra note 686.
636  See generally  JOSEPH  TENENBAUM,  RACE  AND  REICH  3-28  (Greenwood  Press,
1976)  (1956)  (relating  German  science  of  racial  superiority  to  the  Nazi
extermination campaign).  See also Chen  & Hanson, supra note 52.
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dispositionalize  in order to oppress has been particularly strong in the
United  States,  where  cultural  notions  of freedom,  equality,  and  self-
evident,  natural  rights  have  been  celebrated  at  the  same  time  that
many  of  the  humans  within  our  borders  have  been  grouped  and • •  •  631
subjected to bondage, conquest, and exploitation .
Dispositionism has been  the legitimating salve.
2.  The Master's View of the Slave
I  have  often  been  utterly  astonished, since  I  came  to  the  north,  to find
persons who  could  speak  of the  singing, among  slaves,  as  evidence  of  their
contentment and happiness. It  is  impossible  to  conceive  of a greater mistake.
Slaves sing most when they  are most unhappy. The  songs of the slave represent
the sorrows of his heart; and he is relieved  by them, only  as an aching heart is
relieved by  its tears. At least, such is my  experience. I  have often sung to drown
my  sorrow, but seldom to  express my  happiness.  Crying for  joy,  and singing  for
joy,  were alike uncommon  to me  while in  the jaws of slavery. The singing of a
man cast away  upon a  desolate island might be  as appropriately considered as
evidence of contentment and happiness, as  the singing of a slave; the  songs of
the one and of the other are prompted by the same emotion.
-Frederick  Douglass
6
38
Let us return  to  the  topic  of slavery.39  When  plantation  owners
traded  in  human  beings,  they  were  confronted  with  a  problem  not
637 See  generally RONALD  T.  TAKAKI,  IRON  CAGES:  RACE  AND  CULTURE  IN 19TH-
CENTURY AMERICA  (2000)  (examining the cultural and economic foundations  of racial
subjugation  in  the  United  States);  see  also sources  cited  infra note  639  (examining
racism in America).
638 FREDERICK  DOUGLASS,  NARRATIVE  OF  THE  LiFE  OF  FREDERICK  DOUGLASS,  AN
AMERICAN  SLAVE  (1845),  reprinted in  I  THE  NORTON  ANTHOLOGY  OF  AMERICAN
LITERATURE  1874,  1887-88  (Nina Baym  et al.  eds., 3d ed. 1989).
639  There  is  a  vast,  sophisticated,  and  ever-expanding  literature,  across  many
disciplines,  that has contributed greatly to our understanding of the shocking reality of
slavery in the United States.  For useful historical overviews  of the ideas we discuss here
concerning  the basic  dispositionist ideology  underlying  "the  peculiar  institution," see
generally DAVID  BRION  DAVIS,  THE  PROBLEM  OF SLAVERY IN  THE AGE  OF REVOLUTION,
1770-1823  (1975)  (exploring  the  competing  ideologies  of  anti-slavery  and  racist
exploitation  during  the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  centuries);  GEORGE  M.
FREDRICKSON,  THE  BLACK  IMAGE  IN  THE  WHITE  MIND:  THE  DEBATE  ON  AFRO-
AMERICAN  CHARACTER  AND  DESTINY,  1817-1914  (1971)  (outlining the  rise of formal-
ized  racism  in  the  United  States  from  its nineteenth-century  beginnings through  its
apex  during  World  War  I);  GEORGE  M.  FREDRICKSON,  RACISM:  A  SHORT  HISTORY
(2002)  (synthesizing over  thirty years of historical scholarship  on  racism); THOMAS  F.
GOSSETr,  RACE:  THE  HISTORY  OF  AN  IDEA  IN AMERICA  (new  ed.  1997)  (surveying  the
development  of race  theory and race  relationships from  the  colonial period  through
the twentieth  century);  STEPHENJAY GOULD,  THE MISMEASURE  OF MAN  (rev. ed.  1996)
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unlike  the  one faced  by  the  teachers  in  Milgram's  experiment.  In
antebellum  America,  plantation  owners  and  slave  traders,  among
many  others,  exploited  slaves  for  financial  and  social  gain,  while
maintaining  their own  perception  of themselves as  the  sort of people
who  would  never  unjustly exploit  others.
64
0  All  who  were  more  or
less complicit  with  the  practices  and  systems of slavery needed
to believe  that the  groups  and  systems  to which  they belonged
were  fair  and  just,  and  somehow  not  in  tension  with  the
principles of equality to which  so many subscribed.
a.  The basic message-dispositionism
Faced with  this situation,  the plantation  owners  did what we
all  tend  to do-and  what  most of us in  their  situation  would  likely
have  done  at  that  time.  They  looked  at  their  social  world  and
inferred  dispositionist  distinctions  that  made  slavery  not  only
palatable,  but  natural, just,  and  in  effect,  Pareto  superior.  They
embraced  the  self-affirming  faith  that  their  captives  were  intended
(by  God or  nature)  to  be  slaves,  and  that for  their  own  good  they
642 needed  to  be  slaves.  It  was  the  plantation  owners  that  were
(explaining and refuting  various "scientific" theories of racial  superiority);  WINTHROP
D. JORDAN,  WHITE  OVER  BLACK:  AMERICAN  ATIITUDES  TOWARD  THE  NEGRO,  1550-
1812  (1968)  (analyzing  white  men's  attitudes  towards  black  Africans  from  the  pre-
colonial  period  through  the early nineteenth  century);  KENAN  MALIK,  THE  MEANING
OF  RACE:  RACE,  HISTORY  AND  CULTURE  IN  WESTERN  SOCIETY  (1996)  (linking
contemporary, post-Cold War racial ideology to the history of race  and racial ideology
in  the  West).  Legal  scholars  have  also  contributed  significantly  to  our  current
understanding  of racism  in  general  and  slavery  in  particular.  See generally CRITICAL
RACE THEORY:  THE  KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED  THE MOVEMENT  (Kimberl  Crenshaw
et al. eds.,  1995)  (collecting  seminal writings of critical race theorists  engaged in legal
scholarship); A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR.,  SHADES OF FREEDOM:  RACIAL POLITICS AND
PRESUMPTIONS  OF THE AMERICAN  LEGAL  PROCESS  (1996)  (surveying and  analyzing the
history  of  racism  in  the  United  States  and  its  impact  on  legal  theory  and
jurisprudence);  THOMAS  D.  MORRIS,  SOUTHERN  SLAVERY  AND  THE  LAW,  1619-1860
(1996)  (theorizing  the  role  of race  as  a  factor influencing  the  rulings  of particular
judges  in  the American  South  during  the  two and  a half centuries  before  the  Civil
War);  MARK  V.  TUSHNET,  THE  AMERICAN  LAW  OF  SLAVERY  1810-1860:
CONSIDERATIONS  OF  HUMANITY  AND  INTEREST  (1981)  (studying  Southern  case  law
related  to slavery); Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness:  Trials of Racial Determination in
the Nineteenth-Century South, 108 YALE  L.J.  109  (1998)  (examining the role  of the  law in
the construction of race  and racism  in  the nineteenth-century  American South).
640  See supra note  29-31  (providing  brief summary  of motive  to  self-affirm);
Hanson & Yosifon,  supra note 30  (providing extensive summary of that motive).
641 See  Hanson  &  Yosifon,  supra note  30  (summarizing  evidence  of  people's
tendency to group-affirm  and system-affirm).
642  HIGGINBOTHAM,  supra  note 639, at 14.
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designed  to  be  the  masters,  that  could  tame,  train,  and  protect  the
slaves  from themselves.43  They found ways  to believe  that slavery was
precisely  what  slaves  preferred-for  if  a  person  sings,  smiles,  and
otherwise  behaves  "as  if'  she  is happy,  who  can  deny  that  she  is?
644
And  if the  slaves  were  not outwardly  happy,  there  was  still  no
good reason  to conclude  that they were  unhappy.  As Elizabeth
Cady Stanton  summarized:
It is  impossible  to make  the Southern  planter believe that his slave feels
and  reasons just as he does-that  injustice and subjection  are as galling
as to him-that the degradation of living by the will  of another, the mere
dependent on  his caprice, at the mercy of his passions,  is as keenly felt by
him as his master.  If you can force on  his unwilling vision a vivid picture
of the negro's wrongs, and for a moment touch  his soul,  his logic brings
him instant consolation.  He says, the slave does not feel this as  I would.
Put  differently,  slaveowners  (and,  to  some  extent,  most  of
antebellum  society)646 inferred  dispositional  qualities  about  the
slaves when  they  considered  the  situation  of American  slavery.
They  compared  those  qualities  with  their  views  of  their  own
dispositions  and  concluded  that  the  African  race  was
dispositionally  inferior  in  almost every  way.  This subsection  will
attempt  to describe  some  of the  manifestations  of that fundamental
attribution error-missing the situation-in this human tragedy.
i.  Revealed  inferiority
The primary, and perhaps  most powerful,  tendency  of those who
defended  or  were  complicit  with  slavery  was  to  see  Africans  in
America  as  a  subhuman  species,  or  at  least  as  less-highly  evolved
humans. 647  The truth of the African slaves'  inferiority  was so obvious
643  Id.
644  See infra text accompanying notes  647-82.
645 Elizabeth  Cady Stanton,  Address  to the  Legislature of New York  on  Women's
Rights  (Feb.  14,  1854),  reprinted in  ELIZABETH  CADY  STANTON,  SUSAN  B.  A  NTHONY:
CORRESPONDENCE,  WRITINGS,  SPEECHES 44, 50  (Ellen  Carol DuBois ed.,  1981).
646 See HIGGINBOTHAM,  supra note 639, at 12 ("The precept that African Americans
were, in  some immutable way,  inferior became a  powerful  principle around  which  all
white colonists, even  those who  did not own  slaves,  could begin  to  foster a common
identity  ..").
A.  Leon  Higginbotham, Jr. has identified dispositional inferiority  as the first of
ten basic precepts of American slavery jurisprudence, and summarizes  it as follows:
Presume, preserve,  protect, and  defend  the ideal of the superiority of whites
and the inferiority of blacks.
By considering  the black as  a subspecies  of man or, most often,  a heathen
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as  to  usually be  beyond  debate.  As  Chief Justice  Taney  put  it  in
the infamous Dred Scott decision:
[Blacks]  had  for  more  than  a  century  before  been  regarded  as  beings
of  an  inferior  order,  and  altogether  tnfit  to  associate  with  the  white
race,  either in  social or political  relations;  and so  far inferior,  that they
had  no  rights which  the  white  man  was  bound  to  respect;  and that the
negro  might  justly  and  lawfully  be  reduced  to  slavery  for  his  benefit.
He  was  bought  and  sold,  and  treated  as  an  ordinary  article  of
merchandise  and  traffic,  whenever  a  profit could  be  made  by  it.  This
opinion  was  at that  time fixed  and  universal  in  the  civilized  portion  of
the  white  race.  It  was  regarded  as  an  axiom  in  morals  as  well  as  in
politics, which  no  one thought of disputing, or supposed  to be open to
dispute;  and  men  in  every  grade  and  position  in  society  daily  and
habitually acted  upon  it in  their private  pursuits, as well  as  in  matters of
public concern,  without doubting for a  moment the  correctness  of this
S.  648
opinion.
The  consequence  of this  dispositionist  assessment  of blacks  was
staggering.  There  were  two  principle holdings  in Dred Scott.  First, it
meant that no African  could be a citizen of the  United States or even
of  any  state  "within  the  meaning  of  the  Constitution."
6
'  Second,
because  blacks were not citizens  in  the  eyes of the law, they could  be
treated  as  any  other  kind  of  property.  According  to  the  Court,
Congress  had no power to treat slaves differently from any other types
of property. ' °  Consequently,  the  Court  held,  Congress  could  not
exclude  slavery  from  the  federal  territories,  and  therefore,  that  the
Missouri  Compromise  was  unconstitutional.  5   But  of  course,  the
from  a  less  advanced,  oppressed  civilization,  many  whites  could justify  his
enslavement.  The whites'  "logic" went as  follows:  the  African  is  different  in
appearance  and  manner  from  us;  he  must not  be  human  or  at  least  not
equally as human as we are; therefore,  he is inferior to us and can  be enslaved
by us, his superiors.
A.  Leon  Higginbotham,  Jr.,  The  Ten  Precepts of American  Slavery  Jurisprudence, 17
CARDozo L.  REv.  1695,  1697,  1700 (1996)  (citations omitted).
648  Dred Scott  v. Sandford,  60  U.S.  (19  How.)  393,  407  (1857).  Taney was wrong
in  his monolithic  positive description of white attitudes towards  blacks,  and we do  not
mean  to  suggest  that  these  attitudes  were  indeed  monolithic.  But  Taney's  words
certainly represented  the dominant  view and the powerful role of dispositionism in it.
See generally HIGGINBOTHAM,  supra note  639,  at 66  (analyzing Taney's  opinion  as an
argument  that "slavery did not render African  Americans inferior" because  by Taney's
logic "African Americans, by their very nature, were inferior").
649  Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 406.
650  Id. at 451.
651  See id. at 452  ("[T]he act of Congress which  prohibited  a citizen from holding
and  owning  [slaves]  ...  in  the territory of the United States north of the line  therein
mentioned,...  is therefore  void.").
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Court's holding in Dred Scott was  considered  common  sense in  much
of  America  at  that  time. 6 2   We  all  see  dispositionally,  and  this
dispositionism  had long made people blind to the situation  of slavery,
and to the situational influence on slaves.
Yet  this common  sense  dispositionist presumption  about Africans
had  not always  been  the  common  sense.  In  fact, the dispositionism
emerged  in  America  precisely  because  it  was  needed,  as  indicated 65  655
above,
654  to reconcile principles with  practices.  And few people,  we
suspect, felt the dissonance  and the  need to reconcile more intensely
than  did  Thomas  Jefferson656-civil  rights  theorist,  father  of  the
American  Revolution,  author  of  the  Declaration  of Independence,
President of the  United States,  and Virginian  slaveholder.57  Indeed,
652  See HIGGINBOTHAM,  supra note 639,  at 66-67  (showing that, although  the  legal
analysis  was  somewhat  controversial,  the  presumption  of  black  inferiority  was
commonly held); DON E. FEHRENBACHER,  THE DRED ScoTT  CASE:  ITS SIGNIFICANCE  IN
AMERICAN  LAW  AND  POLITICS  (1978)  (noting  that  most white  critics of the  decision
railed  against  the  Missouri  Compromise  restriction  rather  than  the  issue  of Negro
citizenship).
653 See  GOSSETT,  supra note  639,  at  29  ("The  importance  of  Negro  slavery  in
generating  race theories in this country can hardly be overestimated."). 654 See supra text accompanying notes 63941.
655  Cf Barbara Jeanne Fields, Slavery, Race and  Ideology in the United States of America,
181  NEW LEFT  REV.  95, passim (1990)  (arguing that the concept of race emerged, and
continues to this day, in significant part to resolve the contradiction between  espoused
rights and ideals and actual practices).
656We  do not mean  to suggest,  and would  be incorrect  if we did,  that there  was
any unanimity in public opinion  about slaves and  slavery.  See Gossett, supra note 639,
at 53 (noting  that, although  "[t]he  Negro  would  have  to wait a long time,"  eventually
"impressive  voices were  raised in  behalf of his innate  intellectual  and temperamental
equality with the whites").  There were  always dissenters, visionary thinkers, courageous
social movements,  and  individuals of deep  perception,  who  knew for  themselves and
shouted  to  others  that  slaves  were  suffering  from  a  degrading  and  dehumanizing
situation,  not  dispositional  inferiority.  Very  often  these  voices  in  the  dispositional
wilderness  came  from  freed  or  escaped  slaves  themselves.  See,  e.g.,  DOUGLASS,  supra
note  638,  at  1887  (remembering  slaves'  songs  as  "tones  loud,  long and  deep;  they
breathed the prayer and complaint of souls  boiling over with the bitterest anguish.");
BULLWHIP  DAYS:  THE  SLAVES  REMEMBER  41  (James  Mellon  ed.,  1988)  ("'That was  all
the  slave  thought about,  then:  not  being  a  slave.  Because  slavery  time  was  hell."'
(quoting former  slave  Mary  Gaffney)).  Other oral  histories  reveal  that many  slaves
themselves  internalized  the  dispositionist account  of their predicament.  See generally
FED.  WRITERS'  PROJECT,  WORKS  PROGRESS  ADMIN.,  SLAVE  NARRATIVES:  A  FOLK
HISTORY OF  SLAVERY  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  FROM  INTERVIEWS  WITH  FORMER  SLAVES
(1941)  (providing  numerous  examples  from  among  more  than  2,300  first-person
accounts of slavery),  available  at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/ammem/snhtml/.  This human
tendency is part of what makes dispositionism so powerful.
657 See Tania Tetlow,  The Founders and Slavery:  A  Crisis of Conscience, 3  LOY. J.  PUB.
IN'r.  L.  1, 11  (2001)  (noting thatJefferson  owned  154 slaves in  1794, only ten  percent
of whom he manumitted upon his death).
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Jefferson  presumed  to  analyze  the  inherent  nature  of  slaves'
inferiority  through  a  neutral  and  scientific  approach.  In  an
extended  argument  in  his  Notes  on  the  State  of  Virginia, Jefferson
enumerated  in  remarkably  dispositionist  terms  the  evidence  that  he
found tojustify the  maintenance  of slaverypu  We  quote  him here  at
length, not only because  his  analysis  is  so revealing,  but also because
it is  his analysis,  the  careful  work of a man  whose desire  for a shared
freedom for  all men is so celebrated in our culture:
6
,,
9
The  first  difference  which  strikes  us  is  that  of colour....  Is  it  not the
foundation  of a greater  or less  share  of beauty  in  the  two  races?  Are
not the fine  mixtures of red and white,  the expressions  of every passion
by  greater  or  less  suffusions  of  color  in  the  one,  preferable  to  that
eternal  monotony, which  reigns in  the countenances,  that  immoveable
veil  of black which  covers  all  the  emotions  of the other  race?  Add  to
these,  flowing  hair,  a  more  elegant  symmetry  of  form,  their  own
judgment in favour  of the whites,  declared  by their  preference  of them,
as  uniformly  as  is  the  preference  of  the  Oranootan  for  the  black
women  over  those  of his  own  species ....  A  black,  after  hard  labour
through  the day,  will  be  induced  by  the  slightest amusements  to sit up
till  midnight,  or  later,  though  knowing  he  must  be  out  with  the  first
dawn  of  the  morning.  They  are  at  least  as  brave,  and  more
adventuresome.  But  this  may  perhaps  proceed  from  a  want  of
forethought,  which  prevents  their  seeing  a  danger  till  it  be  present.
When  present,  they  do  not  go  through  it  with  more  coolness  or
steadiness  than  the  whites.  They  are  more ardent after  their  female:
but love  seems  with  them  to  be  more  an  eager  desire,  than  a  tender
delicate  mixture of sentiment  and sensation.  Their griefs  are  transient.
Those  numberless afflictions, which  render  it doubtful  whether heaven
has  given  life  to  us  in  mercy  or  in  wrath,  are  less  felt,  and  sooner
forgotten  with  them.  In general,  their existence  appears  to participate
more  of  sensation  than  reflection.  To  this  must  be  ascribed  their
disposition  to  sleep  when  abstracted  from  their  diversions,  and
unemployed  in labour.  An  animal whose  body  is  at rest, and  who does
not reflect,  must  be  disposed  to  sleep  of course.  Comparing  them  by
their  faculties  of memory,  reason,  and  imagination,  it appears  to  me,
that in  memory  they  are  equal to  the  whites;  in  reason  much  inferior,
as  I  think  one  could  scarcely  be  found  capable  of  tracing  and
(158 THOMAS JEFFERSON,  NOTES  ON  THE  STATE  OF  VIRGINIA  (1787),  reprinted in
THOMAS JEFFERSON:  WRITINGS  123,  264-70  (Merrill  D. Peterson ed.,  1984).
659  Much  has  been  written  on Jefferson's  views  about  slavery.  See,  e.g.,  Aaron
Schwabach,  Jefferson  and  Slavery,  19  T.  JEFFERSON  L.  REv.  63,  77-87  (1997)
(summarizing Jefferson's  views  on slavery and collecting  citations of scholarly work on
the issue); Tedow,  supra note 657, at  10-24  (describing  the hypocrisy  of the founding
generation  and  examining Jefferson's  use  of racial  inferiority  to  resolve  it);  see  also
sources cited supra note 639  (containing extended  analyses  ofJefferson's  thoughts on,
and contributions to, American racism).
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comprehending  the  investigations  of  Euclid;  and  that  in  imagination
they are  dull,  tasteless,  and  anomalous....  But  never  yet  could  I  find
that a black  had uttered  a  thought above  the  level  of plain  narration;
never see  even  an  elementary  trait of painting  or sculpture ....  Misery
is  often  the  parent  of  the  most  affecting  touches  in  poetry.-Among
the  blacks  is  misery  enough,  God  knows,  but  no  poetry.  Love  is  the
peculiar cestrum  of the  poet.  Their  love  is  ardent,  but  it kindles  the
senses  only, not the imagination.
...  It  is not against  experience  to suppose,  that  different species  of
the  same  genus,  or varieties  of the  same  species,  may possess  different
qualifications.  Will not a lover  of natural  history then, one who  views
the  gradations  in  all  the  races  of  animals  with  the  eye  of philosophy,
excuse an  effort  to keep  those in  the department  of man  as distinct  as
" Jefferson  is attaching  himself explicitly  to a particular school of thought in the
eighteenth  century  which  held that Africans  were  in  fact  the  same  species  as  man,
rather  than  some  lesser  species.  See,  e.g., JORDAN,  supra note  639,  at  308  (citing  a
debate  at  Harvard's  1773  commencement  where  one  student  argued  that Africans
were the  same species  as white  men).  But notice  how little  difference  it makes  with
respect to Jefferson's dispositionism.  Whether the Africans were  an inferior species or
a  lesser  quality  of  human,  Jefferson  sees  their  condition  as  resulting  from  stable,
internal  dispositional  factors,  and  not  from  the  situation.  Later  scholars  would  go
further than Jefferson and claim to demonstrate that Africans  were, indeed, an inferior
race.  Samuel Morton, one of the best-known antebellum  scientists, amassed the largest
skull  collection  in  the world  in  his  scientific  endeavor  to  demonstrate  that  racial
distinctions  reflected  deep  genetic  differences.  More  specifically,  he  applied  this
theory  of polygeny  to  "prove"  that  Africans  were  inferior.  See  SAMUEL  GEORGE
MORTON,  CRANIA  AMERICANA  5-7  (1839)  (describing  the African  race  as  "the  lowest
grade  of humanity");  see also Am.  Philosophical  Soc'y,  Samuel  George Morton Papers:
1819-1850, at http://www.amphilsoc.org/library/mole/m/mortonsg.htm  (last visited
Oct. 30, 2003).  "Morton's work met with  a receptive  audience in much  of the United
States.  Its massive empirical  base was praised by the scientific elite, and his theories on
human  relations were  endorsed  avidly  by pro-slavery  advocates."  Id.; see  also GOULD,
supra note  639,  at  101-04  (illustrating  the  connections  between  Morton's  work  and
American  slavery).  For  a  relatively  brief history  of  the  emergence  of polygeny  in
America, and  the role played  by numerous scholars,  including Morton and  Harvard's
Louis  Agassiz,  see  Robert  Bernasconi,  Introduction  to  AMERICAN  THEORIES  OF
POLYGENESIS,  at v-xiii  (Robert Bernasconi  ed.,  2002).  Agassiz,  a renowned  European
scientist who came  to America in 1846, had initially concluded  that all humans were  of
one  race.  Id.  But  after  being  in  America  and  reviewing  Morton's  evidence,  he
converted  to  polygeny.  Id.  Apparently,  it  was  not just  Morton's  highly  credible
statistical  analysis  that influenced  Agassiz.  In  a  letter  that  he  wrote  to  his  mother,
Agassiz  indicated  that his own  personal encounters  with slaves  were  having an  effect.
Because they were, by  their appearance,  an evidently "degraded and degenerate  race,"
Agassiz found it difficult "to repress  the feeling that they are not of the same blood  as
us."  Id.  For a more extended account of polygeny,  see GOULD,  supra note 639,  at 71-
104  (exploring  the  development  of  polygeny  throughout  the  nineteenth  century);
JOHN  S.  HALLER, JR.,  OUTCASTS  FROM  EVOLUTION:  SCIENTIFIC  ATTITUDES  OF  RACIAL
INFERIORITY,  1859-1900  passim (1971)  (describing  the  work  of numerous  American
scientists  in  the late  nineteenth  century  who,  inspired  largely  by  Darwin's  work  on
evolution,  attempted  to use science  to prove what they assumed  to be true:  that non-
white "races" were more or less inferior to the whites).
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nature  has  formed  them?  This  unfortunate  difference  of  color,  and
perhaps of faculty,  is  a powerful  obstacle  to  the emancipation  of these
661
people.
Jefferson's  blindness  to  the  situation  is  obvious  to  us  now.  We
can,  from our vantage,  see  the  situation  of slavery  like we  can  see  a
gun  to the head.  But, in Jefferson's  time, the  situation was  obscured
by the  more salient (and  affirming)  dispositions.  While  arguing that
white  people  were  obviously  more  beautiful  than  blacks,  Jefferson
cites blacks'  "own judgment  in favour of the  whites," 66 ' 2  but does  not
see  the  extreme  power  disparities  that  likely  lead  to  this  perceived
reaction.  This  is  an  egregious  instance  of dispositions  wrongly
being  thought  to  be  "revealed"  through  behavior.
6 3  Jefferson
does not see that the situation of forced labor might require  the kind
of palliative  function  of song  that  Douglass  spoke  of, 664  but  rather
concludes  that  the  singing  is  evidence  of  a  "carefree"  disposition.
Furthermore,  he  remarkably  infers  that  blacks  dispositionally
required  less  sleep  than  whites,  ignoring  the  fact  that  sleep  was
situationally  less  available  to  them. 6''  Jefferson  also  concludes  that
blacks  had  inferior  reason  and  imagination,  without  appreciating
the  situation-the  fact  that  blacks  were  denied  schooling,  for
example,  or the  opportunity  for creative  expression  _that created
667
that condition.
At  the  same  time  that blacks  were  perceived  as  inferior to whites
in reason,  they were seen  as  dispositionally superior to whites  in doing
661  JEFFERSON,  supra note 658, at 264-67, 270  (footnote added).
662 Id. at 265.
663 See supra text accompanying  note  32  (discussing  the role  played by "revealed"
preference  assumptions in conventional economic theory).
664  See supra text accompanying note  638.
665  See, e.g.,  SOLOMON  NORTHUP,  TwELVE YEARS  A  SLAVE  167,  171  (Dover Publ'ns
1970)  (1854)  ("An hour before daylight the horn  is  blown.... [T]hey oftentimes labor
till  the  middle  of the night");  cf  WILLIAM  GOODELL,  THE AMERICAN  SLAVE  CODE  IN
THEORY  AND  PRACTICE  128-29  (Negro  Univs.  Press  1968)  (1853)  (citing  South
Carolina's prohibition on forcing slaves  to work more  than fifteen hours per day in the
summer or fourteen hours a day in the winter).
666  See EUGENE D. GENOVESE,  ROLL, JORDAN,  ROLL:  THE WORLD THE SLAVES  MADE
561-63  (1974)  (outlining formal  bans on slave education).
667  Of course, Jefferson  was  not only  wrong  in  his  dispositionist  explanation  of
slaves'  lack of reason and imagination,  he was also wrong to conclude that slaves lacked
those qualities.  Scholars  have unearthed  an incredibly rich world of slave  culture  that
was,  by situational necessity,  largely kept hidden  from slaveholders.  Seminal studies  of
the  elaborate  and  extensive  cultures  built  by  slaves  include,  among  many  others,
GENOVESE,  supra note  666,  and  LAWRENCE  W.  LEVINE,  BLACK  CULTURE  AND  BLACK
CONSCIOUSNESS:  AFRO-AMERICAN  FOLK THOUGHT FROM SLAVERYTO  FREEDOM  (1977).
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the  sort  of work  that the  slaveholders  needed.  As Jefferson  noted,
they seemed  to forget their afflictions,  required  less sleep,  and  were
more  resistant  to  heat.  Therefore,  they  were  well-suited  as  forced
laborers.66
It is  important  to  note  that Jefferson  does not entirely  disregard
the influence of the situational effects  of slavery.  In fact, he purports
to  examine  and  control  for such evidence.  He  explains that "[the
improvement of the  blacks in body and  mind, in the first instance  of
their  mixture  with  the whites,  has been  observed  by  every  one,  and
proves that their inferiority is  not the  effect  merely of their  condition
of  life."
669   Jefferson  continues  his  proof  by  comparing  American
slaves to Roman slaves, who he claims were treated significantly worse
than  American  slaves-in  other  words,  their  situations  were  even
more stifling.70  But, as he then claims,
notwithstanding  these  and other discouraging  circumstances  among the
Romans,  their  slaves were  often  their  rarest  artists.  They  excelled  too
in  science,  insomuch  as  to  be  usually  employed  as  tutors  to  their
master's  children.  Epictetus, Terence,  and Phaedrus,  were  slaves.  But
they were  of the  race  of whites.  It is  not their condition then,  but nature,
which has produced the distinction.
6 7
1
668  This ability to see  "superior" qualities in  an "inferior" group  helps reveal  how
the tendency to dispositionalize is often  motivated  largely by a desire  to justify existing
power relationships.  See infra notes  685-86.  By attributing  superior  physical strength
and  athleticism  to  slaves, Jefferson  further  naturalized  the  division  of labor.  Some
argue,  quite  compellingly, that the  same sorts  of attributions  are made  today,  to  the
same  effect.  See,  e.g, JOHN  HOBELMAN,  DARWIN's  ATHLETES:  How  SPORT  HAS
DAMAGED  BLACK AMERICA  AND  PRESERVED  THE  MYTH  OF  RACE  31-51  (1996)  (arguing
that the general  success  and superstardom of blacks  on  the athletic field have  helped
to justify  their exclusion  and  inferior  status  elsewhere  while  giving  the  reassuring
appearance of integration).
669  JEFFERSON,  supra note  658,  at 267  (emphasis  added).  Jefferson's  suggestion,
here,  that  the  inferiority of  blacks  is  genetic,  remains  only  an  implicit  suggestion.
Explicit "proof" for that proposition would await further scientific study by others.  See
HALLER supra note 660, at 3-39  (describing  the schools  of thought and  methodologies
that developed  in the nineteenth  century to classify races). 670JEFFERSON,  supra note 658, at 267-68.
671  Id.  at  268  (emphasis  added).  Jefferson  again,  ignored  the  situation.  In
Ancient Rome,  some slaves were given  tasks requiring literacy, such as accounting and
education.  See ORLANDO  PATTERSON,  SLAVERY AND  SOCIAL DEATH:  A  COMPARATIVE
STUDY  180  (1982)  (noting that in  Ancient  Rome  "skilled  and literate  slaves  came  to
dominate  not only urban  industries, but education,  the arts, theater, and  literature");
THOMAS WIEDEMANN,  GREEK AND  ROMAN  SLAVERY 8  (1981)  (noting that Roman  slaves
were  "entrusted with  supervisory functions  such  as  responsibility for  the city accounts
or  weights  and  measures").  By  contrast,  in  many  states  in  the  American  South,
especially  after  the  Nat Turner rebellion,  it was  a  crime  to  teach  a  slave  to  read  or
write.  See  JANET  DUITSMAN  CORNELIUS,  "WHEN  I  CAN  READ  My TITLE  CLEAR":
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Thomas Jefferson,  who announced  to the world that "all men are
created  equal," 6'  who founded the  University of Virginia  and carried
the  Enlightenment's  torch  through  his  lifelong  emphasis  on  the
importance  of education,  who  believed  he  was  an  objective  natural
historian  and scientist, still could not see  the  situation  in  the  case  of
slavery.  Dispositionism  runs  deep,  and  we  can  know  with  fair
confidence  that, were we  living in Virginia at  the time  that Jefferson
wrote,  our  position  likely  would  have  been  even  less  situationally
673 sensitive  than his was.
A review  of Jefferson's justifications  highlights  the  source  and
destination  of our  dispositionist  tendencies.  When  we  miss  or
downplay  the  situation,  and  see  or  exaggerate  dispositions,  we  miss
the hurdles, holes, quicksand, and other obstacles  that can  influence
the  outcome  of any  race, and  instead  attribute  the  outcomes  to  the
racers  themselves.  Given  the  existence  of  the  fundamental
attribution error, it is  very  hard for us  not to  assume  that we  are  all
competing on a level  playing field, that the victor deserves  the spoils
and  the  losers deserve  their fate.  And it is  not just  individuals  that
are  engaged  in  a  dispositional  race.  Indeed,  entire  "races"  are
competing  against  each  other.  The  fact  that one  group  dominates
another  often  carries  its  own  justification.  Superior  races,  as
measured  by  their  ability  to  dominate,  should  dominate,  as  nature
appears  to reveal.674  As Alabama physician Josiah  Nott put it in  1854,
LITERACY,  SLAVERY  AND  RELIGION  IN  THE  ANTEBELLUM  SOUTH  32-33  (1991)
(describing laws in Georgia,  Louisiana,  North Carolina, Virginia, Alabama, and South
Carolina prohibiting  the education of slaves).
672  THE DECLARATION  OF  INDEPENDENCE  para. 2 (U.S.  1776).
673  Likely, that is, because acceptance of slavery was the dominant view, as  we  have
noted, and  will  discuss  below.  What one  thought about slavery  may  have depended,
importantly, not on who one was, but rather where one stood.
674  For many,  however, it  is  not just revealed  by nature,  but by God  as well.  For
example,  the  religious  justification  for  slavery  was  also  extremely  popular  and
powerful.  See generally FREDRICKSON,  supra note  639, at 15-49  (describing the influence
of religion  on  the  advent  of  racism).  The  typical  religious  justification  generally
began  with  the  claim  that  God  recognized  and  sanctioned  slavery  in  the  Old
Testament.  Abraham,  the  benevolent  and  powerful  patriarch,  held  slaves  himself
and  was  therefore  considered  the  ideal  for  many  slaveholders.  See  EUGENE  D.
GENOVESE,  THE  SLAVEHOLDERS'  DILEMMA:  FREEDOM  AND  PROGRESS  IN  SOUTHERN
CONSERVATIVE  THOUGHT, 1820-1860, at 38  (1992)  ("Abraham loomed as the principal
Old  Testament  figure  among  the slaveholders.").  The  next step  in  the  religious
argument  was  the  assertion  that  God  wanted  Africans  to  become  slaves.  See
WILLIAM JOHN GRAYSON,  THE  HIRELING  AND  SLAVE  36-39  (1854)  ("Hence has
the  negro  come,  by  God's  command  /  For  wiser  teaching,  to  a  foreign
land  .... ).  Indeed,  even  conceding  that  slavery  was  a  harsh  means,  propo-
nents  would  argue  that it was  for good ends  and  part of a  larger divine  plan.  See
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shortly  before  the  Dred  Scott  decision:  "Nations  and  races,  like
individuals, have each an especial  destiny:  some  are born to rule, and
others  to  be  ruled....  No  two  distinctly-marked  races  can  dwell
together  on  equal  terms....  [H]uman  progress  has  arisen  mainly
,,676 from the war of the races ....
id. at  36-37  ("And  though  the  way  be  rough,  the  agent  stern,  /  No  other
mode,  can  human  wits  discern,  /  No  better  scheme,  may  wealth  or  virtue
find,  /  To  tame  and  to  instruct  the  negro  mind  .... " (footnote  omitted));
id.  at  38  ("So  here,  though  hid  the  end  from  mortal  view,  /  Heaven's
gracious  purpose  brings  the  negro  too;  /  He  comes  by  God's  decree,  not
chance  nor  fate,  /  Not  force,  nor  fraud,  nor  grasping  schemes  of
State .... ").  God worked  in  mysterious  ways,  and  mere men  were not to question
the motives of the Almighty.  As in Galileo's  time,  it was very difficult to question  the
teachings of various  churches.  See PETER  KOLCHIN,  AMERICAN  SLAVERY:  1619-
1877,  at 185,  186  (1993)  (describing  the South  as the "home of religious  and
social  orthodoxy").  Not surprisingly,  the  notion  that God  chose  Africans  to be
slaves found its  way into  the legal  system  as well.  See HIGGINBOTHAM,  supra note  639,
at 14  (describing how notions of the appropriateness  of slavery worked  their way into
court opinions).
675 See supra notes  648-51,  and  accompanying  text (quoting  Chief Justice  Taney's
opinion).
676 J.  C.  NoTT  & GEORGE  R.  GLIDDON,  TYPES  OF MANKIND  53,  79  (1854).  For an
interesting  biographical  account  of Josiah  Nott's  life  as  a  humanitarian  scientist
devoted  to  understanding  and  treating yellow  fever,  on  one  hand,  and  as  a  racial
scientist devoted  to advancing  racial prejudice  and white supremacy on  the other, see
REGINALD  HORSMAN, JOSIAH  NoTr OF  MOBILE:  SOUTHERNER,  PHYSICIAN  AND  RACIAL
THEORIST  (1987).
It is worth pausing to emphasize  our belief that the very concept of "race"  is itself
based  mostly  on  a  fundamental  attribution  error  motivated  by  this  larger  motive  to
justify inequalities.  When  groups of people  appear to be doing better  or worse  than
other  groups,  those  experiencing  and  observing  the difference  often  have  a  strong
desire to attribute  causation for it  to a legitimating source.  See infra notes  685-86 and
accompanying  text. Salient group characteristics, if they exist, are often seized  upon to
carry that weight.  Racial differences, from skin color to hair texture,  fit the  bill nicely.
As so often  happens, though,  the  most salient  features do not necessarily  have  much
causal  significance.  And,  as  many  geneticists,  biologists,  historians,  and
anthropologists  have  argued,  that  appears  to  be  the  case  with  many  of the  "racial"
differences  that  we  observe.  See,  e.g.,  JOSEPH  L.  GRAVES,  THE  EMPEROR'S  NEW
CLOTHES:  BIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF  RACE AT THE  MILLENNIUM  (2003)  (reviewing the
biological theories of "race"  and the evidence  that "race" has very little to no biological
origins beyond those few that are sometimes evident on the surface); AUDREY  SMEDLEY,
RACE  IN  NORTH  AMERICA:  ORIGIN  AND  EVOLUTION  OF  A WORLDVIEW  22  (1993)
("[Race]  was the cultural invention  of arbitrary meanings applied to what appeared  to
be natural  divisions within  the human species.  The  meanings had social  value but no
intrinsic  relationship  to  the  biological  diversity  itself.").  For  an  interesting  and
readable  on-line article on this topic, see Jonathan  Marks,  Scientific and Folk Ideas About
Heredity,  at  http://personal.uncc.edu/jmarks/interests/Baltimore.html  (last  visited
Oct. 26,  2003)  (describing the  naturalizing  but false  racial  categories  that most  of us
have internalized and some of the effects of those categories).  Again, there is a strong
tendency to  miss  the larger context and be  fooled  by  the  vivid  particulars  that stand
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ii.  Consent-implied and revealed
Those  justifications  led  to  another  separate,  but  related,
dispositionist justification  of  slavery-the  myth  that,  were  Africans
competent  to choose,  they would  choose  slavery for themselves.  But
because  they were not, the  responsibility  fell on whites  to choose  for
them.  George  Fitzhugh,  a  slavery  proponent  and  celebrated
Southern  polemicist wrote,  "[the  Negro]  is but a  grown  up child,
and  must be  governed  as  a  child,  not as a  lunatic  or criminal.  The
master  occupies  towards  him  the  place  of parent  or  guardian. 677
Proponents argued that  slavery was  the best thing for the  Africans
because  it allowed  them to become  "civilized,"  to become  Christian,
and to live  a comfortable  life,  free  from  the  dangers of their former
life  as African  savages.6  Thus, there was  at least an implied consent
on the part of blacks  to the slavery system.
out.  When Jefferson  began his  defense of slavery with the phrase  "the first difference
which strikes us is that of colour," he was  evincing what we would  call the fundamental
racial attribution  error.
677  GEORGE  FITZHUGH,  SOCIOLOGY  FOR  THE  SOUTH,  OR  THE  FAILURE  OF  FREE
SOCIETY83  (Burt Franklin  1965)  (1854).
C7S This concept  is vividly portrayed  in verse:
And yet the  life, so unassailed by care,
So blest with moderate work, with ample fare,
With  all the good the pauper Hireling needs,
The happier Slave  on each plantation leads;
Safe  from harassing doubts and annual fears,
He dreads no famine, in unfruitful years;
If harvests fail from inauspicious  skies,
The Master's  providence  his food supplies;
No paupers perish here for want of bread,
Or lingering live, by foreign  bounty fed;
No exiled trains of homeless peasants go,
In distant climes, to tell their tales of woe;
Far other fortune, free from care and strife,
For work, or bread, attends the Negro's life,
And Christian Slaves  may challenge  as their own,
The blessings claimed in fabled states alone-
The cabin home, not comfortless, though rude,
Light daily labour, and abundant food,
The sturdy health,  that temperate  habits yield,
The cheerful  song, that rings in every field,
The long, loud laugh, that freemen  seldom share,
Heaven's boon to bosoms unapproached  by care,
And boisterous jest and humour unrefined,
That leave,  though rough, no painful  sting behind;
While, nestling near, to bless their humble lot,
Warm social joys surround the Negro's cot,
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A more  extreme  version of that paternalistic  dispositionist  fallacy
was  the view that slaves actually  chose  to be slaves-their consent and
support  for  the  institution  was  actually  revealed  by  their happiness
and  satisfaction.  In  this  view,  there  was  really  nothing  paternalistic
involved.  Slaves  were  perceived  to  have  consented  by  the  fact  that
they seemed  to like it.  In this conception,  slavery was  contrasted  with
the  system  of  wage  labor  in  the  North,  and  was  seen  as  clearly
superior.  Fitzhugh again made  the argument:
The  negro slaves of the South are  the happiest,  and, in  some  sense,  the
freest people in  the world.  The children  and  the aged and  infirm work
not at  all, and yet have  all the comforts  and  necessaries of life  provided
for  them.  They  enjoy  liberty,  because  they  are  oppressed  neither  by
care nor labor.
6 '
In  1861,  former United  States Senator James  Henry Hammond
from  South  Carolina explained  the  seemingly unchallenged  "logic"
of the system:
"In  all  social  systems there  must  be a  class  to  do  the  menial  duties,  to
perform  the drudgery  of life.  That is,  a  class requiring  but a  low order
of intellect  and but  little skill.  Its  requisites are  vigor, docility,  [and]
fidelity.  Such  a  class you  must have,  or you  would not have  that other
class  which  leads  progress,  civilization,  and  refinement.  It  constitutes
the  very  mudsill of society and  of political  government....  Fortunately
for  the  South,  she  has  found  a  race  adapted  to  that  purpose  at  her
hand.  A race inferior  to her own,  but eminently qualified  in temper, in
vigor,  in  docility,  in  capacity  to  stand  the  climate,  to  answer  all  her
purposes.  We use them  for our purpose,  and we  call  them slaves."
6 s 0
From  where  Hammond  stood,  the  need  for  slaves  was  beyond
question.  That was  the way great societies  had always  done it.  If you
accept as  a  starting  point  that  certain  people  are  inherently  and
The evening dance  its merriment imparts,
Love, with  his rapture, fills their youthful  hearts,
And placid  age, the task of labour done,
Enjoys the summer shade, the winter's sun,
And, as through life  no pauper want he  knows,
Laments no poorhouse penance at its close.
GRAYSON,  supra note  674, at 52-54.
679  GEORGE  FITZHUGH,  CANNIBAI.S  ALL!  OR,  SLAVES  WITHOUT  MASTERS  29
(Richmond, A. Morris 1857);  see also DON E.  FEHRENBACHER,  supra note  652, at 428
(noting that Chief Justice  Taney described  the  lives of slaves as "usually cheerful and
contented"  (quoting SAMUEL TYLER,  MEMOIR  OF ROGER BROOKE  TANEY,  L.L.D. 660-64
(2d ed. 1876))).
CA0  CARL T.  ROwAN,  DREAM  MAKERS,  DREAM  BREAKERS:  THE  WORLD  OF JUSTICE
THURGOOD  MARSHALL  10 (1993)  (quoting SenatorJames Henry Hammond).
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dispositionally inferior,  the best way to maximize  the utility of society
is  to  put  those people  at the  bottom.""  And if it happens  that even
the slaves prefer-or would  if they were competent-to  be slaves,  then
the idea of emancipation  is ludicrous.
b.  Amplifying dispositionism: The anti-slavery bogeypeople
In  addition  to  those  dispositionist  rationales,  defenders  of  the
status  quo of slavery  also  pointed  to  threats of bogeymen  lurking  in
any change  to  the  situation.  Change  was  frightening, and  could  be
made  to  seem  even  more  so,  not only  to  slaveholders,  but  to  lower
classes  as  well,  including  non-slaveholding  planters  and  poor  white
laborers.  Each of these groups viewed  the  maintenance  of the social
system  as  essential  to keeping  their fears  from becoming  reality.  As
historian  James  McPherson  puts  it,  "[slaveholders]  managed  to
681  We  can  now  see  what  might  be  called  a  "Pareto  inefficiency  bogeyman"  to
justify slavery.  It was widely held that the lives of blacks wouldn't  improve much  after
slavery, and  that the  lives of whites  would get considerably worse.  Proponents would
argue,  why rock the boat when it would  make some people  worse  off without making
others better?  For instance, Alexis de  Tocqueville surmised that:
If  [a  slave]  becomes  free,  he often  feels  independence  as  a  heavier  burden
than slavery  itself, for his  life  has taught  him to submit to  everything,  except
to the dictates of reason;  and when  reason becomes his only guide, he cannot
hear its voice.  A thousand new wants  assail him, and he  lacks  the knowledge
and the energy needed to resist them.  Desires are masters against whom  one
must fight, and  he  has  learned  nothing but to  submit and  obey.  So  he  has
reached  this climax of affliction in  which  slavery  brutalizes him  and freedom
leads him to destruction.
ALEXIS  DE  TOCQUEVILLE,  DEMOCRACY  IN  AMERICA  318  (J.P. Mayer  ed.,  George
Lawrence  trans.,  1969)  (1850).  George Fitzhugh made a similar point:
Would the abolitionists  approve  of a system  of society  that set white children
free, and remitted  them at the age of fourteen,  males  and females, to  all the
rights, both as  to person  and  property, which  belong to adults?  Would  it be
criminal or praiseworthy to do so?  Criminal, of course.  Now, are the average
of  negroes  equal  in  information,  in  native  intelligence,  in  prudence  or
providence  to well-informed  white  children  of fourteen?  We who  have  lived
with  them  for forty years,  think not.  The competition  of the world would  be
too much for the children.  They would be cheated  out of their property and
debased in their morals.  Yet  they would meet every where  with  sympathizing
friends of their  own  color, ready  to aid,  advise  and  assist them.  The  negro
would  be exposed  to  the same  competition  and greater temptations, with  no
greater  ability  to  contend  with  them,  with  these  additional  difficulties.  He
would  be welcome  nowhere; meet with thousands of enemies and no friends.
If he went North,  the white laborers would  kick  him and cuff him, and drive
him out of employment.  If he went  to  Africa,  the  savages  would  cook him
and eat him.  If he  went to  the West Indies,  they would not let  him  in, or  if
they did, they would soon make of him a savage and idolater.
FITZHUGH,  supra note 677, at 88.
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convince  most  non-slaveholding  whites  in  the  South  (two-thirds  of
the  white  population  there)  that  emancipation  would  produce
economic  ruin, social chaos, and racial war.",
8 2
Even  those  that perhaps  philosophically favored  emancipation
feared  that,  if  blacks  were  released,  hell  might  break  loose.  For
instance,  in  a  particularly  grave  rendition  of  this  concern,
Thomas Jefferson  predicted  that
[d]eep  rooted  prejudices  entertained  by  the  whites;  ten  thousand
recollections,  by  the  blacks,  of  the  injuries  they  have  sustained;  new
provocations;  the  real  distinctions  which  nature  has  made;  and  many
other  circumstances,  will  divide  us  into  parties,  and  produce
convulsions  which  will  probably never  end  but in  the extermination  of
the  one or the other race.
682  JAMES M. MCPHERSON,  BATrLE CRY OF FREEDOM:  THE CIVIL WAR  ERA 8  (1988).
This fear expressed  is evident within  the  Dred  Scott decision:
For if [slaves]  were ...  entitled to  the privileges and immunities  of citizens, it
would  exempt  them  from  the  operation  of  the  special  laws  and  from  the
police regulations  which  they considered  to be necessary for their own  safety.
It would give to persons  of the negro race, who were  recognised as citizens  in
any  one State  of the Union,  the  right  to enter  every  other State  whenever
they pleased  ...  and it would  give them  the full  liberty  of speech  in  public
and  in  private upon  all  subjects upon  which  its own  citizens  might speak;  to
hold  public  meetings  upon  political  affairs,  and  to  keep  and  carry  arms
wherever  they went.  And all of this would  be done in  the face of the subject
race  of  the  same  color,  both  free  and  slaves,  and  inevitably  producing
discontent  and  insubordination  among  them,  and  endangering  the  peace
and safety of the State.
Dred  Scott  v.  Sandford,  60  U.S.  (19  How.)  393,  416-17  (1857);  see  also Bryan  v.
Walton,  14 Ga.  185,  202, 206 (1853)  ("[The freed  slave]  resides among us, and yet is a
stranger ....  Generally,  society  suffers,  and  the  negro  suffers  by  manumission....
[Freedom]  to the colored  man ...  is worse than  slavery itself.");  FEHRENBACHER,  supra
note  652,  at  428  (commenting  on  Taney's  view  that  "sudden  emancipation  [of
African-American  slaves]  would  mean  'absolute  ruin.'").  Many  social historians  have
studied  the  part  played  by  the  putative  advantage  of  racial  superiority  in  non-
slaveholders'  support  for  the  social  system  of slavery,  and  the  racial  apartheid  that
would  follow  in  the Jim  Crow  period.  See  DAVID  R.  ROEDIGER,  THE  WAGES  OF
WHITENESS:  RACE  AND  THE MAKING  OF THE AMERICAN  WORKING  CLASS  3-13  (Rev.  ed.
1999)  (summarizing  predecessor  scholarship  and  arguing  that  notions  of  racial
superiority  allowed  the  white  working  class  to  distinguish  and  bolster  itself vis-a-vis
blacks,  thus  encouraging  poor whites'  complicity  in  the social  system  and  inhibiting
the  development  of social  movements  based  on  shared interests  among  poor  whites
and poor blacks).
93 JEFFERSON,  supra note 658,  at 264.  Abraham  Lincoln  also  feared  a version  of
this  bogeyman  and,  therefore,  at  one  point  early  in  the  Civil  War,  suggested  that
blacks  be  kept separate  from  whites  after  emancipation.  See HIGGINBOTHAM,  supra
note  639,  at  67  (noting  that  Lincoln  even  considered  repatriation  of  African
Americans).
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Defenders  of slavery  pointed  to  what  they  saw  as  the  inevitable
and  total  destruction  of the  fabric  of Southern  society  if slavery was
abolished.  As  historian  Eugene  Genovese  notes,  "[t]he  proslavery
theorists  never  tired  of  proclaiming  that  the  greatness  of ancient
Egypt,  Israel,  Greece,  and  Rome  had  been  based  on  slavery ....C68
The  defenders  of slavery  assumed  that  there  could  not be  a  great
and  prosperous  society without slavery;  they were  unable  to imagine
something  that  differed  from  the  status  quo.  The  only  way  to  be
prosperous,  they believed,  was  the  "proven"  way, and thinking  about
alternatives  was  a dangerous  endeavor.  Of course,  the  views  that
blacks  were  inferior,  that  a  successful  society depended  on  the
social  system  of slavery,  and  that only chaos  would  ensue  from
changing it, were wrong.
But  the  fear-mongering  served  an  important  purpose  for  those
who  engaged  in  it  beyond  simply  predicting  hypothetical  future
outcomes.  As  we  have  hinted  throughout  this Article  and  as  we  will
describe  in  more  detail  in  other  work, s there  is  considerable  and
growing social psychological research indicating that the presence of a
threat to existing  systems activates  in us  a general  motive to justify or
legitimate the system, as is.
686  That research further reveals that one of
the  most  effective  means  of  legitimating  the  system  is  to
dispositionalize  those groups  that might otherwise  be seen as  unjustly
victimized.  By increasing fears that the system was at risk, and that any
change  to  the  system  would  be  calamitous,  the  defenders  of slavery
were,  consciously  or  not,  acting  to  reinforce  the  system  and  the
dispositionism  of slaves  on which  the  system  relied.  And  they were
likely having that effect on all  groups, regardless  of their relationship
with  the  system  of  slavery,  including  those  who  were  in  fact  being
harmed.
684  GENOVESE,  supra note 674, at 5.
685  See,  e.g.,  Chen  & Hanson,  Illusion of Law I, supra note  84; Hanson  & Yosifon,
supra note 30.
686  A useful  sample  of that work  containing  support  for the  propositions  in  this
paragraph  and  much  more  would include  the  following  articles:  John  T. Jost &  D.
Burgess,  Attitudinal Ambivalence  and the Conflict Between  Group and System Justification
Motives in Low Status Groups, 26 PERSONALITY  & SOC.  PSYCHOL.  BULL.  293  (2000); John
T. Jost et al.,  Non-Conscious Forms of System Justification: Implicit and Behavioral  Preferences
for Higher Status Groups, supra note 215; John T. Jost, Outgroup Favoritism and the Theory
of System  Justification, supra note  191,  at  89; John  T.  Jost  &  Orsolya  Hunvady,  The
Psychology of System Justification and the Palliative  Function of Ideology,  13 EUR.  REV.  Soc.
PSYCHOL.  11  (2002); John  T. Jost &  Mahzarin  R.  Banaji,  The  Role of Stereotyping in
System-Justification and the Production of False Consciousness, 33  BRIT. J. Soc. PSYCHOL.  1
(1994).
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c.  Dispositionalizing  the opposition
We  have  thus  far  explored  several  ways  in  which  knowledge
structures evolved tojustify the institution of slavery on behalf of those
Who  sought  to  legitimize  it.  More  specifically,  we  have  emphasized
how slaves-and all identity groups for that matter-were more or less
dispositionalized  in  order  to "make  sense"  of the  systems  of slavery,
and  to inoculate  them with  the  "patina of consent.""7  But the deep
capture of "knowledge"  is not accomplished without the deep capture
of knowledge production, and that is also part of the unseen situation.
As  was  true  during  Galileo's  struggles  with  the  Catholic  Church,  as
Stigler argued was true four decades ago of administrative  regulators,
and  as  we  hypothesize  is  generally  true  today,  conceptions  of
ourselves,  others,  and  our  institutions  do  not just  emerge  from
bottom-up, individual  analyses of the given facts.  Nor do they emerge
from a fair tournament of ideas, in which the most meritorious ideas,
beliefs,  and  knowledge  structures  win  out.  Instead,  the winners  are
created,  promoted,  subsidized,  and  protected  by  the  systems,
institutions,  and  individuals  who  enjoy  the  greatest  power  to  define
the  situation.  Influencing  the interior  situation  means  influencing,
among other things, the information  people have  access  to, how it is
framed, and its  credibility.  The success  of pro-slavery  dispositionism
required that dynamic.
688
In  this subsection,  we focus  briefly on one  of its  many elements:
dealing with competing ideas and criticisms of abolitionists.  Here was
the  problem.  Although  dispositionalizing  slaves  helped  many
Southerners ease the dissonance they felt from not permitting the self-
evident natural  rights that they were preaching,  it did not relieve  the
dissonance created by the emerging abolition  movement.  Particularly
after  the  Nat  Turner  rebellion  in  1831,  those  who  justified  and
endorsed slavery  had  to explain  why  so many  other people  were  not
persuaded by the force of their seemingly air-tight arguments.
The  dissonance  was  likely  significant.  According  to  social  psy-
chologists, when such a conflict grows strong, something usually has to
687  The  phrase  is  Duncan  Kennedy's.  See  Duncan  Kennedy,  Legal Education as
Trainingfor  Hierarchy,  in THE POLITICS  OF LAw:  A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE  40, 41  (David
Kairys ed.,  1982)  ("Students act affirmatively within the channels cut for them,  cutting
them  deeper,  giving  the  whole  a  patina  of  consent  and  weaving  complicity  into
everyone's life story.").
688  For a sample of some of the laws prohibiting or discouraging  the promotion  of
any ideas  that might encourage questioning or criticism of slavery, see  GOODELL,  supra
note  665, at 384-86.
[Vol.  152:129THE SFFUA TION
give.  Of course, a person could reconsider and alter her own views,
but  that is  a rare  event,  particularly  when  there  is  a  lot  at stake,  as
there was  on  the  issue  of slavery.  Research  shows  that an  extremely
common  means  of  extinguishing  that  sort  of  interpersonal  or
intergroup dissonance is to attribute the gap between our outlook and
someone  else's  to a lack of objectivity on  their part.  We  assume  that
there  is some  dispositional source of their bias-stupidity, or laziness,
or corruption, or self-interest.6 °  Again, dispositionism saves the day.
And  that  is  largely  what  happened  in  the  South.  To  defend
slavery  and  the  entire  worldview  on  which  it  was  based,  slavery's
proponents  dismissed  abolitionists  and  their  ilk  as  ignorant,
hypocritical,  and jealous  of the  success  achieved  in  the  South.  As
historian James McPherson  summarizes:
[Slavery]  also  established  the  foundation  for  an  upper  class  of
gentlemen  to  cultivate  the  arts,  literature,  hospitality,  and  public
service.  It  created  a  far  superior  society  to  that  of  the  "vulgar,
contemptible,  counter-jumping"  Yankees ....  "Instead  of an  evil,"  said
John  C.  Calhoun  in summing  up  the  southern  position,  slavery was  "a
positive  good ...  the most  safe  and  stable  basis  for free  institutions  in
the world."
691
Southern  newspapers  echoed  this sentiment.  "'The  great evil  of
Northern  free society,"'  insisted a South Carolina newspaper,  "'is,  that
it  is  burdened  with  a  servile  class  of  MECHANICS  and
LABOURERS,  unfit for self-government, yet clothed  with  the  attributes
and  powers  of  citizens."'6 9 2  A  Georgia  newspaper  was  even  more
emphatic in its distaste:
Free society!  we  sicken  at the  name.  What  is  it but a conglomeration
of greasy mechanics,  filthy  operatives,  small-fisted  farmers,  and  moon-
689 See generally  Lee  Ross & Andrew Ward, Naive Realism in Everyday Life:  Implications
for Social Conflict and Misunderstanding,  in  VALUES  AND  KNOWLEDGE  103, passim (Edward
S. Reed et al. eds.,  1996).
690 See, e.g.,  Dale T. Miller & Rebecca  K. Ratner,  The Disparity  Between the Actual and
Assumed Power of Self-Interest, 74J.  PERSONALITY&  SOC.  PSYCHOL.  53,  60  (1998)  (noting
that test-subjects  commonly  overestimate  the impact of self-interest); Dale  T. Miller &
Rebecca  K. Ratner,  The Power of the Myth of Self-Interest, in CURRENT SOCIETAL  CONCERNS
ABOUT JUSTICE  25,  30  (Leo  Montada  & Melvin J. Lerner  eds.,  1996)  (same);  Emily
Pronin,  Daniel Y. Lin  & Lee  Ross,  The Bias Blind Spot:  Perceptions of Bias in Self  Versus
Others, 28  PERSONALITY  &  SOC.  PSYCHOL.  BULL.  369  (2002)  (demonstrating  our
tendency to see other people as biased while assuming that we are unbiased).
691  MCPHERSON,  supra note  682,  at  56  (quoting  CONG.  GLOBE,  25th Cong.,  2d
Sess., app. 61-62  (1838)  (remarks of Senator Calhoun)).
692  LAWRENCE  R.  TENZER,  THE  FORGOTTEN  CAUSE  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR:  A  NEW
LOOK AT THE SLAVERY ISSUE  126 (1997)  (quoting a South Carolina newspaper),
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struck  theorists?  ...  The  prevailing  class  one  meets  with  [in  the
North]  is that of mechanics struggling to be  genteel,  and small  farmers
who  do their own  drudgery, and yet are hardly fit for association  with  a
693 southern  gentleman's  body servant.
In  retrospect,  such  attacks  on  the  dispositions  of  abolitionist
enemies appear to be  a fairly transparent tactic to discredit them.  At
the  time,  however,  those  who  offered  the  critiques  and  those  who
shared in  them,  undoubtedly  believed  that  the  attacks  were  a fairly
neutral assessment of the truth.
d.  Our dispositionalization  of slavery
In just  that way,  today,  we  look  back  with  horror  at slavery  and
the  institutions,  customs,  laws,  and  mindsets  that  made  it  possible.
We  express  outrage  that  "those  people"  could  have  embraced  such
inappropriate  dispositionist  assumptions,  when  it  is  so  clear,  in
hindsight,  that  those  assumptions  were  not  only  wrong,  but  self-
serving mechanisms  of oppression.
The  same  central  lessons  of  the  Galileo  story  are  all  evident
here.  We  retrospectively  witness  powerful  groups  abusing  their
power  by creating  and enforcing  oppressive  laws  based  on  false,  but
self-serving,  dispositionist  attributions.  As with  the  Galileo  story,  we
manage  to  dispositionalize  the  people  involved  as  "evil"-and
obviously  different  from  us.  Yet,  we  are  nonetheless  confident  that
history is not repeating itself today, confident that we  are not blinded
too  by  some  false  dispositionism,  confident  that  we  are  not  also
unduly missing the situation.  In the  examples  of Galileo  and Ameri-
can  slavery  we  can,  in  hindsight, see  situation  as  palpably  as  we  can
see a gun to the head.  And such  a visible form of influence  is,  we  all
agree, unacceptable.  Because  we  can  see the  situation  in retrospect,
we  can  take  comfort in the belief that we are not subject  to anything
similar and that, unlike  those  who  advanced or participated  in those
oppressive practices or "bad acts," we are dispositionally "good."
But  here is  the  rub.  Those  are  precisely  the  same  dispositionist
assumptions  that  the  groups  who  we  see  as  "bad"  made  about
themselves.  They did  not see  oppressive  power shaping their society.
We suspect further that we  take comfort in our own  outrage  at these
obvious evils of the  past, comfort that helps convince  us that we must
not be missing anything like it in our own situation.694  The problem  is
693 MUSCOGEE HERALD  (Georgia), reprinted in N.Y. TRIB.,  Sept. 10,  1856.
694  Today, one of the most well-known  parts  of Galileo's  story is  the  legend  that,
[Vol.  152:  129THE SITUATION
that  we  do  not  understand  that  the  best  defense  against  such
patterns  comes  less  from identifying  flawed  ideas  than  it does  from
identifying the  flaws  in those who  construct the  ideas.  The problem
is  in  the  human  animal  and  our  faith  that  we  are  immune  to  that
which we generally neither see nor understand:  the situation.
Indeed,  instead  of assuming  that our current  views about slavery
and Galileo's imprisonment  provide  evidence  that we  will  not again
make  such  horrific  errors,  a  more  reasonable  inference  would  be
that those  examples,  and the  countless others  like  them,  constitute a
compelling  indication  that history  will  continue  to repeat-precisely
because  we do not appear  to know what  is  moving it.  If humans  are
capable  of believing  that those  we  directly  harm  (be  they  slaves,  or
Milgram's  "learners")  deserve  their  fate,  it should be  even  easier  to
rationalize  the  harms  imposed  less  directly,  less  saliently,  and  more
situationally.
3.  Conclusion
We can thus see that the power of dispositionism,  and the patterns
to which it gives shape, are witnessed  again and again notjust in social
psychology's attributional experiments, nor just in the mundane  basic
habits of our lives, but in  large  and central  questions  of social  policy
and human society.  We will not pursue  this exegesis further here, but
the basic pattern is becoming clear.  When we see disposition and miss
situation, we implicitly  presume  that the situation  is neutral,  that the
playing  field  is  stable,  and  that  everything  else  is  equal.  We  see
outcomes,  then,  as  dispositionally  deserved.  When  the  system  is
challenged  or threatened, all  those involved in the system have a stake
in reinforcing it and, thus, reinforcing its legitimating rationalizations.
As this discussion has indicated, the institution  of slavery emerged
first and was justified later.  And  the justifications  came piecemeal  as
the  need  arose.  Jefferson's  initial  attempt  to  make  sense  of  the
institution was,  at least by comparison  to later efforts, quite  tentative.
as  he was  leaving  his confession,  after  he  had  claimed  that the Earth  did not move,
Galileo  said under his breath,  "and yet it moves."  It's just a legend;  there  is, as  far as
we  have been  able to discover, no real evidence that Galileo  said it.  But, hundreds of
years  later,  we  like  to  believe  he  did.  It  comforts  us  by illustrating  how  Galileo's
capture  and  ultimate  vindication  are  so  very  obvious  in  retrospect.  "Those people"
should  have  known better, and our  hero, Galileo, did.  What  should be  unsettling  is
that, in  Galileo's time,  this part of the story was  invisible.  No one  knew, or probably
would  have  even believed,  that Galileo  said such  a thing.  Those  living through  deep
capture are rarely able  to see  enough of the situation to realize it.
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By  the  middle  of the  nineteenth  century, with  the  attacks  on slavery
growing  to  a feverish  pitch,  the  institution's justifications  were  fully
formed and  robust.  And  they did  the trick.  What had  once been  a
"necessary  evil"  had been  rendered a just, natural,  and  enviable  path
to  civilized  greatness.  And  many  in  the  South  were  proud  of  that
transition.  South  Carolina's  Senator James  H.  Hammond  spoke  of
earlier  times  when  Southerners  "'believed  slavery  to  be  an  evil-
weakness-disgrace-nay  a  sin....  [I]n  fear  and  trembling  [they]
awaited a doom that [they]  deemed  inevitable.' 695  But that belief was
temporary,  as  was  the  resultant fear.  "'  [A]  few bold spirits  took  the
question  up;  they  compelled  the  South  to  investigate  it  anew  and
thoroughly, and what is the result?'  [asked Hammond,]  'Why, it would
be  difficult to  find  a Southern  man who  feels  the  system  to be  the
slightest  burthen  on  his  conscience.'-
6 96  Hammond's  fellow  South
Carolinian,  John  C.  Calhoun,  recounted  the  same  history  from
dissonance to resonance  as follows:  "Many in the South  once believed
that [slavery]  was a moral and political evil; that folly and delusion are
gone; we see it now in its true light, and regard it as the most safe and
stable  basis  for  free  institutions  in  the  world." 9 7  And  so  it  is  that
visible evil fades into the situation and, with it, becomes invisible.
D.  The Situational  Bogeypeople
If not before, it is usually at this point in  the presentation  of our
ideas  to friends, family,  students, and colleagues  that we  are stopped
with  one or another version of "I  hear what you are saying and I may
even  agree, but  I think you are going too far.  Is it not dangerous  to
take the situation so seriously?"
We  suspect that many of our readers  may be experiencing  similar
reactions,  and  we  understand  the  concern.  To  continue  our  argu-
ment, then, we  think it is  necessary  to directly engage  several versions
of this kind  of reaction  to  our claims.  We  are  doing so  not  only  to
try  to  mollify our  readers'  worries,  but also  because  these  common
reactions harmfully narrow the boundaries of most social and  political
debates in our society today.
695  WILLIAM  W. FREEHLING,  PRELUDE  TO CIVIL WAR  299  (1966)  (quoting Senator
James Henry Hammond, Oct. 29,  1858).
696  Id.
697  CONG.  GLOBE,  25th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  App.  61-62  (1838)  (remarks  of Senator
Calhoun).
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One  of our main  concerns with  those  arguments  is  that they  are
not always what they  purport to be.  In  our experience,  they are  not
offered  as  a concern  that emerges  once the  power  of the  situation  is
fully  recognized.  Rather,  they  are  implication-based  fears  that  pre-
vent  people  from  truly  understanding  the  nature  of  our  argument
-that  is,  of the situation.  Still,  those  responses  are  routine,  usually
as  a fallback position-a final  trump  card.  So we  will do  our best  in
this  Section  to  respond  to  commonly  held intuitions,  which  we  call
situational  bogeypeople--siblings of those  that we encountered  earlier. 9 8
These intuitions seem  to come in several varieties.
1.  The Communism  Bogeyman
The most popular version of the challenge  goes like this:
The  playing field  is  level.  And, as  long as everyone  is starting  the  race
together,  there  is no  reason  to be  concerned  about the  fact that there
will be  some winners and some  losers.  That's what a fair competition  is
designed  to do:  separate  winners from  losers  as it creates  incentives  to
win in the process.  Equality of opportunity does not guarantee  equality
of outcome.  If  policymakers  were  to  begin  looking  to  outcomes  as  a
measure  of opportunity,  they would  transform  our  free  world  into  a
communist or socialist regime.
A  major  weakness  of  this  challenge  is  that  it  is  not  actually  a
response  to,  as much  as  it is  a denial  of, our point.  Our  claim  that
situational  influences benefit some groups and disadvantage  others is
a claim that the playing field  is, in ways  unseen,  not level  and that we
are  all operating under the  wrong  presumption.  To  assert that  the
playing  field  is  level  may, in fact, confirm our point:  people  do not
see  relevant  situational  influences  (which  would  include  many  fea-
tures of the playing field)  and overattribute  outcomes to dispositions.
That  basic  challenge  sometimes  finds  some  reinforcement,
though,  by  retreating  to  the  following  version  of  the  communist
bogeyman:
Even  if  the  playing  field  is  not perfectly  level,  it  is  level enough  for  us
to attribute  success or failure  to the participants'  dispositions.  After  all,
many people who  appear  to  start with  situational  disadvantages  outrun
those who  appear to begin  with  situational  advantages-simply  because
they were  dispositionally inclined to overcome  those disadvantages.
698 See supra text accompanying  notes 219-25,  682-86 (discussing the concepts  of
the  totalitarian  and  anti-slavery  bogeymen);  see  also  supra notes  312-13  and
accompanying  text (discussing  the Catholic Church's  fear of heresy).
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This  response  is  just  a  more  nuanced  form  of  denial.
Acknowledging  trivial unevenness  on the  playing field  can often be a
disarmingly  effective  means  of justifying  ignoring  that  unevenness.
Of course, it is possible  that the  field is  only trivially  uneven, but the
evidence  typically  adduced for  that claim  tends  to be very  thin  and
seems  to  be  based  more  on  shared  intuition  than  situational
sensitivity.  We  do  not want  to  deny  that  Horatio  Alger,  and many
like  him,  have  successfully  managed  to  turn  adversity  into
opportunity-or,  in  other  words,  have  dispositionally  chosen  to
overcome  significant situational opposition.  Nor do we  want to deny
that  the  hope  of just  such  an  outcome  is  inspiring  for  many  poor
and  hard-working people in our society.699  But neither do we believe
that  such  exceptional  success  stories  are  much  more  than  that
-exceptional.  The  fact that  there  is  some  movement  across  socio-
economic  groups  does not imply  that situation  does  not  immensely
700 affect outcomes.
First,  when  members  of  disadvantaged  groups  compete  against
advantaged  groups,  the  situation  will influence  the  outcome  even  if
there  are  exceptions.  An  extremely  fast  and driven  runner  with  a
brick  tied  to  his  foot  may  well  outpace  a  slower,  unencumbered
runner.  But  a  class  of  brick-laden  runners  will  tend  to  seem
plodding  or malingering  as  they fall behind  their brick-free  competi-
tors.
Moreover,  what may  be true  individually  almost  certainly  cannot
be  true  generally.  For  instance,  the  fact  that  some  hard-working
people manage  to climb out of poverty does not mean that all could,
if only  they  worked  as hard.  The  point about a  competitive  race  is,
699  See BARBARA  EHRENREICH,  NICKEL  AND  DIMED:  ON  (NOT)  GETTING  BY IN
AMERICA  118  (2001)  (recounting  the  response  of  one  of her  maid  service  co-
workers to  the question of how she  feels about working  for people with so  much
when  she  has so  little:  "All  I can  think of is  like,  wow,  I'd  like  to have this stuff
someday.  It  motivates  me and  I don't feel  the  slightest resentment because,  you
know, it's my goal to get to where they are.").
700  Perhaps  a  parallel  argument  may  be  useful  to  help  make  our  point.  The
tobacco  industry  for  decades  successfully  clouded  the  causal  connection  between
smoking  and  diseases  such  as  lung  cancer  by  emphasizing  two  key  facts:  many
smokers  do not die of lung cancer, and many non-smokers do die of lung cancer.  See
RICHARD  KLUGER,  ASHES  TO  ASHES  203,  209-11  (1996)  (discussing  the  debate
over  the link  between  smoking and  lung  cancer  in  the  1950s).  By  focusing  on
those  individuals,  cigarette  companies  succeeded  in  distracting  us  from  the  fuller
situation-which  was  that the  trends  in  lung  cancer closely  tracked  smoking  habits,
the  incidence  of lung  cancer  among  smokers  vastly  exceeded  that  of non-smokers,
and the amount  that a  person smoked correlated  with  her probability  of contracting
lung cancer.  Id. at 193-97.
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after  all,  to  separate  winners  from  losers.  The  situation  of  the
competition  creates  a meaningful  limit to the  number of winners.  If
everyone  ran  as  hard  as Horatio Alger,  the speed  of the  race  would
increase  to  be  sure,  but  the  number  of  winners  and  losers  would
701 not.
In  any  event,  the  claim  that  policyrnakers  should  not  look  to
outcomes  to  help determine  if  there  is  a problem  with  the  playing
field  simply  denies  a  major  feature  of our  argument.  Because  the
playing  field  is  part  of  the  situation,  there  is  little  reason  to  be
confident that we can know when  it is level  and fair.
Recall  that  nobody  believed  that  the  teachers  in  Milgram's
experiment  would  shock  the  learners  all  the  way  up  to  450  volts.
7 2
The  fact  that  two-thirds  of them  did  suggests  that even  the  experts,
including  Milgram,  misperceived  the  power  of  the  situation  and
overestimated  the  role  of  disposition.  What  social  psychology  and
history teach us is not to trust our perceptions, but to doubt them.
Of course,  claiming  that we  should learn from outcomes  is a very
different  claim  than  "from  each  according  to  his  ability,  to  each
according  to his needs[.] ''7 03  Our argument  is  not that we should all
finish  the  race  together,  but  that  where  people  finish  may  reveal
more about the  race  than it reveals  about the  racers.  Outcomes  can
serve  an immensely  valuable  evidentiary  role  in any serious  attempt
to ensure  that the playing field  is level.
Moreover,  the deference to outcomes as a measure of the process
is  nothing  new.  Indeed,  it  was  Stigler  who  introduced  that  very
methodology  in  assessing  whether  regulations  were  serving  their
purported goal of advancing the public interest.  This outcome-based
701  For example, at Harvard  Law School, new students  are  encouraged  to  believe
that by working hard, they  can  substantially increase  their chances  of getting A's  in
their first-year courses.  They are encouraged  to attend exam-preparation  sessions and
to  heed  feedback  on  mid-semester  assignments.  What  students  and  faculty  often
seem  to  forget,  however,  is  that  those  efforts  will  do  little  to  influence  the  grade
distribution,  which  is  largely  determined  by  a  curve.  What  they  may  influence,
however,  is the sense of dispositional control and responsibility  that students may feel
for their grades.  A common  complaint among second- and third-year students  is that
grading  is,  in  fact,  not well  correlated  with  how  much  energy  they put  into  their
courses-a belief that may help explain why so many seem to reduce  their efforts.
702 See supra text accompanying notes 87-99 (describing Milgram's experiments).
703  Karl  Marx,  Critique  of the Gotha Programme,  inJUSTICE  162 (Alan Ryan ed., 1993).
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assessment,  as  we  indicated  above,  is  one  of  the  most  important
foundational insights of conventional  economic  theory.
04
Finally,  the  idea  that taking  situation into  account  will  somehow
reduce the incentives  of the situationally  disadvantaged  to try to  win,
strikes  us  as  counterintuitive  and  contrary  to  the  most  basic
assumptions  of those  who promote  free competition.  If, in fact,  the
playing  field  is  uneven,  it seems  that all  competitors  gain,  not lose,
incentive  to  run  faster  by  leveling  the  field.  Those  who  are
disadvantaged  on  the  current  field  will  be  given  a  fair  chance,  and
those who are advantaged  will be given a meaningful  challenge.
2.  The Personal-Responsibility  Bogeyman
A  second popular version  of the  situational  bogeyman  goes  like
this:
If  we  begin  to  take  situation  into  account,  people  will  no  longer  be
held  personally  responsible  for their actions.  Criminals  will be  able  to
blame  almost  anything  they  do  on  the  fact  that  they  had  a  bad
situation.  "It  wasn't  me,  it was  the  situation;  I'm  a  victim  of circum-
stances"  will  be  heard  in  all  the  courts  of  the  land and  criminals  will
run free.
We have several  responses to this bogeyman.
First,  as  we  summarized  above,  the  law  already  takes  situation
into account, through doctrines  like duress in contract,70  necessity  in
,,707  708
trespass,  and "heat of passion  in criminal  law.  The  problem, as
we  see  it,  is  that  the  situation  is  far  from  being  an  occasional,
glaringly obvious  gun to the  head, as the current law  treats it.  It is a
704  Supra text accompanying notes  263-82.  Similarly, market-oriented  critics of the
welfare  system motivate  their criticisms  largely  by  arguing that the welfare system  has
failed to achieve its ends.
705 Another version  of the argument  to  which  we are  responding  is  that  even  if
situational  influences  are significant, it is better to pretend that they are not, because
otherwise  doing  so  would  remove  any  self-help  incentive  from  those  who  are
situationally disadvantaged.  This  version  of the personal  responsibility argument  has
several  problems.  First, it  assumes  that  nothing  can  be  done  about  leveling  the
playing field.  Clearly, if the playing field could be leveled, there would be  no need  to
pretend  or  to  create  the added  incentive.  Second,  it  is  an  argument  that seems  in
direct tension  with  the pro-freedom  assumptions  that most of the  people who offer it,
claim  to  embrace.  In the  name of individualism,  they  are  basically  calling  on  us  to
embrace  paternalism:  "let's not tell anyone what we  admit  to be  true, for their  own
benefit."
706 Supra text accompanying  notes 554-614.
707  Supra note 602.
708  Id.
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force  of greater  or lesser  magnitude  in nearly  every  human  interac-
tion.  When  we  argue  that the  law  must  take  situation into  account,
we are  asking  the law  to continue  to function  as  it always has,  but in
a  way  that  gives  the  situation  the  weight  that  social  science  dem-
onstrates it possesses  in human  affairs.
Second,  there  is a strong element of stereotype  in the account  of
this bogeyman.  The  stereotype  is  that the situational character-our
model  of  the  human  animal-is  a  puppet  on  the  strings  of the
situation, entirely lacking in disposition or volition.  But  this is a false
picture  of our model.  We  fully  agree  that  humans  possess  disposi-
tions  and that dispositions  likely  play some  role  in  a great portion  of
our behavior.  But, as  we  argue  above, current  legal  theory and  the
law  overestimate  the  point  at  which  disposition  ends  and  the
situation  begins.  No one wants criminals  to run free, but at the same
time, we do not want to lay blame where it is not due.  A law that takes
a nuanced view of the  roles of situation  and disposition  will be  better
able  to correctly assign  dispositional  responsibility and  blame where
they belong.
Nevertheless,  it  might  seem  that,  if  the  law  were  to  expand  its
acknowledgement  of  situational  factors,  the  result  would  be  to
expand  the  avenues  for  evading  responsibility.  Far  from  it.  As  we
have  shown,  people  systematically-and  often  quite  erroneously-
attribute  causation,  responsibility,  and  blame  to  the  most  visible
actors  in  a given  situation.  They compound  their  mistakes  through
the  fundamental  attribution  error,  by  assuming  that  action  is
attributable  to disposition,  rather  than  situation.  Judges, juries,  and
legislators  are  as vulnerable  to these  cognitive  biases  as anyone  else.
If we  are  truly committed  to the  principle  of personal  responsibility,
then  we  should  be  deeply  troubled  by  the  prospect  that  we  are
applying  it  without  taking  these  biases  into  account.  For  the
damages  to fit the  tort or  the  punishment  to fit  the  crime,  we  must
first be sensitive to the situation.
It  is  our  contention  that,  by  ignoring  situation,  we  may  be
ignoring the  true role  of disposition  and letting those  actors who are
most responsible  for  the harms  we  seek to redress  off the  hook.  To
better illustrate  this point, we  offer a thought experiment, a variation
on  an  actual  experiment.  Imagine  an  alternate  world  in  which
Stanley  Milgram  is  actually  interested  in  studying  the  effects  of
negative  reinforcement  on  learning.  Having  seen  the  power  of the
situation, he  designs  an experiment  identical  in  every respect  to the
actual  one,  with  one  difference:  the  learner  receives  real  electric
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shocks.  Unfortunately,  when  Milgram  runs  these  experiments,  the
learner  receives  third-degree  burns  and  sues  for  damages.  Who
should be held responsible?
Under commonly held notions of "personal responsibility,"  some
might blame  the learner.  He  was an adult and ought to have  known
what  he  was  getting  into.  After  all,  everyone  knows  that  elec-
tricity  is  hot!  Therefore,  he  should  be  made  to  deal  with  the
consequences  of his decision,  instead  of looking  to blame  others for
them.  Some  people,  also  citing  "personal  responsibility,"  might
blame  the  teacher  who  flipped  the  switches  because  she  had many
opportunities  to stop.  There were  teachers who refused  to go along
with  the  experiment  when  they  saw  the  learner's  suffering;  no  one
held  a gun  to this  teacher's  head.  Shouldn't  she be responsible  for
the  (quite visible)  consequences  of her actions?
A typical  "personal responsibility" view  of this lawsuit would likely
stop  at that  analysis  in either  allowing the  loss  or imposing liability.
But what  of Stanley Milgram?  Shouldn't  he have  known  of the  risks
to  the  learner?  Shouldn't  he  be  held  "personally  responsible"  for
setting up a situation in which  the  teacher was quite  likely to flip the
switches?  Or perhaps Yale  University  should  be held  responsible  for
not  better monitoring  Milgram.  Milgram  apparently  conducted  his
original  experiments  with  the  university's  knowledge  and  may  have
been  motivated  by  the university's  tenure  standards  to perform  this
sort  of research.  Doesn't  Yale  profit,  even  to  this  day,  from  the
attention garnered by Milgram's  work?
If any  part  of  this  account  conflicts  with  your  intuitions,  then
consider  the  famed  McDonald's  coffee  case  of a  few years  ago.
7
0
9  In
that case,  hot coffee  spilled  on Stella  Liebeck's  lap, giving  her third-
degree  burns.'  When  she  won  a  verdict  against  McDonald's,
Liebeck  became  a  symbol  of  the  law's  role  in  absolving  citizens  of
711 personal  responsibility  and  the  poster  child  for  tort  reform.
"[R]adio  talk-show  hosts  around  the  country...  lambasted  the
plaintiff,  her  attorneys  and  the  jurors  on  air.  Declining  to  be
interviewed[,]  ...  one juror  explained  that  he  already  had  received
709  See Andrea  Gerlin,  A  Matter of Degree:  How  a Juy Decided that a Coffee Spill is
Worth $2.9 Million,  WALL  ST.J., Sept.  1, 1994, at Al  (recounting the events leading up
to the lawsuit and the trial).
710  Id.
711  See,  e.g.,  This  is  True,  Inc.,  The  TRUE  Stella  Awards,  at  http://www.stella
awards.com  (last updated Apr. 2003)  (showcasing abuses of the tort system in America
and naming an award for such abuse after Stella Liebeck).
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angry calls from citizens around  the country. 7 1 2  Under  the common
sense "personal  responsibility" view,  Ms.  Liebeck  was  responsible  for
knowing  the  coffee  was hot and ought to have  been  more  careful  in
handling it.  After  all,  "she spilled  it on herself.
7 13  However,  when
the jurors were  forced to  look at the situation,  they were able  to see
that McDonald's shared responsibility  for the burns.1
We present  this  case  and our hypothetical  to make  clear  that the
term  "personal  responsibility" does  not resolve  difficult  questions  of
fault.  It  merely  begs  them.  Our  point  is  not  that  people  should
never  be  held  responsible  for  their  acts,  but  that  one  should  not
assume  that their  "common  sense"  can  be  trusted  to  assign  respon-
sibility.7"'  The  law  must  be  concerned  with  questions  of  situation.
712 Gerlin, supra note  709, at Al.
713  Aric  Press et al.,  Are Lawyers Burning  America?, NEWSWEEK,  Mar. 20,  1995, at 32,
34.
714  See Gerlin,  supra note  709, at Al,  A4 (summarizing jurors'  views).  Contrary to
popular perceptions, seventy-nine-year-old  Liebeck was not driving, nor was  the car  in
motion,  when  the accident  occurred.  Her "absurd" conduct was  simply to  place  the
coffee  cup  between  her  legs as she  tried  to  remove  the  plastic  lid.  CARL  T.  BOGUS,
WHY  LAwSUITS  ARE GOOD  FOR  AMERICA  19  (2001).  Furthermore,  McDonald's  served
its coffee at between  180 and  190 degrees  Fahrenheit, whereas the average  household
cup of coffee  is between  130 and 140  degrees Fahrenheit.  Id.  A doctor testified  that
lower temperatures  would have  slowed the rate of burning.  Gerlin, supra note  709, at
A4.  Although  McDonald's  had  received  700  complaints  of coffee  bums  in  the
preceding decade,  it did not sufficiently warn  consumers of the possibility of burns  or
intend to reduce its coffee temperature.  Press et al., supra note 713, at 35; see alsoJohn
F.  Bramfeld, Spilled Coffee and a Shot in the Foot, CHI.  DAILY L.  BULL.,  May  18,  1995, at 6
(suggesting  that  keeping  temperatures  high  despite  complaints  was  a  justified,
deliberate, profit-maximizing  business decision).
Before  ever  filing  a  suit, Ms.  Liebeck  reported  her  injuries  to  McDonald's  and
requested compensation  for her medical expenses  (she spent eight days in the hospital
and underwent  a  series of skin grafts,  leaving her with  permanent scars  over sixteen
percent  of her body).  BOGUS,  supra, at  19-20;  Press  et  al.,  supra, at  34.  Rebuffing
Liebeck's request for $2,000, McDonald's offered $800  to close the matter.  Id.  At trial,
Ms.  Liebeck  only sought damages based  on  the difference  in  injury between  spilling
140-degree  coffee  and spilling  180-degree  coffee.  BOGUS,  supra, at 20.  Furthermore,
despite media coverage  suggesting a "rogue verdict," the jury did not ignore Liebeck's
role  in  the  accident or  absolve  her of responsibility.  They  found  her  to  be  twenty
percent  comparatively  negligent and reduced the compensatory  damages for medical
costs  and disability  to $160,000  from $200,000.  Id.  Moreover,  the  punitive damages
were not quite as arbitrary as commonly depicted-the  $2.7 million  reflected two days
of coffee sales  revenues  for McDonald's.  Gerlin,  supra note  709,  at A4.  The judge
later reduced the punitive damages to $480,000.  BOGUS,  supra, at 20.  Finally, to avoid
an apeal, Liebeck settled the case for an undisclosed amount.  Id.
For  similar  arguments  about  other  products,  see  Hanson  &  Kysar,  Taking
Behavioralism Seriously II, supra note  251,  at 1467-1553  (providing  evidence of how  the
tobacco industry manipulated-and  thus shared  responsibility for-consumer smoking
habits);  Hanson  & Logue,  supra note  402,  at  1350-52  (challenging  the conventional
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How  much  does  the  situation  influence  individuals?  Who  controls
and  profits from  particular  situations?  How  might  the  situation  be
altered  to  influence  individuals  in  other  ways?  These  are  not easy
questions,  but  to  avoid  them  may  be  to  encourage  personal
irresponsibility.
Put differently,  the concern  that taking  hard-to-see  situation into
account may  "encourage  criminals  to  run freely through  our streets"
ignores  the  less  visible  possibility  that  disregarding  situation  may
encourage  even more.
3.  The Paternalism  Bogeyman
No  contingent  of bogeypeople  would  be  complete  without  the
paternalism bogeyman.  Unlike  the  prior  bogeypeople,  the  figure  of
paternalism  appears  more  prominently  and openly  in  legal  theoretic
discourse.  Although  its  precise  definition often  remains shrouded  in
mystery, that has not stopped  it from exercising a powerful  influence
716 in legal-theoretic debate..  Generations  of theorists have  agreed  that
paternalism  is no friend of the dispositional human actor presiding at
the core of the traditional  liberal picture.  John Stuart Mill, who early
laid down  the  line  against  paternalism  in  a  "civilized" society,  stated
that, "the  only  purpose  for which  power can  be  rightfully  exercised
over  any  member  of  a  civilized  community,  against  his  will,  is  to
prevent harm to others.  His own good, either physical or moral, is not
a sufficient warrant.,
7 1 7
Professor  David  Shapiro,  in  his  famous  article  on  the  subject,
claimed  that  the  concept  of paternalism  can  be  conceived  of in  a
number  of  weaker  or  stronger  formulations.1  But  the  basic  anti-
paternalism suspicion has, by now, attached to almost any version of it.
In his article, Shapiro set out, in part, to challenge  Duncan Kennedy's
seminal  claim  that  paternalism  was  actually  quite  widespread  in
private  and public social  arrangements,  including, importantly, many
"personal  responsibility"  argument  against  cigarette  liability);  Hanson,  Yosifon  &
Benforado,  supra note  615  (describing  the  situational  manipulations  by  the  food
industry that have contributed to the obesity epidemic).
716  See, e.g.,  supra text accompanying  notes  388-92  (describing the  ALI Reporters'
rejection of hard-paternalism  in favor of consumer sovereignty).
7:7  JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 68  (G. Himmelfarb ed. 1982)  (1859).
718  David  L. Shapiro,  Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism,  74  VA.  L.  REv.  519,  520
(1988).
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areas  of the  law.  Shapiro  gave  a  renewed  voice  to  the  traditional
view of paternalism  as showstopper, arguing that legal justifications for
many  of  the  kinds  of arrangements  Kennedy  had  pointed  to  were
actually  well  grounded  in  anti-paternalism (at  least  rhetorically).
Professor Shapiro claimed that, in fact, "anti-paternalism  (which  [we]
should perhaps...  [be]  calling  'pro-autonomy')  is  a dominant strain
in  our  tradition."72
1  Moreover,  as  we  have  already  indicated,  legal
economists,  when  met  with  claims  they  perceive  as  threatening  to
individual  autonomy, are quick  to retreat behind, not economics  per
se, but an anti-paternalistic defense  of individual  freedom. 72  Much  of
the  most  recent  law  and  economics-oriented  scholarship  on
paternalism has been directed at defining the boundaries and types of
paternalistic  social policies  that can be justified, assuming that strong
deference should be given  to the  basic "libertarian" view of individual 123
autonomy.  The  paternalism  bogeyman,  despite  the  efforts  of
Kennedy and others, reigns.
719 Shapiro was primarily responding  to the argument found  in Duncan Kennedy,
Distributive and Paternalist  Motives  in  Contract and Tort  Law,  with  Special Reference  to
Compulsory  Terms and  Unequal Bargaining Power, 41  MD.  L.  REV.  563,  624-49  (1982).
This  was  also  the  iew taken  by  H.L.A.  Hart.  See  H.L.A.  HART,  LAW,  LIBERTY  AND
MORALITY  30-34  (1963)  (advocating  the separation  of  law  from  morality  in  certain
areas of personal conduct).
720 Shapiro,  for  example,  notes  that  courts  have  consistently  rested  their
upholding of "seat belt" or "helmet laws"  on public  policy grounds such  as efficiency,
and  even,  with  respect to  the  upholding  of  laws  against  sodomy,  on  the ground  of
supporting public  morals or public  will.  Shapiro, supra note  718, at 541-42.  Neither
type of law has been justified on the ground that it forces people  into behavior  that is
good for them despite  their thinking to  the contrary.  Shapiro himself claims that "one
reason"  he  voted  in  favor  of  Massachusetts'  seat-belt  law  was  that  it  would  lower
insurance  rates.  Id. at 530 n.37.
721  Shapiro, supra note  718, at 572.  While ultimately coming down as a strong anti-
paternalist,  see id. at 572-75,  part of Shapiro's purpose was  to present  an analysis from
the perspective of "legal process,"  an approach  to thinking about the  law that Shapiro
argued had suffered  unwarranted  neglect  by the critical  legal scholars who  he  saw as
emergent in 1988 when he wrote his article.  Id. at 521.
See supra text accompanying notes 551-70; see also Hanson & Yosifon, Missing  the
Situation, (unpublished manuscript,  on  file  with  authors)  (describing  this  pattern  in
legal economists' writings).
723  See,  e.g.,  Paul  Burrows,  Analyzing Legal Paternalism, 15  INT'L  REv.  L.  &  ECON.
489,  497  (1995)  (advocating  an  expanded  emphasis  on  people's  preferences  and
choice  of  behavior);  Colin  Camerer  et  al.,  Regulation for  Conservatives:  Behavioral
Economics and the Case for Assymmetric Paternalism  (forthcoming)  (on file with  authors);
Cass  R.  Sunstein  &  Richard  H.  Thaler,  Libertarian  Paternalism and  the  Law
(forthcoming)  (on  file  with  authors)  (contributing  a  new  perspective  to  welfare
economics);  Eyal  Zamier,  The Efficiency  of Paternalism,  84 VA.  L.  REV.  229,  230  (1998)
(arguing  that paternalism  is  "compatible  with  theoretical  foundations  of  normative
economics" and that "efficiency analysis provides  a centraljustification"  for it).
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A central  effect of its reign is  to scare  away potential interventions
in the apparent dispositional  choices of individuals or arguments  that
would  put  the  meaning  of such  choices  into  doubt.  To  do  so,  the
paternalism  bogeyman  patronizes  the  dispositional  actor  by
highlighting  only  the  most salient  kinds  of situational  exercises  of
power  over  individuals,  calling  these  paternalism,  and  demanding
they  yield in  the  name  of the  freedom  that  is  assumed  otherwise  to
govern.  In  this  way,  the  paternalism  bogeyman,  like  the  others,
succeeds  against  our  argument  only  by  denying  what  social  science
teaches  (and markets reveal)  about the power of the unseen situation.
Shapiro,  for  example,  provides  a  vivid  but  profoundly
dispositionist  picture  when  he  "lay[s]  out  some  baselines"  for  the
724 study of paternalism.  Adopting the axiom  of "consent" as central  to
the  analysis,  Shapiro  discerns the quintessential  form of what he and
most  theorists  find  to  be  a  permissible  kind  of  paternalism-self-
paternalism. 72 5  The  guiding  figure here  is  Odysseus,  that hero  of the
disposition human journey, binding himself to the mast of his ship as
it passes  by the  Sirens, and instructing  his crew  that  they should not
726 untie  him no  matter  how  vigorously  he  demands  to  be unbound.
Odysseus  fears  his  future-self will,  if set free,  choose  to stay  forever
72,7 among  the beautiful,  seductive  voices  of the Sirens.  In  contrast to
this  permissible  "baseline"  of self-paternalism  is  an  even  more  vivid
dispositionist vision  of the sinister paternalism bogeyman-the  Grand
Inquisitor:
[T] he case  for a  claim  of weak paternalism  is itself weakened ...  when
the  asserted  incapacity  exists  on  a  question  of  basic  values  or
assumptions,  especially  (but  not  exclusively)  when  those  values  or
assumptions are  shared  by a large group of mature  adults.  The  Grand
Inquisitor who  is convinced  that the  souls of the  heretics can  be  saved
only if they are coerced  into  recanting  their heresy  may see  the  case  as
the quintessence of weak paternalism.  But I do not.v-
Shapiro accepts  as a premise that power can be exercised  to alter
people's  opinions  even  on  "basic  assumptions,"  but  this  power  is
pictured  as  a  salient  external  power,  in  the  figure  of  the  Grand
724  Shapiro, supra note 718, at 523.
725  Id. at 522-25.
726  HOMER,  THE  ODYSSEY  146-47  (Walter  Shewring  trans.,  Oxford  Univ.  Press
1980)  (n.d.).
727  Id.
728  Shapiro, supra note 718, at 529.
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Inquisitor. 7!"1  The  possibility  that  power  is  exercised  in  unseen  ways
over  "basic  assumptions"  is  not  even  imagined;  and  the  charge  of
paternalism  becomes  a  bulwark  against  examining  the  power
operating in  the formation  of those  assumptions.  If paternalism  is  a
troublesome  exercise  of  power  when  implemented  through  salient
situational influences,  then  critical  realism  suggests  that we ought  to
begin  our  analysis  at  exactly  the  place  where  Shapiro  places  the
bogeyman's barricades.  Put differently, if our  ambition  is  to foster a
world  in  which  people  are  encouraged  to  act  according  to  their
values, attitudes, and assumptions, then legal analysts need  to look far
deeper than just the obvious tip of the situational iceberg.
Further  examination  reveals  that  Shapiro's  conventional
"baselines"  are  the  product  not  of  analysis  or  theory,  but  of the
fundamental  attribution  error.  Defending his  decision  to  "embrace
,,130 the anti-paternalist position,  Shapiro falls  back,  as do so  many, on
intuitions and common  sense perceptions:  "on so basic a question  of
human relations I am not sure how feasible it is  to do more than chart
my  own  course.,,131  Indeed,  most  defenders  of  anti-paternalism,
Shapiro  admits,  have  offered  weak justification  for  their  urge  "to
defend  freedom  against  its  critics.,
7 3
1  In  charting  such  a  course,
Shapiro  argues,  "[e]ventually,  a  leap  of  faith  is  inevitable. 7 33   In
addition, the stakes in this  leap are  profoundly important, for "under
prevailing  community  standards,  the  paternalist  has  the  burden  of
persuasion .734
The  problem,  of  course,  is  that  the  prevailing  community
standards reflect a fundamental  flaw in human attributions,  a flaw that
appears to be greatly encouraged and enhanced by those who can best
influence our situation.  Thus, in  the name of avoiding obvious  (that
is,  paternalistic)  influences  on  people's  choices,  we  may be  turning
ourselves  over  to  less  obvious, but no less  powerful, influences.  Or,
put slightly differently, in  the name of protecting dispositionism from
729  Id.  Readers  will  no  doubt  be  reminded  that  the  same  salient  inquisitorial
power was actually present in the Galileo story.  See supra text accompanying notes  297-
301.
730  Shapiro, supra note 718, at 545.
73 Id. The metaphor of navigational charting may not be coincidence.  It implies
the  kind  of choice-contemplating,  choice-making  dispositional  figure  that  sets  the
"baselines"  of his  view  of paternalism  and  who,  like  Odysseus,  straps  himself  to  the
mast when anticipated  temptations loom.
732  Id. at 546.
733  Id.
734  Id. at 545.
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blatant situational  threats, we  may  be unleashing hidden, but deeply
captured,  situational  forces  that leave  us  feeling  as  though  we  chose
our lot.
Our purpose  here  is  not  to propose  or  defend  a  strong form  of
paternalism.  Indeed,  we  think  our  argument  would  demand  a
thorough  reconceptualization  of  such  conventional  categories
(strong-form  paternalism,  weak-form  paternalism,  self-paternalism,
and  so on)  before such a  discussion  could be fruitful.  What we are
arguing is that the charge of paternalism, as it is typically made, is  an
inadequate  response  to  the  claims  we  have  presented.  What  we
propose  is  a  more  realistic  exploration,  and  acceptance,  of  the
powerful  situational  influences  over  human  behavior  that  go  far
beyond  the  ropes of Odysseus  and the  fires  of the  Grand  Inquisitor.
When we yield in our inquiries  to the paternalism bogeyman,  we may
be yielding to  basic assumptions  that are  themselves  contestable  and
the  subject  of  powerful  situational  influences.  The  problem  of
paternalism  is  profound,  but  it  cannot  be  answered  with  the
conventional bogeyman response.
4.  Summary:  The Bogeypeople  as Response  to, and Creation of,
Threat
Some of the owner men were kind because they  hated what they had to  do, and
some of them were angry because they hated to be cruel, and some of them were cold
because they had long ago found that one could not be an owner unless one were
cold. And all of them were caught in something larger than themselves. Some of
them  hated the  mathematics that drove them,  and some  were afraid, and some
worshipped the mathematics because it provided a refuge from thought and from
feeling ....
-John  Steinbec
7 35
Although  there  are others,36  the  previous Sections  provide  a fair
sample  of the bogeypeople.  We are less interested  in providing a full
735  JOHN  STEINBECK,  THE  GRAPES  OF  WRATH  42-43  (Viking  Critical  Library  ed.
1972)  (1939).
736 Broadly speaking, virtually any human motive, we suspect, might be tapped into
in order to generate  a  bogeyperson.  For instance,  the human  motive  for closure,  see
Hanson  &  Yosifon,  supra note  30,  is  often  activated  by  those  who  seem  unwilling  to
take  "the  situation"  seriously  unless  its  precise  implications  for  policy  and  legal
doctrine  are made  explicit.  Similarly,  the motive  for  control,  see id.,  is  often  tapped
into by those who  assert that situational  causation  is  far more difficult to influence  in
predictable  ways.  (As  an aside, we  suspect that the  combined motives  for closure  and
control may help explain the fundamental attribution  error.)
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catalogue of the beasts  than we  are in  understanding what  motivates
them.  People  invoking the  bogeypeople  often  begin  by claiming  to
concede  that the  situation  can  have  an  immense,  unseen  effect  on
people's  conduct.  They  then  follow  that concession  with  a  gen-
eral  "so  what?"  or,  more  specifically,  with  the  invoking  of one
or more of the bogeypeople  to make  their  case  that it  is  better
to pay  no  more  attention  to the  situation  than  people  already
do.  Upon closer inspection, however,  this technique of responding is
better  seen  as  a  disarming  means  of  denying  our  basic  argument
about  the  power  of  the  situation.  It  is  not  surprising  that  our
audience  would  tend  to  disbelieve  our  claims.  Indeed,  it  is  to  be
expected-just  as  it  is  easy  to  understand  why  so  many  people
initially found Galileo's claims  to be fanciful.  Without the  telescope,
it was one person's claim against the  obvious.
We  do not  believe  that our  arguments  are  immune  to  critique.
We strongly suspect that they are in many ways  flawed.  But our worry
and  our  experience  is  that  they  are  not  given  a  chance  largely
because people  reject them because  they are  hard to see, and, more
importantly, because  they do not want to  see  them.  The  specter  of
the  bogeypeople  provides  a  mechanism  for  evading  the  situation.
Indeed,  we  suspect  that  one  major  reason  for  the  success  of
neoclassical  economics  and  disposition-driven  theories  of law  is  not
simply  that  they  are  good  for  business,  but  also  that  they  serve  to
protect us all from the disquieting possibilities  that many of our basic
systems are both harmful  and rigged.  With that possibility in mind, it
is illuminating  to consider Milgram's career.
After revealing,  to  his  own  surprise,  the  power  of the  unseen
situation,  Milgram's  findings  spawned  an  enormous  hullabaloo.  In
the words of Thomas Blass,  "more than  any other  research  in social
psychology,  the  obedience  experiments  have  been  embroiled  from
the beginning in a number of controversies in which  they have played
a central and enriching role.  These include the ethics of research,  the
social psychology of the psychological  experiment, and the deception
versus  role-playing  controversy.,
7 37  It seems  likely  that  much  of the
criticism found its source  in the  threat that Milgram's results posed to
the  notion  that these systems are just.  To defend against  that threat,
Milgram's  work had to be denied, challenged, and  minimized in  any
way possible.
737 Thomas  Blass,  Understanding  Behavior in the Milgram Obedience Experiment:  The
Role of Personality, Situations, and Their Interactions, 60 J.  PERSONALITY  &  SOC.  PSYCHOL.
398, 398 (1991)  (citations omitted).
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The  upset  generated  by  a  Milgram  ...  in  part  stems  from  ethical
concerns.  But another part of [his experiments']  power lies precisely in
their  demonstration  of  how  strong  situational  determinants  are  in
shaping behavior.  No resort to a correlation between  'those'  people who
do 'evil'  things is allowed:  the subjects were randomly assigned.
Despite his profound influence on psychology and the importance
of  his  work  to  the  fields  of  philosophy,  political  science,  and
education,  Milgram  was never granted tenure at Harvard.739  As  Blass
suggests,  "[s]ome  of  the  opposition  toward  Milgram  came  from
colleagues  who  felt  uneasy  about  him,  ascribing  to  him  certain
negative  properties  of the  obedience  experiment. "74
0  Focusing  on
Milgram's  protocol  may  well  have  been  a  cover  for  a  deeper
uneasiness about his findings, as well as, a means of de-legitimating his
work and, more importantly, legitimating our world.
There  is another, perhaps more  telling, means  of demonstrating
that those who  conjure  the bogeypeople  are,  perhaps  unconsciously,
denying or minimizing our claim.  Consider the likely reaction  to our
argument  if  we  were  describing  more  visible,  salient,  and  obvious
forms  of situational constraints.  Suppose,  for example,  that we were
writing  about antebellum  slavery.  It does  not seem  controversial  to
argue,  as  we  did,  that  slavery  placed  an  immense  and  unjust
situational  constraint  on  slaves,  or  that  slaves'  conduct-including
their singing--did not reveal  dispositional  consent to their fate.  We
do not believe  that the  situational bogeypeople  would be  invoked  in
response  to  those  claims.  Nobody  would  accuse  us  of  being
communists  for  arguing that  the  situation  of slaves  should  be  taken
seriously  or  that slavery  should  be  abolished.  There  is  no tendency
to  invoke  the  communist  bogeyman  in  that  context  because,  in
retrospect,  the  situational  constraints  that  caused  the  unequal
outcomes  are  clear.  If we  truly  accept  the  idea  that  the  situation
wields a  commanding  influence,  then  the  idea  of attending  to  that
influence seems obvious and unobjectionable.
Similarly,  the personal-responsibility  bogeyman  remains  dormant
when  the  situation  is  slavery.  It  should  be  remembered  that  slaves
exercised  some  freedom  under  slavery:  they  developed  their  own
738 Robert Helmreich et al.,  The Study of Small Groups, 24 ANN.  REv.  PSYCHOL.  337,
343 (1973).
739Thomas  Blass,  The  Man  Who  Shocked  the  World,  PSYCHOL.  TODAY,  Mar.-Apr.
2002,  at  72,  available at http://www.psychologytoday.com/htdocs/prod/proarticle/
pto-200203.
740  Id.  In  1967,  Milgram  was  given  full  professor  status  as  head  of  the  social
psychology program at the Graduate Center of the  City University of New York.
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cultural  patterns  and  practices;  they found  or created  items of value
to trade  and sometimes earned  money to  buy things;  they negotiated
in  various ways  with  their masters  for, among other  things, freedom
upon  their master's death;  they plotted and  executed escapes;  and  in
some  circumstances  they  bought  their  own  freedom.  So,  while
slaves undoubtedly  operated  under severe  situational constraints,
they  were  not without  recourse  to influence  their own  lives.  There
was  room  for disposition,  and  it undoubtedly  played  a role  in  their
experiences.
Yet  nobody  today  would  claim  that  slaves  should  have  taken
personal  responsibility  for  the  conditions  in  which  they  lived.
Frederick Douglass,  among others, bought his own  freedom,  and yet
we  do not blame  those  who  did not for their  predicament.  In such
cases,  the  situation  is  obvious,  and  personal  responsibility  lies  less
with  those  enslaved  by  it,  and  more  with  those  who  created  it.
Placing  personal  responsibility  on  the  slave  is  offensive.  When,  on
the  other hand, the situation  plays  a significant  role in the  lives  and
conditions  of  those  who  enjoy  "freedom"  (here  defined  as  "not
slaves"),  invocations  of Horatio  Alger and  the  personal responsibility
bogeymen emerge.  If we recognized  the full sweep  of the situational
influences  over our lives, we  might be  more hesitant with  the charge
of  "personal  responsibility,"  and  the  emergence  of  this  bogeyman
742 might be less automatic.
741  See,  e.g.,  IRA BERLIN,  GENERATIONS  OF CAPTvVIY:  A  HISTORY  OF AFRICAN-
AMERICAN  SLAVES  5  (2003)  (depicting  the  cultural  habits  and  beliefs  which
transformed  the experience  of slaves  into a  culture  which joined  them  together  as a
class);  FRIEDMAN,  supra note  36,  at  224-27  (discussing  the  family  life  and  rights  of
slaves);  GENOVESE,  supra note 666, passim (illuminating  the "world the slaves  made");
WALTERJOHNSON,  SOUL  BY SOUL,  LIFE  INSIDE  THE ANTEBELLUM  SLAVE  MARKET  63-77
(1999)  (commenting on the development  of a slave  community and the launching of
slave revolts).
742  This, of course, is  not to  say that we are all  slaves, or that the situational
constraints on  slaves  were  not more  dramatic  and severe than  those that surround  us
today.  It is,  however,  to suggest  that just as the  "personal  responsibility"  trope  loses
much of its  force when situational  constraints  are salient, we should  be  suspicious of
its use where  situational influences are less visible.
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CONCLUSION:  FACING OUR FEARS
"It  may be that we are puppets-puppets controlled by  the strings of society.  But
at  least  we  are puppets with  perception,  with  awareness.  And  perhaps  our
awareness is the first step to our liberation."
74
-Stanley  Milgram74
Man is the only government-making animal in the world.
-Frederick  Douglass
44
We  all got to figure.  There's some way  to  stop this.  It's not  like lightning or
earthquakes.  We've got a  bad thing made by  men, and by  God that's something
we can change.
-John Steinbeck
745
The inferno of the living is not something that will be; if there is one, it is what is
already here, the inferno that we  live every  day, that we form by  being together.
There are two ways to escape suffering it.  The first is easy for many:  accept the
inferno and become such a part of it that you  can no longer see it.  The second is
risky  and demands constant vigilance and apprehension:  seek  and learn  to
recognize who  and what, in  the midst of the inferno, are not inferno, then make
them endure,  give them space.'
-Italo  Calvino71
We understand  that  there  is  reason  to  be frightened  and to feel
threatened.  In fact,  that is  our point.  There  is  much  at stake.  But
to  thwart  the  real  dangers  of  the  situation-the  vulnerability  to
manipulation,  the  complex  legal,  social,  ethical,  and  personal
problems that it raises-we  should look beyond  the bogeypeople and
face our fears.
The  goal  of this Article  is  to  encourage  us  to take  seriously  the
situation.  We,  and  we  hope  others,  will  say  more  in  future  work
about  its  implications.  Regardless,  the  most important  implication
743 http://www.stanleymilgram.com/quotes.html  (attributing  quote  to  Stanley
Milgram).
44 Frederick  Douglass,  Appeal  to  Congress  for  Impartial  Suffrage  (Jan.  1867),
available at http://www.law.ou.edu/hist/suff.html.
745 STEINBECK,  supra note 735, 42-43.
746 ITALO CALVINO,  INVISIBLE CITIES 165  (William Weaver  trans., Harcourt & Brace
Jovanovich  1974).
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should  be evident:  there  is  not going  to be  a  salient, simple  policy
solution  to our predicament.  The belief or hope  that such  solutions
exist is a manifestation  of the problem-seeing  a  tiny portion  of what
is moving us and assuming that nothing else does.
The  problem  is  akin  to  another  problem  that  is  easier  to
imagine.  Who  was responsible for slavery  in this country?  Clearly,  it
was not the slaves.  Their situation was too vividly powerful-like a gun
to the head-to conclude otherwise.  The most  obvious  answer is  the
slavemaster,  and  for  good  reason.  Slavemasters  bought  and  sold
slaves,  controlled  slaves'  environments,  and  dictated-often  using
brutal  force-much  of  the  slaves'  conduct. 47  There  is  more,  how-
ever,  to  the  situation  than just the  most  prominent  actors.  Slavery
was,  among other things,  a social  system-a powerful  situation-that
was larger  than both  the slaves and  the masters.  Slavery was a  highly
profitable  industry,  not only for  the  South,  but also  for  the  North,
where  textile  mills,  for  example,  relied  on  the  availability  of cheap
cotton.  A plantation  owner who freed his  slaves would not only lose
the  economic  value  of his chattel  but also  the  ability  to produce  his
crops profitably.
Moreover,  freeing  slaves  was  illegal  in  some  states  and  highly
discouraged  by social  norms and conventions  in  all slave  states.7
4  In
that  and  countless  other  ways,  the  laws  and  the  customs  that slave
owners  lived  under were  highly  constraining.  But  those  situational
constraints  were  not, any more  than  the others,  a natural, inevitable,
or  even  random  circumstance.  The  situation  was  itself  the  conse-
quence  of a profitable  economic  system  that created institutions  and
individuals with an interest in maintaining it.
As  we have  described,  slave  owners  held  situationally  influenced
"knowledge"  and  beliefs  that  also  acted  to  reinforce  the  system
and justify their place  in it as powerful  as the  economic and social
forces  that they  faced.  As  we  indicated  above,  a freed  slave  was,  by
some  accounts, unhappy.  If a freed African slave  could not function
outside of the paternalistic  protection  of the "peculiar institution,"  or
if  they  would  almost  certainly  be  kidnapped  and  sold  again  into
slavery and perhaps  down  the river, or if, at best, "freedom" meant
laboring in the North where  the working  conditions were far worse,
how  could  a  plantation  owner-even  a  "social  welfare-maximizing"
plantation  owner-justify  freeing  his  slaves?  Furthermore,  if
747  HIGGINBOTHAM,  supra note 639, at 50-51,  201-02.
748 See GOODELL,  supra note 665, at 338.
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slaveowners  faced  the  threat that without  slavery  their  society
would  not  prosper  and  evolve,  then  the  emancipation  of slaves
might  come  at a  cost  to  freedom. 49  In  short,  slaves  were  not  the
only  people  who  were  subject  to  powerful  situational  influences.
Slaves,  their  owners,  and  their  shared  society,  were  all  deeply
captured.  So, who do we blame?
The point  is  that  this  may  be  the  wrong question.  Suppose  we
were  given  the  task of developing  a  means  of emancipating  African
Americans  from  slavery  and  the  many  situational  chains  that  have
hindered  them  since.  Suppose  that we  had  to accomplish  that end
without  the  horrors and  shame  of the  Civil  War, of Reconstruction,
of Jim  Crow,  of  segregation,  and  of  disparate  opportunities  and
outcomes that remain with us.  What would we  do?
Whatever  our  answer,  it won't be  simple,  and  it  will  require
gaining a better understanding of the situation.
749  See MCPHERSON,  supra note  682, at  56  ("'Indeed', said Senator  Robert  M.  T.
Hunter of Virginia, 'there  is  not a respectable  system  of civilization  known  to history
whose foundations were  not laid in the institution  of domestic slavery.'  'Instead  of an
evil,'  said John  C.  Calhoun  in  summing  up  the  southern  position,  slavery  was  'a
positive good..,  the most safe and stable basis for free institutions in  the world."').
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